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Dutch Companies in China, 1903-1941 
The well-known image of China as a huge market has tempted many foreign 
investors, and not only in recent years. Before World War II, China was known in 
the West as the land of the ‘four hundred million customers’.1 Foreign companies in 
China often encountered a great number of cultural, economic, and political hurdles, 
which were not easily overcome. Consequently, the process of becoming embedded 
in Chinese society has been a slow and difficult one. Large Dutch companies first 
learned how to do business in China in the decades immediately preceding World 
War II. They opened offices in China from 1903 and remained active until the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This year constitutes a watershed in the 
history of Sino-Western relations: after 1941 the Chinese market became largely 
inaccessible because of the Pacific War and the Cold War, and it took until 1979 
before China re-opened to foreign direct investment (FDI) from the West. 2  This 
study focuses on the direct investment activities of large Dutch companies in China 
between 1903 and 1941. 
Since the nineteenth century, many of the cultural and economic characteristics 
that have challenged foreign enterprises in China have remained basically the same. 
For instance, great cultural differences between regions and widespread poverty have 
always posed enormous challenges to firms wishing to sell foreign products in China. 
The nation’s political situation, however, has changed dramatically in the past one 
and a half centuries. In the course of the first half of the twentieth century, China 
transformed from a feudal society under imperial rule into a socialist society under 
communist leadership. This transformation involved a series of revolutions and 
protracted civil wars, and was accompanied by major foreign interference. Thus 
when Dutch firms first entered China, they had to adapt not only to unfamiliar 
market conditions, but also to frequent and unpredictable changes in their political 
environment. The nature of China’s political situation and the accelerated rate of 
change proliferated the number of potential political problems for foreign companies. 
Cultural and economic factors were impervious to foreign intervention, but in the 
political sphere a certain measure of pressure could be exerted by foreign 
governments. Attuned to this, the China policies of the major military powers were 
aimed specifically at removing political obstacles to their countries’ investments by 
interventionist actions. The Netherlands, however, as one of the smaller European 
powers, did not have the military strength to actively protect Dutch business interest 
in China.3 Therefore Dutch firms were likely to experience political problems more 
often than their rivals from stronger states. These other nationalities at least enjoyed a 
collective support against political problems that the Dutch lacked. The fact that 
several large Dutch firms were active in China during a period of major political 
                                                          
1 As was the title of a popular book written in 1936 by Carl Crow (published London 1937), a marketing 
and advertising man who had worked in China for several decades. World population at this time was 
roughly 2 billion. 
2  On Pearl Harbor as a turning point in China’s foreign relations: J. Osterhammel China und die 
Weltgesellschaft: Vom 18. Jahrhundert bis in unsere Zeit (München 1989), 323. 
3 F. Dankers, ‘Nederland en China, 1940-1950: De Hoofdlijnen van het Nederlandse Chinabeleid in 
Continuïteit en Verandering’ (unpublished MA thesis, Nijmegen University 1982); F. van Dongen, Tussen 
Neutraliteit en Imperialisme: De Nederlands-Chinese Betrekkingen van 1863 tot 1901 (Groningen 1966).  
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instability suggests that they may have developed methods to deal with political 
problems. This raises the question: what strategies did Dutch firms employ to 
overcome political obstacles in China?  
This question cannot be answered by relying on mainstream academic literature, 
which has virtually ignored the history of Dutch business activities in China. For 
instance, C.F. Remer’s 732-page standard work on foreign investment in China 
contains just one short paragraph on Dutch firms there. The only three companies he 
mentions are the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, the Nederlandsch-Indische 
Handelsbank, and the Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor Havenwerken—without 
actually mentioning the latter company by name.4 Other authors do not even pay 
attention to Dutch companies as a distinct category. In G.C. Allen and A.G. 
Donnithorne’s work on Western enterprise in East Asia, three Dutch firms—Royal 
Dutch, the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, and the Java-China-Japan Lijn—are 
mentioned or implicitly referred to, but without giving any significance to their 
nationality.5 Chi-ming Hou’s investigation into foreign investment in China contains 
no mention of Dutch firms, except for one footnote on the Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij.6 In Feuerwerker’s outline of the foreign presence in China, the only 
Dutch company mentioned is Royal Dutch.7 The same is true for Tien-yi Yang’s 
overview article ‘Foreign Business Activities and the Chinese Response, 1842-
1937’.8 Chinese-owned Dutch companies from the Netherlands Indies are omitted 
altogether. In these overview works only British, Japanese, American, German, 
French, and Russian companies are dealt with as distinct groups.  
There is an obvious explanation for the lack of interest in Dutch firms in 
mainstream literature: Dutch investments in China were always thought to have been 
extremely small. The most-cited estimates of the value of foreign investments in 
China are those by Remer and Hou. On the basis of data on China’s foreign debts 
and additional information supplied to him in 1931 by Dutch bankers and the 
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, Remer came to the conclusion that 
total Dutch investment in 1931 amounted to US$28.7 million, of which US$10 
million were direct investments and the remainder portfolio investments.9 For the 
decades preceding 1931 Remer could not did find data on Dutch investment, and 
therefore excluded them from his calculations of foreign investment in 1902 and in 
1914.10 In 1965 Chi-ming Hou accepted Remer’s estimate for 1931, but decided that 
Dutch investment both before (in 1902 and 1914) and after (in 1936) that year 
amounted to nothing.11 A more recent estimate by Tien-yi Yang comes to exactly the 
                                                          
4 C.F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York 1968), 656-658. 
5 G.C. Allen and A. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and 
Japan (London 1954), 99-101, 109, and 126 respectively. 
6 Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1937 (Cambridge MA 
1965), 242 n11. 
7 A. Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early Twentieth Century (Ann Arbor 
1976), 85. 
8  Osterhammel, Weltgesellschaft, 253; Tien-yi Yang, ‘Foreign Business Activities and the Chinese 
Response, 1842-1937’ in: Akio Okochi and Tadakatsu Inoue (eds), Overseas Business Activities: 
Proceedings of the Fuji Conference (Tokyo  1984), 234. 
9 Remer, Foreign Investments, 658. 
10 Ibid. 67. 
11 Hou, Foreign Investment, 17. 
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same figures as Hou. 12  Other publications which feature estimates on foreign 
investment in China before 1941 mention only the largest investing nationalities, and 
include Dutch investment into the ‘others’ category.13 Consequently the picture that 
emerges from the main reference works is that there were no Dutch investments in 
China before the 1920s or after 1931. The only figure available is the US$28.7 
million mentioned for 1931, a mere 0.9 per cent of total foreign investment in China 
in that year.14 Consequently, apart from a ninth position briefly occupied in around 
1930, the Netherlands was not even on the ranking list of investor countries in pre-
1941 China. As will be shown in the next chapter, this representation is not correct. 
Nevertheless, it explains the lack of attention paid to Dutch investments.  
Although not many data can be found in the main overview works on the history 
of foreign business in China, there does exist a small body of case studies on Dutch 
business involvement in China. These show that while Dutch investment may have 
been small in comparison to foreign investment in total, several large Dutch firms 
were active and owned assets in China throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century.15 The main evidence for this is provided by the unpublished MA thesis of P. 
Baart on Dutch companies in China between 1895 and 1949.16 Her work is unique in 
that it outlines which Dutch firms were active in China, what their main activities 
were, why they had come to China, and what their local market environment looked 
like. While it does not focus explicitly on strategies to deal with political problems, it 
provides a useful basis for further investigation. Apart from Baart no other author has 
attempted to combine analyses of various Dutch companies into a single piece of 
research. A general study on Sino-Dutch relations between 1900 and 1940—which 
would form a framework for case studies on political, economic, or cultural topics—
is lacking as yet. Only F. Dankers’ analysis of relations between the Netherlands and 
China during the 1940s contains a brief overview of bilateral—including 
economic—relations prior to 1940.17  
Besides Baart’s thesis there are also studies that concentrate on individual 
companies. An MA thesis by M. Groeneveld and an article by L. Blussé deal with 
the NSC, a railway construction firm, and I.J. Brugmans’ company history of the 
Java-China-Japan Lijn gives an outline of this shipping company’s interests in China. 
For Havenwerken there is an unpublished company history that supplies data on its 
activities in China.18  Besides these there is F.C. Gerretson’s company history of 
                                                          
12 Yang, ‘Foreign Business’, 217. 
13 Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise, 1954, 262; Osterhammel, Weltgesellschaft, 256. 
14 According to both Remer and Hou: Remer, Foreign Investments, 67; Hou, Foreign Investment, 17. 
15 See the next chapter for further information on these companies. 
16 P. Baart, ‘Aktiviteiten van het Nederlandse Bedrijfsleven in China, 1895-1949’ (unpublished MA 
thesis, Utrecht University1989). 
17 L. Blussé, Tribuut aan China: Vier Eeuwen Nederlands-Chinese Betrekkingen (Amsterdam 1989), 
148; Dankers, ‘China en Nederland’, 30-34. 
18 Respectively: M. Groeneveld, 'De Constructie van de Nederlandse Sectie van de Lung-Tsing-U-Hai-
Spoorweg, 1920-1925' (unpublished MA thesis; Leiden University 1994); L. Blussé, 'Theory and Practice 
of Railroad Building in China: The Cannibalization of the Lung-Hai Railroad, 1920-1925', Journal of the 
Japan-Netherlands Institute 6 (1996) 29-41; I.J. Brugmans, Van Chinavaart tot Oceaanvaart (Amsterdam 
1952); ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH. Brief overviews of the JCJL and Havenwerken can 
also be found in Blussé, Tribuut aan China, 166-168 and 168-171 respectively. 
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Royal Dutch up to the First World War. 19  His analysis of the strategy of this 
petroleum company towards China is excellent—albeit somewhat buried in a multi-
volume work that covers a very wide range of themes and territories—but does not 
touch the 1920s and 1930s. The latter period is covered by two publications that 
address the role of foreign petroleum companies in China. These works, by I. 
Anderson and J. Osterhammel, include detailed information on Royal Dutch/Shell.20 
However, the value of these publications for a study into Dutch corporate strategy is 
limited by the fact that both authors were interested primarily in the British minority 
parent firm of Royal Dutch/Shell, and interpreted the company’s behaviour mainly 
from the perspective of this British parent and that of the British government.  
Useful as these more specialised works are as a means to gain an insight into the 
market environment of various Dutch firms in China, they are not suitable for a 
detailed analysis of the attitude of these firms towards local political problems.21 
Only Anderson and Osterhammel focus explicitly on the political context of Royal 
Dutch/Shell’s activities, but do so without attempting to link this to its Dutch 
background. The Chinese interests and activities of some large Dutch companies 
outlined by Baart—the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, the Nederlandsch-
Indische Handelsbank, Philips, Unilever, Havenwerken—have received no attention 
whatsoever from other academic researchers. For an analysis of Dutch company 
behaviour in the context of Chinese political developments, new research into 
corporate archives and other sources is needed.  
 
Political Risk  
A starting point for the analysis of Dutch corporate strategies is provided by looking 
at what is known about the investment behaviour of firms from other Western 
nations. Allen and Donnithorne’s 1954 study is representative of most later Western-
language historiography on the development of Western firms in China.22 It sketches 
the basic features of the evolution of Western business presence since the Opium 
War of 1842. Allen and Donnithorne emphasise the strong concentration of foreign 
companies in the main open ports—the so-called treaty ports, including Hong 
Kong23—where they operated outside Chinese jurisdiction and were protected by 
foreign military power. The main ports, Shanghai and Hong Kong, were entirely 
open to foreign commercial activities and investment by any nationality. Foreign 
                                                          
19 F.C. Gerretson, History of the Royal Dutch (4 Vols.; Leiden 1958). The original version was published 
in Dutch in 1932-1941. The final version was published long after Gerretson's death in 1971-1973, and 
was edited and completed by G. Puchinger. This completed version did not contain new data on China.  
20 I.H. Anderson Jr, The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 
(Princeton and London 1975); and J. Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus im fernen Osten: Strukturen 
der Durchdringung und einheimischer Widerstand auf dem chinesischen Markt, 1932-1937 (Bochum 
1982). 
21 The works by Blussé and Groeneveld on the NSC do pay attention to political risks, but without 
making them their main point of attention. 
22 Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise. 
23 Hong Kong was not a port opened to foreign trade by treaty (i.e., a treaty port), but a port on territory 
that was ceded to Great Britain in 1842. Consequently it became a Crown Colony, which was open to 
international trade. From the perspective of Dutch firms, however, there was no important difference 
between British-ruled Hong Kong and the larger treaty ports (mainly Shanghai, Tianjin, Xiamen, Hankou, 
and Guangzhou), which were formally part of China but in practice under foreign administration and often 
under a strong British influence. In this text, the term ‘treaty ports’ is meant to include Hong Kong, unless 
specified otherwise. 
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companies focused on certain sectors such as mining, railway construction, industrial 
manufacturing, import and export trade, and areas closely related to China’s foreign 
trade such as banking, insurance, and shipping. Agriculture, handicraft production, 
and domestic trade remained largely untouched by foreign enterprise. In sectors that 
did attract foreign investment, such as industry and foreign trade, there often was a 
division between Chinese-dominated and foreign-dominated activities.  
Moreover, not only in terms of geographic location and activities but also 
organisationally, foreign business long remained separated from the rest of the 
Chinese economy. Western firms generally operated through Chinese middlemen—
compradores, agents, or contractors—who handled all contacts with Chinese 
suppliers and clients.24 Allen and Donnithorne mention several causes for the limited 
ability of foreign firms to penetrate deeply into the Chinese economy, such as their 
unfamiliarity with the social and commercial structure of China and the importance 
of personal relationships in Chinese business; the refusal by the Chinese government 
to accommodate foreign companies; the absence of local firms able to provide 
auxiliary services; and poor communications in the country’s interior.25 The result 
was that Chinese and Western entrepreneurs each had great difficulty in entering the 
other’s sectors. Only after 1900 did the distinction between the foreign and the 
indigenous sector gradually become less pronounced. This process was accelerated 
by the Guomindang (or ‘Nationalist’) government which came to power in 1928, and 
which pursued ‘an economic policy which showed no deference to the economic 
interests of foreigners’.26 
Allen and Donnithorne, as well as other authors,27 emphasise the enclave nature 
of the foreign business presence in China. Foreign companies were to a certain 
degree immune to political instability because their activities were largely separated 
from the rest of the country. However, during the early twentieth century the treaty 
ports were becoming more closely integrated into the rest of the Chinese economy. 
Therefore their ability to shield foreign firms from the effects of political—and 
ensuing economic—turbulence in China declined. The growing tendency after 1900 
of large foreign companies to invest outside the treaty ports and engage in activities 
related to China’s domestic trade and agriculture is confirmed in the detailed case 
studies by Sherman Cochran into the tobacco industry and Chang J. Ning into 
foreign-controlled up-country trade networks around Hankou (now part of the city of 
Wuhan) during the early twentieth century.28  
                                                          
24 Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise, 31-51. 
25 Ibid. 31-51 and 241-253. 
26 Ibid. 249. 
27 See for example, R.F. Dernberger 'The Role of the Foreigner in China's Economic Development, 1840-
1949' in: D.H. Perkins (ed), China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective (Stanford 1975), 33; Hou, 
Foreign Investment, 165-188; R. Murphy, ‘The Treaty Ports and China’s Modernisation’ in: M. Elvin and 
W. Skinner (eds), The Chinese City between Two Worlds (Stanford 1974), 65.  
28  S. Cochran, Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-1930 
(Cambridge MA and London 1980) and idem, ‘Commercial Penetration and Economic Imperialism in 
China: An American Cigarette Company’s Entrance into the Market’, in: E.R. May and J.K. Fairbank, 
America’s China Trade in Historical Perspective: The Chinese and American Performance (Cambridge 
MA 1986), 151-203; Chang J. Ning, ‘Sino-British Relations during 1910-30: A Case Study of British 
Business in Hankow’ (unpublished PhD dissertation; Cambridge University 1994) and idem, ‘New British 
Companies in China: The Case of International Export Company in Hankou, 1907-18’, Studies in Chinese 
History 8 (Dec. 1998), 29-63. 
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The growing number of firms that expanded their operations outside the protected 
treaty ports must have experienced an increase in political obstacles, especially when 
the abdication of the last emperor in 1912 was followed by decades of great political 
instability. Unfortunately very few scholars have addressed the question of how 
Western business responded to political obstacles during the first half of the 
twentieth century. An important exception is J. Osterhammel, whose doctoral 
dissertation provides a detailed investigation into the position of British business on 
the Chinese market from the late 1920s until the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 
1937.29 The British, together with the Japanese, were the largest direct investors in 
China, and were represented by giant companies such as the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corpration (HSBC); Jardine, Matheson and Company (hereafter ‘Jardine’); 
Butterfield and Swire (‘Swire’); the British-American Tobacco Company (BAT); 
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI); Union Cold Storage; Peking Syndicate; Chinese 
Engineering and Mining Company; Arnhold & Company; Sassoon; Lever Brothers; 
and Asiatic Petroleum Company (a British subsidiary of the Royal Dutch/Shell 
group). Osterhammel examines which obstacles these large British firms encountered 
on their way to conquer China’s markets.30  
He found that during the early 1930s an important shift took place in the 
perception of British corporations of their position in China. They considered two 
political developments to be highly relevant to their position in China. The first of 
these was that the British government was no longer capable of protecting British 
investments: Chinese popular and official resistance to foreign military and 
diplomatic interventions had become too strong by the late 1920s. The second 
development was that China’s political leaders were determined to push back foreign 
economic influence in China, and that these leaders were becoming strong enough to 
carry out such a policy. In response large British concerns attempted to protect 
themselves against the effects of anti-foreign nationalism—in their eyes the main 
cause of political threats—by forming an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek’s (Jiang 
Jieshi’s) Guomindang government. The Guomindang—China’s revolutionary 
Nationalist Party, also known as Kuomintang, KMT—was the strongest political 
power in China during the early and mid-1930s.31 By the mid-1930s Guomindang 
leaders and large British firms were co-operating in various fields.  
The type of companies to which this change in perception applied were those 
‘that saw their future not in hovering on the fringes of the China market, but in 
thoroughly penetrating it’.32 One example given by Osterhammel of co-operation 
was the government’s policy of taxing British-American Tobacco, the largest 
tobacco firm in China, less than competing Chinese producers. BAT rewarded the 
government for this privilege by agreeing to a higher overall tax rate and by paying 
                                                          
29 This dissertation was published as Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus. 
30 Cochran has also paid attention to the response of Western business to political change in China. But 
in contrast with Osterhammel, for him the main focus is not on the interaction between business and 
politics itself, but the issue of competition between foreign and Chinese companies: Cochran, Big 
Business. 
31 Ibid. 406. The arguments for this conclusion are repeated more explicitly and further elaborated in J. 
Osterhammel 'Imperialism in Transition: British Business and Chinese Authorities, 1932-1937', China 
Quarterly 98 (1984). 
32 Ibid. 286. 
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its tax in advance.33 Another case of co-operation was Chiang Kai-shek’s siding with 
the British mining firm Peking Syndicate in its conflict with local authorities in 
Henan (Honan) province, in return for the imposition of greater Chinese control on 
the exploitation of firm’s mining interests.34 Osterhammel also points at plans that 
were being developed by Swire, Jardine, ICI, and Chinese Engineering & Mining to 
transfer part of their operations to joint-ventures with the Chinese government and 
private Chinese investors. 35  He stresses that the motives behind such plans were 
primarily political, not economic. 36  This Sino-British co-operation was possible 
because both sides believed that their interests were compatible to a sufficient 
degree.37  
Osterhammel’s study covers the early and mid-1930s, but can also be used to 
obtain an idea of British business behaviour before and after this period. Allen and 
Donnithorne have shown that after circa 1900 foreign business became more 
involved in the Chinese economy. When civil war erupted in the late 1910s, foreign 
companies were exposed to violence and a breakdown of law and order in many 
parts of the country. Osterhammel’s finding that British business switched from 
British official support to Chinese official support after 1930, implies that from the 
mid-1910s until the late 1920s, British firms had relied on protection by the British 
government. In 1937, the Sino-Japanese War and the Japanese occupation 
undoubtedly produced new political risks for foreign investors, which could not be 
addressed by looking for support from the Chinese government. Nevertheless, it is 
not unlikely that British business maintained its strategy of the early 1930s and 
switched from co-operating with the Chinese government to establishing close 
relations with the Japanese in order to obtain political protection.38  
The work of Osterhammel provided for the first time an understanding of the 
behaviour of large foreign companies towards political events during the early 
twentieth century. His findings have recently been supported and elaborated by R. 
Bickers, who did not focus exclusively on companies but examined the wider British 
presence in China.39 Bickers has shown that by the 1930s large British firms were 
adapting to the demands and needs of the Chinese government, because British 
foreign policy was no longer capable of protecting British business interests through 
the traditional tools of imperialism—diplomacy, finance, and gunboats. The large 
companies believed that in the long run they could sustain their position in China 
only by taking into account the interests of the Chinese and approaching China on 
the same basis of equality that characterised relations among Western nations. Thus 
like Osterhammel, Bickers concluded that the large British firms looked for 
indigenous support in order to deal with the political changes that China was going 
through. Bickers also showed that this led not only to co-operative schemes with 
Chinese political and business elites, but to a general tendency to accommodate to 
                                                          
33 Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 365. 
34 Ibid. 381-382. 
35 Ibid. 387-406. 
36 Ibid. 406. 
37 Ibid. 423-424. 
38  One of the few exceptions is Anderson, Standard-Vacuum, which contains information on how 
Stanvac, Royal Dutch/Shell and Caltex experienced the 1937-1941 period in China. 
39 R. Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture, and Colonialism 1900-1949 (Manchester and New 
York 1999). 
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Chinese interests and popular sentiments. Another important contribution by Bickers 
was that he stressed that not all British firms followed the same strategy. The many 
companies that operated entirely within the foreign sectors of the treaty port 
economy—small and medium-size services and trading firms—preferred holding on 
to their extraterritorial status and the maintenance of British military protection in 
order to survive political changes in China. 
The information that is available on Western firms in general and British firms in 
particular suggests how Dutch companies may have dealt with political risks between 
1903 and 1941. There seems to be no problem with applying the conclusions of 
Allen and Donnithorne, Cochran, and Chang Ning to Dutch firms during the first 
years of the century. Like other Western companies, Dutch firms were initially 
largely immune to China’s political situation. They concentrated their investments in 
the treaty ports, which were open to all nationalities, and until circa 1916 the 
situation in China did not cause major political risks. In 1916 Yuan Shi-kai, who had 
been China’s president since the abdication of the last emperor in 1912, died. After 
his death the country was partitioned up between rivalling warlords, and from then 
onwards the experiences of British and Dutch firms diverged. From Osterhammel’s 
research it is known that British companies obtained protection from their 
government during the 1920s. Dutch investors did not have the same support. 
Although the Dutch government encouraged Dutch business activities in China,40 it 
rarely intervened directly in relations between Chinese authorities and Dutch 
businessmen. 
Research by F. van Dongen and F. Dankers has shown that from the late 
nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century the Netherlands kept a low profile in 
Chinese political affairs. The Dutch government did sometimes participate in 
collective military or diplomatic actions, such as during the Boxer War of 1900 and 
the ensuing peace negotiations, but refrained from confronting the Chinese 
government individually. The main worry of the Dutch government was that 
pursuing an active role in promoting Dutch business interests in China would limit its 
ability to isolate the large ethnic Chinese population of the Netherlands Indies from 
political influences from China. 41  Especially when nationalism developed into a 
force capable of mobilising large parts of the Chinese population for political 
activities during the 1910s, the Dutch colonial administration worried that anti-
Western political agitation would spread to its ethnic Chinese subjects. It feared that 
such a development would be encouraged by intervening in China’s internal affairs, 
which could focus the attention of Chinese public opinion on the problems of the 
Chinese in the Netherlands Indies. Moreover, apart from a small detachment of 
                                                          
40 Especially before the Chinese revolution of 1911. The main reason for the Dutch government to 
establish diplomatic relations with China in 1863 was the desire to stimulate Dutch trade with China. In the 
1880s the Dutch government supported attempts by Sumatran tobacco planters to obtain permission from 
the Chinese authorities to recruit contract labourers. In 1901-1905 it supported the entry of the NHM into 
the Shanghai bankers’ committee for the handling of the Boxer indemnity: F.P. van der Putten, ‘Small 
Powers and Imperialism: The Netherlands in China, 1886-1905’, Itinerario 20/1 (1996) 115-132. 
41 Dankers, ‘China en Nederland’. On the attempt to keep Chinese consuls out of the Netherlands Indies 
in order to limit the contact between overseas Chinese and Chinese government officials: Yen Ching-
hwang, Coolies and Mandarims: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ching Period, 
1851-1911 (Singapore 1985); and P. de Beukelaer, 'De Toelating van Chinese Consuls in Nederlands-
Indië: De Totstandkoming van de Nederlands-Chinese Conventie van 8 Mei 1911’ (unpublished MA 
thesis; Nijmegen University 1979). 
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marines to guard the legation in Beijing, the Netherlands did not have a permanent 
military presence in that country.42 With a policy aimed at avoiding attracting public 
attention and with no military power available, there was little the Dutch legation in 
Beijing could do to protect Dutch investments during times of war and upsurges of 
anti-foreign nationalism. The period of civil war between 1916 and 1928 must have 
caused problems for Dutch firms in China, from which they could not be protected 
by Dutch political power. It is likely that the companies developed alternative ways 
to protect themselves.  
                                                          
For the 1928-1937 period—the ‘Nanjing Decade’ when the country’s capital was 
in Nanjing—the findings of Osterhammel and Bickers relating to British companies 
seem applicable to Dutch firms. Here the main political threat was caused by popular 
and official anti-foreign activities stimulated by the rise of nationalism. The 
Guomindang government, itself a product of nationalism, provided British 
companies with protection against the more extreme effects of anti-foreign 
sentiments. Dutch business was in the same position and quite possibly it also 
responded by co-operating with the Chinese government. For the 1937-1941 period, 
finally, it is again unclear how Dutch or any other Western companies responded to 
political threats, but one distinct possibility is that they switched from co-operating 
with the Chinese government to accommodating themselves to the Japanese military 
in order to obtain political protection. 
This tentative and incomplete outline of Dutch corporate response toward its 
political environment will have to be tested and supplemented by detailed analyses of 
the experiences of Dutch firms throughout 1903-1941. Based on the foregoing 
information it may be assumed that after 1916 Dutch companies sought protection 
against the disruptions caused by political problems. Or, to be more exact, they 
looked for protection against the risk of an upsurge in political problems: firms base 
their strategy not only on the current situation but also on expectations of future 
developments and the assessment of future threats. The main political risks most 
likely were related to the civil war (between 1916 and 1928), Chinese anti-foreign 
nationalism (from 1928 until 1937), and Japanese imperialism (1937-1941). Before 
1916 political risk probably did not play a major role in the Dutch perception of the 
Chinese market. To answer the question of how Dutch business dealt with political 
risk in China, the first step will to be to verify whether this hypothesis is correct: did 
political risk play a subordinate role in corporate strategy before 1916, and were in 
1916-1928 the civil war, in 1928-1937 Chinese nationalism, and in 1937-1941 
Japanese imperialism the main causes of political risk? Provided that the hypothesis 
is correct, the main question can be broken down into three sub-questions. First, how 
did Dutch companies try to minimise the effects of China’s civil war between 1916 
and 1928? Second, did they accommodate to the interests of the Guomindang 
government or other powerful elements in the Chinese society between 1928 and 
42 A large part of central Beijing, the so-called Legation Quarter, was administered by a council of 
foreign diplomatic ministers. The Legation Quarter had its own 2075-men strong multinational defence 
force ('legation guards'). The Netherlands particpated in both the council and the defence. On the 
development of the Legation Quarter: Frans-Paul van der Putten, 'Diplomatieke Cultuur in de 
Gezantschapswijk van Beijing in de Late Negentiende en Vroege Twintigste Eeuw' in: P. van Kemseke 
(ed), Diplomatieke Cultuur (Leuven 2000), 157-172. 
INTRODUCTION 11 
1937? And third, did they accommodate to the interests of the Japanese military in 
1937-1941? 
 
Corporate Behaviour 
To answer these questions two basic approaches are possible: examining the attitude 
of Dutch firms collectively, or conducting a case study for each Dutch company 
separately. The first method, the collective approach, has been used by Osterhammel 
in his study on British firms, which is as yet the only example of an investigation that 
encompasses all companies of a single nationality. He defined a framework common 
to all British firms—consisting of activity, geographic, institutional, and national-
political characteristics—in which he positioned the experiences of individual 
companies. In a separate publication Osterhammel explains why he thinks that this 
collective approach can be used also for studies on American, French, German, 
Japanese, and Russian firms in early twentieth-century China.43 He argues that the 
companies of these nationalities formed ‘business systems’: they dealt with each 
other more intensely than with firms of other nationalities, in certain matters they 
acted collectively through national business associations, and they had close relations 
with a home government that had a large degree of political influence in China. This 
being the case, Osterhammel claims that this collective approach is not useful for 
nationalities that had too few firms in China to form an integrated whole, or that did 
not play a relevant political role in China. Leaving the question of how many Dutch 
firms were present in China and how strongly they were interconnected aside for the 
moment, the fact that the Netherlands was not a country with significant political 
influence in China is sufficient to indicate that according to Osterhammel’s criteria 
Dutch firms do not qualify for his business system approach. This does not mean that 
Dutch firms in China cannot be studied as a group, but it does show that according to 
Osterhammel the behaviour of a single British company or a group of British 
companies cannot be properly understood unless it is seen within the context of the 
British business and political presence in China as a whole. Because this 
precondition does not apply to the study of Dutch companies, these should not be 
analysed collectively.  
There is also a reason why a firm-by-firm approach is preferable regardless of 
which nationality it concerns. Osterhammel concluded that during the 1930s, British 
companies detached themselves from British government protection and tried to form 
co-operative arrangements with the Guomindang government. This means that from 
the late 1920s, the large British concerns gradually behaved less according to a 
national pattern and instead followed a more unique, individual pattern. Their British 
identity lost much of its relevance for their position in China. Therefore, for a follow-
up study to Osterhammel’s work on British firms in the 1930s, a firm-by-firm 
approach would probably be more effective than a collective analysis. With regard to 
the Dutch situation, this applies to the whole period up to 1941. There is no reason to 
assume that Dutch companies responded to political risks in a manner that was 
typical of their nationality, other than that they did not rely on their home 
government for political protection. It is therefore preferable to look at each company 
                                                          
43  J. Osterhammel 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a 
Framework of Analysis' in: Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds), Imperialism and After: 
Continuities and Discontinuities (London 1986), 290-314. 
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separately. Only afterwards can it be established whether a common tendency existed 
in the behaviour of Dutch firms.  
The firm-by-firm approach offers the opportunity to discover variations in the 
way Dutch firms responded to political risks. In order to explain the origin of these 
variations it is necessary to know the origin of corporate behaviour in general. The 
way in which a given company behaves is the result of the interaction between its 
environment and its interests. In this case the environment is the political condition 
of China; generally it was the same for each Dutch firm and forms the starting point 
of the analysis. Therefore the variations in Dutch company behaviour will have to be 
explained from corporate interests. Each firm has a unique interest profile, consisting 
of overall interests that apply to the entire organisation, and local interests, that apply 
only to its activities in China. It is these local interests that make it possible to make 
comparisons of foreign corporate behaviour in China. Every foreign company had a 
certain main interest in China. This could be, for instance, making a profit or 
enlarging sales output. It is assumed here that a firm’s main local interest provided its 
motive for responding in a certain way to changes in its local environment, such as 
the increase of political risks. To explain variations in the way Dutch reacted to 
political problems, this study will relate these variations to differences in main local 
interest. 
To identify what the main local interest for each company was, it is necessary to 
examine how its overall interests related to China. Therefore, the starting point of 
each case study is to use data from corporate archives and company histories to 
reconstruct its overall interests during the time it was active in China. It is possible to 
find out a firm’s overall interests by looking at which people controlled the firm and 
what their interests were. According to A.D. Chandler jr, there were two main 
variants of corporate control in Western companies in the early twentieth century.44 
The first variant was the more traditional one, in which a firm is controlled by its 
owners. They could be the persons who created the company, bankers, or people who 
purchased company shares on the stock market. The second variant came into 
existence only after 1870, and applies to firms that are being controlled by salaried 
managers, i.e., by people who were not major owners of the company.45 Chandler 
postulates that there is a fundamental difference in the behaviour of these two ideal 
types. Owners were interested primarily in matters for which the organisation was 
                                                          
44 A.D. Chandler Jr, 'The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism' in: Alfred D. Chandler Jr en 
Herman Daems (eds), Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern 
Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge MA and London 1980), 9-40; and A.D. Chandler Jr and H. Daems, 
‘Introduction’, ibid. 1-8. 
45 The reason why owners cannot always control a firm is that managers have more knowledge of what 
goes on in the organisation: Chandler, ‘Managerial Capitalism’, 12. Max Weber also pointed out that 
‘bureaucratic governance means rule by knowledge’: M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss 
der Verstehenden Soziologie (5th rev. ed.; Tübingen 1972), 129. Many firms were governed by a 
bureaucracy of managers (Chandler calls this a managerial hierarchy) because of their size, complex 
structure, and technologically advanced activities. The outcome of the historian Chandler’s ‘managerial 
revolution’, the rise to dominance of managerial hierarchies within firms, corresponds with the views of 
economist J.K. Galbraith on the power structure of twentieth century economic life. Galbraith introduced 
the term ‘technostructure’, which more or less refers to the same concept as managerial hierarchy, but 
rather than focus on the development within companies he singled out on the dominant position in Western 
economies of large, manager-controlled organisations. By doing this he supported Chandler’s notion that 
there is a close relationship between corporate behaviour and corporate structure. J.K. Galbraith, 
Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston 1973). 
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merely a tool—usually this was profit, but it also may have been performing a certain 
economic task. Because they directed their company with the aim of achieving their 
own interest, this became also the company’s main overall interest. Managers, 
however, were not primarily interested in maximising the firm’s profits, as dividends 
went not to them but to the owners. Instead their ‘basic objective was to keep their 
organisation profitably employed; they did so by increasing the speed and volume of 
their activities and by internalising more units or processes’.46 Thus it can be said 
that their interest—for the duration of their employment by the company—was not so 
much producing a profit but expanding the company, because this corresponded with 
their career interest. In Chandler’s view, all managers in a large company put 
together formed a ‘managerial hierarchy’, they functioned as intermediaries between 
the owners on the one hand and the company’s workers, customers, and suppliers on 
the other. The two types of firms described by him were ideal types; in reality 
companies often were partly controlled by owners and partly by managers. 
Moreover, some owners—such as the firm’s founding father or his descendants—
may have been interested mainly in growth rather than dividends. Nevertheless, 
when account is taken of the fact that a firm’s main overall interest may be a mixture 
of managerial and ownership interests, and that owners and managers sometimes 
have the same interests, Chandler’s model is a very useful analytical tool. 
Once a firm’s main overall interest has been reconstructed—growth, profit, a 
specific economic task, or a mixture—the second step in each case study is to 
examine how these related to China as a host country. This can be based on data 
from corporate archives, company histories, and publications on relevant economic 
sectors in China. This second step in the analysis—which amounts to a 
reconstruction of its assessment of the market—will reveal a firm’s main local 
interest. It could again be profit, growth, a commercial task, or a mixture, but it was 
not necessarily the same as the company’s overall interest. The third step of each 
case study is to make an analysis of which political risks its encountered in China 
and how it responded to them. This analysis can be made on the basis of data from 
corporate archives, relevant government archives, and publications on political 
situation in China. The perspective to be used is that of the persons who controlled 
the firm. This means that the data are produced at the corporate centre, rather than in 
China itself. Consequently this study contains little local-level information on 
conditions at specific sites or localities in China. This third step should be aimed at 
testing the hypothesis and answering the three sub-questions mentioned in the 
previous section. Moreover, its outcome should relate explicitly to the company’s 
main local interest, in order not just to describe corporate strategies but to also 
explain them. Finally, after a three-step case study has been made of each of the 
Dutch firms, a concluding comparison can be made of the various ways in which 
they responded to political risks in China, in order to establish which elements were 
common to all Dutch firms. By relating behavioural variations to differences in main 
local interest, hopefully it will be possible to explain why some companies responded 
differently than others to certain political risks. 
 
                                                          
46 Chandler, ‘Managerial Capitalism’, 12. 
CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR AND POLITICAL RISK 14 
                                                          
There are two important limitations to this research project. In the first place, its 
scope entails only companies that were incorporated as Dutch and controlled from 
the Netherlands. Legally firms in China that were controlled from the Netherlands 
Indies, which were usually owned by overseas Chinese living in Java, were also 
Dutch companies. However, Chinese-owned firms perceived the political situation in 
China from a perspective that was fundamentally different from Dutch-owned 
companies. This was largely the result of the fact that overseas Chinese were not 
regarded as foreigners by the Chinese government or public, nor did the Dutch 
government consider overseas Chinese investments in China to be Dutch economic 
interests. The aim of this study is to investigate the response of a group of foreign 
companies towards political change in an environment that is culturally unfamiliar. 
Being foreign and being regarded as such are key elements that were largely absent 
in the case of Chinese-owned Dutch companies. In the second place, this 
investigation excludes small firms. Apart from the large enterprises that will be 
introduced in the following chapter, there was an unknown number of small Dutch 
companies present in China. The main reason why they are ignored in this study is 
that most of them were too small to have left sufficient traces of their past for a 
detailed analysis.47 
47 The only larger Dutch companies with direct investments in China that were controlled from Europe 
and that are not included in this study were the Deutsch-Niederländische Telegraphen Gesellschaft, which 
was controlled from Germany, and the two trading firms Holland-China Handelscompagnie (from 1903) 
and Transmarina (1918-1927). The latter traded in all parts of the world, but remained smaller than the 
HCHC in China, and after only nine years it closed down in China. The HCHC was active only in China 
and the oldest Dutch trading firm there. Unfortunately neither its main shareholders M. & R. de Monchy 
and the NHM, nor its later parent Internatio have retained HCHC company archives. There were other 
Dutch firms with FDI in China, but they were very small and often not controlled from Europe. For a full 
list of Dutch companies that were present or represented in China: Baart, ‘Aktiviteiten’, appendix. For 
some basic information on some of the smaller Dutch (trading and insurance) firms in China: ibid. 159-
170. 

  
CHAPTER 1  
 
DUTCH INVESTMENT IN CHINA 
 
There are two basic types of investment: portfolio investment and direct investment. 
Dutch portfolio investments in China were made primarily through the purchase of 
Chinese government bonds that were issued in the Netherlands.48 In 1931 Dutch 
portfolio investments in China amounted to US$ 18.7 million. The larger part of this 
amount consisted of ƒ31.75 million worth of Longhai railway bonds that were owned 
by Dutch investors plus ƒ13.53 million worth of interest in arrears (by 1931), 
together a sum of ƒ45.28 million or $18.2 million. In addition to the Longhai debt 
there was a smaller obligation of the Chinese government to Dutch investors which 
amounted to half a million US dollars.49 By itself, the ownership of these bonds did 
not enable the holders to play an active role in the Chinese economy. Bondholders 
were entitled to the sum they invested plus a certain rate of interest, payable by the 
Chinese government in regular instalments. As will be seen in the chapter on the 
NSC, some Dutch bondholders were banks that also invested directly in China. 
When China declined to fulfil its obligation to these bondholders, they actively tried 
to find alternative ways to get their money back. Nevertheless, their role as 
bondholders was fundamentally a passive one and when they were active within 
China, this was only possible because they happened to be also direct investors.  
As this investigation is concerned with the behaviour of Dutch firms that were 
physically present in China, direct investments (FDI) are more important. FDI, like 
portfolio investments, generate income for the investor. However, the crucial 
difference is that FDI involves control by the investor. In other words, the Dutch 
companies that owned FDI in China played an active role in the local economy 
because they managed these assets—buildings, land, supplies, machines, but also 
people—directly. Political risks affected portfolio and direct investments alike, but 
while portfolio investors could do little once they had made their investments, direct 
investors continued to manage their investments, and were better capable of adapting 
to such change. For instance, they could move the location of their assets to another 
part of China, or they could enter into a joint-venture with other investors, or they 
could move into another market segment; all this with the aim of maximising 
opportunities or minimising damage.  
In 1931 the estimated value of Dutch direct investment in China was $35.5 
million. According to C.F. Remer this was only $10 million,50 but he regarded the 
investments by Royal Dutch/Shell and Unilever as British. His practice is not 
followed here. In this study the assets of Royal Dutch/Shell are considered to be 
Dutch because a Dutch parent company (Royal Dutch) had majority voting rights for 
their control. The value of Unilever investments is regarded here as half Dutch and 
half British, because their control was shared equally between a Dutch company 
                                                          
48 In 1930 the Netherlands was the seventh largest creditor country to the Chinese government, and the 
fourth largest (after Japan, Britain, and Belgium) creditor with respect to Chinese railway obligations: 
Remer, Foreign Investments, 135 and 143 
49 Ibid. 657. 
50 Ibid. 658. 
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(Unilever NV) and a British company (Unilever Ltd). The value of investments by 
Royal Dutch can be based on existing estimates for Standard Oil Company of New 
York, whose investments mirrored those by Royal Dutch/Shell. Wilkins estimated 
Standard’s 1914 investments at $20 million, while in 1929 the US Department of 
Commerce estimated that the total US oil investments in China amounted to $42.8 
million.51 Virtually this entire amount was accounted for by Standard and The Texas 
Company, the former being the larger party. A cautious estimate for Standard in 
1931 would be $25 million. The figure of $25 million for Royal Dutch/Shell seems 
plausible: its investments in the Yangzi (Chang Jiang) provinces (where most storage 
and shipping facilities were located) in the mid-1920s are known to have amounted 
to about £3.5 million or $17 million.52 The figure for the investments by Unilever 
can be based on a 1940 company record, which values the company’s Chinese 
investments in December 1939 at £196,000. Of this £189,000 was invested in the 
soap business.53 The 1939 assets and stock for the soap business were probably not 
fundamentally larger than those of eight years earlier. An estimate for the total value 
of Unilever’s investments in China in 1931 would be £175,000, or $964,000. 
Because Unilever NV had a 50 per cent interest in Unilever, its investment in China 
probably amounted to some $482,000. Therefore if the investments by Royal Dutch 
and Unilever NV are added to Remer’s figure the new total for Dutch FDI becomes 
$35.5 million. The principal aim of this chapter is to present an outline of Dutch 
direct investments and the companies that were responsible for it. The main 
characteristics are the relative size of Dutch FDI, the moment of entry, the main 
activities, the geographic presence, the institutional background, and the linkages 
with the Chinese business environment.54 
A look at the relative size of Dutch FDI in China shows that this was a relatively 
moderate figure. In the first place, in terms of Dutch FDI world-wide this represented 
a share of some 2.6 per cent.55 If the very considerable Dutch direct investments in 
the Netherlands Indies were counted as FDI, the share of FDI in China would be far 
lower.56 Nonetheless, the bulk of Dutch FDI was located in Western countries—the 
US alone accounted for 38 per cent in 1938—and China was one of the larger hosts 
to Dutch FDI in the non-Western world outside the Netherlands Indies.57 This is not 
                                                          
51  M. Wilkins, ‘The Impacts of American Multinational Enterprise on American-Chinese Economic 
Relations, 1786-1949’ in: E.R. May and J.K. Fairbank, America’s China Trade in Historical Perspective: 
The Chinese and American Performance (Cambridge MA 1986), 264; Remer, Foreign Investments, 310. 
52 APC London to British Foreign Office 17 Jan. 1927, PRO London, FO 371, 12431, F471. 
53 ‘Mr J.L. Heyworth visit report China and Japan 1940, Unilever Rotterdam, DIR 18, 325.1. 
54 This approach is based mainly on Osterhammel, ‘Informal Empire’, but it does not include the political 
dimension of intervention mechanisms that was irrelevant in the Dutch case. 
55 In 1938 the amount of Dutch direct investments world-wide was circa $1 billion, which meant that FDI 
in China accounted for at least 3.6 per cent of all Dutch FDI—assuming that the 1931 figure of total Dutch 
FDI was not below the 1938 figure: F. de Goey, 'Dutch Overseas Investment in the Very Long Run (c. 
1600-1990)’ in: Roger van Hoesel and Rajneesh Narula (eds), Multinational Enterprises from the 
Netherlands (London 1999), 49. He included direct investments in the Netherlands Indies in the total FDI 
figure. The $1 billion does not include direct foreign investments by Chinese living in the Netherlands 
Indies, because the value of these is unknown. 
56 In 1938 the Netherlands Indies, under Dutch administration and therefore not regarded as foreign in 
this study, were host to some $1.6 billion—far in excess of all Dutch FDI combined: ibid. 
57 Regarding the relationship between Dutch FDI and political climate in general, the world (between the 
late nineteenth century and the 1930s) can be divided into the West plus its colonies on the one hand and 
the remainder of the non-Western world on the other hand. The first group was generally politically open 
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surprising, as according to some estimates China was the largest recipient of FDI in 
the non-Western world.58 In the second place, the Dutch direct investment of $35.5 
million represented 1.5 per cent of all FDI in China in 1931.59 This made the Dutch 
the seventh-largest foreign direct investors in China. About three-quarters of FDI in 
China was owned in more or less equal shares by British and Japanese investors. The 
remaining quarter was divided between a large number of nationalities, of which the 
US, the USSR, France, and Germany had a larger share than the Dutch. Of the 
remaining investing countries, the Belgian share was about equal to that of the 
Dutch, and the Italian, Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian shares were smaller.  
In terms of their moment of entry into China, Dutch companies entered the 
country relatively late—apart from the notable exception of the Dutch East India 
Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC). The development of 
Western FDI in China, the period prior to 1941 may be divided into four phases. The 
first phase began with the establishment of a Portuguese trading post in Macao about 
1557. During this phase the Portuguese were the only Westerners who were allowed 
by the Chinese government to run a trading establishment in the Chinese empire. The 
second phase began in 1715 when the British chartered trading company for Asia, 
the East India Company (EIC), opened a ‘factory’ or branch office in Guangzhou 
(Canton). During this phase China allowed several Western companies to also 
establish branches in Guangzhou, but kept all other ports closed to Western 
merchants.60 The third phase began in 1842, when Britain defeated China in the 
Opium War and consequently forced China to open an increasing number of places 
to foreign trading activities. During this phase mainly British, but also American, 
German, and other foreign trading firms established themselves in Chinese ports. The 
fourth phase began in 1895, when Japan defeated China in the first Sino-Japanese 
war and forced China to allow foreigners to engage in industrial production in China. 
After 1895 the number of foreign companies in China grew rapidly. 
Dutch FDI in China took place only in the second and fourth phases. The first 
Dutch FDI in China was made in 1762 when the VOC established a branch office in 
                                                                                                                                          
and stable, whereas the second group was also politically open (the USSR being an important exception 
from ca 1920, in the 1930s joined by Japan and to a lesser extent Mexico) but less stable. China was a 
prominent representative of this second group: it was its largest host of FDI, it was politically very open, 
and also very unstable.  
58 In 1930 China was host to some $2.3 billions worth of FDI. This was 8.8 per cent of the figure for the 
world’s total FDI in 1938; China’s share was probably larger in 1930: G. Jones, The Evolution of 
International Business: An Introduction (London 1996), 42. The worldwide total used by Jones for 1938 
includes also colonial investments, and therefore should be lower in the present context. This is another 
reason why in 1930 China probably hosted more than 8.8 per cent of all FDI.   
59  In 1930 the value of all foreign FDI in China combined was some $2.3 billion: Osterhammel, 
Weltgesellschaft, 256. Remer’s estimate for 1931 was $2.5 billion: Remer, Foreign Investments, 69. Mira 
Wilkins only came to $350 million for 1929: M. Wilkins, ‘Hosts to Transnational Investments: A 
Comparative Analysis’ in: Hans Pohl (ed), Transnational Investment from the 19th Century to the Present 
(Stuttgart 1994), 46. It is not entirely clear why her figure is so dramatically lower than those of 
Osterhammel and Remer. One reason why Wilkins’s estimate is too low is that she excluded direct 
investments by foreigners living permanently in China. Foreign firms controlled from within China were 
usually located in Shanghai’s International Settlement, outside Chinese administrative reach and therefore 
regarded as foreign in this study. On the other hand, investments by foreigners in Hong Kong, the 
International Settlement or other concessions are regarded as investments in the Chinese economy.  
60 The foreign direct investment consisted mainly of rented buildings and the stock kept in them.  
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Guangzhou—following the example of the EIC.61 At this time, the VOC was the 
world’s largest shipping and trading company.62 Through its Guangzhou office, it 
purchased tea for the European market. In the latter half of the eighteenth century the 
company ran into financial difficulties and was liquidated in 1799. Its large Asian 
possessions subsequently were administered by the Dutch government, which later 
transferred the Guangzhou office to the care of Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij. 
After the Napoleonic wars Dutch trade with China did not regain its former 
importance and when the Guangzhou branch office was destroyed during the Opium 
War, the NHM declined to rebuild it. During the third phase in the development of 
FDI in China (1842-1895) there was no significant Dutch investment in China.63 
During this period British investors became very active along the Chinese coast. 
British trading firms like Jardine and Swire established themselves in cities like 
Hong Kong and Shanghai, and gradually diversified into activities such as coastal 
shipping and sugar refining. To finance such activities, British bankers also became 
active in China. Dutch private enterprise developed rapidly in the Netherlands Indies 
from the 1870s, but did not turn its attention to China until after 1895.64 Until that 
time several Dutch firms, mainly colonial enterprises, were represented in China 
through German trading companies that acted as their agent.65 
The first major Dutch investment in China since the days of the VOC was made 
in 1897, when Royal Dutch built large oil storage tanks in Shanghai and Hong Kong. 
In the following year installations were built also in six other Chinese cities. Its 
large-scale entry into the Chinese oil trade stands in marked contrast to the 
disinterested Dutch attitude prior to 1897. Yet these investments cannot be regarded 
as FDI because they were not controlled by Royal Dutch. The oil tanks were 
operated by the German firm E. Meyer & Company, that sold the oil to Chinese 
distributors on behalf of the Dutch company. It was also around 1897 that Dutch FDI 
first appeared in China, albeit on a small scale. At the end of the 1890s there were 
                                                          
61Large parts of Formosa (Taiwan) were controlled by the VOC during 1624-1661. However, during this 
time Formosa was not yet part of China: Van Dongen, Neutraliteit en Imperialisme, 16-19. After 1762, an 
office subordinate to the one in Guangzhou was maintained in Macao. 
62 Osterhammel, Weltgesellschaft, 117. 
63 No clear explanation exists for the near complete absence of Dutch economic activity in China before 
1896. Two developments that at first sight seem to have been relevant are the fact that the Netherlands 
industrialised only after the middle of the nineteenth century—later than in the other Western European 
countries—and that private business activities in the Netherlands Indies were only encouraged after 1870 
by the Dutch government. Apparently there were few incentives or organisational capacities to invest in 
Asia before industrialisation, and when this changed during the second half of the nineteenth century the 
new opportunities in the Netherlands Indies may have initially absorbed all available Dutch capital. 
Brugmans and Blussé both believe that business opportunities in Southeast Asia were so attractive that 
China was neglected: Blussé,  'Cannibalization’, 34; Brugmans, Chinavaart, 14 and 17.  
64 On the state of Sino-Dutch economic relations at the close of the nineteenth century see E. Heldring, 
Oost-Azië en Indië: Beschouwingen en Schetsen (Amsterdam 1899). 
65 Between circa 1870 and 1895, the main Dutch economic interest in China was the recruitment of 
contract (‘coolie’) labourers for the tobacco plantations in Deli, Northeast Sumatra. Initially the Chinese 
government refused direct contracting for Deli, and the tobacco planters had to contract their Chinese 
labour indirectly in the British Straits Settlements. However, in the 1880s German trading and shipping 
firms obtained permission from the Chinese authorities to recruit labourers in South China and ship them 
directly to Deli. The Deli tobacco planters left this task to the Germans—rather than doing it for 
themselves—mainly because it were German consuls who had secured permission for labour recruitment. 
Dutch official representatives had tried to do the same but failed: Van der Putten, ‘Small Powers and 
Imperialism’. 
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three Dutch trading firms in Shanghai and Hong Kong: Hotz, s’Jacob & Co., the 
Holland China-Syndicaat (HCS), and J.L. van Laer & Co.66 After the turn of the 
century other Dutch direct investors gradually became active in China. The first large 
Dutch firms established themselves in China in the decade 1903-1912, a second 
group followed after the First World War in the period 1920-1930. There were no 
major new entries during the 1930s.  
Turning to the type of activities of Dutch firms after 1902, they were involved in 
banking, shipping, construction, production, and distribution. In banking there were 
two Dutch firms present in China: the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM) 
and the Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank (NIHB), both were active in financing 
trade between China and the Netherlands Indies. The main Dutch shipping firm 
active in Chinese waters was the Java-China-Japan Lijn (JCJL) which linked several 
Chinese ports to Japan and the Netherlands Indies. The two Dutch construction 
companies in China were the Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor Havenwerken, active 
in harbour works, and the Nederlandsch Syndicaat voor China (NSC) which engaged 
in railway construction.67 Two Dutch firms had production facilities in China: Royal 
Dutch/Shell for candles and Unilever for soap and food. With Philips the same two 
companies were also the main Dutch distributing companies in China. These eight 
companies were responsible for nearly all Dutch FDI in China. Of the firms that were 
controlled from the Netherlands, they were the only eight whose activities went 
beyond importing and exporting and were therefore possibly open to political risks in 
a direct way. 
As will be shown in the following chapters, relations among these eight 
companies were tight in the case of the banks, the shipping line, and the construction 
firms. Some of these held shares in other companies, and frequently managing and 
supervisory board members combined functions in several firms. Sometimes the 
firms also worked together in China. By contrast the three distributing companies 
had few relations with Dutch firms in China. In the early 1920s a China association 
(Nederlandsch-Chineesche Vereniging) was founded in the Netherlands which aimed 
at creating a greater understanding of China among Dutch students, businessmen, 
and politicians. It concentrated on spreading cultural, economic, and political 
information by organising meetings and publishing a journal. This was also the time 
that a Dutch chamber of commerce was established in Shanghai to represent Dutch 
firms active in that city.68 However, the number of Dutch firms in China was small, 
and the interests of most were not located exclusively in that country. As a result of 
this and the close ties already existing between many Dutch companies in Asia, a 
political lobbying organisation to represent all Dutch business interests in China 
never saw the light of day. 
The concentration of Dutch FDI in the services sector was common to foreign 
companies in China. Only a few foreign firms in China were active in natural 
resources; these were mainly interested in iron ore mining (Japanese), coal mining 
                                                          
66 According to Van Dongen, Hotz s’Jacob opened an office in Shanghai in 1898, by which time it 
already had been operating an office in Hong Kong for several years. The HCS was established in 1896 by 
the Rotterdam trading house M. & R. de Monchy. Van Laer was active only in Shanghai: Van Dongen, 
Neutraliteit en Imperialisme, 221-222. 
67 The NSC itself represented a large number of Dutch companies that held shares in it. 
68 Baart , ‘Aktiviteiten’, 40-41. 
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(Japanese and British), tobacco cultivation (British), and the purchase of meat and 
eggs (British). Foreign involvement in industry was limited to a relatively small 
number of activities, mainly cotton spinning (British and Japanese), sugar refining 
(British), cigarette manufacturing (British and Japanese), electric light bulb 
manufacturing (American), soap manufacturing (British), vegetable oil 
manufacturing (Japanese and British), and the woollen industry (British and 
Japanese). The only heavy industry in China was the Japanese steel production site in 
Anshan, Manchuria. Unlike resources and industry, the foreign services sector in 
China was very diverse and cannot easily be outlined. Some national specialities may 
be indicated: British firms were dominant in shipping and banking, and prominent in 
trade and railway management; German firms were prominent in trade; Japanese 
firms were prominent in trade, shipping, and railway management; American firms 
were strong in public utilities; French and Russian firms were very active in railway 
management; and Belgian firms in railway construction.  
Two notable characteristics of Dutch business activity in China were the 
involvement in hydraulic engineering and the prominent role of trade with the 
Netherlands Indies. In the first place, hydraulic engineering—building and 
improving harbours and waterways—was considered by many Dutch entrepreneurs 
to constitute the competitive advantage for Dutch business. Dutch engineers had 
gained considerable experience with harbour construction and dike building in the 
Netherlands, and during the late nineteenth century several Dutch engineers were 
active in various European countries and also in Japan, which boosted the reputation 
for Dutch hydraulic engineering technology. After 1900 the largest foreign harbour 
works firm in China was Dutch, and a number of Dutch hydraulic engineers worked 
in China as advisors to the Chinese government. In the second place, Dutch firms 
were heavily involved in trade between China and the Netherlands Indies. They were 
especially dominant in financing and shipping, and in the distribution of Netherlands 
Indies petroleum products. The first large Dutch companies that invested in China 
did so to support their trade interests in Southeast Asia. Apart from large Dutch-
controlled companies, firms run by Netherlands Indies Chinese also played an 
important role in this trade. In spite of China’s reputation for having little use for 
foreign goods, the main trade between the Netherlands Indies and China consisted of 
exports to China. In particular unrefined sugar and refined petroleum were imported 
by China, followed to a lesser extent by rattan and foods.69 Chinese products going 
to the Dutch colony were mainly silk, tobacco products, tea, and rice. Trade between 
the Netherlands itself and China consisted largely of raw materials exported from 
China via non-Dutch firms and did not directly lead to Dutch FDI. The Netherlands 
imported mainly soya beans, peanuts, and vegetable oils—part of which was 
probably re-exported to Germany. Least significant in Dutch-Chinese trade were 
exports from the Netherlands, which consisted of dyes and other chemicals, dairy 
products, and flour.  
 
                                                          
69 Dankers, ‘China en Nederland’, 32-33. On exports from Java to China around 1900 see also J.A.M. 
Caldwell, 'Indonesian Export and Production from the Decline of the Culture System to the First World 
War', in: C.D. Cowan (ed), The Economic Development of South-East Asia: Studies in Economic History 
and Political Economy (London 1964), 72-101. 
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Table I. Value in millions of guilders and percentage of total exports/imports of the 
Netherlands Indies and the Netherlands respectively to/from China (including Hong Kong), 
1909-1938. 
 
 1909 1920 1928 1938 
Netherlands Indies   
     to China: 43.3 (9.8%) 168.9 (7.5%) 111.0 (6.8%) 22.9 (3.4%) 
     from China: 12.3 (4.8%) 39.3 (3.5%) 25.0 (2.6%) 14.6 (3.0%) 
Netherlands   
     to China:  - 8.8 (0.4%) 3.5 (0.3%) 
     from China: - - 13.8 (0.5%) 18.5 (0.8%)a 
 
Source: F. Dankers, 'Nederland en China, 1940-1950: De Hoofdlijnen van het Nederlandse Chinabeleid in 
Continuiteit en Verandering’ (unpublished MA thesis; Nijmegen University 1982), 32-33. 
 a Imports from China in 1938 include ƒ10.9 million worth of goods from Japanese Manchukuo. 
  
In the matter of their geographic location, most foreign companies of whatsoever 
nationality established their local head office in Shanghai, and Dutch firms did 
likewise. The main difference between them and other foreigners was that the latter 
had more specific regional preferences. Russian direct investments were concentrated 
in Manchuria (i.e., the three provinces Fengtian/Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang); 
Japanese in Shanghai, Manchuria, Formosa (now Taiwan), Fujian (Fukien), and 
Shandong (Shantung); French in Shanghai and Yunnan, German in Shanghai, 
Hankou, and Shandong. American FDI was strongly concentrated in Shanghai, but 
British direct investments could be found in most of China’s provinces. Some Dutch 
companies also had offices in some cities other than Shanghai: Hong Kong (JCJL, 
NIHB, NHM, Royal Dutch/Shell), Shantou (then known as Swatow: JCJL, NIHB, 
Royal Dutch/Shell), Xiamen (or Amoy: JCJL, NIHB, Royal Dutch/Shell), Macao 
(Harbour Works), and Beijing (or Peking: Harbour Works, NSC). Royal Dutch/Shell 
was exceptional in that it had offices in almost all provincial capitals, and that it ran 
its own oil tanks, ships, and trucks along the major rivers and railways. Moreover, 
this company and Unilever operated warehouses and depots throughout large parts of 
the interior of China.  
With respect to the institutional background of the individual Dutch companies,70 
two important elements were whether the companies were privately- or state-owned, 
and whether they were active exclusively in the Far East, or also in other parts of the 
world. With respect to ownership, all Dutch companies in China were privately-
owned. Most foreign firms in China were private interests but there were some 
notable exceptions. The largest single direct investments of Japan, Russia, and 
France in China consisted of railway companies which were heavily influenced by 
the governments of these countries. During the second half of the 1930s, the 
management of the Chinese interests of German and Japanese businesses was also 
strongly influenced by their governments. British, American, and Dutch FDI shared 
the fact that they were not subjected to strong government influence throughout the 
1902-1941 period.  
                                                          
70 On Dutch business history in an international perspective see H. Schröter, 'Small European Nations: 
Cooperative Capitalism in the Twentieth Century' in: Alfred D Chandler Jr, Franco Amatori, Takashi 
Hikino eds, Big Business and the Wealth of Nations (Cambridge 1997), 176-204.  
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Table II. Western and Japanese companies with large direct investments in China (excluding 
Formosa and post-1931 Manchuria), 1918-1937, and their original main activity.71 
 
 Regional Firms   Global Firms  
Britain Arnhold & Co.                     trading Union Cold Storage meat 
 Butterfield & Swire              trading ICI                                manufacturing 
 Dodwell & Co.                     trading Unilever Ltd                  manufacturing 
 Jardine, Matheson & Co.  trading Calico Printers’ 
Assoc.   
manufacturing 
 Sassoon & Co.                      trading Patons & Baldwins        manufacturing 
 Chartered Bank IAC            banking BAT                             manufacturing 
 HSBC                                  banking GEC                             manufacturing 
 China Engineering & 
Mining          
coal   
 Peking Syndicate                  coal   
 China Gas Company            utilities   
 Shanghai Waterworks          utilities   
 China General Omnibus       bus   
 Shanghai Electric Constr.    tram   
 China Imp. Ex. Lumber       lumber   
 Shanghai Dockyards      manufacturing   
Japan Mitsui trading   
 Mitsubishi trading   
 Sumitomo  trading   
 Okura  trading   
 Yokohama Specie Bank       banking   
 Bank of Korea                      banking   
 Bank of Taiwan                    banking   
 Dairen Kissen Kaisha           shipping   
 Nippon Yusen Kaisha          shipping   
 Nishin Kissen Kaisha           shipping   
 Osaka Shosen Kaisha           shipping   
 Bodong mine                        coal   
 Luda mine                            coal   
 Zhengfeng mine                   coal   
 Dangtu mine                         iron   
 Daye mine                            iron   
 Fanchang mine                     iron   
 South Manchuria Electric    utilities   
 South Manchuria Gas          utilities   
 South Manchurian 
Railway       
railway   
 Anshan steel                 manufacturing   
 Naigaiwata cotton          manufacturing   
 Shanghai Spinning         manufacturing   
 Dai Nippon Spinning       manufacturing   
 Toyo Company cotton         manufacturing   
 Kodera Oil                    manufacturing   
 Sino-Japanese Oil         manufacturing   
                                                          
71 These are foreign companies that were controlled by Europeans, Americans, or Japanese. Foreign firms 
controlled by Chinese entrepreneurs are not included. Moreover, companies that were wholly owned by 
firms on the list are excluded, also if they were owned jointly by two or more of these firms. Several large 
firms not on the list were subsidiaries of one of the three huge China conglomerates: Jardine, Swire, or the 
South Manchurian Railway. In China, the Japanese zaibatsu were not only prominent in trading but also in 
banking. Shipping lines that were represented in China through agents are excluded. Companies that 
themselves were not active in China and that had a large but not exclusive interest in China firms are 
excluded.   
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 Santai Oil                      manufacturing   
 Suzuki Oil                      manufacturing   
 South Manchuria Milling  manufacturing   
 East Asia Tobacco        manufacturing   
 Manchuria Woollen        manufacturing   
USA Andersen, Meyer & Co.       trading American Express          banking 
 American Trading Co. trading National City Bank        banking 
 China & Japan Trading trading Am. Foreign Power       utilities 
 Equitable Eastern   banking ITT                                 utilities 
 American Oriental  banking Pan Am                          airline 
   New Jersey Standard petroleum 
   New York Standard petroleum 
   California Standard petroleum 
   The Texas Company      petroleum 
   Curtiss Wright              manufacturing 
   Ford Motors                 manufacturing 
   GE                               manufacturing 
   Western Electric           manufacturing 
Germany Melchers & Co.                    trading IG Farbenindustrie        manufacturing 
 Carlowitz & Co.                   trading Siemens                       manufacturing 
 Siemssen & Co.                    trading AEG                             manufacturing 
 Deutsch-Asiatische Bank     banking   
Netherlands NSC                                     construction NHM                banking 
 NIHB                                   banking Royal Dutch/Shell       petroleum 
 Java-China-Japan Lijn         shipping Philips                          manufacturing 
   Unilever NV                  manufacturing 
   Havenwerken construction 
France Compagnie Olivier Chine    trading   
 Banque de l’Indo-Chine       banking   
 Yunnan Railway                   railway   
Belgium Banque Sino-Belge             banking   
 Credit Foncier                      banking   
 Ch. Fer & Tramways        construction   
Italy  Italian Bank for China          banking   
USSR China Eastern Railway         railway   
 
Sources: Remer, Foreign Investments for Japan, France, Belgium, Italy, USSR, Osterhammel, Britischer 
Imperialismus for Britain and Japan, Wilkins, ‘The Impacts of American Multinational Enterprise on 
American-Chinese Economic Relations, 1786-1949’ in: E.R. May and J.K. Fairbank, America’s China 
Trade in Historical Perspective: The Chinese and American Performance (Cambridge MA 1986), 259-292 
for the US, and W.C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford 1984) for Germany. 
 
 
Regarding the scope of the Dutch companies, there were regional as well as global 
Dutch companies in China. Table II lists the larger foreign companies in China in the 
1920s-1930s. These were the companies that were responsible for the bulk of direct 
investments in local business assets. The list shows that most foreign companies in 
China were ‘regional’: they were created especially for the East Asian region, where 
the bulk of their assets was located. Various Dutch firms were linked closely to the 
Netherlands Indies, while the French, Japanese, and Russian interests related strongly 
to Indochina, Japan, and eastern Siberia respectively. Many major British companies 
in China were even established specifically for operation within China, as were some 
German, Belgian, and American trading companies and banks. These companies had 
a regional scope, and most of them had entered China between the mid-nineteenth 
century and the First World War. Most of the large regional firms were British or 
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Japanese. Some relatively large foreign investing countries such as France and the 
USSR even had remarkably few large firms in China: a large part of their FDI was 
accounted for by the Yunnan and the Eastern (North Manchurian) Railway 
respectively. Other major investors among these regional firms were the South 
Manchurian Railway, Jardine, Swire, and HSBC. 
Apart from regional companies there were also several ‘global’ firms active in 
China. These were companies with substantial FDI not only in Asia but also on one 
or more other continents. They entered China between 1895 and 1937; they generally 
were established in the late nineteenth century and expanded their size and 
geographical presence very rapidly. Although the number of global firms with FDI in 
China was smaller than the number of regional firms, the overall size of the global 
firms usually far exceeded the size of the regional firms. Some of the global firms 
were so large that the value of their Chinese assets alone dwarfed that of nearly all 
regional companies. Most of these global firms were British or American, with a few 
German or Dutch representatives. None were Japanese, French, Russian, Belgian, or 
Italian.72 Given this, in terms of global firm investments, Dutch FDI was much more 
significant than its relatively low value indicated. In particular the involvement of 
Royal Dutch/Shell added a special meaning to Dutch FDI. By itself it accounted for 
three-fifths of all Dutch FDI in China in 1931. The global companies with the largest 
investments in China were Standard of New York, BAT, and Royal Dutch/Shell. In 
overall size, Royal Dutch/Shell was the largest of these three. 
Finally, turning to the matter of the relationship with the indigenous business 
environment—with the Chinese competitors, suppliers, and customers of the Dutch 
companies—the extent to which foreign companies were in direct contact with 
Chinese groups varied considerably per economic sector and per company. One 
difficulty which overrode all other was that of coming into direct contact with 
Chinese consumers. This was a notorious characteristic of the Chinese market. At a 
general level, a distinction may be made between the periods before and after World 
War I. In the period before the war, direct contacts were very limited. Foreign 
companies typically confined their activities to the treaty ports, where they sold and 
purchased goods through compradores–Chinese middlemen who had knowledge of 
both the Chinese and foreign business practices and market situations, and who acted 
as guarantor for the transaction. 73  Such middlemen also played a crucial role in 
shipping, mining, banking, and railway construction. Consequently foreign firms did 
not come into direct contact with their customers or suppliers, and generally they 
were active in different fields to those in which Chinese enterprises were involved.  
                                                          
72 On national differences in the development of global firms that were manager-controlled, for instance 
between US, UK, Germany, and France: Chandler and Daems, ‘Introduction’. For France, whose global 
business organisations developed slower than those of the other three main Western powers, see also P. 
Fridenson 'France: The Relatively Slow Development of Big Business in the Twentieth Century' in: Alfred 
D Chandler Jr, Franco Amatori, Takashi Hikino (eds), Big Business and the Wealth of Nations (Cambridge 
1997), 207-245. The largest Japanese zaibatsu did have FDI in Europe and America, but are regarded here 
as regional firms because the overwhelming majority of their assets was located in East Asia. The term 
‘multinational corporation’ (or ‘multinational enterprise’) is not used in this study; the distinction between 
regional and global firms is thought to be more exact and meaningful in the present context. On some of 
the problems surrounding the usage of multinational see D.K. Fieldhouse, ‘The Multinational: A Critique 
of a Concept' in: A. Teichova, M. Levy-Leboyer, and H. Nussbaum (eds), Multinational Enterprise in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge 1986), 9-29. 
73 On the importance of compradores see Osterhammel, Weltgesellschaft, 185. 
CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR AND POLITICAL RISK 26 
                                                          
After the First World War the Chinese business environment diversified rapidly. 
The compradore-system continued to exist, but foreign companies increasingly 
established direct contacts with their indigenous suppliers and customers. They 
established offices outside the treaty ports and employed more Chinese staff, thereby 
replacing not only the compradores but sometimes even the Chinese wholesale 
dealers. Simultaneously, new Chinese firms moved into activities formerly occupied 
exclusively by foreign business. A large number of Chinese industrial firms emerged 
in the 1920s, as well as Chinese banks and export firms that resembled the foreign 
companies.74 The level of integration by Dutch business into the Chinese indigenous 
economy was generally very low. Most firms were active only in the treaty ports and 
dealt mostly with compradores and foreign companies, but Unilever and Royal 
Dutch/Shell actively tried to reach consumers by circumventing several layers of 
Chinese middlemen. Yet despite their best efforts, foreign firms never achieved 
large-scale direct distribution to consumers at the household level.  
74  On the institutional development of China’s ‘corporate economy’ see Kai Yiu Chan, ‘Capital 
Formation and Accumulation of Chinese Industrial Enterprises in the Republican Period: The Case of Liu 
Hongsheng’s Shanghai Portland Cement Works Company Ltd, 1920-1937’in: R.A. Brown (ed), Chinese 
Business Enterprise: Critical Perspective on Business and Management II (London 1996), 149-170. 

 CHAPTER 2 
 
BANKING: NHM AND NIHB 
 
‘A large territory lies vacant but if we wait 
others will build on it, for its location is 
favourable. The necessary capital exists, yet 
where are the money-lenders, architects, and 
masons? With mutual support of all those who 
have or want to have an interest in China—
bankers, merchants, industrialists, and ship-
owners—a great deal can be accomplished over 
there. Without such co-operation the matter 
remains very hard to achieve for each separate 
category.’  
E. Heldring, 1899.75 
 
Overall Corporate Interest: The NHM 
In the late 1890s an ambitious young Dutchman made an extensive journey through 
the Far East. One of the countries he visited was China, and upon his return to the 
Netherlands he published a book in which he urged Dutch businessmen to seize the 
opportunities he thought China had to offer. 76  This man was Ernst Heldring, a 
member of the managing board of the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot 
Maatschappij (KNSM). His interest was very broad and far exceeded the shipping 
industry, or even the economy as a whole. Eventually he would become one of the 
most influential men in Dutch society with close ties to the country’s leading 
businessmen and politicians. The main thing regarding China, he believed in 1899, 
was that Dutch businessmen would finally become aware of the great opportunities 
existing in that giant nation. Some thirty-five years earlier the Netherlands and China 
had established diplomatic relations, on which occasion China had granted the Dutch 
all the same privileges it had been forced to give to other Western nations. The 
Netherlands became a treaty power in 1863, when it established diplomatic relations 
with China and—through a standard ‘most-favoured-nation’ clause in China’s 
foreign treaties—acquired the same trading privileges that the other powers enjoyed 
in China. In spite of this, Dutch business had been ignoring the promising Chinese 
market completely. It was becoming increasingly difficult to catch up with 
competitors from other countries. Heldring appealed to the leading businessmen in 
his country to co-operate in establishing the foundation for a Dutch business 
presence. One of the main elements he believed was essential to success was a Dutch 
bank in Shanghai. Heldring knew that some people at least would take notice of what 
he wrote, because his father was on the managing board of the Nederlandsche 
Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), which with the Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank 
(NIHB) was one of the two great colonial banks of the Netherlands Indies. Both 
banks opened branches in China in the opening years of the twentieth century. The 
development of indirect investments in China by the NIHB and the NHM will be 
discussed in the chapters on the JCJL, Havenwerken, and the NSC. This chapter will 
                                                          
75 Heldring, Oost-Azië, 74-75. 
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focus exclusively on the direct investments by these banks, i.e., their branch offices 
in China. 
The oldest and the largest of the two Dutch banks in China was the NHM.77 It 
was formed in 1824 on the initiative of King William I of the Netherlands as an 
international trading company—intended in part to function as a renewed Dutch East 
India Company.78 Within a few years it had developed into one of the pillars under 
the Dutch Cultivation System in Java, by which the Dutch colonial government 
produced agricultural produce for the European market. The NHM acted as a broker 
between the colonial producer and the market in the Netherlands. In the 1860s the 
Dutch colonial economy was liberalised and privatised, and the NHM was forced to 
look for new ways to retain its prominent position in the Netherlands Indies. The 
company gradually became an agricultural producer itself—especially in sugar—as it 
acquired its own plantations and mills. However, in the early 1880s its management 
decided that the future of the sugar trade was too uncertain and instead chose 
banking as the company’s new primary activity.79 From 1880s, the NHM developed 
very rapidly into a major colonial banker. The plantation business remained an 
important secondary activity—in 1913 contributing almost 20 per cent of the NHM’s 
total profits80—until the economic depression of the early 1930s and the subsequent 
collapse of sugar prices. 
The NHM played a prominent role in the Dutch colonial economy, and to control 
its extensive interests the company developed into a large bureaucracy. Within the 
organisation, corporate knowledge was concentrated in three places. In the first place 
in the regional management in Batavia (modern Jakarta), which was close to the 
actual operations. In the second place in the managing board in Amsterdam, which 
consisted of three or four persons and was the central governing body of the NHM.81 
In the third place in the supervisory board in Amsterdam, which appointed the 
managing board. Consequently the managing board was the main controlling element 
in the company: because of its intermediate function between supervisory board and 
local management, it had access to more strategic information than either of the other 
parties.82 However, the extent of its influence was somewhat compromised by the 
                                                          
77 NHM (its English name was ‘Netherlands Trading Society’) in 1964 it acquired the Twentsche Bank 
and changed its name to Algemene Bank Nederland. In 1991 ABN and AMRO merged into ABN AMRO 
Bank.  
78 The king decided to establish the company in March of 1824. Although the company began operating 
before the end of this year, it was not until February of 1825 that it was formally incorporated. William 
(Willem) I accounted for ƒ4 million of the ƒ37 million worth of original shares. He was the largest 
shareholder and used his influence to shape the new company according to his wishes, one of which was 
that NHM take over the old VOC branch in Guangzhou so as to participate in the tea trade: Nederlandsche 
Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), Gedenkboek der Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 1824-1924 (n.p. 
1924), 8-13. 
79 The NHM gradually developed into a global firm with branches in the Netherlands and large sugar 
interests in Dutch Surinam. However, until World War I the company’s main interests remained strongly 
concentrated in the Netherlands Indies.  
80 G.M. Verrijn Stuart, Het Bankwezen in de Nederlandsche Koloniën, (2nd ed; Wassenaar 1934), 103. 
81 In 1918 the membership was expanded to five. 
82 Chairmen of the managing board in the 1900-1941 period: B. Heldring (1900-1907), J.T. Cremer 
(1907-1912), C.J.K. van Aalst (1913-1934; on the board since 1902), D. Crena de Iongh (1934-1939; on 
the board since 1925), E. Heldring (from 1939). Other board members: A. Muller (1900-1921), E.D. van 
Walree (1913-1918), J. Bierens de Haan (1918-1933), C.H. Guépin (1918-1923), F.P.J. Vester (1918-
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fact that it was located in Amsterdam rather than Batavia.83 As a result its ties with 
and influence on managers in Batavia were less secure, which made it easier for the 
supervisory board to influence the managing board.  
The supervisory board consisted of experienced Dutch businessmen, often 
directors of shipping or trading companies.84 Until 1921 the Dutch souvereign had 
the right to appoint a royal representative as chairman of the supervisory board.85 
However, the ownership of the royal family was diminished through extensive 
issuing of new shares and by 1921 royal influence had long ceased to affect the 
functioning of the supervisory board.86 The other members of the supervisory board 
were appointed by the other shareholders.87 There were no further direct connections 
between this board and the—mostly Dutch—shareholders, who were numerous and 
anonymous. Given this construction, the fact that the managing board shared control 
with the supervisory board, instead of having full control, did not mean that 
ownership interests played a major role. The main interest of the two boards was 
similar: to promote growth of the company. These aims were to be achieved 
primarily through banking and secondarily though the production of sugar in Java.  
As a bank the NHM did not confine itself to export trade but financed trade 
within the Netherlands Indies as well. Also as a sugar producer the NHM was 
interested in the export trade, because sugar was the main export product of the 
Netherlands Indies. To increase its involvement in international trade, especially in 
the sugar trade, the company established a branch office in Singapore. Subsequently 
it noticed that in order to compete successfully at an international level, it needed 
branch offices in the same places where its main competitors were established: in the 
large commercial centres of South and East Asia.88 A promising target country for 
the company was China, the second largest market for Java sugar behind British 
India.89 In the 1820s the NHM had tried to export tea from Guangzhou, but had not 
succeeded in making this enterprise function on a profitable basis.90 Now, however, 
the situation was changing fundamentally: for the first time China was not just 
exporting but also importing consumer goods in large quantities. Along with 
                                                                                                                                          
1929), J.C.A. Everwijn (1922-1929), M. Taudin Chabot (1929-1946), A.A. Pauw (1930-1946), F.H. 
Abbing (1930-1938), and J.C. baron Collot d’Escury (1934-1948). 
83 The head office and corporate seat had been in Amsterdam since 1831. In 1940 the formal seat was 
moved to Batavia because of the war in Europe; in 1942 it was moved to Paramaribo. Very probably the 
NIHB seat, also in Amsterdam, followed the same route in 1940 and 1942. 
84 A. Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby: Ondernemers en de Indische Politiek, 1914-1940 
(Leiden 1998), 61-62. Sometimes the supervisory board also included former members of the managing 
board, such as J.T. Cremer. The chairmen of the supervisory board (until 1921 named royal delegates) 
between 1900 and 1941: H.L.M. Luden (1889-1903), H.P.G. Quack (1904-1914), J.T. Cremer (1914-
1918), L.P.D. op ten Noort (1918-1924), S.P. van Eeghen (1924-1934), H.C. Rehbock (1934-1938), P.E. 
Tegelberg (1938-1954). Some of the persons who acted as member of the supervisory board between 1902 
and 1941 were J.B. van Heutsz (1910-1921; former Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies); H. 
Colijn (1922-1923 and 1926-1933; former cabinet Minister and director of Royal Dutch, and future Prime 
Minister); and J.H. Hummel (1924-1937; also on the supervisory board of the JCJL). 
85  C. te Lintum, De Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij in Haren Tegenwoordigen Werkkring 
(Amsterdam 1924), 22.  
86 Until 1929 he still had the right to appoint the members of the managing board. 
87 There were always at least ten persons on this board.  
88 Introduction to inventory 2.20.01 NHM, ARA The Hague, p. 291.   
89 A. Kraal, Indonesië en Suiker (Jakarta and Groningen n.d.), 3; and Brugmans, Chinavaart, 86.  
90 These attempts at trading in Guangzhou did not result in major direct investments: the NHM made use 
of the old VOC branch office. 
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kerosene and cigarettes, refined sugar was among the very few foreign industrial 
products for which there was a demand at the ordinary household level. The country 
was itself a sugar producer, but consumer preference was shifting from unrefined to 
refined sugar. 91  Most refined sugar was produced in Hong Kong by two British 
companies, Jardine and Swire. 92  To run their refineries effectively and keep 
production costs low, they required a stable supply of good-quality unrefined sugar. 
Because Chinese sugar was grown by many, relatively small producers, it was less 
suitable to their requirements than Java sugar, which was produced in great quantities 
on large estates and which was of a more stable quality.93 In the early twentieth 
century half to two-thirds of China’s imported sugar came from Java. 94  For the 
NHM, as one of Java’s largest producers of unrefined sugar,95 it was only logical to 
relate investments in China to the sugar trade. Ernst Heldring’s book confirmed that 
great opportunities were waiting to be seized in China and that by 1899 it was getting 
time to consider seriously expanding the NHM’s activities to that country.  
The question was how and when should the managing board decide to invest in 
China? Jardine and Swire, in conjunction with the British bank HSBC, already 
dominated China’s sugar imports.96 The Dutch company would have to find local 
clients and partners, but where could it recruit dependable personnel with local 
experience and contacts? Had the company regarded sugar rather than banking as its 
main interest, it would have been an option to refine sugar in Java and sell it in China 
through an agency firm in Shanghai. But what it really wanted was to invest in 
banking, not sugar production. Therefore the obvious first step to take was opening a 
banking office in Hong Kong or Shanghai.97 In 1900 Balthazar Heldring, who was 
interested in taking this step, became chairman of the managing board. For the time 
being he was baulked by his two colleagues, P. Hartsen and A. Muller, who were 
very sceptical about the risks involved and the decision to enter China was 
postponed. 98  Still, in the next few years three events took place that led to the 
establishment of the branch office. 
The first event was the Boxer War of 1900 between China and the foreign 
powers. This war is traditionally referred to in misleading terms such as ‘Boxer 
disturbances’ or ‘allied intervention’, which distract from the fact that North China 
and Manchuria were the scene of large-scale military violence. After China was 
defeated and Beijing was under foreign occupation, the foreign powers forced the 
                                                          
91 S. Mazumdar, Sugar and Society in China: Peasants, Technology, and the World Market (Cambridge 
MA and London 1998), 383. On the Chinese sugar market: Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 172-
182. 
92 They sold their sugar to Chinese distributors. Between 1916 and 1929, Swire distributed its sugar by 
itself in China: Ibid. 178-179. 
93 Mazumdar, Sugar, 383-384. 
94 Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 174. 
95 By the mid-1920s the NHM controlled some 40 per cent of the Java sugar trade: L. De Bree, De 
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Batavia 1924), 62. Also Verrijn Stuart, Bankwezen, 147-153. In 
1902 NHM owned fourteen sugar companies and had close ties with twenty-two more: De Bree, Handel-
Maatschappij, 29. 
96 HSBC financed the sugar imports of the two British sugar refineries in Hong Kong: annual report of 
the Hong Kong NHM managing director for 1919, ARA The Hague, 2.20.01 NHM, 5092 jaarverslagen 
agentschap Hong Kong 1906-1939. 
97 At the time NHM’s main Chinese business relation was the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. If the Dutch 
bank would establish itself in Shanghai, it could possibly attract part of the DAB’s business. 
98 E. Heldring to E. van Walree n.d. 1902, ARA The Hague, archief geslacht Heldring, 234. 
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imperial government to pay an indemnity to cover their damages. Under this 
arrangement the Chinese also had to pay a sum to the Netherlands for the damage to 
the Dutch legation building and for the costs of sending a warship to participate in 
the invasion of China. This so-called Boxer Indemnity, to be paid to the allied 
powers, was enormous: including interest, it amounted to almost one billion Haiguan 
taels, which was about ten times the total annual revenue of the Chinese central 
government. China was expected to pay the entire sum in thirty-nine years, and a 
transferring procedure was devised for this purpose. The Chinese government was to 
pay the indemnity in monthly instalments to the foreign banks in Shanghai, which 
would form a committee for this purpose. These banks would then transfer the 
money to the foreign governments.99 Each government was allowed to appoint a 
bank to collect its share of the instalments, and consequently each appointed a bank 
of its own nationality. The Netherlands did not have a bank in Shanghai, and was 
represented by the Russo-Chinese Bank simply because two of its Shanghai branch 
managers were Dutch.  
It was clear that the first Dutch bank to open a branch in Shanghai would 
automatically be appointed by the Dutch government to handle the Dutch share of 
the Boxer indemnity. The Dutch share amounted to ƒ1.4 million, a mere 0.17 per 
cent of the entire indemnity. 100  Financially this was not sufficient to justify the 
establishment of a bank office in Shanghai. Nevertheless, the weakened Chinese 
government was now subjected to strong influence by the foreign powers. The 
council of foreign envoys and the foreign-managed Maritime Customs of China 
already controlled some of China’s basic state functions, and at that moment it 
seemed quite possible that the Shanghai bankers’ committee would develop into a 
body with great influence on China’s finances. Around 1900 foreign banks were 
playing an important and highly profitable role as capital suppliers to the Chinese 
government.101 There was every chance that in the future other tasks besides the 
handling of the indemnity might be assigned to the bankers’ committee—which 
included all major foreign banks. Therefore it was an appealing prospect for the 
NHM to join this committee on behalf of the Dutch government.102 
The second event that stimulated the NHM’s first investment in China was that in 
1900 the Dutch government became interested in creating a shipping line between its 
colony and East Asia. The creation of the Java-China-Japan Lijn will be described in 
the next chapter, but it is relevant to note here that one of the people involved in 
setting up this new enterprise was Ernst Heldring. Another person involved was a 
friend of Heldring’s: E.D. van Walree, the Dutch consul in Shanghai. Heldring and 
Van Walree had been classmates at the Openbare Handelsschool, the secondary 
                                                          
99  On the Boxer Indemnity: F.P. van der Putten, 'De Bokserindemniteit en China's Financiële 
Afhankelijkheid, 1901-1913' (unpublished MA thesis; Leiden University 1994). 
100 Van der Putten, ‘Small Powers and Imperialism’, 130 n.51. 
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school both had attended in Amsterdam. Heldring had lodged at Van Walree’s place 
when he visited Shanghai around 1898, and the two shared the same passion for 
introducing Dutch business to East Asia. As consul, Van Walree had given strong 
support to the shipping plan. The Dutch government was prepared to subsidise the 
new shipping line, if Dutch business would participate. It was clear that one of the 
main objectives of this company would be to capture the shipments of Java sugar to 
China, and here lay an opportunity for the NHM to wrest this trade from British 
influence. In 1902 the NHM took a bold step by investing some ƒ1.5 million guilders 
in this new East Asian shipping company, the JCJL. This made the NHM a three-
quarter majority owner, and greatly improved its potential for playing a role in 
China’s sugar imports. The advantages were great, yet risks were limited because 
there was firm government backing and the JCJL was not formally tied to the NHM 
organisation. 
Finally, the third event that led to the opening of a branch office in Shanghai was 
that in 1901-1902 there were some personnel changes within the NHM. In 1901 Van 
Walree, who continued to exchange letters with Ernst Heldring about their plans for 
China, resigned from the consular service. He returned to the Netherlands, where he 
met Ernst’s father, and was immediately recruited to work for the NHM. For the 
present, he was stationed in Singapore, but the aim was to send him to Shanghai 
later. 103  Now the company had someone in its service with knowledge of the 
situation in China. In the following year, Hartsen resigned from the managing board 
and was replaced by C. van Aalst. The latter had been the managing director of the 
Singapore branch office, and favoured expansion into China. Ernst was informed by 
his father about the situation on the company’s managing board, and used his 
knowledge to instruct Van Walree on how the board could be stimulated finally to 
give permission to up shop in Shanghai.104 
At last, in early 1903, Van Walree was instructed to establish a branch office in 
Shanghai; he was given a working capital of 1.5 million guilders.105 Although at the 
time Hong Kong was the main port through which Java sugar and other Java 
products entered the interior China trade, the board believed that there would be too 
much competition in Hong Kong.106 Shanghai was a better chance: not only was the 
Java-Shanghai trade promising, little developed, and open to newcomers, but also 
was the indemnity bankers’ committee was located in that city. The aim of the 
managing board was gradually to build up experience and expand the firm’s business 
                                                          
103 Minutes of the meeting of the managing board of the NHM 10 April 1901, ARA, 2.20.01 NHM, 1983. 
Although Van Walree was not an experienced banker, he was very familiar with the Shanghai business 
scene. Ernst Heldring suggested to his father that the managing director of a new Shanghai branch might 
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104 E. Heldring to E.D. van Walree 22 Aug. 1902, ibid. He suggested that Van Walree ask the Singapore 
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105 Introduction to inventory 2.20.01 NHM, ARA The Hague, p.291. 
106 C. van Aalst 17 Feb. 1903, ARA The Hague, NHM, 9472. 
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in Shanghai. When the branch was opened, Van Aalst told Van Walree to be 
cautious.107 It was hoped that eventually the firm would be able to participate in 
Chinese government loans, and that the JCJL would succeed in diverting the trade in 
sugar and other Java products away from Hong Kong. 
Within a few years Van Walree came to the conclusion that in the near future at 
least Shanghai would not develop a large trade with the Netherlands Indies, therefore 
a second branch office was opened in Hong Kong in 1906 in order not to miss out 
entirely on this business. Although Van Walree remained in Shanghai only until 
1907, he later became member of the NHM managing board.108  During the first 
twenty years after opening its Shanghai branch, the NHM became more deeply 
involved in China through indirect investments. It did so by participating financially 
in several enterprises that were active in China: the Holland-China 
Handelscompagnie (HCHC, the main Dutch trading firm in China, established in 
1903),109 the Deutsch-Niederländische Telegraphen Gesellschaft (a German-Dutch 
telegraph company established in 1904),110  the Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor 
Havenwerken (1912), the Nederlandsch Syndicaat voor China (1919), and the 
Longhai Railway Administration (1921).  
 
Overall Corporate Interest: The NIHB 
The activities of the Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank were very similar to those 
of the NHM, although it had a different background.111 The NIHB was established in 
1863 as a subsidiary of an investment firm, the Algemeene Maatschappij voor 
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World War (Helsinki 1981) 175-178; Baart, ‘Aktiviteiten’; W.J. Oudendijk, Ways and By-Ways of 
Diplomacy (London 1939), 322-323.  
111 In 1950 the NIHB (which also called itself ‘Netherlands India Commercial Bank’) changed its name 
to Nationale Handelsbank. In 1960 the NHB was acquired by the Rotterdamsche Bank (which between 
1911 and 1947 was named Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging). In 1964 the RB merged with the 
Amsterdamsche Bank into AMRO Bank. In 1991 AMRO merged with the Algemene Bank Nederland into 
ABN AMRO Bank. 
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Handel en Nijverheid.112 It was the Algemeene Maatschappij’s aim to participate in 
any type of company, and if the opportunity presented itself even to create new 
firms. Because its directors believed that there was a great need in the Netherlands 
Indies for a bank to finance plantation enterprises, they set up the NIHB for this 
purpose. The Algemeene Maatschappij took a majority interest and issued the 
remaining shares on the Dutch and Netherlands Indies financial market. From the 
beginning most shareholders were Dutch, and ownership was dispersed over a large 
number of persons.113 The Algemeene Maatschappij found itself in very low water in 
1864 and was subsequently dissolved. The result was that the NIHB became an 
independent firm without a dominant majority shareholder.  
Just as in the NHM, corporate knowledge was concentrated in three places in the 
NIHB’s organisation: with the nine-person supervisory board and the managing 
directors, both in Amsterdam, and the managing director of the regional head office 
in Batavia.114 Again as in the NHM, the shareholders were not directly represented in 
any of these places, and control was shared between management and supervisory 
board. Once more this construction was geared for the same corporate interest as that 
of the NHM: growth.  
Originally the NIHB was engaged primarily in financing colonial—mainly 
sugar—plantations. However, after a crisis in the sugar trade in 1884, the NIHB 
transferred its plantation interests to a new subsidiary, Nederlandsch-Indische 
Landbouw-Maatschappij.115 This allowed the company to retain an important interest 
in Netherlands Indies sugar production, while it switched its main activity to 
banking, or more specifically to financing trade. By 1900 it was in a position similar 
to the NHM: it was expanding its branch network beyond the Netherlands Indies in 
order to finance intra-Asian trade.116 Because of its interest in sugar production, it 
was especially attractive for the bank to concentrate on sugar exports, for which 
China was a major destination. When its main rival, the NHM, took a lead by setting 
up branches in Shanghai and participating in the JCJL, the NIHB responded by 
opening an office in Hong Kong in 1906.117  
The NIHB was much smaller than the NHM and, for the time being, was not able 
to follow the NHM’s ambitious policy of participating in Shanghai’s financial world 
and in shipping between Java and China. In spite of the fact that the NIHB did not 
own shares in the JCJL, its managing director, T.J. van Haren Noman, was a member 
of the managing board of the shipping company. He did not formally represent his 
bank, but his involvement in the shipping company obviously ensured close relations 
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between the JCJL and the NIHB. Apparently the NIHB was only interested in 
acquiring part of the financing of the Hong Kong import trade, and not afraid that it 
would not be able to compete with long-established British firms. During the 1910s 
the bank attracted large amounts of new capital from external investors, and 
consequently the difference in size between the two banks grew smaller. 118  The 
NIHB decided to spread its wings in China and opened new branches in Shanghai 
(1919), Shantou (1924), and Xiamen (1924).119 In other words, initially the bank’s 
main interest in China was limited to financing the Netherlands Indies trade in Hong 
Kong, but gradually its scope widened. From 1912 it participated, like the NHM via 
its head office rather than via its Chinese branches, in Harbour Works, the NSC, and 
Longhai. By the 1920s there was no important difference between the profile of 
Chinese direct and indirect investments of the two banks.  
 
Banking in China 
The NHM Shanghai branch was located on the Bund, the riverfront of the 
International Settlement's business district. The NHM's office consisted of Van 
Walree, eight employees, and one compradore. The compradore, who himself had a 
seven-person staff, was contracted for relations with Chinese clients.120 The other 
China branches of Dutch banks were similar in size. Their managing directors 
reported to the NHM or NIHB regional head offices in Batavia.121  
Banking in China was divided into a Chinese and an international sector. The 
Chinese sector was dominated by Chinese qianzhuang or ‘native banks’, which 
financed domestic trade. Foreign banks did not succeed in penetrating this sector. 
The international sector was dominated by the large foreign banks, which financed 
international trade by selling export bills and providing remittance service for 
importing or exporting companies, or for Chinese working in the Netherlands Indies. 
The banks could earn money from this through exchange profits or commission.122 
Other activities engaged in by the foreign banks were to give short-term loans (‘chop 
loans’) to the native banks, provide credit to international firms, accept deposits, and 
buy and sell silver—on which Chinese currency was based, and the gold value of 
                                                          
118 In 1903 the capital of the NHM amounted to ƒ45 million, while the NIHB had only ƒ7.2 million. From 
1920 the figures were ƒ80 million and ƒ55 million respectively: Verrijn Stuart, Bankwezen, 99 and 122. 
119 The Shantou branch was closed in 1931: Brugmans, Twee Banken, 172. 
120 Annual report of the Shanghai NHM managing director for 1903, ARA The Hague, 2.20.01 NHM, 
5168 jaarverslagen agentschap Shanghai 1903-1939. 
121 Information on banking in China presented in this section is based on the annual reports by the branch 
office general managers sent to Amsterdam. Annual reports NHM branch offices, ARA The Hague, 
2.20.01 NHM, 5168-5172 (Shanghai 1903-1946); 5091-5094 (Hong Kong 1906-1946). Annual reports 
NIHB branch offices, ARA The Hague, 2.20.03 NIHB, 1047-1050 (Hong Kong 1913-1917); 1117-1118 
(Hong Kong 1927-1939); 1108-1109 (Shanghai 1927-1948); 1110 (Xiamen 1927-1948); 1107 (Shantou 
1927). 
122 S. Nishimura, ‘International Banking in China, 1890-1913’ in: A. Teichova, Ginette Kurgan-Van 
Hentenryk, and Dieter Ziegler (eds), Banking, Trade and Industry: Europe, America and Asia from the 
Thirteenth to the Twentieth Century (Cambridge 1997) for general information on banking in Shanghai. 
For additional data on the banking activities of NHM and NIHB: Baart, ‘Aktiviteiten’. Other useful works 
are F.H.H. King, The History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (4 vols; Cambridge 
1987); B. Barth, Die deutsche Hochfinanz und die Imperialismen: Banken und Aussenpolitik vor 1914 
(Stuttgart 1995); and D. Broetel, Frankreich im Fernen Osten: imperialistische Expansion in Siam und 
Malaya, Laos und China, 1880-1904 (Stuttgart 1996), for the development of respectively British, 
German, and French banking activities in China. 
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which changed frequently. One special activity open to the foreign banks in 
Shanghai was to circulate their own bank notes. Finally there were the large 
government operations: foreign banks could lend money to the Chinese government, 
or issue Chinese government bonds on Western capital markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Hong Kong branch office of the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 1937 
(reproduced by kind permission of ABN AMRO Bank) 
 
Most foreign banks were located in Shanghai and had entered China only after 1895. 
In 1903 the largest foreign banks in Shanghai were the Hongkong & Shanghai 
Banking Corporation (HSBC, British), the Yokohama Specie Bank (Japan), the 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank (German), the Banque de l’Indo-Chine (French), the 
Russo-Chinese Bank (Russian), and the International Banking Corp. (US). During 
World War I many Japanese banks established branches in Shanghai and Japan 
became the largest foreign banking nation in China.123 Despite this influx, until the 
1930s the most important bank in China remained the HSBC, which dominated all 
aspects of foreign banking.  
The Dutch banks specialised in financing trade with the Netherlands Indies, but 
were also involved in trade with British India, the British Straits Settlements, and the 
US. For all of the China branches of the two Dutch banks, by far the most important 
source of income were exchange profits on the export bills and remittance service 
required by international trading companies. Their main clients were trading firms in 
Shanghai that specialised in trade with the Netherlands Indies. In particular in the 
important sugar trade the Dutch banks managed to become the dominant financiers. 
                                                          
123 Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 22. 
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After the First World War, which caused a serious weakening in the position of the 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, the NIHB and the NHM became and stayed the main 
banks for German trading firms in China. Although the NHM and the NIHB were 
each other’s main competitor in China, there was enough business for them both to 
survive. Their background and interests were so similar that the one did not have a 
major competitive advantage over the other. Consequently, their competition was not 
very intense. 
The range of activities operated by the NHM was somewhat wider than that of 
the NIHB. During the 1900s and 1910s the NHM Shanghai branch handled the 
Boxer indemnity and from 1909 it circulated its own bank notes. In spite of the 
NHM’s initial hopes of providing financial services for the government, neither this 
bank nor the NIHB ever worked directly for the Chinese government. The main 
reason why the government business did not develop into a major activity alongside 
financing foreign trade, was that by the time the two Dutch banks were properly 
established in China, there was hardly any government business left to do. In the 
1890s there had been several major indemnity and railway loans—largely forced 
onto China by the foreign powers—which were handled by the main British, 
German, French, and Russian banks in Shanghai. After the imposition of the Boxer 
indemnity in 1901, the central government in China was financially exhausted. The 
main sources of revenue were already used to guarantee repayment of the older 
loans, and China had little left to offer in return for fresh loans. There were no more 
large foreign loans after 1901, except for the ‘reorganisation loan’ of 1913. It was 
guaranteed by taxation of salt, the last possible source of state revenue that could be 
used for such a purpose. The reorganisation loan was arranged by the main powers—
Britain, Germany, Russia, France, and Japan—to be provided by their banks; the 
smaller powers were unable to influence this arrangement. After 1916 there was no 
longer a central government capable of obtaining new major loans, and after 1928 
the Guomindang government did little business with the foreign banks.124  
The Dutch banks stuck to financing trade, and the financial results were good for 
both banks. By 1909 the NHM Shanghai branch had already succeeded in attracting 
ƒ4 million worth of local deposits.125 Annual net profits usually ranged between a 
few hundred thousand and half a million guilders. For instance, in 1918 the NHM’s 
total profit was 12.7 million guilders, to which the two China branches contributed 
ƒ790,000 (6.2 per cent). In 1924 total profit was 6.5 million guilders, of which ƒ192 
(3 per cent) was produced in China. 126  Table III shows that both of the NHM 
branches continued to produce a profit until 1940. A similar complete record of the 
NIHB profits is no longer available; however, insofar as the annual branch office 
                                                          
124 The Longhai Railway loan of the early 1920s, in which the NHM and the NIHB were involved 
indirectly through the NSC, was not a new loan. Its conditions went back to an agreement signed in 1903 
between China and a Belgian firm. The NSC was asked to participate by the Belgians because they were 
unable to raise sufficient capital. 
125 The largest deposits were by the Shanghai Langkat Maatschappij and the Asiatic Petroleum Company. 
Annual reports NHM Shanghai branch 1909 and 1911, ARA The Hague, 2.20.01 NHM, 5168 
jaarverslagen agentschap Shanghai 1903-1939. 
126 Total company profits in: W.M.F. Mansvelt, Geschiedenis van de NHM, 1824-1924 II (Amsterdam 
1924), appendix VIII. 
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reports for this bank survive, they indicate that its branches operated profitably.127 
Although it operated more branches, the size of the NIHB’s business was less than 
half that of the NHM. Because of its smaller size, the NIHB’s profits usually ranged 
between tens of thousands and some two hundred thousand guilders.128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Shanghai branch office of the Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank, 1937 
(reproduced by kind permission of ABN AMRO Bank) 
 
Whenever the silver price fluctuated in an unexpected direction or if trade intensity 
decreased, the branch offices had to accept a strong decrease in income. But they 
were flexible enough to survive difficult periods in China’s foreign trade, such as the 
economic depression of 1907, the collapse of the rubber boom in 1910, the 
revolution of 1911-1912, and the entire 1920-1941 period. In the 1930s the basis for 
Dutch banking in China began to destabilise first when the sugar trade showed signs 
of waning, and later when political tensions in Europe caused the Dutch banks to 
lose German firms as their clients. The money invested in banking was put mainly in 
short-term deals, usually with foreign firms. The office buildings did not represent 
any large investment; and it was relatively easy for the banks to withdraw from 
China. 
                                                          
127 Annual reports NIHB branch offices, ARA The Hague, 2.20.03 NIHB, 1047-1050 (Hong Kong 1913-
1917); 1117-1118 (Hong Kong 1927-1939); 1108-1109 (Shanghai 1927-1948); 1110 (Xiamen 1927-
1948); 1107 (Shantou 1927). 
128 For an indication of NIHB profits and losses see also Baart, ‘Aktiviteiten’, 248. 
CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR AND POLITICAL RISK 40 
Table III. Net profits of NHM branch offices in Shanghai and Hong Kong, 1903-1940.129 
 
 Shanghai 
(Shanghai Taels; from 1934 in Yuan)
Hong Kong 
 (HK dollars) 
1903  (Taels:)             50,000 - 
1904 25,000 - 
1905 66,000 - 
1906 26,000 -/-      27,000 
1907 28,000 -/-    165,000 
1908 103,000 -/-    143,000 
1909 82,000 -/-      21,000 
1910 38,000 -/-      12,000 
1911 33,000 -/-      40,000 
1912 114,000 7,000 
1913 n.a. 25,000 
1914 -/-     116,000 7,000 
1915 225,000 120,000 
1916 182,000 102,000 
1917 60,000 131,000 
1918 223,000 36,000 
1919 102,000 9,000 
1920 -/-    979,000 3,000 
1921 425,000 415,000 
1922 53,000 364,000 
1923 59,000 220,000 
1924 104,000 72,000 
1925 142,000 110,000 
1926 99,000 64,000 
1927 175,000 107,000 
1928 26,000 152,000 
1929 230,000 156,000 
1930 284,000 975,000 
1931 305,000 811,000 
1932 -/-   285,000 326,000 
1933 539,000 21,000 
1934  (Yuan:)          113,706 31,000 
1935 107,706 321,000 
1936 257,706 109,000 
1937 230,323 86,000 
1938 36,562 217,000 
1939 2,783,214 388,000 
1940 2,187,969 366,000 
 
Sources: annual reports NHM Shanghai branch 1903-1933, ARA The Hague, 2.20.01 NHM, 5168-5172 
jaarverslagen agentschap Shanghai 1903-1940; annual reports NHM Hong Kong branch 1906-1946, ibid. 
5091-5095 jaarverslagen agentschap Hong Kong 1906-1946 
 
                                                          
129  In order to ensure that these figures are accurate and useful, they are listed just like they appear in the 
branch office reports. Expressing these values in guilders involves many difficulties, due to the lack of 
information on how these figures were calculated, and due to the volatile relationship between Chinese 
currency, which was silver-based, and the Dutch guilder, which was gold-based. 
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The foregoing has shown that the NHM and the NIHB shared the same main local 
interest in China: they wanted to expand their banking activities and support their 
sugar producing activities. To achieve this they offered financial services to support 
China’s growing international trade, in particular the Java sugar trade. As a result of 
the inaccessibility of China’s government and internal trade sectors, the NHM and 
the NIHB did not attempt to stimulate activities outside the large treaty ports. 
Inevitably China’s foreign trade was affected by domestic events such as bad 
harvests and disrupted transport routes into the interior, but there were few direct 
linkages between the banks and the Chinese economy. The two banks managed to 
participate in the dynamic treaty port trade without becoming deeply involved in 
China. 
 
Political Risks and Response 
 
1903-1941 
From 1903 until the late 1930s, the China branches of the NHM and the NIHB did 
not see their activities threatened by any political risks. But this did not mean that 
their activities were immune from political factors: political considerations prevented 
the Dutch banks from entering the Chinese government business. Before 1916, the 
banks missed the only opportunity to participate in a large government loan because 
the 1913 reorganisation loan was reserved by the strongest powers for their own 
banks. Between 1916 and 1928 the lack of an efficient central government made it 
impossible to obtain government contracts, and after 1928 the Guomindang 
government was not interested in working with Western banks. These political 
developments prevented the diversification of the Chinese banking activities of the 
NIHB and the NHM, but posed no important threat to their main local interest. 
Foreign trade was conducted mainly in Shanghai and Hong Kong, and continued 
almost uninterrupted up until late 1941.   
The main problem, from the perspective of these banks, was that the civil wars of 
the 1920s negatively affected China’s domestic trade, which in turn was bad for 
international trade. But the bankers remained very optimistic, even after anti-foreign 
movements—which organised strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations against foreign 
business—gained enormously in strength in 1925-1926. The managing director of 
the NHM Shanghai wrote in his annual report for 1927: 
 
‘Having experienced the troubles of the past year I am even more convinced 
about the future of China and the prospects of this branch, that whatever may 
happen to China and whoever may govern Shanghai, this place will continue 
to grow.’130 
 
Indeed, the bank actually profited from the anti-foreign movements of the 1920s, 
which were aimed at the British and the Japanese much more than at other 
nationalities. Because in 1925, as a British firm, Swire was boycotted by Chinese 
companies and consumers, the JCJL looked for new agents in Shantou and Xiamen. 
Until 1928, when the JCJL established its own offices, the NIHB acted as the 
shipping line’s agent in these treaty ports. This represented an extra income, which 
                                                          
130 Annual report NHM Shanghai branch 1927, ARA The Hague, 2.20.01 NHM, 5171 jaarverslagen 
agentschap Shanghai 1903-1939. 
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was very welcome to the two newly opened NIHB branches. Another effect of the 
anti-British boycott of 1925 was the weakening of the British sugar industry in Hong 
Kong, which was dominated by HSBC. Much of the sugar trade moved to Shanghai 
where the sugar industry was still young and not controlled by established British 
firms. This made it easier for the NHM and the NIHB to expand further into this 
trade. The anti-Japanese movement had equally positive effects for the Dutch 
bankers. The 1928 Jinan (Tsinan) incident, in which Chinese and Japanese forces 
clashed in the capital of Shandong province, caused a new wave of anti-Japanese 
boycotts, resulting in the disappearance from the market of Formosa sugar. At the 
same time Java sugar increased its share, which again strengthened the position of 
the Dutch banks.  
After 1928 the main factor affecting foreign trade was not civil war but the severe 
economic depression that hit China. As before, the greater part of the 1930s did not 
present any great political risks to Dutch banking. Even when the war between China 
and Japan in 1937 hit many parts of the country, international trade continued in the 
treaty ports, and the Dutch banks pursued their own work. Only in the first months of 
the war were the banks troubled by a decrease in business. In 1938 and 1939 both 
profits and prospects were good. Trade adapted to the war, and so did the banks. 
Japan occupied all Chinese ports and tried to cut connections with the interior, but 
did not succeed in preventing large-scale smuggling. The NHM branch in Hong 
Kong even witnessed an increase in the number of Chinese business relations 
wishing to trade with the Netherlands Indies.131  
The one major political risk of the entire 1903-1941 period arose only at the very 
end, and was not a direct result of events within China. It was the possibility of war 
looming between the Netherlands and Japan that made the future of Dutch firms in 
China uncertain. The NHM and the NIHB chose to accept this risk and stay in China 
as long as possible. There was little they could have done except to withdraw 
completely. As long as their competitors were intent on staying, the Dutch banks had 
to dig in their heels as well or else they would have had to give up everything they 
had built up over the past decades. Their main local interest was still to defend their 
position in the financing of China’s foreign trade. For several years it was uncertain 
whether Japan would enter World War II, until December 1941 in fact. As a part of 
their surprise offensive against the Western Allies, on 8 December 1941 Japanese 
forces attacked Hong Kong and the Western enclaves in the treaty ports. The British 
crown colony resisted until Christmas Day, but the treaty ports fell into Japanese 
hands almost without resistance.132 It was impossible for the Dutch banks in China to 
withdraw once the Japanese attack had been launched, and by the end of 1941 their 
possessions had been seized by Japan and the few European employees who were 
still in China were treated as enemy civilians.133  
                                                          
131 Annual report of the Hong Kong NHM managing director for 1938 and 1939, ARA The Hague, 
2.20.01 NHM, 5094 jaarverslagen agentschap Hong Kong 1906-1939.  
132 Osterhammel, Weltgesellschaft, 322. 
133 In 1945 both banks reopened their offices in Hong Kong (the NHM on 31 March 1945; the opening 
date of the NIHB branch is unknown) and Shanghai (both banks on 10 Dec. 1945). On 18 December 1946 
the NIHB reopened also its Xiamen branch, but closed its Xiamen and Shanghai branches again on 18 
August 1949 and 31 August 1950 respectively. The NHM’s Shanghai branch ceased operations in 1950, 
but was not allowed to close by the PRC government until 10 January 1955. The NHM and the NIHB 
continued doing business in Hong Kong after 1949. 
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Conclusion 
The two Dutch banks, the NIHB and the NHM, occupied very similar positions in 
China, and shared the same main local interest: to participate in the financing of 
China’s foreign trade, especially the trade in Java sugar but later also expanding into 
financing other trade with the Netherlands Indies. This interest was not seriously 
threatened until the late 1930s, when it became increasingly likely that a war would 
break out between Japan and the West. However, this risk was not directly related to 
Japanese imperialism in China. Although Japan’s aggressive policy towards China 
was one of the main causes of the political tensions between Japan and the Western 
powers, it was not the Japanese position in China in itself that undermined Dutch 
banking activities there. Therefore the hypothesis formulated in the introduction is 
only correct to the extent that political risks were unimportant before 1916. The three 
sub-questions regarding civil war, Chinese nationalism, and Japanese imperialism 
cannot be answered, because they were irrelevant. The only important risk was a 
possible Dutch-Japanese war. This risk could be neutralised only by withdrawing 
completely from the Chinese market. The banks did not opt for this because it was 
contrary to their main local interest.  
 CHAPTER 3  
 
SHIPPING: JAVA-CHINA-JAPAN LIJN 
 
‘No standing still in a part of the world which 
breathes revitalisation from every angle—an 
awakening after centuries of quiet tranquility.’  
P.J. Roosegaarde Bisschop,  
chief representative JCJL, 1905.134 
 
Overall Corporate Interest 
Although the NHM was a large investor in the Java-China-Japan Lijn (JCJL), it had 
not instigated setting up the company. In the 1880s and 1890s several attempts were 
made by Dutch and British entrepreneurs to establish a regular shipping connection 
between the Netherlands Indies and China. 135  These were quickly abandoned 
because of bad financial results, but various Dutch businessmen and government 
officials continued to see the possibilities for such a shipping line. The eventual 
establishment of this steamship company in 1902 was the outcome of the strategy of 
Dutch colonial policy.136  In early 1900 Minister of Colonial Affairs J.T. Cremer 
learned that a Danish shipping firm had plans to open a regular line between the 
Netherlands Indies and China.137 Cremer, who had a strong preference for seeing a 
Dutch firm controlling this route, approached L.P.D. Op ten Noort, who was on the 
managing boards of the Stoomvaartmaatschappij ‘Nederland’ (SMN) and the 
Koninklijke Paketvaartmaatschappij (KPM).138 Minister Cremer asked him whether 
a Dutch shipping line between Southeast and East Asia could be established, and 
confided in him that he was willing to subsidise such an enterprise.139 Op ten Noort 
subsequently gathered a small group of prominent Dutch businessmen, consisting of 
banker A.D. de Marez Oyens, shipping manager B. Ruys, and Ernst Heldring of the 
shipping company KNSM, to investigate this matter.140 Van Walree, then still consul 
in Shanghai, gave his support to this group by writing a detailed report on Dutch 
shipping opportunities in the Far East. 
In June 1900 Op ten Noort’s group informed the Dutch government that several 
companies were willing to participate in the establishment of the new company, if the 
Dutch government was willing to give financial support. It then took the Dutch 
government and parliament two years to decide whether and how support could be 
given; eventually it was agreed that the new firm would receive ƒ3,750,000.- 
stretched out over the first fifteen years of its existence.141 Should the company make 
more than a certain amount of profit, this would be used to repay the government 
subsidy. In return the Dutch government had the right to block certain important 
                                                          
134 Annual report 1904, Nedlloyd Utrecht, KPJCL, 233 verslagen hoofdagent Hong Kong 1903-1923 en 
1925. 
135 For details Brugmans, Chinavaart, Chapter 2. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Cremer had previously worked for the NHM and the Deli Company. He would later become chairman 
of the managing board of the NHM. 
138 Ibid. 34. 
139 E. Heldring to E.D. van Walree 28 May 1900, ARA The Hague, II, 2.20.58.02 KJCPL, 389, 50a.  
140 Brugmans, Chinavaart, 32-33. 
141 Paid half by the mother country and half by the Netherlands Indies. 
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decisions, and obtained guarantees that two-thirds of the ships would be built in the 
Netherlands, and that at least thirteen round-trip voyages to East Asia would be made 
from Java each year.142 Official support was solid in the early years of the Java-
China-Japan Lijn: even though the Danish firm was willing to establish the shipping 
link to China without any financial aid, the Dutch government preferred the 
expensive incorporation of a new Dutch shipping enterprise.143 This attitude was a 
reflection of the general colonial policy of the Netherlands in this period, which 
strongly favoured Dutch over foreign business in the economic development and 
integration of the Netherlands Indies. For the NHM, too, the reason to support the 
new shipping firm was to protect its interests in the Netherlands East Indies.  
When the JCJL came into existence on 15 September 1902, its largest 
shareholder by far was the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij. More than 75 per 
cent of the shares was held by this company; the main motive behind the decision of 
the NHM to invest was that it wanted to improve exporting opportunities for its sugar 
producing activities. Most of the remaining company shares were owned by three 
Dutch shipping companies: the KPM, the SMN, and the Rotterdamsche Lloyd 
(RL).144 The direct business interest of these three shipping firms was that JCJL 
would enable them to expand their service. The SMN and the RL were engaged in 
shipping between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies, while the KPM was 
the major operator of inter-island traffic within the Indies. Their market positions 
were strengthened by the fact that they could now sell tickets for passengers and 
goods from the Netherlands or any port in the Indies destined for East Asia. Their 
tickets were valid on JCJL ships, and vice versa.145 After 1902 new shares were 
frequently issued to attract new capital to build the new ships needed to expand the 
company’s operations. These share issues brought in a large number of external 
shareholders who were not involved in the company’s management. 
Managerial knowledge was concentrated in three places in the firm: with the 
supervisory board in Amsterdam, with the managing director also in Amsterdam, and 
with the ‘chief representative’—or regional manager—in Hong Kong. The 
supervisory board, which represented the interests of the major shareholders, 
consisted of Op ten Noort (chairman, representing the KPM and the SMN), Ruys (for 
the RL), A. Muller (vice-chairman; for the NHM), T.J. van Haren Noman, and 
finally Ernst Heldring.146 The last saw his dream of expanding Dutch finance and 
                                                          
142 Ibid. 40-48. The decisions which the government could influence were related to the appointment of 
the top management, the emission of lending bonds, and the liquidation of the corporation. Official 
involvement in the company ended in 1918, after the fifteen-year period of state subsidy was completed. 
Until 1918 there were two delegates appointed by the Dutch and Netherlands Indies governments to 
maintain contact with the JCJL. The company was profitable enough to start repayments even before 1918 
and to have returned the entire sum by the end of that year: Ibid. 105.  
143 Ibid. 35-41. 
144 Two million guilders in 2000 shares were outstanding. Forty shares were owned by the founders, the 
rest by a syndicate consisting of the NHM (1510), the KPM (200), the SMN (150), and the RL (100): Ibid. 
53. The NHM also owned shares in the KPM and the SMN. 
145 Agreements to this effect were concluded in 1905 and 1906: Ibid. 66. 
146 During the company’s first thirty years of existence, the supervisory board called itself managing 
board (raad van bestuur), and formally there was no supervisory board. In 1933 the name of the board was 
changed to supervisory board: Ibid. 158-159. Because the board actually functioned like the supervisory 
board of other large firms—the members not being employed full-time by the firm and primarily appointed 
to represent the main shareholders—the term supervisory board is used here to designate the raad van 
bestuur until 1933. Banker A.D. de Marez Oyens of the study group did not actively participate in the 
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shipping to East Asia come true with the almost simultaneous establishment of the 
first Chinese NHM branch and of the JCJL. Although he was only thirty-two years 
old in 1903, he had played a role in both events. In 1935 Heldring became chairman, 
replacing Muller who himself had succeeded Op ten Noort in 1923.  
The supervisory board members combined functions in several companies, some 
of which were also active in China. From 1939 Heldring also acted as chairman of 
the managing board of the NHM. Ruys was the only board member who was not at 
some point in his career closely associated with either the NHM or the NIHB.147 
Muller was then on the managing board of the NHM. Later he would also be on the 
supervisory boards of Havenwerken and the NSC. Van Haren Noman was managing 
director of the NIHB. Although he did not officially represent his bank, his 
membership of the board did ensure close relations between the NIHB and the JCJL. 
Like Muller, Van Haren Noman would later join the supervisory board of 
Havenwerken. Among the members of the supervisory board during the later part of 
the 1902-1941 period were O.C.A. van Lidth de Jeude and D. Crena de Iongh. Both 
names will reappear later as supervisory board members of Havenwerken, while 
Crena de Iongh was also chairman of the NHM managing board from 1934 until 
1939.148 The JCJL supervisory board was clearly fully controlled by the firm’s major 
shareholders. 
The members of the supervisory board, although in many cases very familiar with 
the shipping business and even with doing business in Asia, fulfilled very demanding 
full-time tasks with other firms and convened only once a month. Day-to-day 
management was delegated to a managing director in Amsterdam,149 the legal seat of 
the firm. In the first few years, office space and staff in Amsterdam were hired from 
the KPM. The close operational relationship between the JCJL and the KPM was far 
from being irrational: 150  just as the JCJL was created specifically for shipping 
between the Netherlands Indies and East Asia, the KPM had been established in 
1888 by the two steamship firms SMN and RL to run shipping in the Indonesian 
archipelago. In a way, the East Asia line was an extension of the KPM’s existing 
inter-island lines.151 The function of managing director of the JCJL was assigned to 
the KPM’s managing director, J.H. Hummel.152 In other words, at the outset the 
                                                                                                                                          
establishment of the JCJL. Van Haren Noman stayed on the managing/supervisory board until his death in 
1918, Op ten Noort until his death in 1923, Muller until his death in 1935, Ruys until his resignation in 
1947, and Heldring until after 1952. Hummel and Roosegaarde Bisschop stayed with the firm until their 
deaths in 1937. The period under investigation, 1902-1941, was dominated by the people who had been 
involved in the firm from the beginning.  
147 For data on the managerial relationship between the NHM and the JCJL: Taselaar, Koloniale Lobby, 
58-62 and 537-549. 
148 Ibid. 59-61. 
149  Initially his title was ‘administrator’ (administrateur), which was changed to managing director 
(direkteur) in 1918. To indicate that his position was comparable to the managing director or managing 
board of other companies, the term managing director will be used here also for the years before 1918. 
Until 1933 the managing director also functioned as the secretary of the supervisory board. In 1933 the 
managing director replaced the raad van bestuur as the highest executive organ.  
150 Later Hummel would become chairman and Roosegaarde Bisschop would be member of the managing 
board of the KPM. Moreover, Hummel would also be on the supervisory boards of the SMN and the 
NHM: Taselaar, Koloniale Lobby, 542 and 546. 
151  On the KPM see J.N.F.M. à Campo. Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij: Stoomvaart en 
Staatsvorming in de Indonesische Archipel (Hilversum 1992). 
152 Formally also administrateur. 
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Java-China-Japan Lijn was run from Amsterdam by people who were very familiar 
with the industry but not exclusively committed to this firm. The supervisory board 
and the managing director were not in personal contact with the company’s managers 
and ship officers, customers, and competitors.  
                                                          
Initially control was completely vested in the hands of the supervisory board, but 
it was not long before local management also became a very influential factor. In 
Asia the firm was managed by a regional manager whose official title was chief 
representative (hoofdagent).153 In 1902 P.J. Roosegaarde Bisschop was appointed to 
this position. He had formerly worked for the Scheepsagentuur, a Dutch shipping 
agency in Southeast Asia, but was now to devote all his time and energy to the JCJL. 
Bisschop would eventually remain with the company for thirty-five years—until his 
death in 1937. Like Van Walree he was a former school friend of Ernst Heldring. It 
is Bisschop who must have the credit for building up and maintaining the actual 
shipping business of the JCJL. He has been characterised as a straight-from-the-
shoulder person, not diplomatic in his dealings with others but a hard worker who 
regarded the company as his own interest. 154  As the company grew, Bisschop 
emerged as the only person with detailed knowledge of its operations.155 The balance 
of power within the organisation stabilised in 1913 when Bisschop was transferred to 
Amsterdam to become managing director. He succeeded Hummel who became 
member of the supervisory board. 156  It was easier for the supervisory board to 
control Bisschop once he was in Amsterdam, while Bisschop himself had to delegate 
many operational matters to P.H.J.G. Jonckheer, the new chief representative in 
Hong Kong. 157 Despite his exile to Amsterdam, Bisschop remained well-informed of 
operational conditions in Asia. He continued to make visits to Asia to inspect 
business personally.  
On the whole, between 1902 and 1941 control of the firm may be said to have 
been shared between the large shareholders (via the supervisory board) and 
management (via Bisschop, first as chief representative, later as managing 
director).158 The main interest of the large shareholders was maintaining shipping 
between Java and East Asia. The main interest of Bisschop and his staff in Asia lay 
in to expanding the firm. 
153 In 1934 the function of chief representative was renamed representative; from then on there were two 
people holding this job simultaneously (in Dutch the word vertegenwoordigers rather than agenten was 
now used, since the latter word was already used for the non-employed commercial representatives). The 
term chief representative will also be applied to the years after 1933. 
154 Brugmans, Chinavaart, 56. 
155 Relations between management in Amsterdam and local personnel in Asian ports were a delicate 
matter; interference from Europe was generally not welcomed by the local managers: J.H. Warning to F. 
Dankers 10 Feb. and 5 Mar. 1985, private collection F. Dankers. 
156 Brugmans, Chinavaart, 56-57. 
157 His successors as chief representative were P.H.J.G Jonckheer (1914-1919), G.J. Otten (1919-1927), 
T. de Meester (1927-1933), J.A.J.W. Nieuwenhuys (1933-1938), C.F.J. Quarles van Ufford (1933-1937), 
A.L.W. van Dobben (1938-1940), and J.H. Warning (1938-1940). When Germany occupied the 
Netherlands in 1940, the two representatives Van Dobben and Warning replaced the director as the highest 
managing organ: Brugmans, Chinavaart, 164. 
158 He was succeeded as managing director in 1937 by C.F.J. Quarles van Ufford, an employee of the 
firm since 1910 and chief representative since 1934. 
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International Shipping in China 
In 1902-1903 the first challenge awaiting Bisschop was to build an intra-Asian 
shipping organisation almost from scratch. Ships and money were provided from the 
corporate centre in the Netherlands, but it was Bisschop’s task to select crews, 
agents, and compradores, conclude supply and maintenance contracts, open offices, 
and devise operational routines—in other words to create a new enterprise.159By 
September 1903 Bisschop had put together his organisation and for the first time a 
JCJL ship departed from Batavia to make her voyage around East Asia. In the first 
twelve months that the JCJL was operational, it already managed to vouchsafe one 
voyage in every four weeks, dutifully complying with the demands of the Dutch 
government.160 The new shipping line was in business and its service would continue 
until December 1941. 
Batavia was the homeport from where the JCJL’s ships began each voyage. Via 
various ports in the Netherlands Indies and China the ships would reach Japan and 
from there return to the Netherlands Indies, again via China. The exact route of the 
ships changed frequently in the next decades, reflecting the commercial and political 
changes in the Far East. Gradually more JCJL routes developed and co-existed 
simultaneously, and the number of departures per route also increased. In the late 
1920s—just before the great depression—there were seven routes, several of which 
were exclusively to China.161 The frequency of departures was about once every 
forthnight on most routes. This section deals only with JCJL activities in China, and 
leaves aside the other countries with which the chief representative also had to 
concern himself. 
Hong Kong was chosen as the location of the JCJL’s Asian headquarters because 
it was situated more or less at the centre of the firm’s operational territory, and labour 
and technical facilities were considered cheap there.162 Bisschop managed the entire 
business from the British Crown Colony, at the beginning assisted only by three 
Dutch and four Chinese employees.163 For all other ports he contracted trading firms 
to act as shipping agents. The Holland China Handelscompagnie (HCHC) became 
the agent in Shanghai, while in the local absence of Dutch trading firms Swire 
represented the JCJL at Xiamen and Shantou. Agents were also appointed in several 
other Chinese ports, but until the 1920s JCJL ships would usually visit only Hong 
Kong, Shanghai, Shantou, and Xiamen. The NHM was designated to act as financial 
agent wherever this bank had a branch office, elsewhere the NIHB fulfilled this task, 
if possible.164 In Hong Kong, later also in other Chinese cities, the company did its 
business mostly through a Chinese compradore. Right from the outset in 1902, Sum 
Pak Ming was compradore for the JCJL in Hong Kong. In the early years especially 
his task was crucial, for he actually contracted and paid the money for the cargo to be 
shipped by the firm in advance. In later years, as knowledge about local business 
conditions and the availability of financial services increased, the shipping company 
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would depend less on him. Nonetheless, Sum Pak Ming would work with the JCJL 
almost until the Second World War.165  
Bisschop had to carve out a niche for the JCJL in the Java-China shipping route. 
By far the most important trade to be captured by any firm interested in entering 
Java-China shipping was the sugar trade.166 If the JCJL could secure and hold a large 
part of the sugar shipped from Java to China, then the company would be in a strong 
position with respect to its competitors. Demonstrating clearly the importance of 
sugar transports, in 1908 this commodity accounted for 60 per cent of all freight 
shipped by the JCJL from Java to East Asia. In 1918 this figure was 59 per cent, and 
in 1928 sugar accounted for 76 per cent.167 Because of the sugar trade, Hong Kong 
was the most important Chinese destination for the JCJL. Hong Kong was also the 
primary Chinese port for passenger shipping.168 After sugar transports, passenger 
transport was the second basis upon which a regular line between the Netherlands 
Indies and China could be built. Most passengers were ‘coolies’, Chinese contract 
labourers, from South China, either on their way to Southeast Asia to work on 
plantations or in mines, or on their way back home. With this in mind, the JCJL 
always used ships for its China-bound journeys that were specially designed to carry 
both freight and passengers. 169  One characteristic typical of these ships was the 
extended ‘fourth class accommodation’: the deck space reserved for the coolies. 
Apart from them there also were the overseas Chinese living permanently in the 
Netherlands Indies and travelling to China for business or to visit relatives. Still, 
cargo contributed much more to company profits than passengers, especially in the 
early years. In the period 1903-1913 cargo accounted for 88 per cent of total 
revenue.170 This stresses the importance of sugar for the company. 
While sugar could be carried on the journeys to China, and passengers could be 
taken in both directions, unfortunately for the JCJL there was not a single dominant 
cargo freight for the return voyage from China to Java. The main Chinese products 
exported to the Netherlands Indies were Formosan tea, Manchurian beans, products 
from the Kailan Mining Association (KMA), and cigarettes. Tea from Formosa at 
first was shipped to Java via Xiamen, later the JCJL would ship it directly from 
Formosa. In the bean trade, the JCJL managed to create a virtual monopoly. Just like 
the beans, KMA products came from North China and included firebrick, coke, and 
clay. The KMA, a British-Chinese joint venture, was the largest mining company in 
China.171 This firm also operated China’s largest glass factory and its glass was also 
carried to the Netherlands Indies by the JCJL. In the 1920s the JCJL shipped many 
cigarettes for the British-American Tobacco Company and its Chinese rival, the 
Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company. After the Netherlands Indies raised the import 
duty by 50 per cent and BAT responded by building a cigarette factory in Java, the 
JCJL supplied this factory with Chinese tobacco.172 
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From the Indies to China, sugar was far and away the dominant cargo. The problem 
was that, as a seasonal crop, sugar was not shipped throughout the year and other 
cargoes were needed when not enough sugar was traded. One relatively stable and 
important cargo were Royal Dutch/Shell products from Borneo, such as candles, 
lubricants, and paraffin wax. The oil company used its own tankers for kerosene 
shipments from Sumatra and Borneo to China. After it merged its candle-making 
activities with those of Lever Brothers as Candles Ltd in 1922, Royal Dutch/Shell 
closed its Balikpapan candle factory and continued to supply the Chinese market 
from the former Lever Brothers’ factory in Shanghai. The JCJL was compensated for 
the loss of its candle trade by an increase of paraffin exports from Balikpapan to 
China.173 Another link between the JCJL and Royal Dutch/Shell was that from the 
1920s, the JCJL used Royal Dutch/Shell fuel oil for its oil-fired steamers—although 
part of the fleet still used coal, which was supplied by the Kailan Mining Association 
or the Mitsui Trading Company (Mitsui Bussan Kaisha) of Japan.174 
It was not difficult for the JCJL—with its year-round regular schedule and its ties 
with the NHM—to capture a large part of the Javanese shipping contracts for 
sugar.175 The initial problem with competition came from Swire and Jardine, the 
main buyers of Java sugar in Hong Kong, which were very well established in the 
treaty port trade and owned shipping firms of their own which they used to bring 
their unrefined sugar from Java.176 Under different circumstances, competing with 
their ships would have been very difficult since there were no other important 
refineries in China. However, soon after the JCJL went into business, Swire chose to 
co-operate rather than compete with the newcomer. Probably the fact that the Dutch 
sugar growers—lead by the NHM—preferred to work with the JCJL helped Swire to 
make up its mind. From then until the Second World War, Swire let the JCJL ship 
most of its supplies of sugar to Hong Kong.177 The British refinery ordered its sugar 
in advance of the annual sugar season, against a reduced tariff. The JCJL guaranteed 
the delivery of the order, but if Swire booked further orders during the sugar season, 
current market prices were charged for the shipping. Part of the agreement was also 
that JCJL ships would use the new Swire dock in Hong Kong, which was completed 
in 1909.178 In later years Swire’s competitor, Jardine, also contracted the JCJL for its 
Java sugar supplies. Profiting from steady relations with the main suppliers and 
buyers of Java sugar, the JCJL obtained a comfortable foothold for further expansion 
in Java-China shipping.  
In passenger shipping the JCJL enjoyed also a strong position The major 
destinations for Chinese labourers going to the Netherlands Indies were the tin mines 
on the islands of Belitung (Billiton) and Bangka, and the Deli tobacco plantations in 
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Sumatra. The mining enterprises made extensive use of the JCJL’s transport service 
to carry their labour force to and from China. In the Chinese ports the company 
worked hand in glove with boarding houses, organisations that provided the 
prospective labourers with accommodation in the harbour and credit for the 
journey.179 Apart from dominating sugar and passenger shipping, the JCJL was also 
in the forefront in the shipping of the other main products in Chinese-Netherlands 
Indies trade.  
In the 1930s the role of these other products became more important as shipments 
of sugar and coolies decreased in size. The world-wide economic depression 
seriously affected Javanese sugar producers and the Chinese sugar market. In the 
Dutch East Indies, other products replaced sugar as the top export commodity. In 
China there was less internal trade and the Chinese import tariff for sugar was 
doubled in 1932.180 As a result, sugar was out of reach of many Chinese. In addition 
to this, the passenger shipping business also shrank. The Dutch colonial government 
in Batavia decided to restrict Chinese immigration, while the Banka and Belitung tin-
mines replaced part of the labour force by machines.181 As a result Bisschop and the 
supervisory board were forced to reduce the number of shipping movements. 
The Java-China-Japan Lijn entered the shipping industry with strong official and 
NHM support in 1903, and soon became the market leader in shipping between the 
Dutch East Indies and China. This did not mean the elimination of competition on 
this route, both in cargo and in passenger shipping. Various non-Dutch shipping 
companies at one time or other experimented with regular shipping between China 
and Java. Several firms also entered the business during those months when the 
demand for sugar ships was at its peak, trying to capture the most profitable element 
in the JCJL’s business. Two Japanese companies, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha and the 
Nanyo Kisen Kaisha, proved to be tough competitors for the Dutch firm. Both 
shipped between Java and Japan, and once they also included Chinese ports in their 
routes they threatened the JCJL’s Java-China trade. Apart from the Japanese, there 
were Chinese, Indies-Chinese, German, Norwegian, Danish, British, Portuguese, 
Australian, and American shipping companies, all vying for a slice of the cake. 
The main worry for Bisschop always remained how to ‘organise’ competition. He 
argued that since a monopoly would be impossible to achieve, the most preferable 
situation would be one in which the competition would maintain a regular route, and 
stay within the limits set by the Java-China-Japan Lijn.182 During his years in Hong 
Kong, Bisschop became very experienced in dealing with competitors. During such 
negotiations Bisschop acted first and only afterwards asked for approval from his 
superiors in Amsterdam.183 When in 1912 the Japanese Nanyo Kisen Kaisha was 
established and entered the Chinese shipping business, the supervisory board of the 
JCJL instructed Bisschop to come to an agreement with the new Japanese 
competitor, rather than regard it as the enemy. Bisschop obeyed, but not before 
severely attacking the Japanese firm by offering price discounts. Only after this show 
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of strength did Bisschop negotiate with the Japanese.184 In most other cases, rivals 
were either pushed out of the market, or forced into an agreement with the JCJL. 
Although undoubtedly the company held a strong market position, this did not 
mean that it also had a very stable basis of existence. Both sugar and contract 
labourers were uncertain commodities in the sense that demand for them was easily 
influenced by numerous political, financial, and economic factors. Moreover, sugar 
was a seasonal crop. During the summer months when most Java sugar was exported, 
shipping space was at such a premium that the JCJL had to charter ships. It was 
difficult to prevent competitors from entering the sugar trade during the busy season 
and abstracting part of the turnover and profit that the JCJL needed to finance its 
activities during the quiet season. This problem was partly offset by the sugar 
contracts with Swire booked in advance of the sugar season, but continued to exist 
throughout the period described here.   
The fundamental characteristic of shipping was the fact that in the end the tariff, 
not the amounts of goods and number of persons shipped, was conclusive.185 When 
there was great demand for shipping in Asia and ships were hard to come by, the 
JCJL benefited enormously. This situaton was most accute towards the end of the 
First World War. When the reverse situation occurred, business was difficult and 
there was not much the company could do about it. Bisschop’s strategy for dealing 
with this was to persuade competitors to join in tariff agreements. However, this 
worked only to a limited extent, as newcomers continually entered the business. 
Furthermore, with the Japanese competitors it was often difficult to come to a lasting 
agreement.186 From the beginning Bisschop’s view was that ‘[...] the Japanese with 
their notoriously unfair idea of trade have always secretly dodged the agreements.’187 
During the 1920s and 1930s JCJL observers noted that this behaviour was a result of 
pressure exerted by the Japanese authorities.188 
Another strategy employed, not by the management in Asia but by the 
Amsterdam head office, was to create large financial reserves. If tariff fluctuations 
could not be controlled, the company could try to minimise their impact. From the 
beginning, it was the policy of the company to keep substantial portions of the annual 
profits within the organisation. During the profitable years of the First World War, a 
large variety of special reserve funds was created. The advantage of this was that 
management would have sufficient financial freedom to carry out its policy even in 
times when no profits were made. This again shows that the controlling shareholders 
NHM, KPM, RL, and SMN were seriously interested in the continuity and growth of 
the JCJL, rather than in short-term financial gains. The problem was that the 
shareholders who were not directly represented on the supervisory board were not 
primarily interested in the long-term future of the firm. They demanded that much of 
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the reserves be used to create higher profits or given to them as a dividend.189 In the 
1920s the JCJL decided to give in to this demand, and to liquidate many of the 
reserve funds created during World War I.190 The company’s dividend policy reflects 
the cyclical nature of the shipping industry. In years of economic depressions in the 
Far East—1907, 1921-1925, 1930 and probably also the years which followed—the 
JCJL paid no dividend to its shareholders. This contrasts with the second half of the 
1910s, when dividend was exceptionally high and reached a maximum rate of 30 per 
cent of the nominal share value for the year 1918.191  
Despite depressions and its unpredictable nature, trade in the Far East generally 
grew during the first three decades of the century. In the early 1920s the JCJL 
operated a special line to the United States called Java-Pacific Lijn, and it was 
decided that Java was the more appropriate centre of the company’s activities. In 
1921, therefore, the Asian head office was moved from Hong Kong to Batavia.192 
The Hong Kong office was appointed as the local head office of the Holland-Oost 
Azië Lijn—part of the Vereenigde Nederlandsche Scheepvaartmaatschappij, in 
which the JCJL participated financially.193 But within just one year, the JCJL opened 
a second Chinese branch office in Shanghai and also moved the Holland-Oost Azië 
Lijn agency to this new office.194 Other branch offices were established in the late 
1920s in Xiamen and Shantou, which remained relatively important to shipping, and 
briefly also in Formosa. The JCJL fleet grew from three ships when the company 
was established to eighteen in 1929, totalling 119,000 tons. 195  After 1929 the 
company’s total shipping tonnage decreased slighty. 
Beginning in 1903 the JCJL gradually expanded its agency system in China to 
include Guangzhou, Macao, Fuzhou (Foochow), Keelung (in Formosa), Hankou, 
Qingdao (Tsingtao), Yantai (Chefoo), Niuzhuang (Newchwang, now Yingkou), 
Harbin, and Dalian (Dairen). During the opening decades of the twentieth century, as 
the experience of the JCJL shows, the pattern of international trade in China changed 
from being strongly concentrated in Hong Kong to a more even division between 
southern and northern sea ports. But Hong Kong with its excellent natural harbour 
remained the most important Chinese harbour for international shipping, Shanghai 
occupying a second position.196  
In the beginning of the twentieth century Shanghai was not much of a harbour in the 
eyes of JCJL personnel. The fact that the Huangpu (Whangpoo) River was too 
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shallow to allow JCJL vessels to approach the city was a real stumble-block. The 
firm lost much time and money because of the need to transfer of freight to and from 
lighters.197 This particular problem was partly solved by the work of Havenwerken. 
However, also after the harbour improvement works carried out between 1908 and 
1916, Shanghai remained poorly equipped as a port. A 1923 report by Chief 
Representative G.J. Otten, Jonckheer’s successor, complained that the Yangzi River 
near the Huangpu was too shallow and that wharfs and warehouses were inadequate. 
According to the author, Shanghai’s abundant cheap labour force and the uncertainty 
about China’s economic future were the main reasons why necessary investments in 
harbour modernisation were not made.198  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JCJL's ship ' Tjikembang' seen from the Bund, Shanghai, June 1937 (reproduced by 
kind permission of the Maritiem Museum, Rotterdam) 
 
In spite of these problems, the JCJL was among the largest foreign shipping firms in 
Shanghai. Partly as a result of this, the Netherlands was entitled to a seat in the 
Whangpoo Conservancy Board during the 1920s. 199  Shanghai became an 
increasingly important destination for international shipping in the wake of the 
economic development of East and North China. Eventually the JCJL also became 
interested in direct shipping to ports further north than Shanghai. During the 1920s 
Manchuria developed quickly and became a major market for sugar as well as an 
important area of bean production. Dalian became an important destination in the 
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1920s.200 In 1926 the chief representative declared that this city had the best harbour 
in China.201 Another port in the north was Qinhuangdao (Chinwangtao), the Kailan 
Mining Association’s own sea port, where JCJL ships conveniently stopped en route 
to or from Dalian. In Qinhuangdao the ships could take aboard coal, firebrick, coke, 
and other KMA products. 
The JCJL expanded both in volume and geographically to keep up with the 
development of trade between China and the Netherlands Indies. Ons snag was that 
the nature of the business in which the JCJL operated was cyclical; the company 
depended strongly on the prevailing economic fluctuations. In response, the company 
tried to exert influence on parts of its market environment, by trying to regulate 
competition, supply, and demand. Relations on the Netherlands Indies side with 
sugar producers and employers of coolie labour were strong. This was not the case in 
China where the Dutch shipping company did not become highly integrated into the 
Chinese economy—apart from its offices it did not own FDI in China at all. The 
result was that it could not influence supply and demand on the Chinese side of its 
shipping route. In spite of this the JCJL retained its dominant position on the Java-
China route until 1941. Its main local interest in China was almost identical to its 
main overall interest, because China played a central role in the firm’s activities. The 
company’s aim was to defend and enlarge its market position in East Asian shipping, 
in particular between China and the Netherlands Indies, and this remained so 
throughout the 1903-1941 period. 
 
Political Risks and Response 
 
1903-1916 
Because the JCJL was an international shipping company, its operations remained 
confined to Chinese coastal waters and the large treaty ports. Therefore the Dutch 
company was not deeply involved in Chinese society. Still, from the beginning the 
board was aware that anti-foreign sentiments in the Chinese public opinion were to 
be taken seriously. Among the inhabitants of South China whose relatives were 
working as contract labourer in the Netherlands Indies rumours frequently circulated 
about a supposedly anti-Chinese attitude among Dutch colonial officials and 
employers. It was believed by many that Chinese workers were treated as slaves, and 
that generally speaking people of Chinese descent were the victim of a wide range of 
discriminatory measures imposed by the Dutch colonial government. 202 In 1905 the 
policy of the US government against Chinese immigrants sparked off a widespread 
boycott of American consumer goods in China, causing a serious decline in sales.203 
The JCJL was afraid that either an incident in the Netherlands Indies or the rumours 
spread by rival firms would result in a similar boycott of Dutch products and 
companies. Because its ships sailed under the Dutch flag and were highly visible in 
China’s main ports, this would make the JCJL an obvious target.  
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Interestingly, the firm’s managers themselves actually also believed that Dutch 
colonial policy was discriminatory and unfavourable towards Chinese coolies. The 
Netherlands Indies government always found it difficult to administer the large 
Chinese ethnic minority, one of the reasons being the strong relations maintained 
between the Indies Chinese and China. Its worries were not eased by the fact that the 
Chinese government’s standpoint was that all persons of Chinese descent were 
Chinese citizens, wherever they were living. A strong fear which permeated colonial 
administrative circles, was that ‘radical’ political movements might extend their 
influence from China to the Netherlands Indies, thereby undermining Dutch colonial 
rule. As a consequence, the authorities tried to control the movement of Chinese to 
and from China as much as possible—for example, by levying high immigration 
dues, issuing very strict medical regulations, or demanding that every Chinese visitor 
carried a passport. At times, this handicapped the JCJL’s ambitions to increase its 
passenger transportation. In their reports Bisschop and later chief representatives 
repeatedly complained about the ‘harassment of our passengers’. 204  Roosegaarde 
Bisschop also firmly believed that Chinese competitors were quite capable of fanning 
anti-Dutch sentiments in order to improve their market position. In 1906 he accused 
a Chinese shipping firm, Wee Bin & Co., of attempting to organise a boycott 
campaign against the JCJL in Xiamen. The Dutch company responded by bypassing 
the Xiamen tea traders and going to Formosa to get tea directly from there.205  
In 1908, on a rare occasion when the company came in direct contact with the 
Chinese authorities because it needed permission to recruit and ship contract 
labourers from Fuzhou to Deli, the coolie matter led to a problem. China refused to 
give any such permission, as long as the Dutch did not grant China permission to 
open consular offices in the Netherlands Indies. 206  During the 1911 revolution, 
articles appeared in the Chinese press that demanded action against the Dutch 
Billiton Company’s efforts to recruit workers in China. In the end, the Billiton 
Company had to cease recruiting in China and the JCJL had less passengers.207 After 
1911 Sino-Dutch tensions over overseas Chinese eased, because the Dutch 
government decided to allow China to set up semi-official consulates in the Dutch 
colony. 208 Furthermore, the whole situation improved because the new government 
of Yuan Shikai was confronted by too many domestic troubles to address matters 
outside China actively. 
 
1916-1928 
From 1911 until 1921, the JCJL remained untroubled by acute political risks, either 
resulting from conflicts in Sino-Dutch diplomatic relations or any other type. This 
absence of political risks is one of the explanations for the fact that the company 
turned down an offer from Chinese investors who were interested in taking a 
financial interest in the firm.209 The JCJL chief representative noted that this offer 
should be seen in relation to a general desire among Chinese businessmen to gain 
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influence in foreign organisations—a desire he considered ‘vague and unspecified’. 
Since the Chinese lacked the ‘ability, integrity, and organisation’ to create large 
enterprises by themselves, he believed it would be irresponsible to give such people a 
leading role in any large business hierarchy,210 as long as they were not capable of 
setting up similar companies by themselves. The management of the JCJL saw no 
need to invite Chinese capital purely as a measure to limit political risks by creating 
an interest in the firm’s health among Chinese investors.  
Precisely in the same year, 1921, new political risks began to emerge for the 
Dutch shipping line. On the initiative of nationalist and communist activists, port 
workers in Hong Kong and Shanghai formed trade unions which grew increasingly 
militant. In the July of 1921, a stokers’ strike was averted by the large shipping 
companies by conceding a wage increase. This did not last long and in the January of 
the following year, a general harbour strike was organised in Hong Kong by the 
Seamen’s Union, to support Chinese sailors’ demands for higher wages.211 Although 
this caused serious delays, the JCJL managed to keep its business going by bringing 
in extra personnel from the Philippines.212 Only after the strike spread outside the 
harbour and threatened to turn into a general strike, the shipping firms decided to 
give in and pay a 15 per cent increase in sailors’ wages. In spite of this settlement, 
further strikes erupted in Hong Kong in the following years. To be prepared to deal 
with new actions by the Seamen’s Union, the JCJL and the other foreign shipping 
firms established the ‘Hongkong Foreign Ship-Owners and Agents Association’.213  
During the same period, Chinese popular organisations also began to participate 
in activities that were politically motivated. In late 1921 the Xiamen Citizens’ 
Association launched a boycott against Swire, the cause being a dispute over whether 
certain Swire property was part of the British concession quarter of Xiamen. The 
boycott spread to Shantou, and was not settled until Britain agreed to give in to 
Chinese demands over the concession boundary. Meanwhile Swire was immobilised 
and could do no business in Xiamen or Shantou, therefore the JCJL lost its agents in 
those ports. The Dutch company had to appoint other merchants to take over the 
agency from Swire temporarily.214  
The civil wars in China during the early 1920s did not bother the JCJL very 
much. Even the notorious pirate attacks on coastal shipping in South China did not 
cause the Dutch company much trouble. The only significant threat remained the 
growing agitation against foreigners. Nevertheless, JCJL Chief Representative G.J. 
Otten saw no reasons for great concern: 
 
‘Sooner or later the situation in China will become more settled and from the 
moment industrialisation takes off, there will be no limits to the opportunities 
for expansion of trade between the Netherlands Indies and China for a long 
time to come. Consequently the main opportunities of the JCJL’s future 
development will have to be found in both directions of Indies-Chinese 
trade.’215 
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But the strikes against foreign shipping lines that occurred in Hong Kong between 
1921 and 1924 proved to be only the prelude. On 23 June 1925 British and French 
troops killed fifty-two Chinese demonstrators in Guangzhou. This triggered a 
massive strike among Chinese employees of foreign businesses in the Hong Kong 
area and a boycott throughout large parts of the country, of which British products 
were the main target. Chinese seamen’s organisations played a leading role in these 
actions, 216  and the harbour of Hong Kong was hit hard by the strike. Much 
international trade moved from the British colony Hong Kong to the International 
Settlement in Shanghai. The British sugar refineries in Hong Kong also suffered; by 
1928 the situation had become so difficult that Swire had to shut its refinery 
temporarily and to abandon its sugar distribution network in the interior of China.217 
Jardine’s sugar refinery fared worse and went out of business permanently.218 
As long as the British were the main target of anti-foreign agitation, the JCJL did 
not experience any serious problems. Like the Dutch banks, the shipping line 
benefited from the fact that part of the sugar trade moved to Shanghai in order to 
circumvent the strike in Hong Kong. The level of sugar imports in Shanghai shot up 
to reach about the same level as that of Hong Kong.219 This heralded the collapse of 
the old hegemony of Hong Kong in sugar distribution, and new importing firms 
emerged in Shanghai, such as the Chinese-owned Minhua Refinery. 220  This was 
good for the JCJL, because it meant that it now was less dependent on the British 
firms in Hong Kong. Nor did the trend stop at Shanghai: also Dalian, Shantou, and 
Xiamen imported more Java sugar from 1925. The fact that Java sugar entered China 
by way of new ports and importers stimulated its demand. Sugar had always been the 
primary cargo on China-bound ships, but by 1928 over three-quarters in weight of all 
cargo for China consisted of this product.221 
During a visit to China, Otten observed how the upsurge in anti-foreign sentiment 
affected trade. In his annual report he predicted that although emergent nationalism 
in China would cause many more instances of friction with the foreign interests, he 
was not worried about the future of the JCJL: 
 
‘The strange thing, however, is that in spite of this [strengthening of Chinese 
nationalism], trade with this enormous country of some 400 million 
inhabitants is growing, and very probably will continue to do so, in spite of 
the civil wars and the nationalistic upheaval. Japan foresees very accurately 
that China will become the major power of East Asia, and its current policy is 
aimed at all costs at preventing offending this large consumer of its industrial 
goods. The other major powers have also said goodbye to the so-called 
‘gunboat policy’, and now occupy themselves with extensive, fruitless 
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conferences in Peking, with a government which has almost no influence over 
the warring generals in its territory.’222 
 
Meanwhile Swire, which had resumed its agency work for the JCJL in Xiamen and 
Shantou, was once again unable to function in these treaty ports. In 1927 and 1928 
the JCJL therefore opened its own offices in Xiamen and Shantou respectively.223 
J.H. Warning, then JCJL manager in Xiamen, would later refer to China in this 
period as ‘a kind of “Wild West”.’ He characterised his attitude toward the unstable 
situation as: ‘Continuously adapt to the current circumstances and as much as 
possible be prepared for “anything” to happen’. As an example of the ability of the 
company men to adapt, he described how the JCJL had two motorboats in Xiamen. 
One showed the Dutch and company flags, the other had a Chinese flag. The purpose 
was always to have at least one boat ready to reach JCJL ships which were moored in 
the river near the city, if a boycott were to be declared against the company.224  
Although there was always the possibility that the JCJL would become the target of a 
strike or boycott, its managers never believed that the Dutch government could 
provide any protection. They thought that diplomats and consuls were not trained to 
understand trade and shipping. ‘The pace [at which diplomats moved] was not 
impressive, but they were co-operative people.’ 225  For its survival the company 
relied on its capacity to adapt rather than on official suppo 226rt.   
                                                          
 
1928-1937 
In 1930 the dreaded possibility of a boycott aimed directly at the JCJL materialised. 
After the company’s newest ship, the ‘Tjibadak’, returned to the Netherlands Indies 
from a trip to China, a female Chinese passenger reported to the authorities that 
during the voyage she had been raped by a Dutch crew member. 227  Via the 
Netherlands Indies and Singapore press this news reached China where it was 
regarded by many as evidence that Chinese were still maltreated in Dutch Southeast 
Asia. Calls for a boycott against the JCJL were published, but the boycott took effect 
only in Xiamen. The management of the company took the matter very seriously and 
responded swiftly. Even though the Dutch colonial authorities were still investigating 
the case, and the chief representative was convinced that the charge was exaggerated, 
he immediately took disciplinary measures against the crew member involved.228  
Shortly thereafter this person was discharged, and the chief representative publicly 
declared that the employee had committed a serious offence, and apologised on 
behalf of the company—which satisfied the Chinese associations in the Netherlands 
222 Annual report 1925, Nedlloyd Utrecht, KPJCL, 233 verslagen van de hoofdagent 1903-1923 and 
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Indies. 229  Although he went through these motions, he was convinced that the 
Seamen’s Union was behind the Xiamen boycott. Not primarily because of the 
‘Tjibadak’ case itself, but in order to force the JCJL to pay more for the local 
tallymen’s service. The local JCJL manager was of the same opinion: since the JCJL 
was seen locally as the ‘No.1 shipping company’, it was extra-vulnerable as a target 
for union demands against the foreign shipping firms in general.230 He suggested that 
the solution was for the firm to establish friendlier relations with local unions.231  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JCJL's ship 'Tjibadak' at the time of its completion, Van der Giessen's 
Scheepswerven, Krimpen aan den IJssel (Netherlands), April 1929 (reproduced by 
kind permission of the Maritiem Museum, Rotterdam) 
 
The measures taken by the company did not immediately lead to the end of the 
boycott. In an attempt to help the JCJL, the Dutch minister in Beijing, J.W. 
Oudendijk, approached the new Guomindang government in Nanjing (Nanking), 
from which he obtained the assurance that it would end the boycott. This does not 
seem to have helped much, because some weeks after Oudendijk’s action, the 
‘radical rabble’—as the local manager put it—in Xiamen still denied having received 
any orders from Nanjing about ending the boycott.232 A few months were to elapse 
before the Xiamen boycott began to lose intensity; the reason for this is unknown. 
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The entire affair did not have any serious effects for the Dutch shipping firm, which 
lost only one shipload of cargo, to its Japanese rival the Osaka Shosen Kaisha.233 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counter of the passenger department of the Java-China-Japan Lijn branch office in 
Shanghai, July 1937 (reproduced by kind permission of the Maritiem Museum, 
Rotterdam) 
 
The ‘Tjibadak’ affair was the only direct confrontation between the JCJL and 
Chinese nationalism. After 1930 the main focus of disapprobation in Chinese public 
opinion shifted from the European to the Japanese imperialists. Although Japan’s 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931-1932 and its attack on the Chinese-administered parts 
of Shanghai disturbed trade routes in China—Hong Kong now again increased in 
importance in relation to Shanghai234—there were some distinctly positive effects for 
the JCJL. In 1932 the chief representative was able to report that under the duress of 
Sino-Japanese tensions, Japanese shipping lines were less competitive and 
consequently he had been able to raise shipping tariffs.235 During the 1930s Chinese 
businessmen generally preferred non-Japanese to Japanese ships to carry their 
goods.236 
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1937-1941 
In 1937 the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War again affected trade routes. When 
Japan occupied the Chinese coastline connections between the Chinese seaports and 
the interior of the country deteriorated, which made it more difficult for passengers 
to reach the JCJL ships. But the company also profited from the fact that its Chinese 
competitors disappeared, and that many Japanese ships were requisitioned by the 
Japanese armed forces. As a result, freight rates again went up. Furthermore, it did 
not take the JCJL long to find out that movement between the seaports and the 
interior was still feasible. To stimulate passenger shipping, the company sent its 
compradore staff into the interior to escort prospective passengers to the coast. The 
fact that shipping on the Yangzi was restricted by the Japanese did not affect the 
JCJL, because it did not participate in inland shipping. Thus, in spite of the war, 
Java-China shipping by the JCJL grew after 1937.237  As with Dutch banking in 
China, the only major political risk of the late 1930s was that war would break out 
between Japan and the Netherlands, but this risk did not relate directly to the fact that 
Japan replaced the Nationalist government as the main ruler of China. In 1940, when 
the Netherlands were occupied by Germany, the head office of the JCJL was moved 
from Amsterdam to Batavia. The company continued it operations, and responded to 
the threat of war with Japan by withdrawing its European staff from that country—
not China—in 1941.238 To end its shipping routes to Japan and Japanese-occupied 
China would put the company out of business. Nevertheless, by early December—
some days before Japan launched its war against the US, Britain, and the 
Netherlands—the company’s management was concerned enough to withdraw its 
ships from Japanese-controlled waters.239 As a result no JCJL ships fell into Japanese 
hands at the outbreak of the war, but even so all shipping business in East Asia 
became impossible from December 1941 onwards. The company’s offices in China 
were captured by the Japanese army. 
 
Conclusion 
The main local interest of the JCJL in China was to defend its position as the main 
shipping line between China and the Netherlands Indies, consequently the company 
was active only in the largest treaty ports. The hypothesis regarding the main 
political risks between 1903 and 1941 is largely incorrect. From the point of view of 
the JCJL, in the years from 1903 to 1931 there was one important political risk, 
namely an anti-Dutch boycott generated by Chinese nationalism. Only after 1925 
was this risk seen as a major threat. After 1931 the rise of Japanese influence and the 
fighting after 1937 did not cause serious risks. On the contrary, it reduced the risk of 
Chinese anti-Dutch nationalism. Only at the end of the 1930s did the possibility of a 
Japanese-Dutch war produce a new and fundamental threat to the JCJL’s main 
interest.  
The JCJL’s response to Chinese nationalism was a passive one. The offer made in 
1921 by Chinese business relations to take a financial interest in the company was an 
opportunity to limit the risk of a boycott. Once a boycott might be triggered by 
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events in the Netherlands Indies, the shipping company would have allies among the 
Chinese. But the JCJL perceived the risk of bad management—which its leaders 
associated with Chinese influence—as much more serious than the risk of a boycott. 
In 1921 there had never been an anti-Dutch boycott, but bad management would 
endanger the JCJL’s ability to compete with other shipping lines between China and 
Java. When an actual boycott against the JCJL did occur in 1930, the company 
responded alertly. In order to satisfy Chinese organisations and media, the Dutch 
crew member involved in the ‘Tjibadak’ affair was discharged even though his 
superiors believed that the accusations against him were exaggerated. Whether the 
JCJL’s directors would have been willing to make more fundamental changes, such 
as permanent co-operation with Chinese businessmen or the Chinese government, in 
order to limit the effects of similar incidents in the future is not clear. Soon after the 
‘Tjibadak’ affair, in 1931, Japan’s foreign policy diverted Chinese attention away 
from the Netherlands Indies and the Dutch shipping line.  
The company’s response to the risk of a Dutch-Japanese war around 1940 was 
also passive. In this case there was not much the JCJL could do except abandon its 
activities in East Asia altogether—which was contrary to its main overall and local 
interests. The Japanese military dominated the Chinese coastline, and no government 
was able to offer effective protection should Japan decide to attack Dutch 
possessions. Co-operating with the Japanese was no solution in the event of war. The 
only available strategy for the JCJL was to divert its ships to Java as soon as war 
seemed imminent, and this is what the company did in December 1941.  
 CHAPTER 4  
 
PETROLEUM: ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL 
 
‘We were the first Europeans in China, and 
now in Hankow [...] Not a single Dutchman! 
Not one! And that in the Yangtsze valley with 
its 150 million inhabitants and its unlimited 
opportunities in every field of commerce and 
industry! Where are we then? Does Holland 
still exist? Fortunately it does! Five miles 
below Hankow there is a magnificent example 
of Dutch energy; the installations of the 
Asiatic. Admittedly, the British flag flies over 
them, but that was inevitable; Holland [having 
no concession quarters in the treaty ports] was 
unable to offer a single square centimetre of 
land to her spirit of enterprise. [...] I made a 
pilgrimage to the establishment of the Asiatic 
[...] The only organisation in the world to prove 
a match for the Octopus [i.e., Standard Oil] was 
an enterprise managed by Dutchmen. And so in 
the end I spent an enjoyable day.’ 
H. Colijn, former Dutch war minister,  
October 1913.240 
 
Overall Corporate Interest 
The history of Shell begins on 28 May 1890.241 On that day ‘Royal Dutch’ (‘de 
Koninklijke’) was created as a limited liability company rested in The Hague, with 
shares listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange.242 The company was founded by a 
diverse group of Dutch investors including various bankers.243 Royal Dutch initially 
was a typical colonial firm, created to exploit petroleum deposits that had been 
discovered in Sumatra, a situation which gave the company the rather simple dual 
structure that is characteristic of ‘free-standing’ firms:244 all assets and operations 
were concentrated abroad, while the head office was located in the home country. 
The shareholders were represented by a supervisory board that did not consist of 
petroleum experts and that gathered only periodically at the head office in The 
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Hague.245 The managing director was on the other side of the world, in the jungles of 
Sumatra, supervising the extremely strenuous job of finding and producing 
petroleum. Because of this great geographical distance, the members of the 
supervisory board did not have any detailed operational knowledge. However, in the 
earliest years the company’s activities centred on finding oil, which was a scope 
narrow enough to be controlled from the Netherlands. 
In 1900 when Royal Dutch celebrated its tenth anniversary, the company had 
already grown into a concern that integrated exploration, production, refining, 
transport, and marketing. Pertinently, the company did most of its distributing across 
the border: in the British Straits Settlements, in British India, in Japan, and in China. 
After 1900 the supervisory board members no longer had the time or the expertise 
required to manage this integrated and multinational oil company effectively. 
Moreover, the frequent issuing of extra shares to finance the expansion transformed 
the original investors in minority shareholders, a development which in turn 
weakened the power base of the supervisory board.246 Around 1900 the connection 
with the mother country was improved when the managing director was relocated 
from Sumatra to The Hague. 247  Nevertheless, the widening of the gap between 
ownership and control of the firm was accelerated even more under the leadership of 
Henri W.A. Deterding, the chief executive manager from 1901 until the end of 1936.  
As a young accountant he worked for a very brief period with the Twentsche 
Bank before being hired by the NHM and stationed at the bank’s sub-branch in 
Penang. This was a part of the British Straits Settlements in the Malacca Straits, 
located close to Sumatra. There Deterding came into contact with the men of Royal 
Dutch who came to Penang to sell their oil and who needed the NHM’s financial 
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support for their trade. He decided that the young oil company offered better career 
opportunities than the well-established colonial bank, and entered Royal Dutch’s 
service to co-ordinate its marketing efforts in Asia. Deterding’s personality combined 
a capacity for brilliant strategic thinking and boundless ambition, and the oil industry 
offered the ideal environment in which to develop his commercial talent fully. He 
made Royal Dutch into one of the world’s largest and influential companies, with 
operations on a scale that in every respect far surpassed any other Dutch enterprise at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.248 In 1901, five years after joining the firm, 
Deterding became chief managing director. After another five years he consolidated 
his power by making the Royal Dutch managerial hierarchy—with himself at the 
top—fully autonomous from the shareholders and the supervisory board. He did this 
by taking over “The ‘Shell’ Transport and Trading Company, Ltd” (Shell Transport 
and Trading, STT), a British company that was larger than Royal Dutch.249  The 
outcome of the merger was not only that Deterding became more powerful within the 
organsation, but also that now his company was the second-largest oil company in 
the world surpassed only by Standard Oil. 
To combine the activities of the two companies into a single organisation, Royal 
Dutch and STT divested themselves of all of their assets. These were transferred to a 
new organisation, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, commonly referred to 
as Shell. This new concern, which officially came into existence in 1907, was owned 
60 per cent by Royal Dutch and 40 per cent by STT, both of which now acted 
exclusively as holding companies. 250  Royal Dutch took a 25 per cent interest in 
STT,251 the ownership of which was less diverse than that of the Dutch firm.252 In 
this situation the managing board of Royal Dutch could theoretically govern Shell as 
if STT did not even exist. But as it turned out, Deterding and his Dutch fellow 
directors were not interested in trying to suppress British influence. Instead Shell was 
managed as if the Dutch and British sides were equally influential. ‘The Dutch, 
instead of exercising the control which they had won, seemed deliberately to be 
rejecting it.’ 253  Shell has consistently presented itself to the outside world as a 
company with two nationalities: Dutch and British. Whatever causes and 
considerations there may have been for STT to retain its autonomy, a major effect 
was that the shareholders and the supervisory board of Royal Dutch were now almost 
                                                          
248  As manager of the Penang sub-branch Deterding became acquainted with J.B.A. Kessler, then 
managing director of Royal Dutch, and used his position to help Royal Dutch finance its sales operations: 
K. Beaton, Enterprise in Oil: A History of Shell in the United States (New York 1957), 28. Penang was 
part of the British Straits Settlements (Singapore, Malacca, and Penang), which had close commercial 
relations with Sumatra.  
249 For the history of STT see S. Howarth, A Century in Oil: The 'Shell' Transport and Trading Company, 
1897-1997 (London 1997). 
250 The reason why STT as a larger firm obtained only a minority share is related to the financial 
problems of STT and the financial success of Royal Dutch. 
251 After M. Samuel, the company’s main founder, gave up his special controlling position in Shell in 
1919, Royal Dutch decided that this 25 per cent interest was no longer necessary and it was gradually sold 
to the public. By late 1951 Royal Dutch had reduced its interest in Shell to a single share: Beaton, 
Enterprise in Oil, 52-53. Samuel’s control and Royal Dutch’s 25 per cent interest were devised in 1906 to 
guarantee that after the take-over Shell would continue to exist as an independent British conern. 
252 Unlike Royal Dutch shares, STT shares were not quoted on the stock exchange: Gerretson, Royal 
Dutch II, 99. For the original shareholders of Shell in 1897: R. Henriques, Marcus Samuel: First Viscount 
Bearsted and Founder of the 'Shell' Transport and Trading Company, 1853-1927 (London 1960), 164. 
253 Ibid. 499. 
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completely without managerial control.254 Deterding shifted the centre of corporate 
control from Royal Dutch to the top managerial level of Shell—consisting of himself 
and a group of directors that was half Dutch and half British. 255  The continued 
issuing of new shares on the stock market and a policy of keeping shareholders 
satisfied by paying high dividend rates ensured the autonomy of Shell’s managerial 
leadership from shareholder influence.256  
By acquiring STT, Royal Dutch transformed into Shell. To a great extent—but 
not entirely—Deterding surrendered Dutch predominance in return for almost 
complete managerial power.257 How did this affect the relevance of Shell to its Dutch 
economic environment? To answer this question it is necessary to identify the basic 
differences in interests between the Dutch and British sides of the company. At the 
time of the merger in 1906-1907, Royal Dutch was a production company that 
diversified into distribution. STT on the other hand was a distributing firm that 
diversified into production. The new concern, Shell, was nowhere incorporated as a 
firm; instead it consisted of two companies that worked closely together. In The 
Hague a Dutch company was established named ‘NV Bataafsche Petroleum 
Maatschappij’ (BPM), which controlled all assets related to production. In London a 
British company was established with the name ‘Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company, 
Ltd’, that controlled all assets related to distribution.258 In an organisational respect, 
the take-over was not extremely disruptive to activities of the two managerial 
hierarchies that constituted Royal Dutch and STT before 1907. The Dutch hierarchy 
lost its distribution assets, but this was offset by gaining STT’s production assets. 
The British hierarchy also had to cede its less important activities but strengthened its 
main competence.259  
In short, organisationally the two fundamental components of Shell were made up 
of Royal Dutch/BPM (the Dutch managerial hierarchy based in The Hague) and 
STT/Anglo-Saxon (the British managerial hierarchy based in London). Although 
both the BPM and Anglo-Saxon were owned 60 per cent by Royal Dutch and 40 per 
cent by STT, in practice the BPM was managed by Royal Dutch and Anglo-Saxon by 
STT. Turning to the matter of the connection between Shell and the Dutch economy, 
                                                          
254 The function of the supervisory board now was only to appoint the managing directors. As Deterding 
did not retire until late 1936, the supervisory board did not have to exercise its most important power for 
three and a half decades from 1901. 
255 Deterding remained chief executive director of Royal Dutch, but he acquired several new positions, 
among these non-executive board member of STT and chief executive director of the Asiatic Petroleum 
Company. What he did in these functions was difficult for the Royal Dutch supervisory board to monitor 
or influence. 
256  According to director Robert Waley Cohen, who was from STT but also Deterding’s closest 
colleague, the interests of the Dutch and British leaders of Shell were fully identical: Beaton, Enterprise in 
Oil, 54-55. 
257 While according to the company’s ‘articles of association’, the right to appoint supervisory and 
managing directors had to remain in Dutch hands, this did not mean that the managing directors necessarily 
had Dutch nationality: Gerretson, Royal Dutch II, 79. 
258 Ibid. 346-348. The BPM was later renamed NV Shell Petroleum; Anglo-Saxon was later incorporated 
into The Shell Petroleum Company, Ltd (formerly the Asiatic Petroleum Company). This joint-venture for 
Asia pre-dated the Royal Dutch/STT merger and was maintained as a separate holding company alongside 
the BPM and Anglo-Saxon. 
259 Real integration—below the top level—between the Royal Dutch and the Shell hierarchies did not 
begin to take place until the 1950s: A. De Geus, The Living Company (Boston 1997), 164. See also 
Howarth, Shell. 
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it may be concluded that whereas the fortunes of both production and marketing 
activities were closely related and 60 per cent of the profits of both the BPM and 
Anglo-Saxon were destined for the Dutch parent company, it was the production side 
rather than its distribution counterpart that originated in and was integrated into the 
Dutch economy. But it is equally relevant to keep in mind that Deterding and 
managing board of Royal Dutch always retained the right to appoint two-thirds of the 
members of all of Shell’s boards of directors. Even though STT managed Anglo-
Saxon and its distribution subsidiaries, Deterding and other Royal Dutch directors 
were on the board of STT itself and also on that of its largest subsidiary, the Asiatic 
Petroleum Company. As such they were closely involved in the making of strategic 
decisions for the British managerial hierarchy. Under these circumstances it was very 
unlikely that the general course followed by STT/Anglo-Saxon would run counter to 
the interests of Royal Dutch/BPM. 
  
 
 
       STT 
 
Royal  Dutch    owns 25% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     own 
(60% RD) 
(40% STT)
 
 
 
 
Bataafsche 
Petroleum 
    
Anglo-Saxon  
Petroleum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     operating companies  
 
 
Ownership structure of Shell in 1907.260 
 
Knowledge of the way the company functioned was strongly concentrated within the 
managerial structure: at the top managing directors who were the only ones to 
oversee the geographical and organisational diversity of the concern, and at the level 
of the middle managers who had detailed knowledge of operations. The shareholders 
and the supervisory board of Royal Dutch had virtually no operational knowledge. 
Control therefore was shared between higher and middle managers—both groups 
                                                          
260 Not included in this chart is the APC, which in 1907 was the only operating company directly owned 
by Royal Dutch (40 per cent) and STT (26.7 per cent). The remaining 33.3 per cent was owned by 
Rothschild of Paris.  
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having the same basic interests. The consequence of these organisational 
characteristics was that the main overall interest of Shell formed a combination of the 
interests of the two main managerial hierarchies: growth in oil production for the 
Dutch side and growth in oil distribution for the British side. Achieving a balanced 
growth in these two directions may therefore be seen as the highest strategic aim of 
Shell’s managing directors in the first decades after 1907. 
 
The Petroleum Trade in China  
The early twentieth century was a period of transition from an old situation in which 
lamp oil was the major petroleum product, to a new world in which a whole range of 
important products were made from petroleum. This included fuel oil and lubricating 
oil, but the most important new oil product was petrol (gasoline). The division 
between old and new petroleum products is reflected not only in technical changes in 
oil production, such as an increased importance of refining technique, it is also 
cogently reflected in the geography of marketing. Whereas petrol was largely 
confined to the Western markets, where most motor cars were to be found, lamp oil 
typically became a product for the non-Western countries. Lamp oil, or kerosene, 
was marketable only where people used oil lamps—that is, where electricity had not 
yet been introduced. The electrification of the population centres in the Western 
countries limited kerosene sales in those parts of the world. But paradoxically the 
production of kerosene was growing. The exploding demand in the US for petrol 
stimulated its production, but as a consequence of the underdeveloped state of oil 
refining large amounts of kerosene were produced as a by-product of petrol.261 The 
oil companies looked for places outside the West to sell their surplus kerosene, and at 
this point China—then already a moderately important but still underdeveloped 
market for kerosene—came into the picture. With an estimated population of some 
400 million and being not yet electrified, the Chinese market was one of the few 
places in the world where very large kerosene sales could possibly be created.262  
Bringing Shell’s specific characteristics into this picture reveals further elements 
of relevance. In the first place the company’s primary production sites were in the 
Netherlands Indies, to which China practically was next door. Even before the 
problem of the kerosene surplus loomed, Royal Dutch regarded China as a major 
market because of its proximity to the oil wells. Around 1900 Royal Dutch was using 
China and some other Asian countries to create profits as dividend for the 
shareholders, while profits made in Southeast Asia were used to finance production 
costs.263 Both Royal Dutch and STT already had considerable distributing interests in 
China before their merger. A related fact was that Shell was the only major oil 
                                                          
261 R.W. Hidy and M.E. Hidy, History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) I: Pioneering in Big 
Business, 1882-1911 (New York 1955), 264. Around the turn of the century, Royal Dutch could convert 
crude oil into kerosene only by simultaneously producing also petrol and gas oil: Gerretson, Royal Dutch 
IV, 31. 
262 Although probably to a lesser extent than anticipated, China indeed became one of the most important 
markets for kerosene. In 1924 China was responsible for 6.5 per cent of the world’s kerosene consumption: 
‘China’s Erdölhandel, 1913-1924’, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A historisch archief, 91 correspodendentie 
China. In 1931-1937, when its kerosene-consumption was much lower than before 1930, China took on 
average 2.7 per cent of world-wide consumption: Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 146. About the 
1920s see also Charles E. Kern, ‘Chinese Buy Cupful but Burn Enormous Quantity of Kerosene’, The Oil 
and Gas Journal (23 Sept. 1926) 156-157. 
263 NHM Batavia to NHM Amsterdam 5 Dec. 1901, ARA The Hague, 2.20.01 NHM, 2631. 
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company to operate large oil fields in Asia. In the second place, after 1906, Shell 
became one of the world’s largest petrol producers. The focus on petrol production 
and the great volume involved made Shell one of the companies most interested in 
finding a large outlet for its kerosene. During the 1910s much of the attention of the 
company shifted from Asia to the Americas, when Shell acquired new production 
interests first in Mexico and Venezuela, and later in the US itself, where it benefited 
greatly from the petrol boom.264 The North American market was increasingly used 
for the expansion of turnover and profits, and the strategy mapped out for East Asia 
was subordinated to this. Production of petrol in the Netherlands Indies was 
increased to feed the large demand in the Western world, and the existing 
distribution interests in China were exploited as an outlet for surplus kerosene from 
the Netherlands Indies. From 1915 Shell also operated refineries in the US from 
which the surplus kerosene also was exported to China.265 Such surplus kerosene 
was sold by the Netherlands Indies and US production subsidiaries to the Chinese 
distribution subsidiary, which then had to recover its purchasing and distribution 
costs by coming up with an effective marketing strategy. 
Therefore, at the time of the take-over of STT, the primary interest in China for 
Royal Dutch was that it served as an outlet for kerosene from the Netherlands Indies 
and soon thereafter from the United States. This meant that distribution operations in 
China had to meet the capacity offered by the refineries elsewhere, that at least a 
minimal profit had to be made from them, and that the flow of kerosene into China 
had to be stable and controllable in order to obtain maximum production efficiency at 
the refineries. There was also a secondary interest. Under the 1906 merger 
arrangement, the distributing organisation in China was part of Shell’s British 
managerial hierarchy, the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company. The main interest of 
Anglo-Saxon was more limited than Shell’s overall interest, and lay in continuing 
and enlarging its distributing operations around the world. As long as it did not run 
contrary to the objective of maintaining a kerosene outlet suited to Netherlands 
Indies production, the sales management in London and China probably favoured a 
policy of expansion. Logically, such expansion could be achieved by matching it 
with increased sales volumes. Here again a certain rate of profit was needed to 
recover the initial investments and to decrease the production costs of petrol, but 
profit maximisation was not the main requirement.266 Shell strove towards achieving 
controllable and increasing kerosene sales in China.  
Because from the outset kerosene marketing in China was very important to 
Royal Dutch, a large organisation was created to be responsible for this task. 
Investments began in 1897 when the first oil storage tank installations were built, 
which were then still operated by agents. A directly controlled sales organisation was 
created from 1906, when the first branch office was opened. By 1913 it had acquired 
                                                          
264 The petrol demand initially was too large to be met by the near monopolist Standard Oil. This enabled 
Royal Dutch, which had access to large petrol supplies from Sumatra, to enter the European and US 
markets. Royal Dutch Sumatra crude was exceptionally suited to petrol production: up to 30 per cent of the 
refinery output consisted of petrol. 
265 Beaton, Enterprise in Oil, 97. 
266 Until the separation of New York Standard from the rest of Standard Oil, this company also did not 
necessarily have to make a profit on its sales in China. The mother company reaped such high profits from 
pipe transport across the US, that the main objective for New York Standard was to create a growing 
demand in China in order to stimulate the pipage volume in the US: Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, 549. 
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the basic structure it would keep for the following decades. The marketing subsidiary 
for China and other Asian countries was called ‘Asiatic Petroleum Company Ltd’ 
(APC).267 The board of directors consisted of Deterding who was joined by four 
other directors from the STT and Royal Dutch boards.268 The management in China 
reported directly to the top management of the Shell group. Close monitoring from 
London was possible through the carrying out of a detailed and extensive 
correspondence. The take-over of STT in 1906 led to a new policy being developed 
for China. At the core of this new policy was the decision to enter up-country 
distribution. Going up-country meant extending operations beyond the boundaries of 
the treaty ports on the coast and along the rivers and taking its business to the interior 
of China. At the beginning of the twentieth century, foreign activity in China was 
still largely confined to the larger coastal cities. After 1908 Shell’s distribution 
system in China consisted of two main elements. The first of these was the network 
of tank installations and branch offices, first created in 1897 and in 1906 
respectively. In the second place there was the up-country agency network, the 
foundations for which were laid between 1908 and 1913. Although 1906 marked the 
beginning of directly controlled distribution operations, 1908 was even more 
significant, because only by adding an up-country network to the existing treaty port 
network did Shell acquire the opportunity to dominate petroleum marketing in China. 
Taking a plunge, the company changed its primary activity in China from importing 
to wholesale distribution. To understand the revolutionary character of the policy 
adopted by Shell in 1908, it is necessary to have an understanding of the activities of 
Royal Dutch and its chief competitors until that year. 
In 1897, when Royal Dutch made its first direct investments in China, the 
Chinese kerosene market was already partly developed and the two main petroleum 
companies active in China were STT and the Standard Oil Company. Standard Oil 
was the largest petroleum concern in the world and the main importer in China. At 
                                                          
267 The agreement to establish the APC was concluded on 27 June 1902: the APC was to be a British 
company with £600,000 worth of shares issued to the three shareholders Royal Dutch, Shell, and 
Rothschild. The board of directors would consist of M. Samuel (chairman), Deterding (managing director), 
and Fred Lane (deputy managing director). They would be assisted by a secretary (J.Y. Kennedy) and an 
assistant-manager (R. Waley-Cohen). When the company came into being on 29 June 1903 it obtained 
twenty-one tank installations, three tankers, and two refineries from Royal Dutch. It obtained from Shell 
thirty-one installations, twelve tankers, and two refineries. The APC was to manage distribution in East, 
Southeast, and South Asia and in East Africa: Henriques, Marcus Samuel, 402-404. 
268 From 1903 until about 1930 Rothschild of Paris was also represented on the board, as it owned one-
third of the shares. During the 1930s Anglo-Saxon acquired Rothschild’s APC shares. The APC was also 
responsible for marketing in other Asian countries; from 1913 it did this through its subsidiaries APC 
North China and APC South China. During the 1920s and 1930s the boards of the APC, APC-NC, and 
APC-SC were entirely or mostly manned by the same people: W. Samuel (chairman of APC-NC and APC-
SC; also on Shell board), H.N. Benjamin (STT), R. Waley Cohen (STT), A.S. Debenham (STT), A. Agnew 
(STT), F. Godber (STT), G. Legh-Jones (STT), H.W.A. Deterding (Royal Dutch and STT), J.C. van Eck 
(Royal Dutch), and J.B.A. Kessler (Royal Dutch and STT). These people were also on the boards of STT 
or Royal Dutch or both. At most times there were five men on the APC-NC/SC boards, the chairmen and 
two others being British. The managing board of Royal Dutch had the right to put three Dutchmen on these 
board, but chose to leave marketing in China in the hands of STT people. In 1946 the APC was renamed 
The Shell Petroleum Company; in 1955 it took over all assets of Anglo-Saxon, thus becoming the sole 
holding company for all downstream subsidiaries. After the Second World War, APC-North China was 
renamed Shell Company of China Ltd. Its assets were handed over to the People’s Republic of China 
during 1952-1953: A. Shai, The Fate of British and French Firms in China, 1949-54 (London 1996). APC-
South China was renamed Shell Company of Hong Kong Ltd. 
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first kerosene was produced only in the US and in the late 1870s Standard Oil was 
the first company to ship large quantities of kerosene to China.269 Its kerosene was 
packed in tins, which were shipped from the American East coast via the Atlantic 
and Indian Oceans to the Far East. As was the case with many Western products 
when they first appeared in China, kerosene was initially sold only to the Westerners 
in Hong Kong and Shanghai. But soon a demand was created among the Chinese 
population. The prominent trading house of Jardine acted as Standard Oil’s agent in 
China, and was with its knowledge of local conditions initially very useful for 
enlarging the demand for kerosene in China. Jardine sold kerosene to Chinese 
traders, who took the product into the country and sold it on to regional wholesalers. 
The oil finally reached its consumers via local retailers. As with all other imports, 
kerosene distribution in China was completely in Chinese hands. But being a general 
trader, and as such not interested exclusively in the oil business, Jardine’s interests 
were not always compatible with those of Standard Oil. Consequently, as the 
importance of the Chinese market grew, the American petroleum firm wanted more 
direct control. In 1893 Standard Oil decided that it no longer needed the services of 
Jardine, and began to establish sales offices and warehouses (‘godowns’) in the 
treaty ports which would enable it to make deliveries directly to Chinese 
merchants.270 Even before the end of the century, a sub-office was opened as far 
inland as Chongqing (Chungking) in Sichuan (Szechuan) province.271  
In the meantime Russia had developed into the world’s second kerosene 
producing country. Russian oil came from the Caspian Sea region and was shipped to 
Asia via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. STT—or its predecessor—was the 
main trader involved in this practice. From 1892 STT shipped Russian oil to China 
via Suez. Unlike Standard Oil, STT used tanker ships which could transport kerosene 
in bulk. In the treaty ports STT oil was handled by the German trading firm Arnhold, 
Karberg & Co. This firm was more than just an agent: Arnhold was one of the 
founders and original shareholders in STT.272 Because the German firm was itself a 
shareholder in STT,273 its interest in the oil company went beyond that of a regular 
agency firm and for the time being the need to follow the American example of 
establishing sales offices was not felt very strongly. In the largest Chinese ports, STT 
built oil tank installations and tin factories which were managed by Arnhold Karberg. 
Chinese traders preferred lamp oil in tins, not in bulk, and therefore STT packed its 
product in tins after it had been unloaded from the tanker ships. Standard Oil 
continued to rely on its shipments of tinned oil until 1911, when it also erected 
storage tanks.274 
                                                          
269 Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 48. 
270 Anderson, Standard-Vacuum, 15. 
271 Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, 750. 
272 Henriques, Marcus Samuel, 164. 
273 Arnhold, Karberg & Co. was a German company that was run from London, and was largely owned 
and controlled by British subjects. In 1914 a British firm ‘H.E. Arnhold’ was created that took over the 
Chinese business of Arnhold, Karberg: Chang, ‘British Business in Hankow’, 57-58. 
274 ‘Extracts from Mr Bunje’s Report Dated 5.6.1939; Subject: Royal Dutch in the Far East’, Shell The 
Hague, SIPM, 190A historisch archief, 91 correspondentie China. The reason why Standard waited so long 
was that tins could be sent on regular ships, that could bring other products on the way back. There was no 
return cargo for oil tankers: Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, 262. By 1913 New York Standard had already 
invested—since 1893—$20 million: Chronology, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A historisch archief, 92 
China. 
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While competition between Standard Oil and STT in China increased, in the 
Netherlands Indies, Royal Dutch was established as one of the first companies to 
exploit the newly discovered Southeast Asian oil fields. Production began in 1892 
and Royal Dutch oil was subsequently marketed, via agents, in Sumatra, Singapore, 
and Penang. As early as 1894 the Dutch firm expanded its horizon beyond Southeast 
Asia and began exporting tinned kerosene to China, using the German trading house 
of Meyer & Co. as its agent.275 In 1896 when Henri Deterding joined Royal Dutch, 
his first task was to define a coherent marketing strategy. China was the nearest 
major market for kerosene and he decided to launch a major challenge to the better 
established positions of American and Russian oil there. Imitating the STT strategy 
of using bulk carriers and tank installations, Royal Dutch made its first direct 
investments in China by building tank installations: in 1897 in Hong Kong and 
Shanghai; in the following year in Shantou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Hankou, Zhenjiang, 
and Tianjin (Tientsin).276 The installation in Hong Kong was the largest and best-
equipped in China.277 These installations were owned by Royal Dutch, but operated 
by its agent Meyer & Co. As a result of these investments, Royal Dutch conquered a 
segment of the Chinese kerosene market. By 1900 it was the third largest oil importer 
in China, behind Standard Oil and STT. 
In order to compete with the still very powerful Standard Oil, Deterding and STT 
Chairman Marcus Samuel made an agreement to join forces with regard to 
distribution in Asia. On 2 July 1903 STT and Royal Dutch combined their Asian 
distribution assets into a joint venture: the Asiatic Petroleum Company. This new 
company was managed by Deterding,278 and continued to pursue the strategy of STT 
and Royal Dutch: agents were contracted and tank installations built in a growing 
number of Chinese treaty ports.279 A new step was taken in 1906 by establishing the 
first Chinese APC branch office in Hong Kong. This was the beginning of the APC’s 
directly controlled Chinese sales organisation, that would soon undertake steps to 
develop an up-country sales network. The only important competitor left in China 
was Standard Oil. 
So far the kerosene trade was still carried on mainly along traditional lines. The 
fact that Standard Oil and the APC were setting up representative offices and storage 
facilities in the treaty ports had no impact on the distribution process within China 
itself. The Western petroleum companies could bring their kerosene to China, but 
they could not do much to influence either the price or the size of the market. Large 
                                                          
275 Only British and German trading firms were well enough established in the treaty ports to be able to 
handle large quantities of kerosene. Dutch companies in China such as the NHM were very disappointed 
that Royal Dutch did not work with a Dutch agent. See for instance the remarks made by NHM director 
Van Aalst: ‘C.J.K. van Aalst over Oost Azië 17 feb. 1903’, ARA The Hague, 2.20.01 NHM, 9472. 
276 Gerretson, Royal Dutch II, opposite p.173; Beaton, Enterpise in Oil, 33. 
277 ‘The Petroleum Trade in the Far East’, The Petroleum Review (3 Dec. 1904), 451. 
278 The predecessor of the APC was the Eastern Oil Association established 10 August 1899, which also 
combined Shell and Royal Dutch distribution interests and was also managed by Royal Dutch. When the 
APC was formed, Deterding moved to London to concentrate on managing this joint venture and became 
‘director-general’ of Royal Dutch. After 1910 Deterding’s top position in Royal Dutch was renamed to 
‘general managing director’. 
279 APC agency contracts 1903-1905: Arnhold, Karberg & Co. (various places); Meyer & Co. (various 
places); Dodwell & Co. (various places); M.W. Grieg & Co. (Fuzhou); Bradley & Co. (Shantou); Lauts & 
Haesloop (Shantou); Pasedag & Co. (Xiamen); Douglas Lapreik & Co. (Xiamen): Chronology, Shell 
London, Group Archive, GHS/2B/24 China and Hong Kong. 
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Chinese distributors bought the oil in the treaty ports and then sold it to regional 
wholesalers throughout the country, which was the customary way to sell any foreign 
product in China. The problem in the eyes of the foreign oil companies was that the 
large distributors co-operated to obtain the lowest possible price from the foreigners, 
and also that they speculated on the price differential between kerosene and 
vegetable lamp oil. After a bad harvest vegetable oil would be more expensive, and 
kerosene prices would also go up. The Chinese distributors tended to hold on to their 
kerosene supplies until selling prices were high, which kept consumers’ demand for 
kerosene down in the long run. To supply the regional wholesalers in the interior 
directly was a possible solution, but not one with which any foreign firm had much 
experience. The reason Shell rather than Standard Oil took the first step towards 
changing the old system by entering the up-country market was because Standard Oil 
kerosene had a larger market share, which it could easily defend because it was of 
better quality than any competing brand.280 
The first Western companies that ventured beyond the treaty ports did so not to 
sell but to buy. From the 1860s pioneering merchants travelled in the interior 
provinces of China to purchase wool, braid, musk, rhubarb, bristle, and hides.281 By 
the end of the nineteenth century, German trading houses such as Melchers & Co., 
Siemssen & Co., Carlowitz & Co., and Arnhold, Karberg & Co had emerged as the 
pioneers among the larger foreign companies and were routinely exporting as well as 
importing directly in the interior. 282  They chose to specialise themselves in up-
country trade because, as relative latecomers in China, they wanted to bypass the 
large British houses, such as Jardine, Swire, and Dodwell & Co., which were 
dominating trade in the main coastal treaty ports. 283  The fact that one of these 
German trading firms, Arnhold, had close ties with STT may have helped to 
convince Shell’s management that direct distribution in the interior was feasible.284 
While the Germans had already set an example for running up-country business 
in the lower Yangzi area, creating an organisation that covered the entire country was 
still a very new phenomenon in 1907. The only example for Shell to follow in the 
distribution business was BAT, which had been engaged in setting up its network for 
cigarette distribution since 1905.285 In 1910 Standard Oil also initiated up-country 
marketing,286 and in the following years, Shell, BAT, and Standard Oil expanded 
their up-country networks. During the next few decades these were regarded by 
foreign businessmen and diplomats in China as the most successful foreign-
controlled marketing operations in that country. Not only were these three the first to 
cover more or less the whole country, they also were the largest. During the 1910s-
                                                          
280 Also in subsequent years it was Shell that did most of the pioneering work in China’s interior: 
Interview with Mr Bell 22 Aug. 1939, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A, 91. 
281 Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise, 37-39.  
282 Ibid. 44-45. 
283 Chang, ‘British Business in Hankow’, 21-24. 
284 From 1987 until 1910 one of the Arnhold directors was non-executive member of the STT board of 
directors: Jacob Arnhold 1897-1900, Philipp Arnhold 1900-1905 and 1906-1910, Harry E. Arnhold 1905-
1906. It is possible that Philipp resigned already before his death in 1910.  
285 Cochran, ‘Commercial Penetration’, 159. 
286 Chu-Yuan Cheng, ‘The United States Petroleum Trade with China, 1876-1949’ in: E.R. May and J.K. 
Fairbank, America’s China Trade in Historical Perspective: The Chinese and American Performance 
(Cambridge MA 1986), 215. 
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1930s other Western firms followed their example, but none achieved the same 
geographical spreading or financial proportions.287 
Shell used not only the Yangzi and China’s other navigable rivers, it also 
embraced the recently built railways to reach regional wholesalers directly. The 
reason Shell was so keen to initiate this new policy in 1907-1908, very shortly after 
the acquisition of STT’s interests by Royal Dutch, was that via STT the firm owned 
newly developed oilfields in Dutch Borneo. Before 1907 Royal Dutch had exported 
its ‘Crown’ brand kerosene from Sumatra to China, and STT had brought to China 
kerosene purchased in Russia and—only recently—its own Borneo kerosene which 
was called ‘Cross’. In 1907 the sales of Russian oil in China were terminated, 
because by then Shell owned both Sumatra Crown oil and Borneo Cross oil and had 
sufficient self-produced oil for the Chinese market. The problem was that Borneo oil 
was not particularly suited to kerosene production; after refining at Balikpapan it was 
impossible to prevent discolouring of the product without spending an inordinate 
amount of money.288 Sumatran oil on the other hand yielded a reasonably good type 
of kerosene which did not require much processing. Consequently in China the 
quality of Cross was regarded as below that of Crown, even though Crown was 
cheaper to produce than Cross. But Crown itself was of lower quality than Standard 
Oil’s product, which was called ‘Devoes’. Selling both Cross and Crown on the same 
market would hardly affect the position of Devoes. It would only affect the position 
of Crown that had been carefully been built since 1894. And so it was decided to 
market Cross in the interior of China as a cheap, low quality kerosene, and Crown 
would continue to be sold in the large coastal cities where it occupied a position that 
was second to Devoes but still good.289 This policy created a completely new outlet 
for Borneo kerosene and a bypass around the mighty Chinese distributors in the 
treaty ports. The older and more fundamental problem of uncontrollable sales and the 
new problem of selling Borneo oil could then be solved.  
It transpired that matters did not evolve entirely according to this plan: after a few 
years of high Borneo oil sales, especially in 1913-1915, imports from Borneo fell 
again and Shell had to find other ways to dispose of its Borneo oil. The quality of 
Cross was not good enough even for the up-country market, where new problems 
                                                          
287 Other pioneers in up-country distribution following a few years behind BAT, Shell, and Standard Oil 
were Brunner Mond (later ICI) from 1914 and Taikoo Sugar (subsidiary of Butterfield & Swire, later 
Swire) from 1916. Possibly large German chemical producers such as BASF, Bayer, and Hoegst, were 
engaged in up-country distribution before 1914 (and again from 1925 as IG Farben). In collection 
networks the major firms following behind the German export firms were the International Export 
Company (subsidiary of  the Union Cold Storage Company, later Union International) from 1907 and BAT 
(to collect tobacco for its factories) from 1915: Chang, ‘British Business in Hankow’, 81-92. In 1938 a 
manager of Stanvac told a Japanese businessman that its own and Shell’s capital investments in China 
were about equal and that their investment was ‘unquestionably larger than that of any other foreign 
interest whose field of operation embraces all China and [...] the only interest which might approach that 
figure is that of certain utilities whose field of operation is very circumscribed’: Notes on Mr Ely (Shell 
Japan) and Mr Meyer’s (Stanvac Japan) talk with Messrs Masayuki Tani and Shunkichi Nomura on 21 
Nov.  1938 at the Tokyo Kaikan, PRO London, FO 371, 23499, F1498. In other words: the only foreign 
company in China that came close to the value of the oil interests was the American & Foreign Power 
Company, which controlled Shanghai’s power and light facilities: Wilkins, ‘American Multinational 
Enterprise’, 282.  
288 R.J. Forbes and D.R. O'Beirne, The Technical Development of the Royal Dutch/Shell, 1890-1940 
(Leiden 1957), 343-354. 
289 Gerretson, Royal Dutch III, 195-196. 
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emerged when Standard Oil launched its own cheap up-country brand ‘Eagle’ to 
compete with Cross.290 This was so successful that after a few years Shell decided to 
take Cross off the market and to use Crown to fight Eagle. 291  The Borneo oil 
problem was then addressed by mixing it with Sumatra oil under the Crown brand. 
Although this had a negative effect on the quality of Crown, the company found this 
acceptable as long as it hovered in the region of Eagle’s quality. In the next few 
decades Crown oil became Shell’s most widely sold brand in rural China. It was 
distributed both in tins and unpacked, the unpacked version being the cheapest and 
Shell’s main weapon in its fight against locally made vegetable oils. Although the 
repositioning of the Crown brand brought two favourable developments—it created 
an outlet for low-grade Borneo kerosene and a relatively cheap alternative to 
vegetable lamp oils—it also exposed Shell to attacks from Standard Oil. The 
American firm now had its cheap Eagle to compete with Crown, and it could keep 
the price of its unchallenged Devoes high and make profits from it to finance a price 
war. Shell thought up a new strategy and neutralised this threat by positioning 
‘Dragon’ kerosene in the Devoes price segment. Dragon was not a new product; it 
was a popular brand imported from Sumatra by the Sumatra Lankat Company, a 
subsidiary acquired by Shell in 1910. In addition, Shell introduced ‘Fish’, a new high 
quality brand, but Devoes was so well-known and valued so highly by the Chinese 
that neither Dragon nor Fish could ever attain the same level of popularity. In later 
years Shell never succeeded in selling a brand of lamp oil that was considered to be 
quite as good as Standard’s Devoes by Chinese consumers.292  Still, even though 
kerosene marketing in China did not quite work out according to the original plans of 
1907-1908, Shell did reach its original goal: Borneo oil was sold cheaply in the 
interior in conjunction with Sumatra oil, and the original market position in the large 
cities was retained. Perhaps benefiting from Devoes’ popularity, the more Shell 
expensive brands were increasingly sold also up-country during the 1920s. The 
power of the Chinese intermediary traders was largely eliminated and from about 
1910 the Chinese market was successfully exploited as Shell’s outlet for surplus 
ker
                                                          
osene. 
The first up-country installations were established in 1907 along the large rivers 
and main railway lines.293 But the real break with the established tradition of treaty 
port trade came in 1908, when all agency contracts with Arnhold, Meyer, and the 
other European treaty port merchants were cancelled. From then on Shell sold 
directly to local Chinese distributors, both in the treaty ports and up-country. In the 
years which followed Chinese agencies were established throughout China; at first in 
the larger trade centres, subsequently expanding into the countryside to include 
290 In other countries Eagle was named ‘Petrolite’. It was made from cheap Kansas and Texas petroleum. 
291 Gerretson, Royal Dutch IV, 113.  
292 Eventually the pricing agreements with Standard Oil during the 1920 offered Shell another chance. 
Yet another high quality brand was launched, this one called ‘Sycee’—Dragon and Fish now occupying a 
middle-position on the market, together with Standard Oil’s competing Tiger and Nonpareil. It was agreed 
with Standard Oil that Devoes and Sycee would always be sold against the same price. But again the 
Devoes brand proved so strong that in practice dealers were forced to sell Sycee at a lower price. 
293  Interview with Mr Bell 22 Aug. 1939, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A historisch archief, 91 
correspondentie China. Also ‘Extracts from Mr Bunje’s Report Dated 5.6.1939; Subject: Royal Dutch in 
the Far East’, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A historisch archief, 91 correspondentie China. Also Gerretson, 
Royal Dutch III, 196. 
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smaller market towns as well. More tank depots were also built across the country. In 
1913 two separate subsidiaries into which these assets were put were created by the 
APC.294 The ‘Asiatic Petroleum Company (North China) Ltd’ was the larger of the 
two. It was responsible for Central, East, and North China, and Manchuria—its 
eight-storey main office building being located on the Bund, Shanghai, along with 
the NHM branch office and many other corporate offices. Its smaller sister 
organisation, the ‘Asiatic Petroleum Company (South China) Ltd’ was based in 
Hong Kong and managed sales in South and West China. The two head offices in 
Shanghai and Hong Kong comprised various departments: marketing, marine 
transport, engineering, accounting, and legal matters.295 Smaller branch offices were 
opened in the major treaty ports.296 In the years after 1913, although the system was 
gradually expanded, its organisation was not changed fundamentally. During the 
1920s and first half of the 1930s the network was geographically at its widest—the 
AP
inces Gansu, 
Nin
                                                          
C had to retreat from Manchuria in 1935 as a result of the Japanese occupation. 
Geographically the Chinese kerosene market was located largely in the eastern 
half of the country, where most of the people lived. The major sub-markets within 
China were North China (the provinces Shandong, Henan, Shanxi, and Zhili/Hebei), 
Manchuria (Fengtian/Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang), South China (Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Fujian), and the Yangzi area. The latter was the largest in terms of 
population, and could be divided into the lower Yangzi area (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Anhui), the middle Yangzi area (Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan), and the upper Yangzi area 
(Sichuan). By 1927 the company had invested 3.5 million pounds (about ƒ42 
million) in the Yangzi provinces, of which £2 million (ƒ24 million) went into 
buildings and installations.297 Turnover in the same area amounted to at least Y13 
million annually. According to data collected by the British legation, Shell’s business 
was the largest British interest in the Yangzi area—the second largest British 
distribution firm along the Yangzi being BAT with an annual sales value of Y1.8 
million. 298  While it is true that the more remote and sparsely populated parts of 
China did not elicit enormous sales promotions by Shell, only the prov
gxia, and Tibet stayed completely outside its distribution system.299 
The main regional distributing centres for petroleum in the 1920s were, in order 
of importance: Tianjin (for the North China market), Hankou (for the middle 
Yangzi), Zhenjiang (lower Yangzi), Qingdao (North China), Dalian (Manchuria), 
294 According to Anderson a third subsidiary was created specifically for Yunnan province, named the 
Compagnie Asiatique des Petroles: Anderson, Standard-Vacuum, 218 n4. If this really was an organisation 
independent of the two British APCs, the reason must have been that Yunnan was regarded as part of the 
French sphere of influence. At the beginning of the century Yunnan was thought to be easily accessible 
from Indochina. However, relevant documents in Shell’s archives made no mention of a French subsidiary 
for any part of China; it seems that after all the company decided to market in Yunnan from its Hong Kong 
base. In 1914 a Hong Kong subsidiary called Staff Buildings Ltd was created to own Shell’s Chinese 
offices. Later subsidiaries were added to this subsidiary: ‘APC (Staff Buildings Ltd) Soochow’ for Suzhou, 
‘APC (Staff Buildings Ltd) Chinkiang’ for Zhenjiang, etc. 
295 ‘The Chinese Market for Petroleum’, The Petroleum World (Jan. 1931), 5-8. 
296 In 1926 The Oil and Gas Journal reported that the size and strategy of the APC and New York 
Standard distributing in China were the same: Charles E. Kern, ‘Chinese Buy Cupful but Burn Enourmous 
Quantity of Kerosene’, ibid. (23 Sept. 1926), 156-157. 
297 Macdonogh (Shell London) to British Foreign Office 17 Jan. 1927, PRO, FO 371, 12431, F471. 
298 British Envoy Lampson Beijing to British Foreign Office 28 March 1927, PRO, FO 371. 
299 Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 144-150. 
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Shanghai (lower Yangzi), and Changsha (middle Yangzi). The secondary petroleum 
ports were Niuzhuang (Manchuria), Chongqing (upper Yangzi), Jiujiang (Kiukiang, 
middle Yangzi), Wuhu (lower Yangzi), Nanjing (lower Yangzi), Suzhou (Soochow, 
lower Yangzi), Hangzhou (Hangchow, lower Yangzi), Ningbo (Ningpo, lower 
Yangzi), Fuzhou (South China), Shantou (South China), and Guangzhou (South 
China).300 Shell had tank installations in these places and also in other towns such as 
Wuzhou, Xiamen, Yantai, Haimen, Wenzhou, Yichang (Ichang), Gaoqiaosha, Xidu, 
Lingjiaqiao, Pukou, Bengbu, Dongzhou, Anqing, Nanchang, Shashi, Changde, and 
Weixian. 301  However, the country’s primary distribution centre was Hong Kong, 
where all imported petroleum arrived in 9,000 ton tanker ships. Transhipped into 
smaller, 900 ton tankers it was then distributed to Shanghai and the other main ports 
along the coast and the lower Yangzi basin.302 The tank installations in the treaty 
ports were regarded by customs as extra-territorial,303 which meant that Shell could 
store large oil deposits in many places while not having to pay import duty until the 
mo
name and brand logo and could 
be found throughout the length and breath of China. 
                                                          
ment of shipment to the distributing agents.  
The following characteristics were typical of these treaty port installations. Such 
constructions were built near the harbour, on a plot of land leased by Shell in 
perpetuity. This was usually outside the city—and the foreign concession quarter if 
the city had one—as kerosene was considered too dangerous to be stored in a 
residential area. On the plot of land several large cylindrical storage tanks, 
warehouses, an office building, living quarters for the staff, a tin factory, a filling 
shed, a railway that connected to a main railway line, and a pipeline to the place 
where Shell tankers could be loaded or unloaded were built.304 Often an identical 
Standard Oil installation was located next to Shell’s. The installation was manned by 
a European manager and Chinese packers. From these installations, oil was 
transported—if possible—by train to 25 ton storage tanks along the main railway 
lines. The total tankage capacity in the Yangzi, including Shanghai, and Northern 
areas amounted to 384,000 tons by 1939.305 Shell owned a large number of trucks 
and several ships which it used to transport petroleum; it even had its own wharfs in 
Shanghai. At the treaty port installations and the railway tanks the kerosene was put 
into tins, which were often packed per two in a wooden case. These cases were then 
transported by truck, boat, or whatever was available to the up-country agency 
depots. The company also launched an advertising campaign to boost up-country 
sales. Shell’s major brand names were well-known, as was the APC’s Chinese name 
Yaxiya (Ah Sai Ah). An important contribution to the advertising effort was made by 
the fact that empty oil tins were re-used by the Chinese for many different household 
and commercial purposes. These tins carried Shell’s 
300 ‘China as a Market for Oil’, The Petroleum Times (13 Aug. 1927), 327-330. 
301 Furthermore in ‘Zahkow’, ‘Kashing’, and ‘Tsingkiangpu’ (old spelling). 
302  Interview with Mr Bell 22 Aug. 1939, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A historisch archief, 91 
correspondentie China. 
303 Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 144-150.  
304 For instance see the map of Shell’s Yichang installation in PRO London, FO 381, 24680, F2674. 
305 Shell Companies in Greater China, Looking to the Long Term: The Story of Shell in China (Beijing 
1997), 16. 
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Shell's main office for Central and North China: the Asiatic Petroleum Building at 
No.1, the Bund, in Shanghai  
 
To manage these storage, transport, and advertising activities, Shell opened offices in 
the major distributing centres. These offices were staffed with a European office 
manager, European and Chinese up-country inspectors, and Chinese interpreters and 
clerks.306 The regional office managers reported to the main offices in Hong Kong 
(South China), Shanghai (Yangzi), Tianjin (North China), or Shenyang (Mukden, 
Manchuria). The Tianjin and Shenyang offices themselves also reported to Shanghai, 
while Shanghai and Hong Kong reported directly to the managing director 
responsible for Asian marketing in London. The European staff was usually 
British—in the early years also Dutch—and was entrusted with the very important 
task of maintaining relations with the Chinese employees, the Chinese agents in the 
same province or region, and the local Chinese authorities. The company had to rely 
on these men for local representation, and the men had to be able to negotiate with 
Chinese agents and officials directly. In the early twentieth century it was common 
practice for foreign firms in China to rely on compradores for undertaking all 
relations with Chinese parties, but Shell was anxious to avoid as many intermediates 
                                                          
306 By 1934 there were twenty-four sub-branch offices (probably in Harbin, Niuzhuang, Dalian, Andong, 
Qingdao, Taiyuan, Zhengzhou, Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Wuhu, Jiujiang, Hankou, Chongqing, Changsha, 
Hangzhou, Suzhou, Ningbo, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shantou, Guangzhou, Wuzhou, Qiongzhou, Zhangjiang), 
two intermediate branch offices (Tianjin and Shenyang) and two main offices (Hong Kong and Shanghai): 
Shell Companies in Greater China, The Long Term, 10-12. 
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as possible. Therefore it was of crucial importance that the European up-country 
managers and inspectors were highly reliable, which required in an elaborate 
recruitment policy to be worked out. Most large British firms in China did not pay 
similar close attention to recruiting and training until the late 1920s, and even 
Standard Oil was slower in introducing a rigorous personnel policy.307  
When Shell first established up-country offices, it began recruiting and training 
British managers in Europe. The easier and cheaper method of recruiting Europeans 
in China, who were more experienced and familiar with local conditions, was 
avoided because it was thought that such locally-recruited staff would behave more 
autonomously and might be more difficult to enthuse with a corporate spirit. The 
European trainees joined the company after graduation, were trained in Hong Kong 
or Shanghai and then sent to an up-county office. There they would remain for 
several years, working as agency inspectors. Eventually they were moved to an 
office elsewhere in China, where they again did several years of up-country 
inspection work. Gradually they were promoted to be office manager of a small 
office, then of a larger office, eventually ending up in Hong Kong or Shanghai. The 
work was very demanding: long years in China, many of them spent in the smaller 
Chinese treaty ports where few other Westerns ever came, with little European 
furlough, and with very many lonely up-country inspection tours that could last for 
weeks and took them through difficult and sometimes dangerous terrain. But once 
these British employees had become branch office managers, responsible perhaps for 
an entire province, they had achieved a certain degree of autonomy. Although their 
activities were closely monitored by the main offices, they were given space to 
improve local sales through improving the agency organisation. An important effect 
of this combination between being part of a strict hierarchy and having great 
responsibilities was the tendency toward incessant expansion. Each manager tried to 
improve the sales results for his territory during the years he was assigned to one 
office, in order to obtain bonuses and to earn a higher rank in Shell’s China 
organisation. 308  The total number of Shell employees in China was six to seven 
thousand.309 The large-scale building of tank installations and the long-term career 
paths of the up-country managers indicate that from the beginning of its up-country 
operations, Shell intended to stay in China for much longer than just a few years. 
Shell’s directly owned distribution organisation—its office staff and distribution 
facilities—functioned as a tool for controlling the Chinese agents, who in turn 
                                                          
307 About the British firms see Bickers, Britain in China, 173-182. According to Gerretson the Standard 
Oil training course for China was modelled on Shell’s programme: Gerretson, Royal Dutch IV, 110. Like 
the concept of up-country distribution itself, Shell may have learned how to create a dependable 
organisation from Arnhold or other German agents. As late-comers, in order to create a competitive 
advantage, the German firms had their staff learn Chinese in order to be less dependent of compradore 
services. This probably resulted in special training programmes for German up-country personnel. It did 
not take Standard Oil not long to create its own high-standard recruiting and training programme: ‘They 
[Standard Oil] established schools in New York to train carefully screened personnel. Indeed, Standard 
Oil’s selection process was far more rigorous than that of the US Foreign Service’: Cheng, ‘Petroleum 
Trade’, 215. For a very informative account of the career of the Western up-country manager see A.T. 
Hobart’s novel Oil for the Lamps of China (7th ed; Indianapolis 1934). Although fiction and modelled on 
the Standard Oil Company of New York, the story perfectly matches the archival information available on 
Shell. The book also gives a very interesting insight into the agency system.  
308 Gerretson, Royal Dutch IV, 111. 
309 Shell Companies in Greater China, The Long Term, 12. 
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supplied local shopkeepers or sold directly to the consumers. Most Chinese 
consumers bought only a tiny quantity of lamp oil at one time in order to save 
money. To obtain a large sales volume, it was vital to make kerosene available in the 
small shops near the consumers’ homes and to re-supply these frequently. Shell 
depended on the Chinese agents to sell oil to as many local retailers as possible, and 
to establish the optimal flow of supplies. In 1921 Shell Director R. Waley Cohen 
explained to the British Foreign Office how important the relations with the Chinese 
agents were: 
  
‘You may no doubt be aware that we possess in China a very extensive 
organisation for the distribution of petroleum products throughout the 
country. This organisation has been built up over some 35 years, and has 
enabled our European representatives to establish with important Chinese 
merchants in the interior of the country closer relations than has been usual 
with foreign firms trading in China. It has been our practise to encourage a 
considerable esprit de corps among the very large body of Chinese merchants 
and agents through whom we trade, and there is considerable inter-
communication between them. They are men of high standing in the localities 
[...] there is no firm in China, other than [Standard Oil] which has this 
extensive organisation throughout the Interior of China, which is constantly 
being visited by educated Englishmen [...].’310 
 
During its pre-1942 history in China, Shell always worked with agents. At first there 
were the European agents, mainly Arnhold and Meyer, and after their contracts were 
terminated in 1908 there were two types of Chinese agents with whom Shell dealt. In 
the first place there were the treaty port agents, who supplied retailers in and around 
the main cities. These merchants were organised into powerful dealer groups or 
bang. The foreign oil companies were unable to circumvent these dealer groups, and 
they could not easily control them. For instance in the 1920s in Fuzhou there were 
200 kerosene dealers, of whom forty formed a group that traded only Shell products. 
There were also a Standard Oil group of forty and a group of twenty dealers 
connected to the Texas Company, which since the 1910s was the third-largest foreign 
oil company in China. The members of the Shell group obtained Shell kerosene 
below the normal price. The company could not dictate the selling price of the 
dealers, as the three main dealer groups made price agreements among themselves.311 
Faced with this situation, the foreign firms were forced to make agreements among 
themselves to counterbalance the power of the dealer groups. Because distribution in 
the major cities was well-organised and difficult for the oil companies to control, 
they directed their attention mainly to the smaller towns and the countryside. From 
the 1920s electrification slowed down the growth of urban kerosene consumption. 
Yet still in that era by far the largest part of the population lived in the countryside. 
There per capita kerosene consumption was low so that a great potential for 
expansion still existed. 
                                                          
310 R. Waley Cohen (APC London) to FO, PRO London, FO 371, F3587/63/23. The thirty-five years 
mentioned by him are an exaggeration.  
311 Chi Lung-Sing, ‘The Chinese Oil Trade on the Foochow Market’, The Petroleum Times (5 Nov. 
1927), 885-886. 
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Therefore the second group of agents, the up-country agents, were considered by 
Shell to be the more important group. 312  There were three kinds of up-country 
agents: main agents, sub-agents, and third-party dealers. Each province was divided 
into agency districts, each agency district contained one main agency, perhaps also 
one or more sub-agencies, and several third-party dealers. The main agent always 
owned a large trading firm. The main agencies were located in the largest 
commercial centre in the agency district. Sometimes they were owned jointly by 
several merchants. Agencies in several towns could also be owned by a single firm. 
The main agent did not usually manage the agency by on his own, and his agency 
business often came second to his other trading activities. Petroleum distribution was 
simply incorporated into his existing distribution network for consumer goods. Such 
an example of a Shell agency being part of a far greater business empire could be 
found in Shanxi, where the prominent businessman Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kong) was 
agent for part of the province. Kong’s oil agency was one of his earlier business 
interests, but even as China’s finance minister in the 1930s he continued to be an 
agent for Shell.313 The location of a main agency was usually comprised of an office 
plus a warehouse, managed by a staff of various persons, including an agency 
manager, an assistant agency manager, an accountant, a statement compiler, a 
warehouse keeper, and several travelling representatives. The task of the agency was 
to distribute oil to the retailers in its district. In order to reach villages further away 
from the main agency town, sub-agencies and third-party dealers were used. The 
sub-agencies were owned by the main agencies, and the third-party dealers 
functioned as the main agents’ agents. However, the third-party dealers were also 
under contract to Shell and were as such not substantially different from the main 
agencies and sub-agencies. Typically the third-party dealers ran a ‘grocery and 
sundry goods business’ or were involved in a similar trade in basic consumer goods. 
They supplied not only the shops in their own village but also in the surrounding 
market villages. An important part of Shell’s sales results depended on the efforts of 
these agents to establish business relations with local retailers.  
                                                          
Unfortunately no detailed data on the up-country organisation—such as the 
agents’ names and the number and location of the agencies for all China—have been 
preserved by Shell. 314  A general impression of the geographical reach of Shell’s 
organisation can be obtained from data available on West Zhejiang (lower Yangzi) 
and Guangxi (Kwangsi, South China). The data on Zhejiang province is based on a 
surviving collection of reports from the Shell office in Hangzhou. 315  In the late 
1920s the western half of Zhejiang consisted of twelve agency districts, the main 
agencies being those in Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Shaoxing. The others were along the 
River Fuchun.316 Apart from the main agencies there were eleven sub-agencies and 
sixty-nine third-party dealers spread over these twelve agency districts. The data on 
312 An important source for this section on up-country agents are the reports by Shell up-country manager 
E.G. Masters for Shandong and Zhejiang in the 1920s, kept at Shell London. Fragmented data in other 
Shell archives suggest that these reports are fully representative of the entire up-country system during the 
1920s and 1930s. 
313 Memorandum by J. Hansard, PRO London, FO 371, 23441, F4407. 
314 According to both the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company in The Hague and STT in London. 
315 Based on the annual trade report for Hangzhou area 1927 and an up-country inspector’s diary for 27 
Feb.-4 March 1930: Masters papers, Shell London. 
316 These districts were supplied from an installation at ‘Zahkou’ (old spelling). 
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Guangxi province in the mid-1930s was compiled by the acting Dutch consul-general 
for Hong Kong, F.A. van Woerden, when he visited it in June of 1937.317 Shell’s 
Wuzhou office supervised the 29 agencies that together covered the entire province; 
the number of sub-agencies and third-party dealers was not mentioned by Van 
Woerden. If West Zhejiang and Guangxi were representative of the other provinces, 
then a plausible estimate would be that the interior of each province consisted of 
some twenty to thirty main agencies and some 100-200 sub-agencies and third-party 
dealers. The number of retail shops that sold Shell products—the final link between 
the company and the Chinese consumer—is untraceable. 
It was not its maintenance of storage tanks, the operating of river and coastal 
ships, or the sales to the large urban dealers, but its close relationship with the agents 
in the interior which gave Shell an active role in the internal distribution system in 
China. This relationship was extremely important: because the company had to leave 
the supplying of shops to its agents, it could not come into direct contact with the 
consumers. The only thing Shell could do to influence trade at the retail level was to 
select energetic and trustworthy agents and keep these under its thumb as much as 
possible, hoping that they would represent the company in a satisfactory manner. 
There were two main components of this relationship between company and agent.  
The first one was the up-country inspection tour. To make sure that they 
maintained the selling prices set by the company and that they did not trade in the 
competitors’ products, the main agents were visited at least twice a month by a 
company inspector, who usually lodged in the same town for several days.318 The 
sub-agents and third-party dealers were visited less frequently by Shell, but 
representatives from the main agency made frequent visits to them instead. When a 
Shell inspector visited an agency, he instructed the agency manager about the price 
and sales policy to be followed. Shell gave the exact price limits for the whole 
agency district; the limits were usually adjusted every one or two months in response 
to fluctuations in demand or competition. The inspector also counted the remaining 
stock and inspected the books; the company had the right to do the same with third-
party dealers. He also took the opportunity to collect the agency’s sales revenue, and 
supplied it with advertising materials. Besides the agency itself he visited the local 
shops where kerosene was sold to interview the shopkeepers and to see how much 
they had in stock of each brand, and what their selling prices were. After each 
agency visit, the inspector made up a very detailed report, which included not only 
sales and stock information, but also assessments of the agency staff and the agency 
owner plus data about local retailers, large consumers such as bus companies and 
manufacturing firms, the local Standard Oil agency, and economic and political 
developments. Van Woerden, the Dutch consular official who visited Wuzhou, was 
struck by the fact that the Shell office manager was very well informed about the 
province under his supervision. He noted that the manager’s source of information 
were reports sent to him by his agents and which covered all local economic and 
political developments. Copies of these reports were not only sent to the Shell South 
                                                          
317 Report by Dutch Acting Consul-General Van Woerden (Hong Kong) 1 July 1937, Shell The Hague, 
management 15, directie BPM, China: politieke en economische toestand 1931-1938. 
318 Notes of interview by Mr Polman with Mr Bell 22 Aug. 1939, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A 
historisch archief, 91 correspondentie China. Also extract from ‘Kerosene Trade’, The Petroleum Review 
(17 July 1915) 58, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A, 93. 
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China office in Hong Kong, but also—Van Woerden remarked somewhat 
jealously—to the British consulate-general in Guangzhou. 319  Probably he was 
referring to the sections in the inspectors’ reports that dealt with local political 
developments. Because of his findings, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affair made 
an arrangement with Shell by which the Dutch consulate-general in Hong Kong 
would also obtain copies of Shell reports.320 
The second main component of the relationship between the company and the 
agent was their financial interdependence. An understanding of this topic is crucial to 
the assessment of Shell’s involvement in China. When a new agent was recruited by 
Shell, he gave the company cash or other guarantee deposits in order to receive a 
supply of petroleum. In return, Shell sent to the agent about a month’s supply of 
kerosene and other petroleum products. Every four weeks the agent had to transmit 
to Shell his sales revenue, minus his 8 per cent sales commission. 321  Whenever 
necessary, Shell sent new supplies to replace the sold ones.322 At no point did the oil 
become the property of the agent. Although the agent owned and managed the 
agency, the oil remained the property of Shell until it was bought by a retailer or a 
consumer. As a consequence, the company and the agent were mutually dependent. 
The company entrusted not just its products to the agent, but he was also responsible 
for its reputation. Established brand names could be severely damaged by an agent’s 
disregard of quality requirements. 323  More importantly the agent should follow 
Shell’s pricing instructions in order to establish the desired balance between turnover 
and profit. This balance was crucial to Shell’s success in China: the price had to be 
low enough to make kerosene affordable to a desired number of consumers, and high 
enough to recover at least the distributing costs. The agent depended on Shell for a 
                                                          
319 Report by Dutch Acting Consul-general Van Woerden (Hong Kong) 1 July 1937, Shell The Hague, 
management 15, directie BPM, China: politieke en economische toestand 1931-1938. 
320 Van Woerden asked his superiors for permission to appoint the Shell manager at Wuzhou, E. Jones, a 
honorary consul for the Netherlands. As such Jones could also be asked to send copies of his agency 
reports to Van Woerden. Neither the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor Shell objected—in fact, the 
Dutch ‘Taihoku’ (old spelling) consulate was occupied by a British Shell manager (or agent; in a limited 
number of places Shell still employed foreign merchants as local agent). Shell did reserve the right to move 
Jones from Wuzhou to another Shell office. When the Dutch government inquired whether it was possible 
for the company to station Dutch managers in China—there were none in 1937—who could act as 
honorary consul, Shell decided to send at least one Dutch trainee to Hong Kong to be prepared for up-
country duty. Furthermore, Van Woerden was given permission by Shell to see up-country reports—the 
Hong Kong manager was to decide which: Dutch Acting Consul-general F.A. van Woerden (Hong Kong) 
to Dutch Minister to China G.W. Baron de Vos van Steenwijk (Beijing/Beiping) 7 Aug. 1937, Shell The 
Hague, legal 65, China; internal note Shell London 16 Aug. 1937, Shell The Hague, legal, 65 China; F. 
Godber (Shell London) to J. de Kok (Shell The Hague) 20 Aug. 1937, Shell The Hague, management, 15 
directie BPM, China: politieke en economische toestand 1931-1938; Oppenheim (Shell The Hague) to 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 29 Dec. 1937, Shell The Hague, legal 65, China. This shows that Shell 
was very willing to maintain good relations with the Dutch government. Indeed, this is how Director F. 
Godber motivated the sending of a Dutch trainee in a letter to the Hong Kong manager: ‘The [Dutch] 
Government is most responsive in giving all possible assistance in our various difficulties, and it is not 
very often that we can reciprocate by assisting them’: 30 Aug. 1937, ibid. 
321 `Onderhoud met Mr Bell op 22 aug. 1939', Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A, 91. According to Cheng 
only 0.1 to 0.2 per cent: Cheng, ‘Petroleum Trade’, 219. 
322  Interview with Mr Bell 22 Aug. 1939, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A historisch archief, 91 
correspondentie China. 
323 A notorious problem was that kerosene dealers added cheap oil to expensive brands to increase their 
profits. 
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reliable line of supply, a constant quality of the oil, brand support through 
advertising, and also to keep the market stable. This was possible only if Shell co-
operated with Standard Oil and the Texas Company in preventing the establishment 
of new oil agencies in his territory. The mutual dependence of agent and company 
arrangement constituted the foundation for Shell’s up-country activity in China.  
Creating a nation-wide network of agency relations was not cheap. Petroleum 
was stored at a great number of agency depots. The sales proceeds were remitted 
only after four weeks. As a result, the initial investments which had to be made by 
Shell were extremely high, and a sizeable amount of company property remained 
constantly in agency hands. In assessing the extent of risk involved for Shell, the 
value of the agency deposit is an important issue: was the value of Shell’s agency 
stock more or less than the value of the deposits given to Shell by the agents? 
According to various sources, the standard requirement for the agents was to deposit 
between Y10,000 and Y30,000 in cash.324 At first sight this seems to have been more 
that the value of the stock, as the agency claims for looted up-country depots 
submitted by Shell to the Chinese and Japanese governments suggest that the stock 
value was usually several thousand yuan, but rarely more than Y10,000. However, 
there is evidence which suggests that in practice only part of the deposits were in 
cash.  
In February 1927, a message was sent to London by the Hong Kong office: the 
political situation was uncertain and the South China management reminded the head 
office that some one million yuan in stock and remittances were in the hands of 
agencies in troubled southern districts. The fact that this report warned against 
creating a situation in which this money could no longer be collected indicates that 
the guarantee submitted by the same agencies did not cover the entire sum. 325  
Another company report was more explicit about the value of stock and guarantees. 
In 1927 Sichuan province was also the theatre of severe political unrest. The 
Chongqing office informed the Shanghai office that at no Sichuan agency were the 
cash deposits enough to cover the value of the stock. The agency deposits consisted 
partly of cash, and partly of guarantee bonds and title deeds: ‘We cannot hope to 
raise cash securities to cover more than a maximum of 25 per cent of the total value 
of stocks at any but those agencies that can be supplied within a few days from 
Chungking [Chongqing] and furthermore it would not be economical either for the 
Company or for the agents to put up such heavy cash securities as would be required 
to cover the entire value of their stocks.’ 326  And the non-cash remainder of the 
deposit was not regarded by Shell as a full guarantee: ‘Guarantee bonds and title 
deeds cannot be regarded as satisfactory security in instances where they are 
deposited by agents [since] they merely serve as a deterrent against defaulting 
without providing us with a definitely realisable asset.’ At more normal times this 
practice may not have caused many problems, but in 1927 the Nationalist army 
invaded Sichuan and the resulting insecurity worried the company: ‘The position at 
                                                          
324 Cheng, ‘Petroleum Trade’, 219; Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 145. 
325 Shell Hong Kong to Shell London 8 Feb. 1927, PRO London, FO 371, 12473, F1377. This situation 
could arise were Shell Hong Kong to stop sending new supplies into the interior. See also the reply of the 
following day, ibid. which says: ‘We never intended you should stop deliveries as naturally this would 
prevent all collection of outstandings.’ This letter explains that it is better to risk losing stock through 
looting and warfare, than to be unable to collect agency remittances. 
326 Shell Chongqing to Shell Shanghai date unknown, ibid. 12417, F1937. 
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present is that any agent could repudiate his indebtedness to the Company at any time 
leaving us with the cash security only to be set off against the debit.' Taking an agent 
to court to force him to pay was usually not effective in a country where vital state 
organs were either absent or did not function.327 
The foregoing suggests that regardless of the official guarantee requirement, in 
practice the up-country agency stock in many parts of the country were covered only 
to a limited extent—a quarter or less—by cash deposits. The remainder of the value 
of the stock was covered by title deeds and guarantee bonds that were mostly useless 
to Shell if the stock and the sales remittances were lost. These guarantees were 
helpful in ensuring the agent’s loyalty, but were no remedy once the connection 
between company and agent had been severed. In this sense the risk involved in the 
kerosene trade was carried not only by the agent but also by the oil company itself. In 
parts of the country where political instability threatened agency stocks, it was a 
difficult decision for the company to limit its risks by cutting off further supplies 
because then the agents involved might respond by retaining their sales revenue and 
their remaining stock. Withdrawing for a period of several months or longer would 
severely damage a relationship with local agents that was built on trust and often on 
many years of close co-operation. Therefore, the agency relations made it difficult 
for Shell to withdraw from China once it had established itself in the interior.  
Shell’s agency policy was greatly facilitated by the fact that it co-operated closely 
with Standard Oil and the Texas Company, the other two main importers of 
petroleum into the interior. In particular its relationship with the Standard Oil 
Company was of great importance to Shell’s up-country position. Between 1906 and 
1941, the carrier of the name Standard Oil Company in China was not always the 
same corporation. In 1911 the US supreme court ruled that the original Standard Oil 
Company, which was created in the second half of the nineteenth century, obstructed 
competition and that it had to divest itself of a large part of its assets, inclusing all its 
Chinese interests. These were owned by the Standard Oil Company of New York 
(SOCONY or New York Standard),328 the largest of the newly independent Standard 
Oil subsidiaries but still much smaller than its ex-parent. The former parent firm now 
operated under the name of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (SOCONJ or New 
Jersey Standard).329 Formally New Jersey Standard was no longer involved in the 
Chinese market, but during the first decade after the formal dissolution of Standard 
Oil, its relations with New York Standard remained very close.330 During the 1920s, 
the two became more independent of one another, but during the 1930s they decided 
on a partial merger: a new joint venture called the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company 
(SVOC or Stanvac) was created to manage all Asian production and marketing 
interests of New Jersey Standard and New York Standard. This study uses the name 
                                                          
327 An example of the conditions in which such court cases sometimes took place was given by a British 
consular official in a court case in Chengdu in 1930. On 29 July of that year the high court of Chengdu 
decided that Shell’s local agent owed the company Y76 thousand; within an hour of giving the verdict, the 
judge fled the city as to be out of the reach of a local general. Ibid. 15453, F134. Of Y2,453,970 claimed 
by Shell from Chinese agents between 1927 and 1933 in thirty-three cases, Y933,800 was awarded but 
only Y131,400 could be recovered by the company: Osterhammel, ‘Imperialism in Transition’, 272. 
328 The Standard Oil Company of New York later became the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, still later 
Mobil, and was finally re-integrated into Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon). 
329 Later renamed to Esso, Exxon, and Exxon-Mobil 
330 For instance, they shared the same head office building in New York. 
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‘Standard Oil’ for the entire 1906-1941 period, a choice which the in Chinese setting 
indicates either the original Standard Oil group (until 1911), New York Standard 
(1911-1933), or New York and New Jersey Standard together (1933-1941). This use 
of the name Standard Oil runs parallel to its general use in China before 1942.  
The relationship between Shell and Standard Oil was characterised by close co-
operation and a joint domination of the petroleum market. Strong competition 
between Shell and Standard Oil infused Shell’s drive into the interior, an initiative 
which was immediately followed by Standard Oil. However, the very process of 
establishing up-country distribution largely ended competition between the two. 
Temporary market agreements had occasionally existed between the two companies, 
but always ended in price wars. The most ferocious—but also the last—price war 
occurred in 1910, when for the first time the two companies had their up-country 
assets operational. The combination of low prices and up-country distribution 
produced a strong increase in kerosene consumption. The price war forced smaller 
competitors out of business, but did not establish either Standard Oil or Shell as the 
stronger party. At the same time, the two rivals learned that the up-country market 
was open only to companies with their own distributing operations. These could be 
maintained only through dependable agency relations, which also had to be cheap in 
order to keep oil prices low. Only by making mutual agreements about the credit and 
commission terms they offered their agents could the two oil companies prevent the 
agents from bargaining for better terms. Therefore, Shell and Standard Oil reached 
the conclusion that they had access to a great new reservoir of kerosene consumers, 
but only if they co-operated with each other on agency matters.331 This co-operation 
was then extended to the exchange of pricing data and sharing arrangements for large 
contracts. 332  During the 1920s, when political turbulence threatened to their up-
country interests, Shell and Standard Oil made a habit of consulting each other 
before making any policy decisions, which usually resulted in identical measures. 
Close co-operation did not mean a complete absence of competition. Throughout 
the period 1910-1941, the two petroleum companies continued to compete for local 
market shares by encouraging their agents to sell more than the agents of the other 
party. This led to constant fluctuations in market share per agency district, while the 
overall market share remained very stable. Developments outside China were of 
greater importance to relations between Shell and Standard Oil inside China than was 
this mild form of local-level competition. To a large extent the two firms succeeded 
in keeping other major Western oil companies outside China before attempts were 
made by newcomers to enter even the most accessible treaty port. This was done 
through mutually beneficial agreements being concluded between the large 
companies for dividing certain markets in various parts of the world among 
                                                          
331 Gerretson, Royal Dutch IV, 108. 
332 For instance, in the first half of the 1920s Shell and Standard Oil had an agreement about how to 
divide kerosene contracts to all Chinese railways, except the South Manchurian Railway, among 
themselves. And even before this agreement existed, the two took turns to obtain railway supply contracts 
by underbidding each other, and subsequently offering half of the contract to the other. At the latest by the 
early 1920s Shell and Standard Oil were making detailed agreements with each other, including about 
freight allowances and the terms of their agency contracts. 
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themselves.333 However, this approach was not always successful. During the First 
World War, the Texas Company opened offices in the treaty ports and subsequently 
also built tank installations and even entered up-country selling.334 Standard Oil and 
Shell tolerated the entrance of this firm for reasons unknown, but after the Texas 
Company no other up-country organisations were created. The Texas Company 
remained much smaller than the two other firms; it operated fewer agencies and 
extended only to the larger towns. The arrangements of limited competition and 
general co-operation made between Shell and Standard Oil were also extended to 
include the operations of the Texas Company.  
In 1933 a cartel that was linked to the division of other petroleum markets in the 
world was formally created for China. The leading Western oil companies agreed 
that the Chinese market for petroleum products would remain the preserve of Shell, 
Standard Oil, and the Texas Company and that the existing market shares would 
continue unaltered. This was referred to as the ‘as is’ agreement: ‘[...] under “as is” 
there is a great measure of freedom to all parties, the only thing which is really called 
for is co-operation against a common enemy, and respect of each other’s trading 
position.’335 This was no different from the practice that had prevailed in China for 
many years, but the important new element was that these rules applied to all large 
oil companies everywhere in the world. The Chinese market was sealed off from 
powerful rivals.336 When New York Standard decided to join forces in the Far East 
with New Jersey Standard in 1933, and when the Texas Company did the same with 
Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) in 1936, this did not affect Shell’s 
position.337 In return for co-operation elsewhere, New York Standard and the Texas 
Company offered half of their Chinese interests to their respective partners, but 
Shell’s market share remained untouched.338 
                                                          
333 The major Western oil companies of this period being primarily New Jersey Standard and Shell, 
followed by New York Standard, Socal (Standard Oil Co. of Calofornia or California Standard), the Texas 
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334 The Texas Company later became Texaco, and was eventually acquired by SOCAL (Chevron). 
335 A. Agnew (Shell London) to De Kok (Shell The Hague) 13 Jan. 1936, Shell The Hague, legal 7, 
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336 In April 1928 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company made preparations for entering oil distribution in 
China. A representative, E.C. Russell, visited Beijing and Shanghai. There he spoke with British 
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of favouring state interests. Furthermore, as the planned distribution subsidiary would be half-owned by 
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Achnacarry, agreement of September 1928 with Shell and Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, that 
Anglo-Persian ceased its preparations to enter the Chinese market. British Minister M. Lampson (Beijing) 
to British Foreign Office 27 Apr. 1928, PRO London, FO 371, 13233, F2937; British commercial secretary 
(Shanghai) to British Minister (Beijing) 18 May 1928, ibid. F3576.  
337 SOCAL later became Chevron. 
338 The organisational situation in China remained the same. New York Standard transferred ownership 
of its Chinese assets to Stanvac, which was owned half by New York Standard and half by New Jersey 
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The monopoly of Shell and Standard Oil and their junior partner the Texas 
Company was never complete. A basic cause was the fact that treaty port merchants 
always continued to import kerosene and other petroleum products, and to sell these 
on to Chinese distributors. After all, the treaty ports represented the Open Door and 
were accessible to exporters anywhere in the world, and the cartel of the ‘oil majors’ 
could not control all of the world’s oil flows. Chinese distributors who brought 
imported oil from the treaty ports to the regional wholesalers also continued to 
operate. But such distributors had great difficulty in keeping their prices down. Shell 
and Standard Oil had eliminated the intermediate traders, which enabled them to 
keep their selling prices very low. To compensate for this the Chinese distributors 
had to limit their operations to regions that were easy and cheap to reach. The largest 
challenge from a Chinese distributor came from the Guanghua Gongsi (Kwanghwa 
Company) during the first half of the 1930s. This firm purchased its kerosene from 
the USSR through the Soviet Neft syndicate. Although the Guanghua/Neft 
partnership made large investments in distribution equipment and caused the severest 
price war since 1910, eventually they were driven from the market.339 In the mid-
1930s Guanghua sold its stock and equipment to Shell.340  
Thanks to its up-country distribution system, Shell gained access to China’s 
gigantic rural market. Through its agreements with Standard Oil and the Texas 
Company, Shell sealed off this market to potential newcomers, but one important 
element of competition continued to exist, namely that between kerosene and bean 
oil. Although Shell kerosene was widely available and the consumers’ choice of 
kerosene was limited to only a few brands, there was little the oil company could do 
to prevent people from buying bean oil. This was the traditional fuel for oil lamps in 
China, and because it was produced locally by simple methods it was very cheap. Oil 
made from soya beans was especially widely used. Soya beans were extensively 
cultivated in Manchuria, Shandong, and Jiangsu. Apart from these, peanuts were also 
often used to extract lamp oil from. The lamp oil trade was lively only in winter, 
when there was little sunlight. China’s domestic trade in vegetable oils was well-
established, making bean oil widely available and cheap. A side-activity of the 
kerosene business was the trade in candles and paraffin wax. Like lamp oil, candles 
could be made from both vegetable and mineral oil, and again the mineral oil variant 
generally was more expensive and of better quality. Shell exported its Borneo 
paraffin wax to China where it was partly processed into candles in Shell’s Shanghai 
candle factory, and partly sold to Chinese candle and match factories.341 Candles 
were used everywhere in China, and were distributed by Shell through its kerosene 
agency network. Important though they were, candles were less popular and traded 
on a smaller scale than lamp oil, and always remained a secondary petroleum 
                                                                                                                                          
Standard. The Texas Company transferred ownership of the Texas Company (China) to Caltex, its new 
joint venture for Asian interests with SOCAL. 
339 Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 151-154. 
340  British acting commercial secretary (Hong Kong) to British Ambassador Sir A. Cadogan 
(Beijing/Beiping) 20 Mar. 1936, PRO London, FO 371, 20239, F3438. 
341 Paraffin wax occupied a similar place to kerosene in Shell’s China strategy: both were originally by-
products that were less easy to dispose of than the main product petrol, and both came partly from Borneo. 
An important difference was that paraffin wax still had to be processed into candles when it arrived in 
China before it was marketable as a consumer product. Therefore  Shell could sell it as a raw material to 
rivalling candle companies. 
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product. The kerosene market was the main market, and the consumers’ choice 
between kerosene and bean oil was the main determinant for the size of the kerosene 
market in China.  
Generally speaking, kerosene was more expensive than bean oil, but its burning 
qualities were also much higher: less smoke, more light, and more stable and reliable. 
This meant that for many Chinese customers kerosene was a luxury product, not a 
basic necessity.342 Still, early on Shell and Standard Oil found out that a substantial 
part of the up-country consumers was prepared to pay more in order to obtain 
kerosene. Sales figures rose sharply after 1910, and the fact that still so many 
Chinese were using vegetable lamp oil meant that there was a potential for sustained 
sales expansion for many years into the future. Essential to Shell was whether it 
could market all of its surplus kerosene from Borneo and Sumatra, not how many 
Chinese still used bean oil. According to F.C. Gerretson, who was once the board 
secretary of Royal Dutch and later wrote the company’s history,343 ‘it can safely be 
said that the crucial problem in the Chinese market after the Amalgamation [of Royal 
Dutch and STT] was the uncertainty of supplies and not the inadequacy of the 
demand, as was the case before 1908’.344 After 1909 China was able not just to 
absorb all of Shell’s Southeast Asian kerosene, the company even shipped kerosene 
from its American refineries to China because production in the Netherlands Indies 
could not keep up with the Chinese demand. Kerosene now was one of China’s top 
import products, cigarettes being the only other industrial product so widely 
available throughout the interior of China. Mineral lamp oil made up 4-6 per cent of 
all imports in China, and this remained so until the 1930s.345 
In terms of size and growth potential the Chinese market was ideal. Unfortunately 
its stability left much to be desired, which made it difficult for Shell to plan the ideal 
balance between production and distribution. The bulk of the Chinese population was 
poor and unpredictable events had a very strong influence on purchasing power. 
Failed crops, droughts, floods, and warfare caused extreme regional poverty, as a 
result of which people were not inclined to buy expensive lamp oil—if they bought 
any lamp fuel at all. Unknown to Shell when it made its up-country investments, the 
1920s and 1930s would bring an exceptionally large number of such disasters. An 
important reason why up-country kerosene sales during the 1920s did not collapse in 
many parts of the country was that while kerosene had become cheaper after 1908, 
prices of vegetable oils had risen strongly during the same time.346 In Europe and the 
                                                          
342 Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 147. 
343  He was board secretary in 1920. Moreover, he was also professor of colonial history (Utrecht 
University, 1925-1954), and poet (under the pseudonym Geerten Gossaert): De Vries, Herinneringen, 
1724. 
344 Gerretson, Royal Dutch IV, 110. 
345 Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 48. 
346 ‘China as a Market for Oil’, The Petroleum Times (13 Aug. 1927), 327-330. At the beginning of the 
century, the company actually thought about ways to influence the price of vegetable oil. Shell’s idea was 
to co-operate with export companies. If tanker ships and trains could be properly cleaned after they had 
dropped off their kerosene at the tank installations, they might be filled with vegetable oil which they 
would then bring to Shanghai and Hong Kong, from where it could be transported abroad. That would 
create an outlet for vegetable oil in years of good harvests, so that the demand for kerosene would not be 
ruined at those times. ‘But once again an otherwise excellent plan was foiled by the technical difficulty of 
cleaning the holds adequately—a snag which had always prevented the use of tankers for cargoes other 
than kerosene’: Gerretson, Royal Dutch IV, 109-110. 
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US a very large demand for vegetable oils had been formed, for instance with 
industrial producers of chemicals, soap, and foods. China developed into an 
important exporter of vegetable oils, mainly bean oil and peanut oil. Moreover, 
within China itself the industrial demand for these products was increasing. This 
great demand for vegetable oil caused its price to soar, making it no longer notably 
cheaper than kerosene. Fluctuations in vegetable oil prices directly affected kerosene 
sales. Until the late 1920s these conditions kept the Chinese demand for kerosene 
high, albeit also very unstable. 
The 1930s saw a rapid decrease in this demand. The main reason was that 
kerosene prices now went up, while bean oil became cheaper. From the late 1920s 
new standardised kerosene taxes were introduced to replace older irregular ones, 
possibly resulting in a price increase. Furthermore, China’s import duties were raised 
for the first time since the nineteenth century. On top of this the value of silver—i.e., 
of Chinese currency—decreased. 347  These developments forced Shell to raise its 
selling prices. Then in the early 1930s the great depression came, affecting not only 
the purchasing ability of the Chinese population, but also causing vegetable oil prices 
to fall. A clear price difference now existed between mineral and vegetable lamp oil, 
and kerosene was too expensive for many rural consumers. The demand in the large 
coastal cities, the original and long-time stable bridgeheads of the foreign oil 
companies, was also diminishing as a result of the increasingly widespread use of 
electric lighting. Finally complications resulting from the Japanese occupation of 
large parts of China negatively affected kerosene marketing. Yet, these developments 
did not render China irrelevant as a kerosene market. As long as electricity was not 
available in the countryside, new growth opportunities would materialise as soon as 
the price differential between kerosene and bean oil lessened once again. Moreover, 
during the 1930s the high selling price caused the value of turnover to remain 
high.348 
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347 Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 323. 
348 For instance, in 1933 Shell stated to be selling more than £2 million worth of kerosene annually in 
China: British Petroleum Dept to British Foreign Office 1 Aug. 1933, PRO London, FO 371, 17126, 
F5140. 
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Source: Chu-Yuan Cheng, ‘The United States Petroleum Trade with China, 1876-1949’ in: E.R. May and 
J.K. Fairbank, America’s China Trade in Historical Perspective: The Chinese and American Performance 
(Cambridge MA 1986), 208-209 
 
Disappointing as the decrease in kerosene sales during the 1930s may have been for 
Shell, by this time the company’s main interest in China was changing and kerosene 
selling was becoming less important. During the 1910s China primarily was a 
kerosene outlet that absorbed oil from the Netherlands Indies and that enabled Shell 
to maximise sales profits on petrol in the US and Europe. But two developments 
made this function of the Chinese market less important. Firstly, technological 
development made it increasingly possible to refine crude oil according to the 
demands of the market. Whereas in the past kerosene was a by-product of petrol 
production that Shell had to dispose of somehow, it was now possible to extract 
much more petrol from crude, which resulted in much fewer by-products such as 
kerosene. Secondly, by the mid-1920s China was showing a rapidly growing 
capacity to absorb petroleum products other than kerosene. In the West products 
such as fuel oil to power machinery, aviation spirit for aeroplanes and lubricating oils 
had already joined petrol in surpassing kerosene in importance. It seemed not 
unlikely that the same would happen in China within the next few decades. 
Motorised transport developed strongly, 349  as did industrialisation. Factories and 
power plants were built in many cities. In this respect the coming of electricity was 
favourable to Shell, because fuel oil was used in the electricity plants. Table IV 
shows how quickly the demand for these products was rising.  
 
Table IV. Petroleum products imported into China, 1925 and 1935. 
 
 1925 
(millions of litres) 
1935 
(millions of litres) 
change 
kerosene 979 387 -/-  60% 
petrol 33 155 + 370% 
lubricants 27 39 +   44% 
fuel oil 92 377 + 310% 
 
Source: Chu-yuan Cheng, ‘The United States Petroleum Trade with China, 1876-1949’ in: E.R. May and 
J.K. Fairbank, America’s China Trade in Historical Perspective: The Chinese and American Performance 
(Cambridge MA 1986), 208-209. 
 
China was now perceived by the oil companies as an important growth market for 
petrol and fuel oil. Some day the US and European markets would be saturated, and 
although they would remain the largest markets for a long time to come, expansion 
would have to be sought elsewhere. In 1936 petrol and fuel oil imports combined 
represented the same value as kerosene imports.350 Capitalising on assets, Shell used 
its existing kerosene distribution system in China to market also the newer products. 
The agents were now no longer expected to devote their attention exclusively to local 
retailers. By the 1930s it was also their task to maintain relations with local bus 
companies and small factories for soap, candles, matches, vegetable oil, et cetera. In 
                                                          
349 Between 1927 and 1936 the number of registered motorised vehicles in China rose from 19,000 to 
over 47,000: Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 149. 
350 Ibid. 146. 
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the larger cities some retailers were equipped with petrol filling pumps for motor 
cars. Finally, the many wars of the 1920s and 1930s gave a huge impetus to the 
military consumption of petroleum. This development forced the company to 
reinterpret its main interests in China. Despite such portents, for the time being China 
remained a potentially important market for kerosene, and the transition from 
kerosene distribution to distribution of other petroleum products could be achieved 
by introducing gradual changes. Therefore, during the 1930s, the main aim of Shell 
in China was still the expansion of controllable sales, no longer exclusively for 
kerosene but for the newer oil products.   
From the beginning Shell was profitable and paid its shareholders dividends each 
year. The APC’s financial figures for China for the period 1906-1928 do no longer 
exist. 351  The initial investments in tank installations and agency stock were 
undoubtedly huge, probably amounting to over ƒ60 million by the mid-1920s. There 
is a very good chance that because of these investments and the low kerosene prices, 
it was many years after 1908 before Shell’s Chinese operations showed a profit. 
However, at the latest from the late 1920s until the Second World War, the APC was 
able to remit dividend from China to Europe each year. From 1929 onwards figures 
are indeed available and they show that from 1930 until the end of 1940 the average 
annual turnover of APC North China and APC South China together was £4.5 
million (ƒ42 million against the average exchange rate for 1930-1940), and the total 
net profit for this period amounted to £576,881 (ƒ5.4 million). The total sum of 
dividends remitted to the mother company in London amounted to about the same 
figure (£579,625, ƒ5.4 million).352 Until the beginning of the war in 1937 turnover 
and profits were relatively stable. Neither the economic depression nor the loss of the 
Manchurian market is obviously reflected in these figures. The loss of sales seems to 
have been compensated for by the rise in price of kerosene and petrol. The beginning 
of the war did lead to much lower profit figures for APC North China, but APC 
South China clearly found ways to compensate for lost selling opportunities: from 
1938 its profits went up steeply. Both subsidiaries remained profitable, and the 
northern organisation even showed a slight recovery in 1939 and 1940.353  
The main local interest of Shell initially was to sell all surplus kerosene from the 
Netherlands Indies and the Unites States. Achieving a maximum profit rate was less 
important than creating a reliable and stable outlet for this surplus kerosene. To 
achieve this aim the company invested a huge amount of time and money in building 
an up-country distribution system, from which it could not easily withdraw once it 
was in place–which was the case from the late 1910s. This was the strategy for the 
first two decades or so but in the 1930s the main local interest of the company 
changed. The primary function of the Chinese market was changing from being that 
of an outlet for surplus kerosene to being a major market for petrol, fuel oil, and 
lubricants—the main petroleum products of the 1930s. Because Shell used its 
                                                          
351 Information provided by Royal Dutch Petroleum Company The Hague and STT London. 
352 In the period 1930-1934 Royal Dutch/Shell profits were approximately (1930) £7.7 million, (1931) 
£4.2 million, (1932) £4.3 million, (1933) £4.5 million, (1934) £6.3 million: Howarth, Shell, 159-160 (for 
STT profits, which constituted 40 per cent of Group profits). 
353 APC NC and APC SC accounts 1930-1940, Shell London, Group Archive, EA112 APC (NC) Ltd 
1930-1940 and EA82 APC (SC) Ltd 1930-1953 respectively. 
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existing selling organisation to achieve this new aim, its presence in China remained 
largely the same as it had been during the 1910s and 1920s. 
 
Political Risks and Response 
 
1906-1916 
Exploration Concessions under the Yuan Shikai Regime. In 1906 for the first time 
Royal Dutch and STT made direct investments in China. The earliest occasion when 
they perceived the threat of a major risk as a direct result of political change was in 
1914. 354  In 1911-1912 the Qing dynasty made way for the new republic under 
President Yuan Shikai. The fighting between loyalist and revolutionary troops did 
not last long and soon trade picked up to continue as before. The problem was that 
Yuan’s regime was even more unstable than the old imperial administration. The first 
president of China had a host of enemies and little money to consolidate his power. 
In order to increase its revenue, the Chinese government was now more prepared 
than before to enter into co-operative ventures with foreign companies. Shell was not 
interested in changing the basis on which it was building its up-country presence, but 
unfortunately for the company its rival Standard Oil was quite willing to exploit the 
fact that Yuan was desperate for money. In 1914 the American oil company and the 
Chinese government signed an agreement to commence oil exploration and 
eventually production in China. 
In an earlier phase Royal Dutch and STT had already investigated possibilities for 
oil production in China. Oil seepages were known to exist mainly in two provinces, 
Sichuan and Shaanxi;355 therefore the attention of the foreign oil companies was 
largely confined to these two territories. In 1904 the Asiatic Petroleum Company 
became the first major oil concern to search for oil in China when it obtained an 
exploration concession for Sichuan.356  The company sent a small expedition that 
reported that for the time being Sichuan was too difficult to reach without incurring 
huge costs.357 Consequently the project was terminated.358 In 1914 and 1918 the 
company was again offered the opportunity to look for petroleum in Sichuan, but this 
it declined. 359  The main motive for not sending any further expeditions to that 
                                                          
354 Both Royal Dutch and STT had already made indirect investments in China the 1890s, and as early as 
1900 STT experienced political risks in China as a major problem. In 1900 Boxer and Chinese troops 
attacked the foreign concessions in Tianjin and damaged the site where STT was constructing a large tank 
installation. After the fighting the site was occupied by German soldiers who removed all the building 
materials. The destruction of its Tianjin installation was a major financial and strategic setback for STT. 
However, after 1901 there were no great political risks for either STT or Royal Dutch until the 1914 
agreement between Yuan and Standard Oil.  
355 Cheng, ‘Petroleum Trade’, 229. 
356 Which is surprising because the APC was created exclusively for distribution, not production or 
exploration. It may well be that the concession was obtained through the Paris Rothschilds who were a 
partner in the APC, not in STT or Royal Dutch. 
357 The concession was actually owned by the Societé Française d’Explorations Minières (SFEM), but it 
sold it to the APC. The company set up the Compagnie Française des Mines de Setchuan. In 1906 the right 
was returned to the SFEM: ‘China’, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A, 92 and Gerretson Royal Dutch III, 
193-194. 
358 ‘China’, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A historisch archief, 92.  
359 In February-March 1914 Shell was again offered a concession in Sichuan, this time by W. Pritchard 
Morgan of the Eastern Pioneer Company, but the oil company declined: Shell Director H.N. Benjamin 
(London) to W. Pritchard Morgan (London) 9 Mar. 1914 , Shell The Hague, EP 21, x009.1 347.258 China 
concessies. This Sichuan concession was obtained by W. Pritchard Morgan in 1899. He then leased his 
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province remained the underdeveloped state of communication links between 
Sichuan and the rest of China.360 
In Shaanxi it was the Americans who obtained an exploration concession.361  An 
agreement was signed with the government of President Yuan Shikai, on 10 
February 1914, allowing Standard Oil to look for petroleum in Shaanxi. In return 
Standard Oil promised a share of the production profits to President Yuan, who 
inherited the problem from the Qing administration of hardly any revenue being 
available to the central government. 362  In the past when China granted railway 
concessions to foreigners, the money to finance the construction of railway was 
raised on foreign capital markets by foreign banks. The railway was then constructed 
by a foreign contractor. Only after China had repaid the bonds, were control and 
ownership of the railway handed over to China. But in 1914 Standard Oil did not 
need the involvement of a bank or the capital market. Should sufficient oil be found, 
then the company would finance a production company. In return for the concession 
and for protection, the Chinese government would be given 37.5 per cent of the 
shares in this company, with an option of buying another 7.5 per cent. The remaining 
shares would stay in Standard Oil’s hands.363 Data in the Shell archive indicates that 
Standard Oil advanced the Chinese government a sum of Y35 million—constituting 
probably the first Y35 million of dividends payable to the Chinese state by the 
planned production company.364  
Soon a large-scale expedition, escorted by the Chinese military, was mounted by 
the American firm to survey Shaanxi province. Finding oil fields in China was 
important to the Americans. Just a few years before, in 1911, Standard Oil had 
divested itself of its export subsidiary New York Standard. As a result New York 
Standard was left with a giant distribution organisation, but without any equally large 
oil supplies. As STT had opened oil production in Borneo, Standard Oil now seemed 
close to doing the same in Shaanxi. This worried the Shell leadership. What if 
Standard Oil were to find oil and refine it locally? The American firm might produce 
kerosene so cheaply that Shell’s products would be pushed out of the North Chinese 
market. Cogently, the relationship now formed between Standard Oil and the 
Chinese government in oil production might result in a pro-Standard Oil policy with 
                                                                                                                                          
right to Pearson & Son: ‘Over Petroleum Concessies’, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A, 92. Deterding 
remarked to one of his colleagues that it would suit Shell perfectly if Pearson were to spend a great deal of 
money on trying to find a ‘needle in the haystack’ in Sichuan: H.W.A. Deterding (London) to C.M. Pleyte 
(The Hague) 15 July 1915, Shell The Hague, EP21, x009.1, 347.258 China. The identity of who 
approached Shell in 1918 with regard to Sichuan remains unknown.  
360 J.B. August Kessler (Shell The Hague) to Benjamin (Shell London) 31 Dec. 1918, ibid. 
361 Actually the concession was for three districts: Yan’an and Yanchuan in Shaanxi, and in Chengde in 
Zhili. However, it was very quickly found out that the Zhili concession was not interesting for exploration: 
Gerretson, Royal Dutch IV, 122. 
362 The main national revenue, the import duty collected by the Maritime Customs Service, was put under 
foreign control and used to pay off foreign debts and the Boxer indemnity, and most other forms taxation, 
such as regional trade duties, remained in the hands of the local authorities. 
363 ‘China’, Shell The Hague, 190A, 92. 
364 ‘Chronologisch Overzicht’, ibid. This source, probably notes made by or for Gerretson, states only the 
amount in ‘dollars’ without mentioning whether these were Chinese or other dollars. It is assumed here that 
Chinese dollars were meant. Why Gerretson did not mention this information in his book remains a 
mystery. In 1917 China paid Standard $543,703 to reimburse part of the exploration costs: M. Wilkins, The 
Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge MA 
1974), 16. 
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regard to oil distribution. Just when Shell was in the middle of building its expensive 
up-country distribution organisation, its position already seemed undermined. 
Particularly worrying in this respect was that China had promised Standard Oil not to 
grant concessions to other foreign oil companies until one year after the contract was 
signed. Meanwhile Standard Oil, should it turn out that the concession areas were 
disappointing, had the right to look for oil wherever it liked in China. Shell 
complained that this ran contrary to the ideal of the Open Door. 
On the grounds that the APC was a British company that was being discriminated 
against, Shell asked the British legation to present its case before the Chinese 
authorities. The British government indeed decided that the Shaanxi concession was 
a breach of the Open Door principle—and its legal underpinning, the most-favoured-
nation clause in China’s foreign treaties—since it gave the exclusive right to find and 
produce oil in Shaanxi to an American firm. The British minister in Beijing sent 
letters of protest to the Chinese government, but President Yuan showed no intention 
of altering the Standard Oil agreement. Then, in July 1914, Deterding decided to 
follow Standard Oil’s example of negotiating directly with the Chinese 
government.365 This constituted the beginning of Shell’s active role in Sino-British—
and Sino-Dutch—relations. While after 1914 the company frequently asked the 
British government to send complaints to Beijing when trouble loomed, Shell 
increasingly also used the parallel strategy of direct talks with Chinese officials.  
According to Shell’s internal organisation, matters relating to exploration and 
production were managed by the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM) in The 
Hague. Consequently not the Anglo-Saxon or the APC management in London but 
BPM Director H. Colijn in The Hague was responsible for finding a suitable 
response to the Standard Oil concession. Colijn had joined Shell only recently, 
having served as an officer in Sumatra during the Aceh (Atjeh) War and having been 
Minister of War in 1912-1913. After Colijn had—on his own behalf—visited China 
in the autumn of 1913 he was hired by Deterding to become BPM director. Later, 
during the 1920s, he would leave Shell again to return to politics and to become 
Prime Minister. To undertake the challenge of going to Beijing and engaging in 
actual negotiations, Deterding hired another Dutch government official, W.J. 
Oudendijk. He had been in the consular service and in this capacity had been 
stationed in Beijing around the turn of the century. Oudendijk, who could speak 
Chinese fluently, had developed closer contacts with Chinese than was usual for 
foreigners in Beijing. Later, after his work for Shell was completed, Oudendijk 
resumed his diplomatic career, and during the whole of the 1920s he served in 
Beijing as the Dutch minister and as the dean of the diplomatic corps.366  
During 1914-1915 when Oudendijk was in China on behalf of Shell, his mission 
was to obtain exploration concessions for parts of Shaanxi where Standard Oil was 
not yet active, or for other parts of China.367 It is noteworthy that negotiations on 
                                                          
365 H. Deterding (Shell London) to H. Colijn (Shell The Hague) 6 July 1914, Shell The Hague, SIPM, EP 
21, x009.1 347.258 China. 
366 On his career: Oudendijk, Ways and By-Ways. In this book Oudendijk briefly refers to his stay in 
China in 1914-1915 without mentioning that he was sent there by Shell.  
367 Sichuan was the one place in which Deterding was still not interested: Deterding (London) to Colijn 
(The Hague) 6 July 1914 , Shell The Hague, EP 21, x009.1, 347.258. At that time Royal Dutch had only 
unconfirmed reports of petroleum indications in Sichuan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Zhili (Hebei), Fujian, Zhejiang, 
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behalf of Shell were completely in the hands of former Dutch government officials. 
Before 1912 Chinese officials would only negotiate with foreign government 
representatives, not with private persons or organisations. This policy had forced 
foreign firms to rely on help from their own governments. Now that the Qing dynasty 
had been replaced by the new republic, the foreign oil companies were among the 
first businesses to experiment with building up government relations. Apparently 
Shell felt more comfortable with the formula of former officials in company service, 
than with sending long-time managers to Beijing. Colijn’s employment by Shell was 
probably not specifically related to the Standard Oil concession, but Oudendijk was 
more or less borrowed from the Dutch government to take care of the concession 
matter.368  
In August 1914 Oudendijk arrived in Beijing where he soon found out that to get 
a concession, Shell would have to offer a loan to the Chinese government—the sum 
of £2 million was asked for by the Chinese.369 Colijn was prepared to lend money to 
the Yuan Shikai regime, but first he wanted Shell experts to conduct an exploration 
in China.370 Therefore a Dutch geologist was sent to Beijing from Java in 1915.371 
Before this resulted in an actual survey, Shell found out that the Standard Oil 
expedition to Shaanxi had not discovered any commercially viable oil fields and that 
the exploration activities had been halted. In June Colijn sent the geologist back to 
Java, and a few months later Oudendijk was told to return to Europe.372 President 
Yuan did not get a loan from Shell, because its motivation for hunting for a 
concession was very different from Standard Oil’s. Shell already produced large 
quantities of kerosene in Southeast Asia and was interested only in starting 
production in China if Standard Oil was. Producing in China would interfere with 
Shell’s objective of using China to absorb its kerosene surplus created in the 
Netherlands Indies. The news of Standard Oil’s failure must have come as a great 
relief to Colijn and Deterding.  
Although Oudendijk was convinced that he had succeeded in obstructing the talks 
between Standard Oil and the Chinese government, after he left China in October 
1915 the American-Chinese negotiations were resumed.373 It was not until 1917 that 
Standard Oil made the decision to abandon the Shaanxi project completely. For many 
years the company was no longer interested in exploration concessions for any part 
of the country. There has been some confusion as to why Standard Oil paid so much 
attention to the Shaanxi concession and then decided to abandon exploration entirely. 
The expensive 1914-1915 expedition and its failure to find oil were widely 
                                                                                                                                          
Jiangsu, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Any other provinces with possible oil deposits were too remote even to 
consider exploring: ‘Over Petroleum Concessies’, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 190A, 92. 
368 As can be read in Chapter 5, at about the same time the Dutch government also ‘lent’ the civil 
engineer O.C.A.  van Lidth de Jeude to Havenwerken to make a study of Yantai harbour and to obtain the 
related harbour improvement assignment for that firm. During the 1930s Van Lidth de Jeude would return 
into government service to become a cabinet minister. 
369 Gerretson, Royal Dutch IV, 129. 
370 Colijn (The Hague) to W. Oudendijk (Beijing) 24 Dec. 1914 , Shell The Hague, EP 21, x009.1, 
347.258 China concessies. 
371 Shell Netherlands Indies to Colijn (The Hague) 10 June 1915, ibid. 
372 Deterding (London) to C.M. Pleyte (The Hague) 15 July 1915 and Colijn (Netherlands Indies) to 
Oudendijk (Beijing) 19 Sept 1915, ibid. According to Mira Wilkins, the US-Chinese co-operation halted in 
August 1915 because Standard refused to raise a loan for China: Wilkins, Maturing, 15. 
373 Oudendijk (Beijing) to Shell The Hague 29 Sept. 1915, Shell The Hague, EP 21, x009.1, 347.258. 
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publicised at the time, and this deterred other foreign oil companies from undertaking 
similar attempts. Simultaneously a rumour began to do the rounds that the Standard 
Oil geologists really had found oil, but that the company decided to conceal this fact 
in order to discourage anyone who had plans to develop petroleum production in 
China. 374  The implication of this was that the Americans wanted to keep China 
dependent on kerosene from their refineries in the US.375  
It is indeed curious that Standard Oil kept the concession talks going for two 
years after the end of the Shaanxi expedition. Clearly Shell had not expected this 
when Colijn told Oudendijk that his mission was over in 1915. Cheng Chu-Yuan 
claims that oil was found, but it was the combination of low potential oil reserves 
and their distance from the markets that led the Standard Oil directors to take their 
decision.376 In other words, oil exploration and production in Shaanxi were possible, 
but would also be very expensive. This could explain what Standard Oil and the 
Chinese government were talking about in 1916-1917: how the financial burden 
could be divided. Cheng concluded that ‘there is no evidence that American 
geological surveys were consciously designed to seal off China’s petroleum 
resources from the rest of the world’.377  
Materials in the Shell archives partly support this, but also provide new 
information. In 1919 Shell acquired copies of the reports that the Standard Oil 
geologists had written in 1915. How Shell acquired these copies remains unclear, but 
the company certainly did not doubt their authenticity. 378  The Shell geological 
department in The Hague examined the more than 500 pages of the reports and 
concluded that oil exploration in Shaanxi was possible, but commercially very 
unattractive. However, on the basis of the reports Shell also concluded that Standard 
Oil was actually prepared to go ahead with the expensive development of oil fields in 
Shaanxi, provided that China would give the company a monopoly on exploration 
and production throughout the whole country.379 It was only after it had become 
clear that the Chinese government was unwilling to give all rights to a single foreign 
firm, that Standard Oil decided to terminate the agreement with China.380  
                                                          
So while for the time being it was true that oil production in China was not 
commercially profitable, this was not the whole story. Standard Oil had clearly been 
interested in exploration even despite the apparent unattractiveness of the venture. 
374 Oudendijk informed Shell of this rumour in late 1922 or early 1923: J.T. Erb (Shell The Hague) to 
Oudendijk (Beijing) 6 Feb. 1923, ibid. 
375 This in turn is related to the widespread suspicion that the former Standard Oil companies were still 
working together in secret, and that consequently Standard Oil did not really want to commence production 
in China. 
376 Cheng, ‘Petroleum Trade’, 229. 
377 Ibid. 233. 
378 One possibility is that a certain E.T. Birchall gave them to Shell because he wanted to convince Shell 
that oil exploration was still possible in China. Birchall approached Shell in 1919 with the proposition that 
he acquire a concession in China on behalf of Shell: E.T. Birchall (Brighton) to Shell 2 May and 11 July 
1919, Shell The Hague, EP 21, x009.1 347.258. 
379 According to the Petroleum Department of the British government, Standard Oil found ninety-one 
indications of oil in China. Production operations were commenced in ‘Yenchang’ (old spelling) in 
Shaanxi, and terminated in 1916: memo Petroleum Department (London) to British Foreign Office 1921, 
PRO London, FO 371, 6625, F960. According to the British legation in Beijing there were no large oil 
deposits in Shanxi: ibid. 
380 Van Gogh (The Hague) to Benjamin (London) 16 Aug. 1919, Shell The Hague, Ep 21, x009.1 
347.258. 
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But outside the Chinese government and a few people in the oil industry—including 
Shell’s top managers—no one was aware of this. Standard Oil was not inclined to 
encourage anyone to acquire oil concessions by disclosing that it had been willing to 
commence exploration in Shaanxi, and for Shell it also ran counter to its interests to 
make this information public. China’s capacity to absorb surplus kerosene would be 
spoiled if the country developed its own oil producting industry. The company 
turned down several offers for acquiring new concessions in 1919 and 1924.381 The 
events of 1914-1915 revealed that the new republican government was willing to 
deal directly with a foreign company in return for financial aid, and that Shell was 
equally willing to give such aid in order to obtain a concession. Contrary to what had 
been the custom during the Qing period, neither the British nor the Dutch 
government was involved in negotiations about economic concessions, and now for 
the very first time Shell acquired experience with dealing with direct government 
relations in China.  
 
1916-1928 
After the death of Yuan and the breakdown of central government, Shell faced 
various new political risks. These can be divided into four main types: risks related to 
Japanese imperialism, looting of stocks, popular anti-foreign violence, and 
unpredictable taxation. 
 
Restrictions on Land use under the Japanese. While problems of Western firms 
related to Japanese imperialism in China are usually associated with the 1930s, Shell 
came into conflict with the Japanese military in China at a relatively early stage. 
When Japan put forward its ‘Twenty-One Demands’ to China in 1915, it was not 
opposed by the Western powers. This was interpreted by many observers as 
international acceptance of Japan’s ambition to replace Great Britain as the first 
among the foreign powers in China. Shell, which until World War I had enjoyed the 
privilege of being protected by the most influential of the foreign powers, now had to 
get used to the idea that in the future Japan might be strong enough to do whatever it 
wanted in the parts of China that were under its control. Against this background it is 
easy to understand why Shell responded vehemently to a Japanese administrative 
regulation in Qingdao that was not necessarily intended to harm the firm’s interests. 
During the First World War, Japan occupied the German concession at Qingdao. 
Shell owned a large tank installation in that city from where it supplied most of 
Shandong province. Problems began when the Japanese army invaded the German 
concession in 1914. In the process the Japanese shelled the city and caused severe 
damage to the tank installation. The company presented a claim for financial 
compensation to the Japanese government, but the Japanese argued that Germany 
was responsible. By 1925 the claim was still outstanding, which probably created an 
unfavourable impression of the Japanese army in Shell. 382  In 1919 the Japanese 
military authorities of Qingdao asked Shell—and its neighbour Standard Oil—to 
                                                          
381  C.S. Gulbenkian (London) to Erb (London) 23 Jan. 1919 and J.B.A. Kessler (The Hague) to 
Gulbenkian (London) 17 Feb. 1919 , ibid. Shell to H. van der Veen (Nederland in den Vreemde, Beijing) 2 
July 1924, ibid: about Gansu and Xinjiang. Shell The Hague to NSC Amsterdam 29 Sept 1924, ibid: about 
the Longhai Railway area. 
382 Tsingtao claims, PRO London, FO 371, 10955, F1940. 
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remove its kerosene tanks. The reason given was that these constituted a danger to 
the public. When the Shell installation was built in 1907, it was well outside the city. 
But the rapid growth of Qingdao meant that housing gradually encroached on the 
tanks. Over and above this, the Japanese authorities insisted that it was also too 
dangerous for oil tankers to enter the busy harbour. Shell was unwilling to abandon 
its position, and tried to force the Japanese to cancel their relocation plans.  
The first step in its plans was to involve the British government. The North China 
head office of Shell in Shanghai informed the British consul general of the problem 
in Qingdao.383 Shortly after that the Foreign Office in London received the same 
information from the London office of the company.384 The Shell standpoint was that 
the Japanese could not possibly really be worried about the danger of fire, since the 
Qingdao installation was probably the safest in any treaty port.385 The real reason 
therefore must be that the Japanese wanted to curtail Western influence in Qingdao 
by making it harder for Shell and Standard Oil to continue their business. This was 
contrary to the principle of the Open Door. Shell argued that Britain should put 
pressure on the Japanese to change their attitude regarding the kerosene tanks. Not 
just for the sake of Shell’s position in Qingdao, but because this act of discrimination 
would set a dangerous precedent. If Japan could get away with this, then in the future 
any British company might become the victim of Japan’s growing influence in 
China. The ideal of the open door was endangered, which meant that all of Britain’s 
interests in China were at stake. The Foreign Office was highly receptive to this 
argument. 386  Promoting the Open Door policy was considered the only way to 
protect the British position in China, and firm protests were sent to the Japanese 
government. Orchestrating its case, Shell had managed to generate considerable 
pressure on Japan. Public opinion in China and in the West tended to condemn 
nations that did not comply with the most favoured-nation regulation. Japan’s 
reputation in China—at this time considered very important by the Japanese 
government—could deteriorate because of Shell’s accusation. Importantly, Shell and 
Standard Oil acted in concert. While Shell asked the British government for help, the 
American company did the same, using the same arguments, in Washington. The 
result was that the American government joined the British in sending protests to 
Tokyo. Whether the company asked the Dutch government to do the same is not 
known.  
The second step was for Shell to make it financially unattractive for Japan to 
remove the oil tanks. The petroleum company informed the Japanese and British 
governments that it was willing to move its installation further away from Qingdao, 
but only if it could choose the new site itself and if Japan were to pay for all the costs 
involved.387 Shell even pointed out exactly where the new installation plus a new 
petroleum harbour were to be constructed. Naturally it would be very expensive to 
build an entirely new oil installation.388 Standard Oil meanwhile sent out the same 
                                                          
383 C.G. Humphrys (Shell Shanghai) to British Consul General J.W. Jamieson (Shanghai) 10 July 1919, 
ibid. 3695, F128739. 
384 Shell London to British Foreign Office 18 Sept. 1919, ibid. 3695, F131151. 
385 British Minister J.N. Jordan (Shanghai) to British Foreign Office 8 Nov. 1919, ibid. 3695, F150510. 
386 British Minister J.N. Jordan (Beijing) to British Foreign Office 22 July 1919, ibid. 3695, F128739. 
387 Shell London to British Foreign Office 24 Nov. 1919, ibid. 3695, F155216. 
388 Moreover, the site chosen by Shell and Standard Oil was in a zone that was declared prohibited by the 
Japanese army: Shell memorandum, ibid. 5320, F1219. 
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message. The Japanese government was faced with a difficult choice. Paying for two 
new installations was so expensive that it was very probably out of the question. But 
removing Shell and Standard Oil from their present sites without their consent could 
have grave consequences. Possibly the British and US governments considered the 
attitude of their firms very reasonable and co-operative, and they would condemn the 
Japanese action as a breach of international agreements. Consequently Japan might 
become isolated from both China and the West, which was exactly the opposite of 
what Japanese foreign policy was trying to achieve. After more than a year of 
endeavouring to convince the other parties involved that fire safety was its only 
concern and that the installations really had to go, the Japanese government officially 
postponed the removal order. Unofficially the British government was informed that 
the case was closed and that the installations could remain where they were.389 
Shell had won by putting pressure—jointly with Standard Oil—on both the 
British and the Japanese government. While Japan received protests from London, 
the British Foreign Office itself was regularly reminded by Shell people how directly 
this case was related to Britain’s China policy. Had Japan decided to pay for the 
removal, this would also been a satisfactory outcome of the conflict. The British 
government gave it its full support, even though both the British vice-consul at 
Qingdao and the British legation in Tokyo informed the Foreign Office that the 
Japanese were probably right that the kerosene tanks did pose a danger to the city.390 
There was no clear evidence that the removal order actually constituted an act of 
discrimination, which indicated that Britain was primarily interested in limiting 
Japanese influence, not in letting the Japanese administer Qingdao as efficiently as 
possible. In this phase, the interests of Shell and the British government were still 
close to each other. Moreover, it was still possible to resist Japanese power. The risk 
that Japan would gain dominance in China and push out Western influence did not 
become relevant again until the 1930s. At the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 
Japan was acknowledged by the West to be the main military power of East Asia, 
and it was also agreed by all powers that the open and independent status of China 
would not be changed. Indeed, for the time being Japan did not undertake any major 
initiatives to impose its power on China. Meanwhile China became engulfed in a 
series of civil wars fought between rival warlords. The largest of these wars were the 
Anhui-Zhili War (1920), the First Zhili-Fengtian War (1922), and the Second Zhili-
Fengtian War (1924). They were followed by the great unification war initiated by 
the Guomindang in 1926.  
 
                                                          
389 C. Elliott  (British legation Tokyo) to British Foreign Office 23 Nov. 1920, ibid. 5322, F3345. At first 
Shell demanded—in a letter to the Foreign Office—that Japan would officially declare the case closed, as 
the company had to make urgent decisions about extensions to the Qingdao installation. When the British 
legation obtained informal assurances that the removal plan had definitely been dropped, Shell was 
informed of this and made no further demands. In answer to the remark by Elliott in Tokyo that Japan 
would not give the company permission to build new tanks, Shell responded that its extension plans did 
not include new tanks. It seems possible that Shell used the suggestion of new tanks deliberately to obtain 
the assurances it consequently received from Britain. Shell London to British Foreign Office 1 Nov. 1920, 
ibid. 5321, F2670; British Foreign Office to Elliott (Tokyo) 10 Nov. 1920, ibid.; Elliott (Tokyo) to British 
Foreign Office 20 Nov. 1920, ibid. 5321, F2880; Shell London to British Foreign Office 6 Dec. 1920, ibid. 
5322, F3136. 
390 British Minister Alston (Tokyo) to British Foreign Office 11 Dec. 1919, ibid. 3695, F163392; C. 
Elliot  (British legation Tokyo) to British Foreign Office 23 Nov. 1920, ibid. 5322, F3345. 
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Safety of up-country depots. Fighting and the concomitant looting were the second 
major political risk of the 1916-1928 period. The contents of Shell agency 
warehouses were frequently removed against the wishes of the company or the 
agent—by whom or why was not always known to the company, as the difference 
between regular troops, prowling ex-soldiers, local militia, and bandits was often 
vague. The removal of stock might be the consequence of an act of requisitioning or 
outright destruction out of strategic motives,391 but in most cases agency stock was 
simply stolen to be sold elsewhere. This situation made storing valuable goods like 
kerosene in rural towns a hazardous undertaking. Although the company employed 
guards to protect its tank installations and ships, it was not possible to station guards 
at the numerous agency warehouses.  
There was not much the company could do to prevent the occasional looting of 
agencies. Not sending new supplies into unsettled districts could mean the loss of a 
carefully established local market position. Shell opted for this solution only in 
extreme situations, in areas where commercial life had become virtually impossible 
in the wake of widespread violence. An example of this policy could be seen in West 
Zhejiang in 1927, when the advance of the Nationalist army severely disrupted trade 
in the Yangzi area. At that time, Shell operated ninety-two agencies in this sales area. 
To be less vulnerable, Shell temporarily cancelled the contracts with all ninety-six 
third-party dealers there, maintaining only the twenty-three main and sub-
agencies.392 Shell preferred to retreat only from territories where Standard Oil did the 
same; otherwise the balance of market shares would be disrupted. Another 
consideration was that it was also not without risk to close agencies of any type. 
Relations with agents might not be re-established again after the dangers had passed, 
and agents might decide to keep sales remittances for themselves—possibly to obtain 
new non-Shell petroleum supplies elsewhere. Therefore in 1927 the Shell South 
China office in Hong Kong advised against any measures going beyond a gradual 
reduction in shipments to the unsettled areas. At that time some Y1 million was 
outstanding in Guangxi, Guangdong (Kwangtung or Canton), and Fujian 
provinces.393 The London management instructed Hong Kong to maintain full stocks 
at river ports that could be protected by the British navy, such as Wuzhou and 
Nanning, unless the situation were to become drastically worse than it was: ‘We are 
prepared to take reasonable risks in holding stocks in the interior with our Chinese 
age
                                                          
nts [...].’394  
Usually the company did not close agencies, but kept its business going as far as 
it was possible to do so and tried to recover damages from the Chinese government. 
Whenever looting and destruction had occurred, Shell’s policy was to send an 
inspector to assess the damage and collect evidence. In most cases the company 
reasoned that the cause of the damage was bad government, and that the Chinese 
central government was responsible—even if it did not exercise any real power in 
391 In one instance, Shell products were even removed from a Chinese agency by Soviet troops. During a 
border clash  with Chinese troops in Manchuria, the Soviets occupied Hailar where the Shell agency was 
located. The British consul-general at Harbin had the impression that the Russian population of Hailar had 
requested the removal of these goods, and those in the local Standard Oil agency, for fear of fire: British 
consul-general (Harbin) to British Minister (Beijing/Beiping) 10 March 1930, ibid. 14700, F2796. 
392 Annual report for the Hangzhou area, Shell London, Group Archive, E.G. Masters Papers. 
393 Shell Hong Kong to Shell London 9 Feb. 1927, PRO, FO 371, 12473, F1377. 
394 Shell London to Shell Hong Kong 9 Feb. 1927, ibid. 
PETROLEUM: ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL 103 
most parts of China. There was no alternative to obtaining compensation for loss of 
goods: it was not possible to insure them and the Chinese justice system was often 
not effective in dealing with cases like these. Therefore a claim was documented by 
the company and handed to the British mission in China. The company did not 
expect much from the Dutch government in terms of claims representation, and 
persistently argued that its subsidiary the APC was British and therefore deserved 
British support. The British government, which agreed that the APC was a British 
interest, then decided whether these claims should indeed be presented to the Chinese 
government. They were grouped per incident: other claims by British firms and 
individuals resulting from the same kind of problem were combined into a single 
claim. Often the process took years and required the repeated exertion of pressure by 
the British legation before money could be collected. Sometimes the claim was 
completely rejected by the Chinese government, and sometimes only a part of the 
claim was recognised. In such a case the British government made a pro rata 
division among the parties claimants staggered according to the amounts of their 
claims. 395  After the establishment of the Guomindang government in Nanjing, 
cha
                                                          
nces of recovering claimed damages increased. 
Shell always tried to obtain full damage compensation. Given the size of its up-
country business—and its vulnerability—Shell was usually responsible for the 
largest British commercial claim. For instance, in the period 1916-1922, Shell filed 
254 claims against the Chinese government totalling Y476,000 for robberies and war 
damage. Other large British claimants were BAT (Y255,000) and the International 
Export Company (IEC, a Union Cold Storage subsidiary; Y209,000).396 The problem 
for Shell was that of this claim, Y429,000—i.e., 90 per cent of the entire sum—were 
claims lodged by its Chinese agents. Again this illustrates that agency stocks 
represented an important weak spot in Shell’s Chinese interests. Although the 
company was aware that many of the agency claims were not backed up by sufficient 
evidence for the Chinese government to be held responsible, it put pressure on the 
British government to demand payment from China in each case. In 1925 the 
motivation was phrased as follows: companies like Shell and BAT had ‘built up 
enormous organisations all over China on the strength that the British Legation 
would always support the right of British merchants to trade in China under the 
consignment agency system.’ 397  Despite such high-flown rhetoric, in 1928 the 
British government decided to stop the routine presentation of agency claims in cases 
of looting—only agency claims resulting from confiscation by the Chinese 
authorities were still handled by the British legation. Instead official assistance for 
looting claims would be limited to consular representations at the local level. 398  
395 For example, in 1929 a ‘Sino-British (Chinkiang claims) joint commission’ was established, which 
decided that Shell was entitled to Y23,423 for claims submitted at he British Zhenjiang consulate. The 
Shell claim was included in a collective British claim for the Zhenjiang region. The money was then paid 
by the Chinese government: minutes of the Sino-British (Chinkiang claims) joint commission 22 Nov.-18 
Dec. 1929, ibid. 14715, F2903. 
396 These were just the claims against China not yet paid by 1924. It is assumed here that the number of 
British claims paid by China between 1916 and 1924 is negligible: ibid. 11687, F3436. 
397 Shell London to British Foreign Office 6 Aug. 1925, ibid. 10933, F3731. 
398 The consul nearest to the looted agency could still recommend that because of special circumstances a 
claim should be made. Protests without claims could also still be made. British Minister Sir Miles Lampson 
(Beijing) to British Foreign Office 7 July 1928, ibid. 13178, F4723. 
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Several British firms with large up-country agency organisations—Shell, BAT, ICI, 
Swire, and Jardine—were informed of this. On the understanding that the Chinese 
agents would not be told about this change in policy, all companies except Shell 
agreed. In London the Shell director Waley Cohen repeatedly protested to the 
Foreign Office that this new policy was far from satisfactory, and that it would lead 
to an upsurge in the looting.399 But the Foreign Office dismissed his view, replying 
that the inclusion of the often vague agency looting cases would weaken the stronger 
cla
inister in China rejected this plan as it could lead to a 
ser
                                                          
ims Britain made to China.400  
Apart from the closure of agency depots and the actual destruction of stored 
petroleum products, the civil wars also disrupted trade in other ways: ships and 
railway wagons often were not available for commercial purposes, the population 
fled certain areas, purchasing power decreased. Sometimes farmers could not buy 
kerosene or other supplies because they were afraid that their horses or carts would 
be commandeered if they went to a market town. The dangers which might be 
encountered by Shell’s travelling inspectors and other up-country personnel could be 
a disrupting force. In 1920 Inspector R.E. Covil was killed during fighting between 
two rival armies near Chongqing.401 In 1926 Inspector J. Philips was murdered by 
bandits as he was travelling between Longzhou and Nanning. 402  Increasingly 
foreigners in China were kidnapped for a ransom. In August 1926 the Shell 
installation at Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, was attacked by bandits. The 
British installation manager, J. Moore, was kidnapped. Shell paid Y5000 to free him, 
and held the Chinese government responsible. After his release the company asked 
the British government to make an official claim for full compensation from 
China.403 Shell sometimes obtained protection from the British navy for its tanker 
ships and its treaty port installations. But even on the busy main rivers that were 
patrolled by foreign gunboats incidents still occurred. In early May 1925, Chinese 
warships opened fire on a small Shell vessel near Shanghai. One of the six British 
persons in that boat was badly wounded.404 On 26 May a Shell motor barge was fired 
at by Chinese warships, this time causing only material damage.405 The company 
asked the British government to intimidate the Chinese navy by allowing British 
warships take up positions close to those of the Chinese.406 The British commander-
in-chief and the British m
ious military incident.  
The civil wars of the 1920s made Shell aware of its vulnerability, especially in 
the interior, and the effect of any British military protection it might expect was 
extremely limited.407 The main weapon against the looting of agency stocks was not 
British military power, but British diplomatic support. Therefore in 1928 the refusal 
399 R. Waley Cohen (Shell London) to British secretary of state for foreign affairs 11 Apr. 1928, ibid. 
13177, F1731.  
400 British Foreign Office to Shell London 19 Apr. 1928, ibid. 13177, F1731. 
401 Shell Chongqing to T. Covil Oct. 1920, ibid. 5347, F2601. 
402 ‘The Pipeline’ (June 1926), Shell London, Group Archive. 
403 Shell Changsha to British Consul Changsha 13 Sept 1926, PRO, FO 371, 11681, F5510. 
404 ‘Britsch-Chineesch Incident’, NRC (11 May 1925). 
405 Shell Shanghai to Shell London 2 June 1925, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 8, 886. 
406 Shell Shanghai to Shell London 13 May 1925, ibid. 
407 This sense of vulnerability also continued in the 1930s. In 1931 the top management in Europe saw 
banditry and the expected loss of extra-territoriality of expatriate personnel—plus the unfavourable silver 
price—as the main problems in China. 
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of the British government to present agency claims routinely to the Chinese central 
government was a severe disappointment to Shell. While the British government 
continued to regard Shell as a British interest worth supporting—the APC’s British 
identity was never called into question by any British official—it was a matter of 
great concern to the company that this support did not extend to its agency system. 
This was precisely where official protection was most needed. The seriousness of 
this problem was thrown into sharp relief by the wave of anti-foreign nationalism 
that swept through South China from 1925. This constituted the third main political 
sk of the 1916-1928 period. 
solved when the British government 
dec
 
ri
 
Anti-foreign boycotts and strikes. In 1921 for the first time Shell experienced the fact 
that anti-foreign nationalism, even when aimed at Japan rather than the West, was 
having an impact on the oil trade in China. In the wake of the Japanese occupation of 
a part of Shandong, anti-Japanese movements were fueled. At this time the British-
Japanese alliance that had been signed in 1902 was about to expire, and its renewal 
would be seen by many Chinese as a token of support for Japanese aggression. When 
Shell’s Chinese agents sent a joint letter to the oil company with the warning that a 
renewed alliance might result in an anti-British boycott, Director Waley Cohen 
contacted the Foreign Office asking it to urge the British government not to continue 
the alliance with Japan.408 The problem was 
ided not to renew the alliance with Japan.  
Events in 1925 and in the years which followed revealed how little Britain could 
do once its economic interests in China were targeted by popular boycott 
movements. After the 30 May and 23 June killing of Chinese demonstrators in 
Shanghai and Guangzhou respectively, a rash of anti-British strikes and boycotting 
actions broke out in the Southern coastal cities. In many places Shell—being 
regarded a leading British firm—was affected by the strikes, its storage and shipping 
activities being especially hard hit. In some incidents the company could enlist the 
protection of local potentates against strikes in return for petroleum. 409  But in 
Shanghai the North China management looked for a more definite solution and, 
arguing that the Guomindang revolutionaries were responsible, proposed to the 
London head office that a ‘naval demonstration or punitive expedition’ should be 
undertaken by the foreign powers. 410  The aim should be to remove all Russian 
communists from South China and the establishment of a new government in 
Guangdong. This could be made even more effective by Britain giving the 
Manchurian anti-communist warlord Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tsolin) strong but 
informal support, including money and ammunition. Shell’s South China office in 
Hong Kong agreed that the strikes should be answered by a British naval action at 
Guangzhou. 411  Shell asked the Hong Kong government to initiate a blockade of 
                                                         
408 R. Waley Cohen (Shell London) to British Foreign Office 26 Sept. 1921, PRO London, FO 371, 
F
l in return for fuel oil: Shell Hong Kong to Shell London 14 July 1925, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 
8,
 F2859. 
3587/63/23. 
409  This happened in South China where General ‘Hung Wongzhiu’ forbade strikes by installation 
personne
 886. 
410 Shell Shanghai to Shell London 2 July 1925, PRO London, FO 371, 10946,
411 Shell Hong Kong to Shell London 6 July 1925, ibid. 10946, F2926. 
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Gu
ion of the navy. In Taiyuan, Shanxi, the local Shell 
off
angzhou, 412  but the British government abstained from using military force 
against the Guomindang government. 
The anti-British boycott and strike activities proved a major stimulus to the larger 
political process of nationalist revolution, which produced yet another civil war. In 
1926-1927 Chiang Kai-shek led the army of the Guangdong-based Guomindang 
(Nationalist Party) north to attack the principal warlords. Until 1926 anti-foreign 
agitation was confined largely to the South China coastal areas, but in tandem with 
Chiang’s military advance, the nationalist revolution spread to Central and East 
China where most of the Shell distribution assets were concentrated. The oil 
company, like many other firms with a British background, was hit by both general 
violence resulting from civil war and by anti-foreign agitations. Although it is not 
always possible to establish the motives behind attacks against Shell, it is clear that 
its possessions and employees were less safe than they had been before the summer 
of 1925. There were numerous reports of damage. In at least one incident Chinese 
students seized Shell kerosene, publicly sold it, and used the proceeds to support the 
boycott.413 In Guangzhou a Chinese strike picket team captured a Shell motor boat. 
The three Shell employees on the boat, one British and two British Indians, were 
maltreated before they and their boat were released.414 In Chongqing the situation 
was perceived to be so serious that foreign women and children were evacuated to 
Hankou.415 The Chongqing oil installation was protected by a British warship.416 A 
British gunboat was also sent to Wuzhou, at the request of Shell, because of danger 
threatening its tank installation.417 Here expectations differed. In such instances the 
British navy merely wanted to evacuate British personnel and then use its ships for 
other assignments. This disappointed Shell which hoped to continue operating its 
installations under the protect
ice was attacked by Chinese and partly destroyed.418 At numerous other places 
Shell stock was destroyed.  
Such incidents also continued to occur after 1926-1927, just at a time when the 
capacity of the British navy to intervene had virtually evaportated. In September 
1926 the British navy shelled the city of Wanxian to retaliate against the Chinese 
capture of six British nationals. This resulted in the death of at least several 
hundred—but possibly several thousand—Chinese civilians, and an intensification of 
the anti-British movement. By now the British government was convinced that guns 
were counter-productive when used against anti-foreign popular movements.419 In 
January 1927 a great number of Chinese demonstrators occupied the British 
concession at Hankou and forced foreign residents to retreat into the local Shell 
                                                          
412 Shell Hong Kong to Shell London 3 July 1925, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 8, 886. 
413 This happened in Whuzhou: Shell Hong Kong to Shell London 23 July 1925, ibid. 
414 Shell London to Foreign Office Apr. 1926, PRO, FO 371, 11624, F1652. The company filed a claim 
against China with the Foreign Office for damage incurred amounting to Y14,045. Shell wanted to pay 
these three employees two years’ extra salary to compensate for the unpleasant experience (salary of the 
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for): Shell Guangzhou to British consulate-general (Guangzhou) 29 July 1926, ibid. 11674, F4816. 
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office building. Britain decided to return the concession officially to the Chinese 
government rather than use force against the Chinese activists. Trade on the Yangzi 
had already stopped, foreigners in all treaty ports up-river from Hankou were 
evacuated, and Shell decided to move 30,000 tons of petroleum from Hankou 
downstream to Jiujiang. When the danger abated in the up-river Yangzi area and 
Shell representatives returned to Sichuan province in September 1927, they found 
that Y936,000 worth of stock had disappeared.420 During the capture of Nanjing by 
Nationalist troops, several Westerners were killed and foreign warships had great 
difficulty in evacuating the remaining foreigners—including Shell personnel—from 
the city. In Changsha the Shell depot was looted, and in Jiangxi the company was 
forced to pay a ‘fine’ to prevent its Boyang Lake installation being set on fire.421 In 
November 1927 Chinese soldiers attacked and slightly injured two British Shell 
employees in the Zhenjiang office.422 It seems that while material damage to Shell 
property was worst in Guangdong,423 most violence was actually experienced by the 
com any in the Yangzi provinces in Central and East China. The Shell management 
in Chi
with th
 
d [upon] Chinese common 
sense and not on possible recourse [to] legal procedure, especially as any 
                                                          
p
na realised that it was very vulnerable but completely on its own in dealing 
e widespread attacks on its property: 
‘[...] our organisation [is] extremely vulnerable to such hostile national 
feeling, as at bed rock, sales and payment depen
claims on [the] Chinese Government for any losses incurred in [the] interior 
appear likely never to be pressed for payment.’424 
 
In general the boycott hurt Shell’s sales in South, Central and East China, as 
consumers were less inclined to purchase Shell products, which were regarded as 
British. Still the company managed to hold on its market position in most territories, 
helped by speculative purchases by dealers and the fact that the first months of the 
boycott were in the commercially less important summer season. Another factor 
which helped the situation was the co-operation between the foreign oil companies. 
When the crisis began, Shell and the American firms were working closely together 
in Guangdong in order to solve a taxation dispute with the Guomindang government. 
Still, the anti-British movement did put a strain on the Shell-Standard Oil-Texas 
collaboration, and in June and July of 1925 mutual distrust between the 
representatives of Shell and Standard Oil in China really raised its ugly head. Shell 
felt threatened and initiated price cuts, and Standard Oil soon followed suit. Yet 
communication aimed at preventing a full price war between the two companies 
remained intensive and succeeded in limiting the lowering of selling prices.425 As 
will be explained in more detail below, the largest problem for Shell was that 
420 Shell Shanghai to British consulate-general (Shanghai) 7 July 1928, PRO London, FO 371, 13232, 
F5592. 
421 ‘Plunderingen te Tsjangsja: waarschuwingen tegen Molestaties’, De Courant (31 Jan. 1927). 
422 British Minister (Beijing) to British Foreign Office 8 Nov. 1927, PRO London, FO 371, 12513, 
F8531. 
423 See the list of British claims against the Chinese government for the period 1924-1926, ibid. 15450, 
F4198. 
424 Shell Shanghai to Shell London 20 June 1925, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 8, 886. 
425 Shell Shanghai to Shell London 20 June and 9 July 1925, ibid. 
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Standard Oil felt strong enough to end the dispute in Guangdong on terms 
unacceptable to Shell. However, by and large the market situation did not change 
during the boycott. The most remarkable fact was that Shell’s Chinese agents did not 
cause Shell any major problems. They could have united against the company—
eith
mittee, met the 
Bri
ship with China and abandoning its reliance on the traditional 
instruments of imperialist coercion. In the new situation there was little the British 
in local taxes. When Royal Dutch first exported oil to China in the 1890s the tax 
                                                          
er on their own initiative or under pressure from political activists—which would 
have paralysed distribution operations in at least some parts of the country. Yet 
nothing indicates any form of obstructive activity on the part of the agents. 
In spite of the increase in political risks after 1916, especially after 1925, the 
company saw no reason to consider its position in China to be hopeless or even in 
grave danger. The cause of anti-foreign agitation was quickly identified as 
communism and its supporters were thought to be a small minority. In the words of 
E.G. Masters, a British up-country inspector for Shell in 1926: ‘They [the Chinese 
population] appreciate that foreign control is based on consistent rules rigidly and 
disinterestedly adhered to and they know that no such policy will be followed by 
their own officials.’426 Therefore, he argued, the common man in China would be 
happy were the foreign powers to intervene and end the civil wars. But if the foreign 
countries did nothing at all, the Chinese would think they were weak and that would 
lead to the end of the foreign position in China. In May 1927 the Shell North China 
management again urged the head office in London to give Zhang Zuolin money or 
materials to encourage him to stay in Beijing. Otherwise, it was feared, the 
communists might take control of North China.427 In the same month Waley Cohen, 
Shell director and member of the British parliamentary China Com
tish Foreign Secretary to urge him to use force against the Guomindang. He was 
given to understand that the British government did not believe that violent action 
could be the basis for future relations between Britain and China.428 
Britain never at any stage undertook military action against the Guomindang 
government of China, and after 1927 Shell ceased to ask for such intervention. 
Gradually the relationship between the oil company and the Guomindang, which 
now ruled over most of China, improved, and the anti-British movement became less 
violent. Although civil war and looting still reigned in many parts of China, and 
continued to cause serious damage to the Shell organisation, the 1925-1927 period 
had brought about fundamental changes. Shell had witnessed the destructive power 
of widespread anti-foreign agitation, and had had to swallow the refusal of the 
British government to use force to protect Shell property against political risks. 
Becoming aware of the strength of Chinese nationalism, Britain was redefining its 
political relation
government would or could do for Shell when it came to dealing with operational 
risks in China.  
 
Taxation before China’s Re-Unification. The inability of the British government to 
protect Shell’s up-country interests also applied to the fourth main type of political 
risk of the 1916-1928 years: the unpredictability of and seemingly boundless increase 
426 Report 1926, Shell London, Group archive, E.G. Masters Papers.  
427 Shell Tianjin to Shell London 12 May 1927, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 8, 886. 
428 R. Louis, British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939 (Oxford 1971), 134. 
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situation was simple. Foreign goods entered China at one of the treaty ports, where 
an import duty averaging 5 per cent of the value of the goods was collected by the 
Maritime Customs Service. 429  Although it was a part of the Chinese state 
administration, the customs service was created and largely managed by British 
experts and China could not change the level of this duty without the consent of the 
foreign powers. The only other type of unavoidable tax all foreign merchants had to 
pay was the local port duties, which were used for harbour improvement. In later 
years, especially during the 1920s, the tax situation became much more complicated, 
and caused Shell some major problems. As local and central authorities in China 
introduced new commercial taxes, Shell showed various ways of responding. The 
pre
 another within that province, the company had to pay tax at 
sev
which the latter would end the local trade taxes on petroleum in the areas under its 
                                                          
-1928 experience of Shell with taxation problems played an important role in the 
firm’s relationship with the Guomindang government. 
The fundamental difficulty for Shell and all other foreign firms that were active 
outside the treaty ports was the lijin, China’s interior trade tax. After Britain had 
forced China to open its borders to foreign imports in the mid-nineteenth century, 
China introduced lijin duties on goods transported within the country. As a 
consequence, foreign imports were cheap in the treaty ports but grew more expensive 
the further they were transported into the interior. When Shell’s up-country 
organisation became operational, the company did succeed in by-passing most 
Chinese middlemen but now had to pay lijin directly to the local authorities. During 
the civil wars of the 1920s the number of lijin barriers multipled, because many local 
military leaders were desperate for revenue. Furthermore, the variety of local trade 
duties also expanded. Apart from the original lijin, military protection fees, school 
taxes, dike taxes, customs surtaxes, famine relief taxes, survey fees, stamp taxes, 
documentary taxes, and surtaxes on transit passes, were all introduced. Any local 
warlord could and did impose any tax he liked on goods passing through his 
territory. The most internally divided provinces, such as Sichuan, were the worst in 
this respect. This province was divided between various warlords, who continued to 
fight each other until subdued by Chiang Kai-shek in 1935. To move petroleum from 
one distribution centre to
eral tax collection points, each collection point often demanding payment of two 
or more types of tax.430  
Neither the virtually non-existent central government in Beijing nor any foreign 
government had the power to intervene. Under these circumstances Shell was 
sometimes willing to bargain with the provincial or regional government—or rather 
the warlord who controlled it. Shell’s preferred solution was that the foreign 
governments should conclude treaties with the provinces that would provide the 
latter with customs revenue raised in the treaty ports. In return the provinces should 
abolish the local lijin barriers.431 But the foreign states did not wish to participate in 
the fragmentation of China and maintained official relations only with Beijing. Shell, 
joined by Standard Oil, therefore made its own arrangements with the provinces. The 
company offered to pay a fixed trade tax to the provincial government, in return for 
429 Until 1912 formally ‘Imperial Maritime Customs’. 
430 Shell Chongqing, ‘List of taxes up-river from Chongqing’, PRO London, FO 371, 11697, F5369. 
431 Shell Tianjin, ‘Memorandum on the proposed Abolition of Li-Kin’, PRO London, FO 371, 9217, 
F2971 
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control. In 1922 and 1923 such agreements were made with the governments of 
Hubei and Jiangsu respectively. 432  In Sichuan, where there was no provincial 
government, Shell approached one of the leading local warlords, General Liu Xiang, 
who controlled the eastern part of Sichuan. In 1927 Shell lent the general Y936,000 
in order to get his assistance in limiting the number of local duties. The company 
allowed him to repay part of his debt by writing it off against the local petroleum 
tax.433 The company also supplied General Lui’s army with aircraft fuel, agreeing 
not
 was to 
ove
                                                          
 to sell the same to rival warlords.434  
There were also situations in which Shell was not willing to deal with the 
provincial or local government. In April 1925 Guangdong province decided to raise 
the import tax for kerosene, and Shell refused even to negotiate. This resulted in the 
first of two Guangdong tax conflicts and in Shell’s first confrontation with the 
Guomindang, which still played a role only at the provincial level. Unlike what it had 
done in other provinces the oil company refused to negotiate about this local tax. 
Two factors seem to have been relevant to the company’s attitude. First, to impose 
local transit and dike taxes was a common practice, while unilaterally deciding to 
raise the import duty in the treaty ports set a new precedent. In the past China had 
been forced to abandon its tariff autonomy. But the Guangdong government claimed 
that it represented the entire country and that China had the right to determine its 
own tariff policy. This leads to the second reason why Shell refused to compromise. 
The Guangdong government was in the hands of Sun Yatsen’s Guomindang. The 
provincial capital, Guangzhou, was the party’s power base and from there it aspired 
to conquer and reunify the entire country. In 1925 foreign businessmen considered 
the Guomindang to be dominated by left-wing extremists whose aim
rthrow China’s social order and destroy all Western influence in China. 
In fact, the motive for Guangdong to raise the import duty was not based on 
radical nationalist or communist ideology. The regular import duty was collected by 
the Maritime Customs Service in Guangdong treaty ports such as Guangzhou and 
Shantou on behalf of the regime in Beijing. This money went to the northern 
warlords who controlled the capital, and who were regarded by the Guomindang as 
its main enemies. Thus the Guangdong government felt forced to introduce new 
taxes to provide the Guomindang with a source of revenue to finance its war of 
unification against the north.435 Unfortunately for the Guomindang, Shell was not at 
all interested in helping it in its war against the northern warlords. The company, in 
conjuntion with Standard Oil and the Texas Company, decided to withhold all 
kerosene supplies to Guangdong until the province abandoned its new kerosene tax. 
Britain and the US were consulted by the oil companies and supported the boycott 
with diplomatic pressure.436 After a few weeks, in early May 1925, Shell decided 
432 British legation (Beijing) to British Foreign Office 17 Sept. 1923, ibid. 9217, F3131. In the case of 
Jiangsu, the agreement was between the Chinese agents and the government. Officially, Shell was not 
involved, and the agreement was irrelevant to Sino-British relations. The same agreement was made by the 
Standard Oil agents. British Consul General Pratt to British envoy (Beijing), ibid. 9217, F2971. 
433 In March 1933 the debt was expected to be paid off by the end of that year: British consul-general 
(Chongqing) to British Minister (Beijing/Beiping) 27 Feb. 1933, ibid. 17136, F2791 and F3371.  
434 But on one occasion Shell and Standard Oil did also supply his enemy, General Lui Wenhui, with 
aircraft fuel: ibid. 16208, F8224. 
435 Shell London to British Foreign Office 14 April 1925, ibid. 10933, F1366. 
436 British Foreign Office to Shell London 7 April 1925, ibid. 10933, F1176. 
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that stronger measures were required to solve the Guangdong tax problem. The 
company approached the British Foreign Office with a request for military 
intervention. While pointing out that Sun Yatsen was pro-communist and violently 
anti-foreign, Shell asked the British government to send in troops to either seize the 
Guangzhou arsenal, the Chinese section of the Guangzhou-Kowloon railway, or the 
lijin stations around Guangzhou. Shell Director A.S. Debenham explained the 
desirability of such a move as follows: 
 
 growing interference with foreign trade and disregard of 
foreign rights.’437 
o undertake anything which might 
ant
 
‘It has become customary among the Treaty Powers to avoid the use of force, 
with the result that a belief has undoubtedly arisen that protests can be 
disregarded with impunity and that Breaches of Treaty, if persisted in, will 
lead eventually to a compromise satisfactory to those guilty of the breach. It is 
further to be remembered that whereas formerly with an effective Central 
Government, pressure could be brought to bear by threatening to withhold 
loans and in similar ways, with the Government of China divided no such 
pressure can be brought to bear. Loans to provincial authorities are known to 
be out of the question, while anything that tends to increase the difficulties of 
the Government at Pekin is welcomed. Direct pressure must, therefore, be 
brought to bear on those actually responsible. To effect this without the ill-
will of the populace is admittedly difficult, but it is believed that action on the 
lines indicated would have the effect desired and something decisive would be 
done to check the
 
Some within the Foreign Office agreed that action of this type might be desirable, 
and proposed a joint British-US naval demonstration at Guangzhou and to threaten to 
use force if the demonstration itself should prove ineffective.438 Before such a plan 
materialised, the Shanghai Incident of 30 May 1925 triggered off strong anti-British 
agitation and Britain was no longer willing t
agonise the public opinion in China further.  
From June 1925 there was a double boycott in Guangdong. Shell refused to 
supply the province, while at the same time anti-British organisations urged traders 
and consumers not to buy British goods, such as Shell kerosene. This unusual 
situation was disadvantageous to Shell, because Standard Oil and the Texas 
Company were not boycotted by the Chinese. The American firms’ sales managers 
and agents in Guangdong now were tempted to exploit the situation and capture 
Shell’s market share in South China. As the anti-British boycott continued, the 
likelihood of the Anglo-American alliance breaking intensified. Meanwhile, the 
Guangdong government added a new element to the conflict by introducing the first 
step towards a provincial monopoly on petroleum sales: all oil companies were 
ordered to pay tax and licence fees to the province before they could supply their 
agents. 439  By early 1926 Standard Oil was putting pressure on Shell to reach a 
compromise with the Chinese. The Americans were willing to pay a lump sum tax, if 
the province would end the monopoly system. Shell responded that it preferred to 
                                                         
437 A.S. Debenham (Shell London) to British Foreign Office 6 May 1925, ibid. 10933, F1626. 
438 British Foreign Office to British Consul General (Guangzhou) May 1925, ibid. 10933, F1767. 
439 British consul-general Guangzhou to British minister Beijing 9 Feb. 1926, ibid. 11667, F1132. 
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wait.440 In June 1926 the alliance broke. Guangdong announced that it had abolished 
its monopoly, and instead created a new tax that would have to be paid the moment 
when kerosene and petrol left a depot. The company that sold the product also had to 
pay the salary of a government inspector for each depot.441 In response Standard Oil 
agreed to pay this new tax and resumed its kerosene deliveries. Guangdong obtained 
a wise or a practicable policy [...].  Consequently, the 
British government had 
 
h can be 
applied which will enforce respect for treaty rights in such cases.’445  
 British government was that interior trade 
tax
                                                          
its revenue, but without raising the import duty. 
The boycott against British companies by the public was still effective and Shell 
wanted to continue to fight the Guomindang, regardless of whether the new tax 
technically was an import or a trade duty. Shell’s Shanghai director called Standard 
Oil’s deal ‘gross treachery to Foreign trade and Foreign treaty rights’, 442  and in 
London Debenham informed the Foreign Office that it had lost its battle ‘against 
overwhelming odds’, and that Shell now was forced to pay the Guangdong tax on 
kerosene and petrol. The company blamed its American allies and the British 
government. Director Waley Cohen claimed that Britain was abandoning its support 
for British firms in China.443 To this the Foreign Office replied that, ‘At no time 
[since 1842] has the use of force or compulsion in regard to taxation in the interior 
been considered either 444
‘reluctantly come to the conclusion that there does not appear to be any means 
of preventing the Chinese authorities from levying illegal taxes on goods 
marketed in the interior of China. There is in fact no compulsion whic
 
In other words, Shell was asking the impossible. The Foreign Office was well aware 
that the company itself had already tacitly accepted interior taxation by paying lijin 
for many years and making tax agreements with the governments of Hubei and 
Jiangsu. The definitive position of the
ation was entirely Shell’s problem.  
Shell understood the message. It no longer expected help from the British 
government, and for the first time was willing to negotiate with the Guomindang. By 
late 1926 the Northern Expedition led by the Guomindang’s military leader Chiang 
Kai-shek was making good progress, as a result of which the Guomindang controlled 
an increasingly large part of South China. This meant that the Guangdong petroleum 
tax would very probably be introduced in the areas under Nationalist control. In 
November 1926 Song Ziwen (T.V. Soong) of the Guomindang informed Shell that 
he wished to discuss this. This time the company was prepared to consider co-
operating in return for a tax reduction. 446  Despite such a conciliatory attitude, 
negotiations did not result in an agreement until a year later. During 1927 the future 
440 Shell Shanghai to Shell London 5 Jan. 1926, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 8, 884. 
441 British consul-general Guangzhou to British minister Beijing 3 July 1926, PRO, FO 371, 11667, 
F3238. 
442 Shell Shanghai to Shell London 12 July 1926, ibid. 11667, F3524. 
443 Waley Cohen (London) to British Foreign Office 1 Oct. 1926, ibid. 11667, F4149. 
444 British Foreign Office to Shell London 28 Sept. 1926, ibid. 11667, F3744. 
445British Foreign Office to Shell London 9 Sept. 1926, ibid. 11667, F3579. 
446 Debenham (Shell London) to British Foreign Office 22 Nov. 1926, ibid. 11667, F4974; and Shell 
Shanghai to Shell London 17 Nov 1926, ibid. 11667, F4974. 
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of the Nationalist regime remained uncertain, and it seemed that for the time being 
the oil tax would not be enforced outside Guangdong. Then the whole picture 
changed. Not only did the Guomindang armies manage to capture the strategically 
important middle and lower Yangzi provinces, where many of the major cities were 
located, but immediately thereafter Chiang Kai-shek violently purged the 
communists from the party. Sun Yat-sen, the Guomindang’s founding father who had 
favoured collaborating with the Communist Party, had died already in 1925, and by 
the end of 1927 it seemed that Chiang’s new Guomindang was firmly committed to 
banning communism from China. Another development that had not escaped Shell’s 
attention, was that previous to their occupation by Nationalist forces, many provinces 
were already introducing the new petroleum tax.447 This indicated that the tax would 
have to be paid, regardless of who would emerge from the civil war as the victor. 
Th
                                                          
e Guomindang, now less radical but more powerful, became an increasingly 
attractive negotiating partner for Shell. 
On 20 December 1927 an agreement was reached between Shell and the new 
National Bureau of Mineral Oil Tax of the Guomindang government. The company 
promised to pay the new tax on kerosene and petrol in all areas under Nationalist 
control. In return the Guomindang government would eliminate the lijin and all other 
interior trade taxation, and attempt to check anti-foreign activities aimed at Shell’s 
agents or property. The petroleum tax would be collected twice a month in Shanghai. 
For the time being Shell would have to pay only Y0.60 per case instead of the Y2 per 
case demanded before the Northern Expedition, but to obtain this agreement the 
company had to make an advance payment of Y350,000.448 To recover the tax the 
company instructed its agents to raise the selling price by Y0.60; the advance tax was 
paid entirely by the company itself. 449  A similar agreement existed between the 
Guomindang and Standard Oil. In this way the oil companies invested hundreds of 
thousands of yuan in supporting the Guomindang financially, and in keeping their 
selling prices artificially low. A few months later, in March 1928, the Guomindang 
controlled an even larger part of the country and successfully demanded a tax 
increase from Y0.60 to Y1 from the foreign oil companies.450 By late 1928 Shell 
paid this Y1 per case tax on kerosene and petrol in most parts of the country, 
including provinces that were only nominally controlled by the Guomindang 
government.451 The situation was becoming less chaotic, which was welcomed by 
Shell. For the first time in many years there was a real prospect that lijin and the 
447 In the summer of 1926 Shell was negotiating with the government of Jiangxi province, which wanted 
a Y25 thousand lump sum from Shell and Standard Oil as provincial petroleum tax. The two companies 
met Sun Chuanfang, the warlord that controlled the lower Yangzi region, to discuss the matter. This proved 
fruitless, and protests by Britain in Jiujiang and Beijing also produced no effect. In August 1926 the 
Foreign Office advised Shell to pay Y25 thousand per month as kerosene tax: Shell Shanghai to Shell 
London 15 August 1926, ibid. 11667, F3336; British Foreign Office to G. Macdonogh (Shell London) 30 
Aug. 1926, ibid. 11667, F3484. 
448 British consul-general (Shanghai) to British minister (Beijing) 31 Dec. 1927, ibid. 13156, F1391.  
449 For instance, see the annual trade report from the Hangzhou office for 1927, Shell London, Masters 
papers. 
450 British consul-general (Shanghai) to British Minister (Beijing) 10 Apr. 1928, PRO London, FO 371, 
13157, F2770. 
451  For instance in Hebei and Fujian: understanding between Hebei and Shell 11 Aug. 1928, PRO 
London, FO 371, 13160, F5584; Chi Lung-Sing, ‘The Chinese Oil Trade: Kerosene on the Foozhow 
Market’, The Petroleum Times (5 Nov. 1927), 885-886. 
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other local taxes would eventually disappear. Since a trade tax on petroleum had to 
be paid anyway, it was better for the tax to be centralised and at a fixed level. By not 
recovering the pre-paid tax through an increased selling price, Shell and Standard Oil 
tried to keep their kerosene affordable for the public, and to capture the market share 
mpetitors. 
ncessions. A further political risk did not relate to the unification of 
Ch a under the Guomindang government, but to the Japanese occupation of 
the Maritime Customs, and China promised that no other tax would have to be paid 
by Shell or its agents. The trade tax on kerosene and petrol was now abolished—
                                                          
of smaller co
 
1928-1937 
After the civil wars and the revolutionary turmoil of the 1920s, there followed a 
period of greater political stability in which the Guomindang consolidated its power. 
Although the company was not immediately convinced that the Guomindang 
government was a reliable partner—in 1931 Shell still felt that the government was 
‘too weak to withstand the demands of Chinese [anti-foreign] nationalists’452—for 
the time being there was no alternative. At this time, Shell’s main political concern 
was to reach compromises with the new government to neutralise the main political 
risks of this period. These related to the imposition of new regulations by the 
nationalist rulers, in particular to taxation, the leasing of land, distribution rights, and 
exploration co
in
Manchuria. 
 
Taxation under the Guomindang Government. The unification of China under the 
Guomindang government had immediate consequences for the national import tariff, 
which since the mid-nineteenth century had in practice been far under the formal 
limit of 5 per cent of the value of the goods. This was a very low tariff compared 
with that of most other countries. One of the first goals in the Guomindang’s foreign 
policy was to regain tariff autonomy for China, which would almost automatically 
result in higher import duties. This in turn would force Shell to raise its prices, 
putting kerosene out of the reach of its poorer customers. In 1928 the Chinese 
government approached Japan, the US, Britain, and the Netherlands—the four 
countries that supervised China’s tariff policy on behalf of the other foreign 
powers—with the request that restitution of tariff autonomy be discussed. 
Subsequently Shell was asked by both the British and the Dutch governments to state 
its opinion on this matter. The company informed the two governments that it did not 
oppose China’s tariff autonomy under certain conditions, mainly that the new tariff 
would be stable and the same for traders of whatever nationality, and that the lijin 
would be completely abolished.453 These were also the main demands put forward by 
the British and Dutch governments. After negotiations with the foreign powers, 
China officially regained tariff autonomy on 1 February 1929. On the same date 
Shell made its move by concluding an agreement with Finance Minister Song Ziwen 
of the Chinese government according to which the company would pay a single fixed 
import duty on its products, valid for the entire country. Shell would pay its duty to 
452 A. Debenham (Shell London) to J. de Kok (Shell The Hague) 20 Feb. 1931, Shell The Hague, 
management 15, direktie BPM, China politiek en economisch 1931-1938. 
453 De Kok (The Hague) to Debenham (London) 25 Oct. 1928, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 8, 884; Shell The 
Hague to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 5 Nov. 1928, ibid. 
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officially it was incorporated in the new import duty. No outsiders, except for the 
British government, were aware of this arrangement.454  
Within a few years Shell’s attitude towards the Guomindang had undergone a 
complete reversal. In 1925 the company had been vehemently opposed to this party, 
by 1929 Shell had come to the conclusion that the Guomindang was exactly what it 
needed to get rid of the old lijin problem. The taxation situation appeared to be 
improving. Although the Guomindang did not yet have actual control of all 
provinces, Shell tried to benefit from their claim that theirs was the government of 
the entire country, and that it was just a matter of time before de facto rule would be 
imposed on every part of China. In August of 1928 when negotiating about a tax 
agreement with two important Sichuan warlords, Liu Xiang and Yang Sen, Shell 
demanded that the Guomindang government be involved in the agreement. The idea 
was that as soon as Nanjing claimed that Sichuan province was under its control, the 
oil tax paid in Sichuan could be recovered in Nanjing, as it would then have been 
integrated into the national oil tax.455 However, it was not always possible for the oil 
company to involve the government in Nanjing in local taxation disputes. In the early 
1930s, once again Guangdong province—nominally under Nationalist control—was 
the scene of serious taxation problems, and for years the central government did not 
interfere in the matter.456  
In the early 1930s power in Guangdong was held by Marshall Chen Jitang, in 
name of the Guomindang, whose main power base had now moved from Guangzhou 
to Nanjing in East China. The Chen regime followed its own taxation policy, 
studiously ignoring orders from Nanjing. In this case the problem was not the 
introduction of a new petroleum tax, but the fact that the import duty on kerosene 
was much higher than that on fuel oil—the respective duties being Y92 and Y6 per 
ton.457 The result was a second Guangdong tax conflict, which erupted when Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Guangdong discovered a way to make a profit from the tax 
difference. They imported fuel oil with a high kerosene content into Guangdong. The 
kerosene was extracted from it in distilleries, and this was then sold on the South-
                                                          
454  ‘Agreement between the National Government of China and APC North China Ltd Relating to 
Revision of Customs Import Duty and Providing for the Incorporation Therein of the Special Tax on 
Kerosene and Gasoline 1 Feb. 1929’ [same also for APC South China Ltd], PRO London, FO 371, 
13894/F2098; and British consul-general (Shanghai) to British Minister (Beijing/Beiping) 25 Feb. 1929, 
ibid. 
455 British rear admiral (Yangzi river) to British Admiralty 17, 20, and 23 Aug., and 3 Sept. 1928, ibid. 
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first place a similar agreement had been made between Standard Oil and the two warlords. In the second 
place the shelling incident of 1926, when a British gunboat killed a large number of Chinese residents of 
Wanxian, had produced an anti-British boycott that was much stronger here than in most other parts of the 
country. Shell hoped that its agreement with Yang Sen would help end the boycott: British consulate-
general (Chongqing) to British legation (Beijing) 10 Sept. 1928, ibid. 13160, F6463. 
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Shell offered to pay half of the tax, but the Manchurian government declined. The outcome of the conflict 
is unknown: Shell Shenyang to British consulate-general (Shenyang) 19 Nov. 1928, ibid. 13892, F497. 
457 Shell The Hague, ‘Memorandum Betreffende de Moeilijkheden die Buitenlanders Ondervinden bij 
den Verkoop van Lampolie in China’ to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 23 Aug. 1933, Shell The 
Hague, legal, 65 China.   
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Chinese market. Because this locally distilled kerosene was cheaper than the 
imported kerosene sold by Shell, Standard Oil, and the Texas Company, these three 
companies felt seriously threatened. The confrontation between the Guangdong 
distillers and the foreign oil companies has already been told, on separate occasions, 
by I. Anderson and J. Osterhammel. 458  Their accounts have shown that Shell 
managed to solve the matter under its own steam, by paying advance tax to the Chen 
Jitang regime. Nevertheless, looking more closely at the intentions and plans of the 
Shell leadership will reveal further insights into the company’s attitude regarding the 
changing relationship between China and the West.  
From Shell’s point of view, the period of competition with Chinese distillers in 
Guangdong can be divided into four phases: firstly the problem proved insoluble 
simply by making complaints in Nanjing; secondly Shell came with a counter-
strategy; thirdly the provincial government openly intervened on behalf of the local 
distillers; and finally the provincial government switched to unofficial methods to 
support its distillers. The first phase, beginning around 1930, was when Chinese 
distilling first began to make itself felt and Shell found itself losing part of its market 
share in Guangdong and Guangxi. In this phase Shell still hoped that Nanjing would 
intervene and force Chen to raise the import duty on fuel oil. However, as time went 
by and nothing happened it eventually became clear that the central government 
could or would no nothing. Although Nanjing decided that fuel oil destined for 
kerosene production should be taxed at the rate of the kerosene duty, nothing 
changed in Guangdong.459 The provincial rulers were defiant, and for the time being 
the national government refused to intervene. Shell could not easily make a claim for 
reimbursement from Nanjing, as this was not a case of double taxation.  
The second phase started early 1933, when Shell decided to address the distilling 
problem locally, in Guangdong province itself, rather than in Nanjing. In April 1933 
the company began operating its own distillery in Guangzhou. Standard Oil and the 
Texas Company did likewise. Like its Chinese competitors, Shell did not import 
‘real’ fuel oil. Instead, just enough ‘Solar Oil’ fuel oil was added to Shell’s regular 
‘Crown Oil’ kerosene to have the product qualify as fuel oil according to customs 
regulations. 460  This could be done in Hong Kong, where no import duty was 
imposed. After it had crossed the Chinese border, the mixture was easily reconverted 
into Crown Oil and Solar Oil at the Guangzhou installation. There was even a 
possibility to avoid the payment of import duties altogether. Shell believed that the 
Chinese distillers used this method, which was related to the colour of the imported 
oil. For the time being, Shell chose not to use the same method in order to appease 
the Maritime Customs. It was thought that if Customs received no revenue at all, it 
would eventually raise objections to the practice of mixing oils in Hong Kong only to 
separate them again in nearby Guangzhou. 461  Another relevant aspect was that 
Shell’s distilled kerosene was sold at a loss in order to stay under the lowest price 
which the Chinese could sell against.462 It is clear that at this point the financial 
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considerations were relatively unimportant to Shell. The company worried more 
about possible opposition from Customs, and about its market share in kerosene 
sales. The only aspect that the directors did not like about the distilling operation was 
the risk that in the future China might demand that all imported kerosene and petrol 
would be distilled locally. 463  The distilling activities of Shell and its American 
partners were successful—in terms of the elimination of competition—until the 
Guangdong government decided to intervene on behalf of the Chinese firms.  
In the summer of 1933, the third phase commenced when Guangdong informed 
the foreign companies that to distil kerosene locally, they were required to obtain 
certain permits. These permits were in practice impossible for the foreign companies 
to obtain. Only then, in August 1933, did Shell approach the British and Dutch 
governments to put pressure on Guangdong to abolish this permit regulation. As a 
part of Shell’s case reasoning why it should be helped, it pointed out to the Dutch 
government that the Asiatic Petroleum Company represented primarily a Dutch 
interest.464 At the same time the British government was told by the company that the 
APC was a crucial British interest. 465  Both governments responded by sending 
protests to China, in compliance with Shell’s request. But within a few weeks, the 
directors in London concluded that diplomatic pressure would probably not bring 
about the solution. Simultaneously a new dimension was added to the problem. The 
Guangdong government wished to develop the existing Chinese capacity for 
distilling into refining. The Shell management decided that this scheme should be 
‘squashed’.466 The company approached the largest of the Chinese distillers with a 
proposal that they co-operate in distribution. A new subsidiary would then be created 
for this purpose, which would secretly enlarge Shell’s share at the expense of the 
Chinese. Eventually the Chinese partners would be eliminated.467 Both the distilling 
and the refining threats would be a thing of the past. However, the London office 
very soon decided to abandon this plan.468 The reason was that Shell was afraid that 
this would encourage Chinese initiatives to ‘blackmail’ the oil company into similar 
co-operative agreements in the future.469 
In September 1933, Shell Director Heertjes came with a new suggestion, asking 
‘whether the fact that the Chinese are allowed to live and trade in Java as in Paradise 
could be exploited to our advantage’. 470  According to his plan, the Chinese 
communities in Java should be asked to send a letter to the Guangdong government 
in which they emphasised ‘their immunity from unpleasant government interference’, 
and in which a plea would be made against discriminating measures on oil imported 
from the Netherlands Indies. But the colonial administration in Batavia informed 
Shell that, in fact, the Indies Chinese did not feel that they were treated at all well by 
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the Dutch authorities. It was added that threatening Guangdong with repercussions 
for its commerce with Java was useless, because of the negative balance of trade 
existing at the time. The plan was dropped. Yet another attempt by Shell was to 
prevent supplies of fuel oil from reaching Guangdong. The Chinese distillers 
imported their raw material from some ‘smaller’ US producers. Joining forces with 
the Texas Company and Standard Oil, Shell tried to convince the American suppliers 
to stop their deliveries.471 This also failed.472 At this point Shell seems to have had 
some difficulty in defining its future policy with respect to Guangdong. The events 
of the next few months remain obscure.  
About December 1933 the fourth phase was ushered in, when the Guangdong 
authorities suddenly yielded to the Dutch, British, and American governments’ 
demand that official protection of Chinese distilling be dropped. Shell, Standard Oil, 
and the Texas Company obtained their permits and could now continue their fight 
against the Chinese firms legally. However, this diplomatic success accounted for 
little, as Guangdong simply introduced an unofficial way to protect indigenous 
distilling. Its strategy was to introduce a new tax, which was to be paid by all 
distilleries. Shell soon discovered that the tax was largely, and secretly, returned to 
the Chinese companies—but not to the foreigners. In other words, the problem 
remained more or less the same, while the grounds for diplomatic intervention had 
disappeared. 
In the following year Shell put pressure on the British government to do 
something about Guangdong’s policy, but without even proof of the secret tax 
refunds there was nothing Great Britain could do. In January 1934 Director Heertjes 
from London visited the Shell offices in Hong Kong and Guangzhou to decide on a 
new policy. In the first place he instructed the local management to sell at a price 
slightly above that of the Chinese distillers. In the second place he ordered the 
building of a cleaning plant, hidden in a warehouse. This warehouse would also 
contain a small distilling plant to deceive the local authorities, should they inspect the 
warehouse. 473  This suggests that Shell had decided to make use of the option, 
mentioned earlier, of importing coloured kerosene free of duty. To put Customs on 
the wrong track, the kerosene would be secretly cleaned. This would save money for 
the company, which by now had invested heavily in its war against the Chinese 
distillers. Underselling the Chinese for a prolonged period of time was very 
expensive. In the third place Shell secretly purchased at least one of the Chinese 
distilleries, probably with the aim of gaining information about the strategy adopted 
by the Chinese. In order to hide this fact from the other Chinese distillers, the local 
Shell office went as far as hiring thirty persons to join on behalf of the purchased 
distillery a demonstration against the foreign oil companies.474 
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The measures introduced by Heertjes were aimed merely at defending Shell’s 
position in South China, not at recovering its pre-1930 market share. Heertjes hoped 
that within a few months the Guomindang government would take direct control of 
Guangdong—a process that was then under way in neighbouring Fujian. But by 
summer, when Guangdong was still in the hands of Chen Jitang, Shell began 
considering some form of co-operation. The option of paying in order to have the tax 
disadvantage removed was already on the cards, but was not favoured by Shell. In 
late August the company sent a memorandum to the Foreign Office which stated 
that:  
 
‘It has been suggested that we should overcome our present difficulties by 
going into partnership with certain Chinese interests but we feel that this 
would involve the surrender of the fundamental trading rights secured to us by 
treaty and such a surrender might have far reaching and costly repercussions 
elsewhere in China. In any case, the partnership proposals which have been 
made to us by Chinese interests have only amounted to suggestions that we 
should pay them a certain commission on our sales and in return they would 
undertake to secure us equality of treatment with our Chinese competitors. In 
other words, we have merely been asked to pay blackmail [...].’475 
 
In spite of these words, on 28 September 1934—a few weeks after the memorandum 
to the Foreign Office—Shell and the US firms reached an agreement with Chen 
Jitang and the Guangdong government. The companies jointly paid 5 million Hong 
Kong dollars (ƒ3 million) as a tax advance in return for an end to the secret subsidies 
given by Guangdong to the Chinese distillers.476 Given the respective market shares 
of the three oil companies, it is likely that Shell’s contribution amounted to at least 
HK$2 million (ƒ1.2 million). The oil companies claimed—probably realistically—
that they would recover the advanced sum in only seven months. The tax paid in 
advance was on sales of distilled kerosene, which amounted to 3 yuan per 10 US 
gallons (37.85 litres). Until the advance was repaid, Shell would have to pay only 1 
yuan per 10 gallons. Before the agreement the Chinese distillers paid only 1 yuan, 
while Shell had to pay 3 yuan. Thus from September 1934 the Chinese competitors 
had to increase their selling price by 2 yuan in order to stay in business, which ended 
their competitive advantage over the foreign companies. Under these circumstances 
Shell, Standard Oil, and the Texas Company were finally in the position to eliminate 
local competition. In the following months Shell and Standard Oil bought up several 
of the local distilling firms.477 On 13 January 1935 the Chinese distillers gave up 
their fight. They sold their stocks of kerosene to the foreign companies and went out 
of business.478 
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Shell had finally achieved its goal, but the real winner was the provincial 
government, which continued to be paid kerosene tax well after the Chinese distillers 
had cleared the field. The foreign companies were forced to continue distilling their 
kerosene locally, at least until they had recovered their advanced tax. Consequently 
Guangdong was certain to get at least another HK$ 2.5 million (ƒ1.5 million) from 
the foreign firms. Because it remained cheaper for the oil companies to distil locally 
as long as there was a difference between the import duties for kerosene and fuel oil, 
they continued operating their distilleries in 1935 and 1936—meaning that more tax 
went to the province. When the pre-paid tax was fully recovered, Shell was willing to 
advance a further sum.479 There was no change in the situation until July 1936, when 
the Guomindang government took control of Guangdong and ended the tax 
difference between fuel oil and kerosene. Immediately all distilling activities were 
stopped by the foreign companies, and the South China market was once again 
supplied with imported kerosene.480 The Shell directors were clearly worried about 
the possible effects of this way of solving their problems in China. They saw it as a 
form of blackmail, where—under the banner of nationalism—government authorities 
introduce discriminatory practices purely with the aim of obtaining advanced tax or 
another financial benefit. Internally, the Shell management referred to the pre-paid 
Guangdong tax as a loan. 481  The available data on Shell’s policy in Guangdong 
during 1933-1934 indicate an awareness among its leaders that diplomatic support 
and treaty privileges could not be depended upon. But the company also did not have 
a clear-cut answer to a problem that could not be solved merely by business tactics 
such as initiating price wars or local production. The idea of long-term co-operation 
with Chinese business or official partners in Guangdong did not appeal to Shell, 
probably because it involved indigenous refining which ran counter to Shell’s main 
interest in China.  
Even with the second Guangdong taxation conflict was settled, Shell’s tax 
worries did not end. The agreement with the central government of 1 February 1929 
initially worked well in many parts of China. In instances where Shell agents were 
forced to pay local tax, the company simply demanded and obtained a refund from 
the finance ministry in Nanjing. But on 30 June 1931, when the agreement expired, it 
was not renewed.482 The reason may have been that there were still too many areas 
where the Guomindang government could not control local officials, which made the 
agreement a very expensive undertaking for the Chinese side. Until Nanjing could 
actually impose direct rule in all provinces, Shell instructed its agents to recover local 
taxes in the selling price. The company gave all agents a copy of a government letter 
that stated that local duties were illegal. The agents could show the letter to local tax 
officials. This situation drew Shell’s interests closer to those of the Guomindang 
government: generally speaking petroleum would be more expensive in areas where 
the central government was weak. An expansion of Nationalist power would 
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therefore be welcomed by the company, just as it hoped for central government 
control of Guangdong during 1934-1936. This could also be seen in other provinces. 
For instance, in 1931 the provincial government of Hunan ordered Shell to pay a 
dike tax on kerosene and petrol sales, and threatened to arrest its agents if it did not 
comply. The conflict ended after Chiang Kai-shek, in his capacity as leader of the 
Guomindang government, sent a telegram to Hunan taking away the province’s 
competence to collect dike tax.483 Another example is the Fujian business tax on 
petrol and kerosene, a problem that ended in early 1934 when the central government 
imposed direct rule on the province.484  
However, in a similar case in Shaanxi in 1934, Shell believed that Finance 
Minister Song had secretly told the local authorities to ignore any instructions he 
would officially give to end extra taxation. 485  Clearly there was some suspicion 
among Shell people as to the trustworthiness of the Chinese government. In some 
other provinces where central government influence was also strong, Shell continued 
to be dissatisfied with taxation. In 1935 Shell complained about this being the case in 
Sichuan,486 and in the same year there was a collision between the company and tax 
officials in Fujian. Shell refused to pay tax on certain products because it believed 
that competing importers from Japanese Formosa were secretly getting preferential 
treatment, which led to the temporary seizure of Shell oil stocks by the local tax 
office.487  In the mid-1930s, local tax-related incidents continued to be constant thorn 
in the company’s flesh. Despite such irritations, the advantage of increased 
centralisation in China was becoming apparent to Shell. A clear illustration of this 
was the successful lobby against a higher import tax on oil by the foreign oil 
companies in 1934. 
The more Nanjing effectively controlled taxation in the less obedient provinces, 
the more likely an increase in the national import duty on petroleum was. In January 
of 1934 press reports appeared saying that such an increase was imminent. Shell, 
Standard Oil, and the Texas Company responded by sending a letter to the Chinese 
government to point out the likely results of such a tax increase: a lower standard of 
living for those who could no longer afford kerosene, a slowdown in the 
development of roads and of bus services, and above all less government revenue 
because of the decrease in imported kerosene and petrol—the companies predicted 
that local distilling would take the place of imports.488 It was at this crucial moment 
that Shell began to make plans to build a refinery in Shanghai to make petrol and 
kerosene out of lowly-taxed heavier petroleum types.489  Within a few weeks the 
Legislative Yuan in Nanjing decided to oppose the government’s plans for a raised 
import tariff.490 The Shanghai refinery was no longer required. This proved to the 
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foreign oil companies that it was quite possible to influence the Nanjing government 
by putting forward arguments related to its revenue. On the whole, from Shell’s point 
of view the tax situation in China had greatly improved since 1925. For the time 
being an expansion of central government influence solved many of Shell’s tax 
problems, and in principle the company was willing to support the Guomindang by 
making tax deals. The second Guangdong taxation conflict showed how strongly 
Shell opposed the emergence of a Chinese distilling industry. 
 
Restrictions on Land Use under the Guomindang Government. The second kind of 
political risk perceived by Shell during 1928-1937 related to its use of land. At many 
locations the oil company leased land for its wharfs or tank installations, and this 
sometimes made the company vulnerable to local conflicts.491 This happened in the 
late 1920s when the warlord Zhang Zuolin was using Shell to put pressure on the 
USSR to withdraw its influence from Manchuria. The Soviets owned and controlled 
a major trans-Manchurian railway line, The Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). As with 
other main railways in China, Shell leased plots of land alongside for the storage of 
petroleum. The company had been paying rent to the CER, but when the latter asked 
Shell to clear one particular site in 1927, the petroleum firm refused to move unless 
offered a suitable new location. Zhang’s government saw this as an opportunity to 
push back Soviet influence and told the company that it could stay if it paid rent to 
the Chinese Land Administration rather than to the CER. When Shell did this, the 
CER threatened to cut off its siding facilities from the petroleum storage site. In 
order to keep the site in operation, the oil company then was also forced to pay rent 
to the CER.492 
More often Shell itself was targeted by the Chinese authorities, especially during 
the first half of the Nanjing decade. At the treaty ports, the company had long-lasting 
lease contracts for substantial areas of land, which often dated back to the Qing 
dynasty. In many cases these plots of land were outside the foreign concession areas, 
and consequently attracted the attention of the local Chinese authorities. In 1930 the 
Reclaimed-Land Bureau of Zhejiang wanted Shell and Standard Oil to pay for an 
area of reclaimed land in front of their installations at Ningbo. Shell asked for a 
consular intervention, claiming that the so-called reclaimed land was actually mostly 
under water and that it would have paid ‘to avoid local difficulties’ if the sum had 
been lower. The British and US consuls at Ningbo obtained a declaration from the 
mayor saying that the reclamation money should not have to be paid.493 While it was 
possible that in the Ningbo case the provincial government was mainly trying to find 
a pretext to increase its revenue, there also were cases in which Chinese officials 
were persistently attempting to take from Shell land lease privileges it had enjoyed 
for decades. 
In 1929 Fujian province asked Shell to move its installation from Gulangyu 
Island—part of the city of Xiamen—to a nearby site on the mainland, where 
Standard Oil already operated an installation. Shell agreed and built a completely 
new oil storage installation on the new site, a plot of 96,000 square feet of land 
leased to the company in perpetuity. When the new installation was almost finished 
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and its costs already had totalled Y1 million,494 the district authorities sent troops to 
end the construction work. The local magistrate claimed that the province was not 
entitled to make agreements about oil installation sites.495 Among his demands was 
that in the new agreement the land lease would be valid for only twenty-five years. 
Shell refused to give up its Gulangyu lease, which was in perpetuity, if the new lease 
were not on the same terms. It referred to the Chinese demands as ‘most 
preposterous’.496 Shell’s own negotiations with Chinese officials failed to produce 
any result. Official protests to the Guomindang government by Britain did not help, 
as the latter did not want land being leased to foreigners in perpetuity. To its regret, 
the oil company was informed that the British government was unwilling to station a 
gunboat in Xiamen harbour to step up pressure on the Xiamen authorities.497 By 
1933 the matter was still unresolved when the British minister to China, Miles 
Lampson, was on leave in England. He was approached by a Shell director who 
urged him to do something quickly, and on his return to Hong Kong the local Shell 
managing director did the same. This pressure resulted in Lampson personally 
visiting the local, provincial, and national Chinese authorities. His performance as 
mediator between the Chinese and the oil company produced a settlement within a 
few weeks. A lease in perpetuity was out of the question, which was now accepted 
by Shell. However, in return for paying a rent of at least Y10,000 a year, Shell was 
granted a 75-year period for the lease by the Chinese government. The magistrate no 
longer stood in the way of the move to the new installation site, and a final 
agreement was signed on 8 November 1934.498 
Another case in which the Chinese authorities tried to limit the land rights of 
Shell occurred in Shanghai. In 1930 the Bureau of Harbour Affairs of the Chinese 
administered part of Shanghai introduced a new regulation, according to which all 
companies located on the Huangpu River bank no longer automatically had the right 
to access the river from their land. Instead, they had to lease the right to make use of 
the frontage, i.e., the line separating their land from the river, from the Chinese 
bureau.499 Free river access was very important to the economic prosperity of the 
International Settlement, and the foreigners in Shanghai interpreted the new frontage 
regulation as an attempt by the Chinese government to limit their treaty privileges. 
Before enforcing the new rules, the Chinese authorities first used Shell as a test case. 
Shell was told by the Chinese authorities that part of the river front of its Lower 
Pudong Wharf would be expropriated to make way for a new ferry landing.500 
Shell was willing to give up some of its land for the ferry, but in return it wanted 
a guarantee that it could keep and use its Pudong wharf also in the future.501 The 
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problem for Shell was that it did not hold a title deed for the contested plot of land, 
because the company had bought it only recently from another firm, the Shanghai 
Dock Company502 The Chinese authorities were not inclined to give a title deed to 
the company until it complied with the ferry plan. To strengthen its bargaining 
position, the company asked the British government for diplomatic support. The 
latter declared that it was willing to assist, but also intimated that China had the right 
to appropriate any plot of land outside the foreign concessions for public use. By this 
time the traditional relationship between British diplomats and the companies whose 
rights they defended was no longer as close as it had been in the early 1920s. The 
British minister to China, Miles Lampson, advised to the Foreign Office in London 
that it should be careful in giving promises of support to the companies. First of all, 
he stated, the old methods of diplomatic pressure were no longer efficacious and ‘the 
best results are usually obtained by the firms themselves seeking a compromise 
settlement by direct discussion with the local authorities’. And in the second place, 
the British government should not let itself be manipulated by ‘our extremely 
intelligent friends of the Asiatic Petroleum Company and Butterfield and Swire 
[B&S was having a similar problem]’. Lampson believed that these companies would 
hold the British government responsible for their problems, if they were unable to 
reach a compromise with the Chinese.503 Despite such misgivings, he did his duty 
and sent a letter to the Chinese foreign minister to complain about the river frontage 
matter.  
Meanwhile Shell had not sat still and tried to solve the ferry problem by direct 
talks with the Chinese. Throughout the year 1931 Shell representatives were in 
contact with various officials of the Chinese municipality of Shanghai, including the 
mayor. As with the Xiamen case, the company made it clear that it had a strong 
aversion to the Chinese demands: ‘We told the [Chinese municipal officials] that 
their proposals were simply ludicrous [...].’504 In October of the following year, after 
lengthy negotiations, the Chinese finally agreed to give Shell what it wanted: the title 
deed for the land of Shell’s Lower Pudong Wharf. In return the Chinese city of 
Shanghai acquired its ferry landing and a road from the landing to the boundary of 
Shell’s land. The decision by the Chinese to give in was probably stimulated by the 
Japanese attack on the city earlier in 1932. After the Japanese violence against China 
in 1931 and 1932, China’s policy of limiting Western privileges became less 
pronounced. More anxious to be conciliatory, the Chinese municipality of Shanghai 
no longer tried to enforce payment of frontage rights.505  
The leasing of Chinese land was sometimes a source for conflict with the local 
authorities, and like the customs duties it represented an area in which in the late 
1920s the company was confronted with the increasing determination of Chinese 
officials to push back foreign influence. The British government was helpful to the 
oil company, but only as a mediator and it eschewed the policy of making threats 
against China. The Chinese were creative in finding ways to undermine the treaty 
system, and Shell was learning that its capacity to resist this development was 
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limited. In Xiamen the company was forced to accept a change in its lease contract 
from perpetuity to seventy-five years. In Shanghai, where the outcome of the conflict 
was less dramatic for Shell’s position, the company also cannot have failed to notice 
its ultimate inability to resist the will of a persistent Chinese government. The 
revision of old treaty rights was very probably regarded as an inevitable process, but 
Shell was not in a hurry to give up its land rights and in this respect the company 
benefited from the growth of Japanese power in East Asia. After 1931 the waxing 
Japanese threat made the Chinese authorities less inclined to limit Shell’s land rights, 
consequently no further disputes of this type occurred. 
 
Guomindang State Control of Oil Distribution. A third important political risk of this 
period was the possibility that the Chinese government would bring parts of the trade 
in petroleum products under its control. In 1933 the Guomindang government was 
waging a military campaign to destroy the communist power base in Jiangxi 
province, the ‘Jiangxi Soviet’ of which Mao Zedong (Mao Tsetung) was one of the 
leaders. Central to the strategy employed by the government was a blockade to 
isolate the communist-controlled area. Consequently public sales bureaux for salt and 
kerosene were established in counties in the immediate vicinity of the territory under 
blockade. The oil companies needed special permits to transport kerosene and were 
forced to sell it via the public sales bureaux, instead of directly through their own 
agents. Because each customer was allowed to buy only 2 ounces of kerosene, 
Shell’s sales figures in Jiangxi quickly deteriorated. In the following years similar 
blockades were installed in several other provinces where the government wanted to 
bring ‘bandit areas’ under its control. Shell did not complain about this practice until 
after the government’s successful advance into Jiangxi, which forced the communists 
into their Long March to Yen’an in North China. By early 1935 communist influence 
in Jiangxi had been destroyed, but the monopoly on kerosene distribution was not 
lifted. On the contrary, apart from restrictions on transport and the quantity per 
buyer, the agents of the foreign companies now also were forbidden to raise their 
selling prices. By early 1935 it had become clear that the Chinese authorities were 
planning to substitute the public sales bureaux—which regulated the trade still 
carried out by the agents—for rural co-operatives of kerosene consumers—which 
would distribute the oil to their members and thereby obviate the position of the 
agents.506  
Shell informed the British legation and the British minister sent complaints to the 
government in Nanjing. 507  Furthermore, in February of 1935 Shell’s Jiujiang 
manager Morton Smith approached the wife of Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he was 
apparently acquainted, and asked her to bring the matter to Chiang’s attention. 
Consequently, General Chiang instructed Governor Xiong of Jiangxi to discuss the 
problem with Morton Smith; but subsequent talks between the Shell representative 
and the governor and with other provincial officials produced no result.508 In early 
October Shell, Standard Oil, and the Texas Company stopped their deliveries to at 
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least some of the Jiangxi public sales bureaux. Their place was taken by the 
Guanghua Petroleum Company, a Chinese distributing firm.509 Further protests by 
the British legation did nothing to change the situation.510 In early April of 1936 the 
planned co-operatives materialised: in certain towns in Jiangxi the agents of the three 
foreign companies were ordered to sell only to the co-operatives.511 But later in the 
same month Shell was surprisingly informed that the monopolies of the sales bureaux 
and the co-operatives had been abolished, and that kerosene could again be traded 
freely.512 What had happened? According to Osterhammel’s study, a British League 
of Nations advisor, W. Campbell, successfully urged Chiang Kai-shek to end the 
monopoly. Osterhammel also mentions that introducing co-operatives was part of a 
League-sponsored programme. Therefore it made sense that someone from the 
League of Nations should ask the Chinese government to exclude kerosene from the 
rural co-operatives program. The questions why Campbell made his request, or why 
Chiang Kai-shek decided to abandon the oil monopoly scheme altogether 
unfortunately both remain unanswered. No other attempts were made by the 
Guomindang government to impose a monopoly on the petroleum trade. As the 
conflict with Japan over the Manchurian monopoly will show, Shell was prepared to 
put up strong resistance to any form of state monopoly on the distribution of its 
products. 
 
Exploration Concessions under the Guomindang Government. The fourth main 
political risk of the Nanjing Decade was caused—just as under Yuan Shikai—by the 
government issuing new oil exploration concessions that threatened the status quo on 
the Chinese oil market. During the 1920s Shell paid no attention to opportunities for 
oil exploration in China. This changed during the 1930s, when Standard Oil again 
showed a willingness to invest in oil exploration in China—this time at the request of 
Chinese officials.513 Several high-ranking Chinese officials and influential Chinese 
businessmen established a syndicate to develop China’s oil reserves. In November of 
1935 this syndicate obtained a concession to look for oil in Xinjiang, Gansu, and 
Qinghai from the Chinese government. On 21 May 1936 the syndicate approached 
Standard Oil with a proposal that they form a partnership. The result was an 
agreement that gave Standard Oil the right to look for and produce oil in the same 
three provinces, whereby the Chinese syndicate and the American oil company each 
would take part for 50 per cent.514 In the summer and autumn of 1937, two US 
geologists were in China to survey the concession provinces. Unlike during the 
1914-1915 expedition, media attention was scrupulously avoided. 
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Standard Oil, which through the international cartel agreements was committed to 
co-operating with Shell in China, offered half of its participation to the European 
concern.515 At that time Shell believed that Xinjiang (Chinese Central Asia) offered 
good prospects for oil exploration in China.516 China was largely reunified under 
Chiang Kai-shek, and with the development of a new road system the idea of 
exploration in this remote part of the country seemed much less unrealistic than 
before. This occurred at a time in which Shell’s interest in China was changing. 
Whereas the Chinese market formerly was used to absorb surplus kerosene—a by-
product of petrol—it was now becoming an important market for the main petroleum 
products of the 1930s themselves: petrol and fuel oil. Therefore, provided that Shell 
was involved, commencing oil production inside China was now more attractive than 
it had been two decades earlier. On 26 July 1937 the three parties met in Dorchester, 
England. The Chinese syndicate was represented by two of its members, Finance 
Minister—and Shell agent—Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kong) and the experienced 
diplomat, Gu Weijun (Wellington Koo). Shell was represented by O.W. Darch, 
Standard Oil by Ph.W. Parker and G.S. Walden. They were high-ranking managers; 
no British or US government officials were involved or even informed. At this 
meeting Kong and Gu invited Shell to join on the same terms as Standard Oil. Two 
days later Shell and Standard Oil reached an agreement on Shell’s participation in the 
Standard Oil concession.517 This agreement and the new Standard Oil expedition 
were kept a secret even from the management of Shell’s organisation in China.518 
The reason for this secrecy is difficult to fathom, but may have been of a 
propagandistic nature: possibly the Guomindang was afraid of loosing popular 
support if it were made known that its officials gave oil concessions to the large 
Western firms. Therefore the fact that Standard Oil offered Shell the opportunity to 
participate in the concession neutralised the risk of Shell’s position being 
undermined by China’s desire to become an oil-producing country. As it turned out, 
the initial survey was not followed by more thorough exploration activities.  
When the Dorchester meeting took place, the Sino-Japanese War had already 
broken out. In January 1938 the Japanese occupation of East China had made oil 
exploration in Xinjiang unattractive again, and the concession partners agreed to let 
the project rest until after the war.519 Another aspect that worried Shell was ‘the 
uncertainty as to the holdings of the syndicate and the legal conditions’. 520  
Meanwhile the geologists had visited Gansu and Qinghai—why Xinjiang was not 
included in their survey is not clear. In the spring of 1938 they reported that the 
prospects of finding oil in Gansu and Qinghai were not bright. Although 
discouraged, Shell and Standard Oil did not want to abandon the project entirely. 
Instead it was decided to ‘leave this matter as it stands now’.521 The companies made 
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sure that the geologists would not disclose the nature or the results of their mission. 
They were instructed not to tell anyone that they had been in China on behalf of 
Standard Oil, or to publish any scientific or technical articles.522 The costs of the 
expedition, amounting to about $34,000, were borne equally by Shell and Standard 
Oil.523 As with taxation, Shell was quite willing to enter into close- co-operation with 
the Guomindang government in the field of oil exploration. For the first time the oil 
companies were not even informing their governments of important contacts with 
high-ranking Chinese officials. However, as long as Japan continued its advance into 
China the company postponed actual support for Chinese oil production. 
 
Machukuo State Control of Oil Distribution. The fifth and last major political risk 
that threatened Shell’s position in China prior to 1937 was caused by the Japanese 
invasion in Manchuria of 1931 and the subsequent establishment of the Japanese-
controlled puppet state of ‘Manchukuo’ that was not recognised by the Western 
powers. Initially some Western businessmen welcomed the invasion, because they 
hoped that Japanese control would bring more stability to that part of China. Despite 
their expectations, Chinese resistance was not quickly eliminated by the Japanese 
army and in 1932 and 1933 Shell continued to be troubled by war damage and 
looting. By early 1933 some thirty-five agents had reported damage, totalling over 
Y100,000.524 These problems of violence and theft were not entirely the same as 
those experienced by the company during the 1920s. The new element was Japan, 
which meant that the experience Shell had built up with provincial warlord regimes 
and the Guomindang government was irrelevant here. Britain’s official relations with 
Japan were very different than those with China–Japan was militarily strong and less 
inclined to tolerate Western influence in areas under its control–even when compared 
with the Japanese policy at Qingdao around 1920.  
The protection of the larger treaty port installations by the British navy was still 
possible in China, but no longer feasible in Manchuria. Shell operated a large 
installation in the vicinity of Niuzhuang, South Manchuria, in an area where many 
bandits were active who benefited from the unsettled condition in Manchuria. A year 
after the invasion began, in September 1932, two British Shell-managers and the 
daughter of a British missionary were kidnapped by bandits in the vicinity of 
Niuzhuang.525 One Shell-employee escaped, but the two other victims were released 
only after a high ransom was paid. This increased the danger that other foreign Shell 
personnel would also be kidnapped. Consequently the company felt very vulnerable 
in this area, and feared that its tank installation would prove an attractive target for 
bandits. Apart from Chinese personnel and forty to fifty company guards there were 
also two British managers living in the installation, which was located out in the 
countryside. To be able to protect these two British subjects, the crew of a British 
                                                          
522 R. Leibensperger (Stanvac The Hague) to H.M.E. Schuermann (Shell The Hague) 20 Aug. 1938 and 
response Schuermann to Leibensperger 30 Aug. 1938, ibid. 
523 Godber (Shell London) to De Booy (Shell The Hague) 17 Nov. 1938, ibid. The plan was revived in 
1947, when Shell sent a survey team to Gansu. The preparations for oil production were stalled again 
during the Korean War: Shell Companies in Greater China, The Long Term, 20. 
524 Most of these claims were investigated and confirmed by the company. For a list of the agents, the 
town where their business was located and a description of the cause of the damage (usually looting by 
bandits or Chinese troops): PRO London, FO 371, 17045, F4671. 
525 Ibid. 16223, F6591. 
PETROLEUM: ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL 129 
naval vessel based in Niuzhuang harbour practised armed landings near the 
installation.526 This irritated the local Japanese authorities, who regarded it as a sign 
of disregard for Manchukuo’s sovereignty. The British government decided that 
under such circumstances it was better to remove its warship, and asked Shell not to 
allow its British staff remain at the installation during the night, when a bandit attack 
was most likely to occur. The company was loathe not to have a European at the 
installation at all times to supervise the Chinese employees. Initially two British 
managers were ordered to stay in Niuzhuang at night, but soon the busy winter 
season started and they were back again permanently at the installation.527  
The situation in North Manchuria was even more difficult. The northern agencies 
were so far inland that the company lost contact with many of them during the 
fighting and the accompanying chaos of 1931-1932. In September 1932 the disturbed 
communications between the company and its agents caused the Harbin management 
to fear that many agents had sold their stock and remitted the proceeds to other parts 
of China. The value of the North Manchurian agency stock was thought to be 
certainly more than Y400,000.528 This was only partly covered by guarantees. If the 
company were to try to recover its stock and debts, agents could easily escape its arm 
by crossing the border between Japanese Manchukuo and unoccupied China. In spite 
of these problems, Shell was no doubt pleased about the puppet state’s policy 
towards the foreign debts of the Chinese provincial governments it replaced. Even 
though following the invasion the Japanese government declared that it did not feel 
responsible for such debts,529 the Manchukuo regime did decide to repay them.530  
Problems of a different nature arose when trading conditions gradually settled 
down after 1932. Shell was the market leader for petroleum products in Manchuria, 
occupying almost 32 per cent of a market that consisted of some 126.5 million litres 
in 1933. 531  Shell was particularly strong in the marketing of the strategically 
important products petrol and fuel oil, while Standard Oil had a lead in kerosene 
sales. As a consequence of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, diplomatic 
relations between Great Britain and Japan deteriorated. The British government 
refused to recognise Manchukuo, which caused worries for Shell, because it feared 
that Japan might retaliate by limiting Shell’s rights in Manchuria. These worries 
multiplied when Japan’s exports were threatened by changes in the tariff policy of 
British India, a major market for Japanese consumer goods. Shell then pointed out to 
the British government that an anti-Japanese policy with regard to Manchuria was 
undesirable for British business and that it feared losing its main Japanese customers 
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in Manchuria: the South Manchurian Railway Company, the Dairen Kissen Kaisha, 
and the Dairen Fishing Boat Association. According to the oil company its future in 
Manchuria was ‘so utterly dependent on friendly relations with Japan’, and therefore 
its message to the British government was that it should refrain from taking anti-
Japanese measures. At this point the East Asian interests of the company and the 
Western governments were further apart than ever before. The Manchurian oil 
market was a large one and Shell had no intention of losing it. In the long run, the 
Japanese occupation promised more stability and faster economic and industrial 
growth, which made Manchuria even more attractive. But the Western powers, 
traditionally represented in China by Britain, saw the international order threatened 
by the Japanese invasion and refused to recognise Manchukuo. Moreover, the British 
government was not convinced that the future of Shell in Manchuria was really at 
stake. According to the British consul in Dalian, what Shell was implying was not 
true, that no Japanese firm was contemplating closing its door to supplies from Shell 
because of British foreign policy.532 
Although Japanese firms in Manchuria never actually boycotted Shell, sooner or 
later a deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations would be unfavourable to a British 
company with large assets in the territories controlled by the Japanese army. Besides 
the danger of war between Britain and Japan, there was the problem that the 
government of Manchukuo was not recognised by the British and Dutch 
governments. Therefore, as in China after 1916 but for a different reason, British and 
Dutch diplomats could offer little direct support when Shell came into conflict with 
the Manchukuo authorities. The first time this happened concerned a case of alleged 
discrimination, in some respects similar to what Shell was experiencing in 
Guangdong about the same time.  
Japanese firms were importing into Manchuria a type of petroleum that could be 
burned in lamps as kerosene, but that qualified with customs as gas oil or ‘light oil’. 
As a result the Japanese importers paid the light oil import duty, which was lower 
than the one for kerosene, and were able to market lamp oil more cheaply than Shell, 
Standard Oil, and the Texas Company, the main importers of regular kerosene.533 
When the Western firms complained and the Manchukuo government did not change 
the situation, Shell turned to the British government, claiming that the Open Door 
principle was at stake. While formally Britain and the US sent protests to the 
Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo, Shell decided to fight the Japanese importers with 
their own weapons. The company’s managing director at Shenyang ordered the Shell 
installation at Dalian to mix kerosene with gas oil, the result of which was presented 
to and accepted by Manchukuo customs as light oil. Although Shell successfully 
imitated the Japanese tactic, the company disliked the fact that this produced a lower 
burning quality and continued to ask the Manchukuo customs to change its 
definitions of kerosene and light oil.534 Still, putting its misgivings aside, Shell began 
shipping its self-mixed light oil to Manchuria, even though the British government 
warned that under these conditions it could not continue its support. It was difficult 
to maintain that this was a case of anti-Western discrimination if Shell were allowed 
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to do exactly the same as its Japanese competitors. 535  At this point the light oil 
conflict did not develop any further, probably because a far more serious issue was 
now arising.  
In the spring of 1933 for the first time Shell heard rumours that the Manchukuo 
regime intended to establish a state monopoly for petroleum distribution in 
Manchuria.536 Near the end of that year, Manchukuo officials began visiting agents 
of Shell and of the other foreign oil firms in various remote parts of Manchuria. The 
Manchukuo government was collecting data on the petroleum trade from these 
agents, and Shell knew that this indicated that the introduction of the monopoly 
would only be a matter of time.537 Throughout 1934 it gradually became clear that 
Manchukuo intended to incorporate parts of the existing distributing networks of the 
foreign companies into a state-controlled organisation, that would have a monopoly 
on kerosene and petrol distribution. 538  Manchukuo would still buy most of its 
petroleum from Shell and Standard Oil, but there was no guarantee that this would 
continue to be the case in the future and it was known that Japanese firms were being 
encouraged to expand their production capacity in Manchuria. The new system was 
scheduled to become effective in early 1935.  
Meanwhile Anglo-Japanese diplomatic relations had become even worse after the 
Japanese withdrew their membership from the League of Nations in March 1933. 
Shell now believed that the only government that could protect the company in 
Manchuria was not Great Britain but Japan. The company’s attitude towards political 
risks in Manchuria was summed up as following: 
 
‘[...] whilst [we] quite understand sovereign rights etc. [of the state of 
Manchukuo, we] also fully realise [the] important influence of Tokyo [on the 
government of Manchukuo;...] as traders we have nothing to do with 
diplomatic recognition and we [are] only concerned with [the] real situation 
with leads us to the fixed conclusion that we must depend upon Tokyo for 
protection [of] our position.’539 
 
By mid-1934 the intended Manchukuo oil monopoly was perceived by Shell to be a 
very serious problem. Manchuria was a large and rapidly developing market where 
Shell had two large tank installations and an extensive agency network. Supplying 
Manchuria with petroleum without having any influence on local distribution would 
be extremely disadvantageous to Shell, since it amounted to a return to the pre-1908 
situation in which the company could not control volume and price level. There were 
only two possible strategies which could be adopted to prevent the introduction of 
the monopoly law: either to force Manchukuo to drop the idea, or to find some 
compromise in which Manchukuo would drop it in return for something else. As 
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research by I. Anderson has shown, both strategies failed and Shell withdrew from 
kerosene and petrol distribution in Manchuria—as did Standard Oil and the Texas 
Company.540 The withdrawal from Manchuria was the first major setback suffered 
by Shell since it built its up-country organisation at the beginning of the century, and 
therefore deserves some closer attention.541  
As mentioned above, Shell thought that control of the Manchukuo regime rested 
in Tokyo. It is relevant to note, as indicated by Anderson, that also in Japan itself the 
Western oil companies were faced with a new petroleum law that seemed to 
undermine their position on the Japanese market.542 This reinforced Shell’s notion 
that protection against political risks in Manchuria could be found only in Tokyo. At 
first Shell tried to discourage the Manchukuo authorities by refusing to give detailed 
information on its market operations and position in Manchuria, either from its local 
head office or from its Chinese agents. 543  Joining forces with Standard Oil, the 
company also looked for ways to threaten Manchukuo with an oil embargo, 
preferably without actually formulating the threat.544 The two firms succeeded in this 
by generating a discussion between the governments of the US, Britain, and the 
Netherlands about a possible official oil embargo against Japan—not just against 
Manchukuo because the difficulties in Manchuria and Japan were thought to be 
closely related, and oil would continue to reach Manchuria through Japan.545 After a 
few months these governments decided against putting this idea into practice, but by 
then rumours about it had already reached Japan and had produced an effect which 
was desirable to the oil companies.546 Shell also made use of the press to increase 
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pressure on Japan. In October 1934 the Shell office in Shanghai asked the local 
Times correspondent to write about—the negative aspects of—the Manchukuo oil 
policy.547 In the following weeks several articles on the topic appeared in The Times 
and in other Western newspapers. After Shell and Standard Oil had succeeded in 
giving the Japanese government the impression that the monopoly plans were raising 
considerable opposition in the West, the two oil companies were ready to begin 
negotiations. 
In December of 1934 top-managers of Shell and Standard Oil gathered in 
Shanghai to prepare for their meeting with Japanese officials.548 The companies now 
asked the three Western governments involved to end their efforts to put diplomatic 
pressure on Japan, and instead arrange an invitation from the Japanese government 
for the representatives of the two oil companies.549 The companies had several things 
to offer to Japan. In the first place of course oil. Although Japan and Manchukuo 
could buy their oil from other producers, Shell and Standard Oil were the leading 
suppliers in the Far East. Other firms trying to take their place would have to face 
strong opposition from these two giant corporations. New York Standard was firmly 
backed by its former parent, New Jersey Standard, which in 1933 had taken a 50 per 
cent interest in New York Standard’s Chinese and Japanese business. The Texas 
Company was in the same boat in Manchuria, and the remaining major oil firms—
Socal, Gulf, and Anglo-Persian—were prevented by agreements from entering the 
Far Eastern markets.550 In the second place these companies could offer the Japanese 
the strategic benefits of their presence: as long as the oil tanks and the stocks were 
company property, the Japanese government did not have to spend large amounts of 
money on setting up such facilities by itself. To put themselves in readiness for a 
future war, the Japanese armed forces required extensive petroleum stocks. Soundly 
backed by their financial strength, Standard Oil and Shell were able to maintain 
larger stocks in Manchuria and Japan than smaller firms could. Shell was also willing 
to consider building refineries in Japan. Finally, the companies could offer the 
Japanese the knowledge and the right to use a coal hydrogenation process.551  In 
April 1933 a hydrogenation cartel—that owned the exclusive rights for this 
process—had been formed by Shell, New Jersey Standard, ICI, and IG Farben.552 By 
the process of hydrogenation it was possible to convert coal into oil, something that 
would be very valuable during a war. Japan had far more access to natural reserves 
of coal than of oil. However, for the time being this bargaining tool disappeared into 
the background when the managers—even before they went to Tokyo—found out 
that the Japanese were not interested in buying the hydrogenation process. At the 
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time the authorities believed that Japanese researchers were capable of developing a 
similar process 553by themselves.  
                                                          
In January 1935 the oil men were in Tokyo and began their talks with Japanese 
officials. The leader of the Shell delegation was F. Godber, a top managing director 
from London. He was instructed not to make a distinction between the Manchurian 
and Japanese issues.554 The Texas Company was represented by Standard Oil and 
Shell, and during the talks it was generally Godber who spoke for the oil companies. 
It was Deterding, still the top man of the Shell concern, from whom Godber had to 
obtain approval before he could make any proposals. The Japanese government—
and that of Manchukuo—was represented by the commercial bureau chief of the 
foreign ministry and the vice-minister of commerce and industry.555 It did not take 
long for the fact to emerge that the Japanese were willing to compromise on their oil 
law in Japan, but not on the establishment of a state monopoly in Manchuria. Shell 
decided to accept the monopoly, as long as it was allowed to distribute the oil it 
imported by itself under its own brand name, and as long as no new Japanese 
refineries were built in Manchuria. 556  However, the Japanese refused to let the 
companies use their own distributing organisations. They were only willing to give 
them a guaranteed purchase of refined products only for 14 per cent of the 1934 
Manchurian market. 557  By late February the talks were still under way, and the 
Manchurian issue now was the only point on the agenda. While both sides remained 
in a deadlock, the Shell office in Shenyang learned that the monopoly was due to 
become effective on 10 April. Godber believed that Japan was bluffing, and that the 
introduction of the monopoly would be postponed.558 The Manchukuo government 
was convinced that, in the end, the oil companies would accept the monopoly rather 
than withdraw from Manchuria altogether. Both sides were wrong.  
The monopoly became effective as announced, even though no compromise had 
yet been reached in Tokyo. The negotiating process was severely hindered by the 
fact that during March talks were suspended and the oil representatives retreated to 
the Philippines. During this time the Japanese Diet was in session and it was 
expected by both sides that pressure on the Japanese government not to yield to the 
Westerners would be too high. The negotiations could not be resumed before early 
April, by which time it was already clear that the monopoly would not be stopped. 
Shell and Standard Oil realised that it was now impossible for the Manchukuo 
authorities to yield to their main demands. The companies could not revert to a 
boycott against Japan, because they were very close to an agreement which would 
solve their problems relating to the Japanese market itself. And because the Japanese 
market was larger and considered to be more important than the Manchurian market, 
the companies accepted their defeat in Manchuria and turned their full attention to 
maintaining their position in Japan. The situation in Japan and in Manchuria were 
now regarded as separate issues.  
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Shell and Standard Oil decided to withdraw from Manchuria. Such a move was 
imperative to impress on the Japanese that they could not take a similar 
uncompromising action in Japan itself. Indeed it was even hoped that the unexpected 
might still occur, and Manchukuo might end the monopoly regulation after all.559 
Therefore the Western oil companies did what they could to make the situation for 
Manchukuo as difficult as possible. 560  Although a full boycott was not possible, 
Shell and Standard Oil did establish an informal boycott of crude oil for Manchukuo 
by Western oil companies. While the Manchukuo regime could still import oil from 
Japan or from independent suppliers in the US, Shell was convinced that this at least 
would ‘involve expense and difficulty’. Furthermore, Standard Oil and Shell were 
supported by the US government, which asked the independent American producers 
not to sell to Manchukuo.561 The American producers agreed to this.562 The British 
government also discouraged small producers within its empire from exporting to 
Manchuria. Similar support from the Dutch government was not needed, since 
Shell—via the Indies producers’ association—controlled the entire oil export from 
the Netherlands Indies. Therefore for a while from mid-April 1935 Manchukuo was 
only supplied from Japan, which itself was having difficulty in creating oil 
reserves.563  
At the same time Shell, Standard Oil, and the Texas Company filed claims with 
the Japanese government for full compensation for the loss of their Manchurian 
interests. On 11 May 1935 the three Western firms presented their claims, Shell 
demanding £418,000—which was the estimated value of ‘Shell Manchuria’.564  It 
was some time before the Manchukuo government realised that the refusal to sell 
crude oil and the claims were not intended to be a prelude to any further 
negotiations.565 In the course of the following year, foreign marketing operations in 
Manchuria were gradually halted. Shell’s main branch offices in Manchuria, in 
Harbin and Shenyang, were closed on 4 January and 15 May 1936 respectively. 
Standard Oil and the Texas Company had already left Manchuria by the latter date. 
Even then Shell was not entirely gone. The only remnant of the Asiatic Petroleum 
Company was the large tank installation at Niuzhuang, still supervised by a British 
manager. But when the APC left, the Rising Sun Petroleum Company entered. Rising 
Sun was Shell’s Japanese distribution subsidiary. In 1935 it opened an office in 
Dalian, South Manchuria, which had been leased to Japan by China since the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-1905. Rising Sun began distributing, the petroleum products 
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that were not covered by the monopoly law through Japanese agents in Manchuria. 
Although Shell no longer sold crude oil and the important products kerosene and 
petrol to Manchukuo, some of its other products were still marketed in Manchuria. In 
late 1935 when it became clear that all three oil companies were really closing down 
their operations in Manchuria, a Manchukuo government official stated that his 
government had never expected that the companies would really leave, and that it did 
not have the money to pay for their claims.566 In principle Japan was willing to pay 
in order to obtain the facilities and stocks left in Manchuria by the oil companies, but 
not at the price which they demanded. Until Pearl Harbor, Shell and Japan continued 
negotiations about the price to be paid by Manchukuo to obtain its Manchurian 
assets. By April 1938, Shell scaled down its price, because it had managed to sell 
some £69,000 worth of stock in Manchuria—which indicated that it took some years 
before Shell’s products actually disappeared from the Manchurian market.567 During 
these years the Manchukuo monopoly organisation paid rent to the Western firms for 
use of their installations,568 but a final settlement was never reached. 
Even after it had made the decision to leave Manchuria, Shell was still anxious to 
maintain good relations with the Japanese government. In May 1935 the company 
informally passed on a draft section of the speech that Shell’s management was 
preparing for the annual shareholders’ meeting to a Japanese foreign ministry 
official. The section mentioned the withdrawal from Manchuria, and Shell wanted to 
avoid offending Japan by it.569 After Manchuria was no longer an issue at the talks in 
Tokyo—which were renewed in April—Japan and the oil companies quickly 
managed to come to a settlement. When Godber finally returned to London after 
having been in the Far East for almost half a year, he brought with him an agreement 
with Japan which guaranteed the continuation of Shell’s leading position in the 
Japanese market. The company was pleased with this outcome, although the loss of 
Manchuria was a major setback. Shell had showed itself willing to continue its 
business in Japanese-occupied Manchuria and to accept working within the 
Manchukuo oil monopoly nominally. It only left that part of China and initiated an 
unofficial boycott against it in order to save its market position in Japan, where Shell 
continued to sell oil throughout the 1930s.  
From the outset Shell certainly did not expect that it would have to choose 
between the Manchurian and the Japanese market. The introduction of the monopoly 
combined with the desire to save the Japanese market explain Shell’s decision to 
undertake a near-complete withdrawal. But there are other explanations for the fact 
that it came to a point at which Shell had to take such a drastic action. In the first 
place there was Shell’s decision to handle the matter exclusively through the 
Japanese government and to tie it to Japan’s domestic oil policy, which produced an 
enormous distance between the company and policy makers in Manchukuo. The 
relations between the government in Tokyo and the Manchukuo regime were largely 
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directed through the Japanese military and were not as close as Shell had apparently 
thought. In the second place there was Godber’s conviction that Manchukuo was 
bluffing about the introduction of the monopoly, and the Japanese conviction that 
Shell and Standard Oil were bluffing about their intention to leave Manchuria. These 
misjudgements hardened the resolve on either side, making both less eager to come 
to a speedy agreement. And in the third place there was the fact that the monopoly 
became effective at the end of the session of the Japanese Diet when negotiations 
were postponed. This made it impossible for last-minute talks to be organised before 
the imposition of the monopoly. 
Besides the light oil and monopoly issues a third, less dramatic, confrontation 
occurred between Shell and the Manchukuo authorities. The trade in candles was not 
included in the state monopoly, but the creation of the state of Manchukuo meant the 
introduction of a trade barrier between Shell’s candle factory in Shanghai and the 
Manchurian market. Because the new Manchukuo import tax on candles was high, 
the company decided to build a candle factory at its Niuzhuang installation. The 
factory represented a value of 12 million Manchukuo dollars, had a capacity of 75 
tons of candles per month, and was to be operated by thirty-four men. The company 
hurriedly built it in the spring of 1934, hoping to be able to operate it during the 
summer—the production process requiring warm weather. Unfortunately for the oil 
company, by the time the factory was ready, the Manchukuo authorities still had not 
given a permit to operate it. The reason given for this delay was that this was the first 
time that a foreign company had wanted to operate a factory in Manchukuo. 
Furthermore, the Manchukuo government wanted to settle all matters related to the 
monopoly before it decided about the factory permit.  
Talks between government and Shell representatives broke down when the 
Manchukuo government demanded full information about the owners of the new 
factory. The only data supplied by Shell was that the factory was owned by APC 
North China in Shanghai. In fact the factory was operated by APC on behalf of 
Candles, a joint venture between Shell and Unilever. The Shell representative who 
was doing the negotiating thought that the Japanese demand for information was 
‘ridiculous’ and answered that it would take ‘months of correspondence and 
searching old records both locally and in London’ before the information requested 
could be supplied.570 Feeling the pressure to produce sufficient candles before the 
end of summer, the company then decided to operate the factory without a permit.571 
Shell benefited from the fact that its factory was located within its tank installation 
precincts. This made it easier to operate it without consent from the local authorities. 
The situation was helped because there was no law stipulating that a permit was 
actually needed to operate a factory. The British Consul-general at Shenyang 
suspected that Shell had only applied for the permit to obtain the goodwill of the 
authorities.572 In December 1934, when the Manchukuo government informed Shell 
that a permit would not be issued and that no foreign companies were allowed to 
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operate factories, the candle factory was already closed down for the winter.573 The 
atmosphere became better and in February of the next year the Manchukuo 
government stated that it regarded the candle factory to be a subsidiary rather than a 
separate company, and that no permit would be needed.574 This change in policy may 
have been the result of a desire by Manchukuo to limit its international isolation, and 
to give a signal to Shell that it favoured the company’s continued involvement in the 
Manchukuo economy. 
The Japanese invasion of 1931 caused an increase in political risks in Manchuria, 
but at the same time led to less political risks in the parts of China that were under 
control of the Guomindang government. In 1933 Shell noted that, as a result of 
Japan’s aggression in Manchuria, the problems with Guangdong’s provincial import 
tariff would not expand to North China.575 The Japanese threat, felt most directly in 
the North, made the Chinese government less inclined to risk a major conflict with 
the oil companies, which might be exploited by the Japanese army to expand its 
influence in the northern provinces. In North China Japan’s expansion had a distinct 
impact on the oil trade. In 1935-1936 the Western oil concern suffered from the 
effects of the large-scale smuggling of Japanese oil into Shandong and Hebei 
(Hopei).576 According to Shell over 6 million litres of Japanese kerosene and petrol 
were smuggled into North China in the period from early April to mid-September of 
1936, causing Shell to lose part of its market position. While Shell recognised that 
little could be expected from British official support in Manchukuo, with regard to 
the rest of China it was still the policy of Great Britain to defend the Open Door. The 
oil company still considered it worthwhile to send its complaints about Japanese 
smuggling in North China to the British Foreign Office. Losses caused by smuggling 
were so great, Shell reported to the British government, that the future of its North 
China organisation was in grave danger. Its installations and ships would become 
useless, and its staff would be ‘thrown on the streets’.577 In spite of such dramatic 
appeals, the British government had not succeeded in accomplishing a solution when 
in July 1937 Japan invaded North and East China. 
 
1937-1941 
In this period the main political risks to Shell in China were damage from fighting, 
trade restrictions imposed by the Japanese military, the danger of being cut off from 
the part of China that was still under Chinese control, and the possibility of war 
between Japan and either of the two home countries of the oil company, the 
Netherlands and Great Britain.  
 
Damage from the Sino-Japanese War. Shell’s first worry in the summer of 1937 was 
that fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops would induce the foreign 
governments to evacuate the main treaty ports. On 17 August 1937 the Shell 
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Shanghai office believed that the whole British population of the International 
Settlement might have to be evacuated because of the fighting, and feared that this 
would result in the Japanese or the Chinese taking control of the Settlement. The 
Shanghai management claimed that British prestige and trade interests were at stake, 
and asked the directors in London to persuade the British government to defend 
Shanghai rather than evacuate it.578 The directors in London were less alarmed: they 
did not expect that either the major British companies or the British government 
would want a full evacuation of the International Settlement. 579  Indeed, at an 
informal meeting on the same day with Shell and other major British firms in China, 
the British Foreign Office assured that only an evacuation of women and children 
was being contemplated, not a full evacuation.580 
The International Settlement of Shanghai was defended by foreign troops and 
remained under international control. Even so, the war could not entirely be kept out: 
when Chinese planes attempted to bomb Japanese vessels in the harbour they hit 
various parts of the city, including the industrial areas of Yangshupu and Pudong. 
Serious damage was caused to Shell’s Yangshupu depot on the north bank of the 
Huangpu River and its upper wharf across the river in Pudong. 581  Inland from 
Shanghai, the presence of foreign gunboats could not protect foreign trade and 
shipping from war damage. Shell depots and ships were occasionally hit by bombs or 
shells. In the ‘Panay Incident’, in which the Japanese bombed and sank three 
Standard Oil tankers and the American gunboat the ‘Panay’ near Nanjing,582 some 
Shell vessels were also damaged—in spite of their clear display of the Union Jack. 
Shell’s ship the ‘Tien Kwang’ was evacuating 250 staff members and their families 
plus oil stocks from Nanjing when the city was occupied by the Japanese army. On 
11 December 1937 the ship was shelled by Japanese forces, the following day it was 
bombed by Japanese planes. No information on casualties among the refugees is 
available. Another Shell steamer and the accompanying British gunboat the 
‘Ladybird’ were also shelled, the gunboat taking four hits. Several of Shell’s Chinese 
crew members were injured in the incident, the material damage amounted to 
Y9,000.583 The Panay Incident received a blaze of publicity and Japan quickly paid 
for the damage. Still, the Chinese bombing of Shanghai and the Panay Incident had 
again shown how vulnerable Shell’s installations and ships were to war damage.584 
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Japanese Trade Restrictions. But the period following the fighting was even more 
threatening to Shell’s interests: the advancing Japanese military introduced trade 
restrictions in the territory that fell under its control. The Japanese pushed the 
Chinese army back into the interior and occupied the major population areas in the 
lower and middle Yangzi area. With the Japanese soldiers came Japanese firms that 
attempted to expand their trade in China. The Japanese military measure which 
proved most troublesome for Shell was the closure of the Yangzi to foreign shipping. 
For a year, until the middle of 1938, Shell was unable to supply its Yangzi 
installations. As an emergency measure petroleum was sold to Japanese dealers in 
Shanghai, who did have limited and therefore costly access to inland-bound shipping 
space. The company was cut off from its up-country agents and forced to use 
expensive middlemen to reach them. But not all was gloom. The fact that the 
Japanese occasionally needed Shell’s co-operation gave the company hope for a 
better treatment in the future. In July 1938 the Japanese army requested Shell to lease 
its depot at Pukou. Because of the Japanese regulations, Shell’s installations along 
the river were closed. Although the company refused to lease its depot, at the same 
time it was considering means to obtain the co-operation of the Japanese military to 
achieve the resumption of its Yangzi trade. A plan was made to offer petrol at an 
attractive price and to arrange a supply agreement by which the Yangzi installations 
would be reopened and petrol would be transported from Shanghai in Japanese 
tanker ships. Shell was prepared to convert kerosene storage tanks to handle these 
petrol supplies. The outcome of this plan is not known. 
In some places the Japanese also interfered in the local agency businesses. For 
instance, when Zhenjiang was used by the Japanese army as a base for its operations, 
the oil agents were forced to appoint Japanese firms as their representatives.585 The 
entire local oil trade then fell into Japanese hands, although how much petroleum the 
Japanese actually managed to sell to the Chinese consumers remains obscure. 
Sometimes the Chinese agencies were also the target of unofficial Japanese 
initiatives. On 30 July 1939 a Chinese agency in Shandong was attacked by 
demonstrators who looted almost Y16,000 worth of Shell stock. The company sent 
an inspector to investigate the matter. His report claimed that the demonstration was 
instigated by the Japanese consulate using the local ‘farmers revival assembly’, a 
Japanese controlled organisation, as its instrument. 586  The Japanese authorities 
denied any such involvement. 
From the late summer of 1938 transport conditions in East China quickly 
improved. The Japanese reorganised the two major railways running inland from 
Shanghai, leading to Nanjing and Hangzhou respectively. This resulted in an 
increase of freight space being available in Shanghai. Moreover, after the initial 
demand for oil was met its prices fell. This made it unattractive for the Japanese 
dealers to continue their trade. In search for customers, the Japanese shipping firms 
on the Yangzi offered freight space for oil to non-Japanese firms. Shell’s Chinese 
agents, who were able to work with much lower profits than the Japanese could, 
seized this opportunity and by late 1938 almost all major depots in the lower Yangzi 
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area were restocked. From there the agents farther up-country were supplied—the 
Japanese did not interfere. Perhaps the mutual willingness of the Japanese military 
and Shell to do business with each other also contributed to Shell’s success in 
resuming its Yangzi operations. When the Japanese navy wanted to lease a tank 
installation at Hankou that was owned jointly by Standard Oil and Shell, Shell was 
willing to comply.587 To make distribution easier, the company was also gradually 
reopening its depots along the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, one of China’s major north-
south connections. Proving its adaptability, the company removed distribution 
equipment from the more war-torn areas to less affected territories.588 In April 1939 
the company was not dissatisfied with the pace of commercial normalisation in East 
China. In an internal memorandum it was noted that the Japanese treatment of 
Chinese merchants in the lower Yangzi area was getting better, and that Japanese 
traders were unable to compete with their Chinese counterparts. As a result, trade in 
the occupied areas was, after initially having been put under Japanese control, 
gradually returning to Chinese hands. The outlook was that Shell would be able to 
recapture its oil business in the occupied areas: ‘Other than the ban to foreign 
shipping on the Yangtsze and the continued monopolisation of transport facilities by 
Japanese Transportation Companies, trading conditions are tolerable’.589  
Because of the war, the Japanese now needed oil more than ever and had no wish 
to alienate their suppliers.590 The Japanese army consumed great amounts of petrol 
during the war, but most of this was not supplied by the Western oil companies. The 
Japanese army bought its supplies from Japanese oil companies via the Chinese Da 
Hua (Ta Hwa) company. Additional supplies were purchased from Shell, Standard 
Oil, and the Texas Company mainly for three reasons: in order to create emergency 
supplies; to maintain an alternative supply source; and because Japanese petrol was 
of a lower quality. In North China Shell was not pessimistic about its petrol business. 
The Japanese army was expected to buy more Western petrol in the future. All the 
more so because it had developed bus and trucking services in the area under its 
control, which gave consumption a boost. In the regular—non-military—North 
Chinese petrol market Shell still occupied a leading position.591  
Shell sold petrol and other fuel to both the Chinese and the Japanese military as 
long as the British government did not object. 592  During the fighting between 
Chinese and Japanese troops at Shanghai in early February of 1932, China had 
wanted to buy the company’s entire local stock of aviation fuel, but this sale was 
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blocked by the British government, which hoped for a quick settlement between the 
fighting parties. 593  But in July 1937, at the outbreak of the war, no Western 
government intervened when Shell and Standard Oil sold their entire stock at Dalian 
consisting of 3.8 million litres of oil and petrol, plus an additional 5.7 million litres to 
the Japanese army in North China.594 Shell would sell petrol and fuel oil only to the 
Japanese armed forces against sterling credit or against negotiable yen. 595  In 
December 1938 the Japanese army asked Shell for a licence to use the hydrogenation 
process—the rights for its use in Asia were owned by the International 
Hydrogenation Patents Company, a Dutch joint venture of Shell and New Jersey 
Standard. A few years before Shell had been willing to sell this licence to Japan, but 
now the company first went to the British government to ask for advice. The 
Japanese wanted to build a hydrogenation plant in North China, where petrol would 
be made from coal. The licensing procedure was stalled, and in the end Japan never 
obtained the licence.596  
In March 1938 press reports began to appear in Japan about an oil monopoly for 
Japanese-occupied North China.597 On 30 June the Manchuria Oil Company—the 
very monopoly firm that had been the cause of Shell’s withdrawal from Manchuria—
informed Shell, Standard Oil, and the Texas Company that a few days later a 
marketing firm would be formed by the Inner Mongolian (Mengchiang) government, 
which, like the Manchukuo government, had been created and was controlled by the 
Japanese military. The Western firms were asked to participate for Y50,000 each, an 
offer they refused.598 The situation in Inner Mongolia was similar to the Manchukuo 
monopoly case, but led to a different outcome. US, British, and Dutch diplomatic 
protests were made in Tokyo, and Shell declared that the independence of its brands 
and its distribution organisation could not possibly be compromised by any form of 
co-operation. However, in this case Shell also decided not to make any agreement at 
all as long as the war between China and Japan was undecided. 599  Secret talks 
between the company and the Japanese ambassador in (Eastern) China gave Shell 
some assurance that this time the Japanese would take no definite steps before 
negotiations were finished. The company decided that official protests should be 
low-key.600 While Shell’s Shanghai office unsuccessfully tried to establish contact 
with the Inner Mongolian government, the company stopped its trade in that part of 
the country.601  
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At stake for Shell were its interests in that province: £3,914 worth of invested capital, 
29 per cent of the local kerosene market, 27 per cent of the petrol market, and almost 
complete dominance of the market for fuel oil.602 Like Shell, the two US firms also 
refused to co-operate with the monopoly. The only concession Shell was prepared to 
make was to sell oil to the Inner Mongolian Oil Company—but only if payments 
were made in gold currency, which the Japanese were no less short of than the oil 
itself.603 The Japanese military and government, having seen in Manchuria proof that 
the oil companies were very serious about withdrawal if no compromise could be 
arranged, were anxious to see a resumption of the Western oil supplies to Inner 
Mongolia. On 24 September the monopoly and the Inner Mongolian Oil Company 
were abolished, and the Western oil companies resumed distribution activities in 
Inner Mongolia through their agents.604 This was a decisive and quick victory for the 
foreign companies, but not the end of their worries. The Japanese never ceased trying 
to bring the Chinese oil trade under their control. 
In late 1938 the Japanese authorities in other parts of North China were trying to 
pressure the foreign companies to surrender their agency business to Japanese 
trading firms. Shell saw this as the first step towards losing its distribution system, 
and was therefore strongly opposed to any such move. It was afraid that its American 
competitors were less disturbed by the prospect of powerful Japanese partners, such 
as the Mitsui Trading Company, managing distribution in China.605 On 21 November 
representatives of Shell and Standard Oil had lunch with Nomura Shunkichi, a 
leading Japanese oil broker. He declared that Japan was looking for ways to turn its 
expensive war in China into a financially more balanced situation. He proposed that 
Shell and Standard Oil participate in forming a new Chinese oil company, in which 
Japanese and Chinese capital would also be invested. All existing distribution assets 
would be transferred to the new concern, which would also build refineries in China. 
In addition to giving this information, the Japanese oil broker commented that ‘it 
should be very reassuring to traders and investors in general if it can be established 
that the Companies having the greatest stake in China are able to adjust themselves 
satisfactorily to the new conditions’. 606  Apart from pointing out that refining in 
China was uneconomical, the Western oil men refused to comment on the proposal 
and the matter was postponed.  
Although a Japanese-Western joint oil enterprise never materialised, at this time 
Shell’s ideas on the future of Western oil interests in China and those of Standard Oil 
were beginning to draw apart. After the lunch meeting—according to Shell’s 
information—the Standard Oil representative advised his superiors in New York to 
‘study the picture closely and not too long, lest someone else steals the ground-
                                                          
602 Per year in the 1935-1938 period: 1.7 million litres of kerosene, 568 thousand litres of petrol, and 
70,000 litres of fuel oil: Darch (Shell London) to British Petroleum Dept. 31 Aug. 1938, ibid. 22139, 
F9563. 
603 Shell London to Shell Shanghai 31 Aug. 1938, ibid. 22139, F8995. 
604 British consulate-general (Tianjin) to British Foreign Office 19 Nov. 1938, ibid. 22139, F12245. Also 
Anderson, Standard-Vacuum, 113. 
605 British consul-general (Shanghai) to British Foreign Office 9 Nov. 1938, PRO London, FO 371, 
22099, F13328. 
606 Notes on Mr Ely (Shell Japan) and Mr Meyer’s (Stanvac Japan) talk with Messrs Masayuki Tani and 
Shunkichi Nomura on 21 Nov.  1938 at the Tokyo Kaikan, ibid. 23499, F1498.  
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floor’.607 In the opinion of the Standard Oil man, the era of the Open Door in China 
was over. He expected that the US and Britain would not challenge Japan’s military 
power in China, and that Japan would continue to keep the Chinese market open to 
foreign investors. Shell, however, was determined to make only minor concessions to 
the Japanese in order to stay on in the Far East—and was feeling strong enough to 
stand up to Japan. The company was equally convinced that it would succeed in 
preventing Standard Oil from making unfavourable agreements with the Japanese in 
China.608 This indicates that in December 1938 the company was determined to stay 
on in China, confident that it could achieve this on its own terms. Meanwhile, both 
Shell and Standard Oil were losing part of their market shares in occupied China to 
the Texas Company, which apparently had found opportunities to exploit its position 
as the smallest of the three oil giants.609 
 
War with Japan. By this time the possibility of a war between Britain and Japan was 
becoming too blatant to be ignored by Shell. Shell was well aware that in the case of 
a war with Britain or the US—and regardless of whether the Netherlands would 
initially be involved—the Japanese military would very probably attack the 
Netherlands Indies in order to get access to the Sumatra and Borneo oil fields. In 
Manchuria and China the company could distance itself to a certain extent from 
British and Dutch foreign policy, claiming that it was merely interested in commerce. 
But, if Japan were to occupy the Southeast Asia oil fields—which were largely 
owned by Shell and Standard Oil—the company would automatically be involved on 
the Western side of the war. These circumstances forced Shell to consider the 
possibility of war more thoroughly than most other Western business in China. Early 
in 1939 the firm’s Hong Kong office was informed by the British Navy that should 
the Japanese military attack the colony, this attack could lead to a Japanese seizure of 
Shell’s stock around Hong Kong, and in the south coast treaty ports of Guangzhou, 
Shantou, Fuzhou, and Xiamen. Therefore Shell was asked to make preparations for 
the destruction of the stock and the installations. The company replied that in such an 
emergency it preferred to hand over its stock to Standard Oil or the Texas 
Company—should the US remain neutral—in order to save it from destruction or 
seizure, and Shell asked the British government to take responsibility if the company 
were forced to take recourse to destruction.610 Some months later the British navy 
concluded that it was too much to ask of Shell to prepare for the destruction of its 
stock, because almost all coastal installation were in Japanese-occupied ports. The 
Japanese military was likely to detect these preparations, which would then endanger 
the company and its employees.611 The only thing the oil concern could do was keep 
its stock in the Japanese occupied cities limited.612 
Selling oil to the Chinese government became increasingly difficult. One of the 
reasons why Japan continued to expand its military presence in South China was 
precisely so that it could cut off supplies to the Chinese army. When the Japanese 
                                                          
607 Shell Yokohama to Shell Shanghai 26 Nov. 1938, ibid. 23499, F1498. 
608 Shell Shanghai to British commercial councillor (Shanghai) 13 Dec. 1938, ibid. 23499, F1498. 
609 Capital expenditure from Area Management B 5 Oct. 1939, Shell The Haue, SIPM, 8, 1250. 
610 British commodore (Hong Kong) to commander-in-chief British Navy for China 24 Feb. 1939, PRO 
London, FO 371, 23520, F5328. 
611 British Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief British Navy in China 10 Aug. 1939, ibid. 23521, F8802. 
612 Commander-in-chief British Navy in China to British Admiralty 14 Oct. 1939, ibid. 24692, F246. 
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conquered the lower Yangzi valley, an arrangement was made by Shell with the 
Guomindang government that the former would import oil supplies into the 
unoccupied part of the country via Hong Kong.613 But when the Japanese invaded 
also South China and largely cut off the route inland from Hong Kong and other 
ports, Shell sent its oil to Haiphong, in French Indochina, and from there overland to 
Kunming, in Yunnan province. From Kunming the Chinese government took the 
supplies by truck to its war capital Chongqing. In line with its policy since 1907 the 
company wanted to keep as much as possible of the distribution line in its own 
hands, and therefore initiated its own transport service between Kunming and 
Chongqing. By early 1939 Shell operated seventeen trucks on this route, and was in 
the process of buying more transport vehicles. The aim was to supply not only the 
Chinese government, but also the company agencies in West China which were now 
very difficult to reach from the Chinese coast.614 Although Shell could no longer 
bring oil from Shanghai or Hong Kong to unoccupied China, this did not mean that 
no oil reached the Chinese army from the coastal cities. The Japanese were powerless 
to prevent extensive smuggling, and continued to stimulate Shell’s Hong Kong and 
Shanghai sales strongly up to December 1941.615 The Chinese government, while cut 
off from Shanghai, supplied the foreign oil companies with foreign exchange in 
order to maintain oil imports into that city.616 
In August 1939 the company explained to the British government that it feared 
that soon its American competitors would have seized the entire oil trade with 
unoccupied China. As one director pointed out, the Chinese preferred to buy Shell oil 
because it was cheaper, Shell could send supplies from nearby Southeast Asia, and 
Shell had a good distribution system that reached all the way to Chongqing. 
Unfortunately China was short of foreign currency, which it needed to pay Shell. The 
American rivals did not have this problem, since they benefited from the export 
credit scheme set up by the US government. To maintain its position, Shell asked 
Britain to grant an export credit guarantee for British oil supplies to China. The 
British government refused this.617 A month later, in September 1939, the French 
colonial government temporarily closed the Haiphong-Kunming route for oil and 
                                                          
613 Shell Shanghai to Shell London 27 July 1938, ibid. 22138, F8371. 
614 Capital expenditure from Area Management B 6 Feb. 1939, Shell The Hague, SIPM, 8, 1250. 
615  In the summer of 1939, Shell reported it was getting petroleum supplies (‘quite much’) into 
unoccupied China via South Chinese ports: Darch (Shell London) to British Petroleum Dept 14 Aug. 1939, 
PRO London, FO 371, 23414, F9932. Two years later an incident occurred that suggests that the company 
might have sold oil in Shanghai directly to representatives of the Chinese forces, even smuggling it out of 
Shanghai. On 22 July 1941 the company’s motor vessel the ‘Wukiang’ was taking 4,000 tins of kerosene 
from Shanghai to the north bank of the Yangzi delta. The Japanese military seized the vessel, believing that 
the kerosene was to be delivered to the Chinese 4th Route Army, engaged in guerrilla actions in the 
vicinity. The Japanese claimed to have evidence that the goods had already been sold, unlike normal 
agency shipments which remained Shell property until sold by the agent: British Consul-general 
(Shanghai) to British Embassy (Shanghai) 13 Nov. 1941, ibid. 27960, F12882. Certainly Shell must have 
profited from the smuggling. In the first half year of 1941 alone almost 5.7 million litres of petrol and 
aviation fuel were smuggled out of Hong Kong, most of it probably destined for unoccupied China: British 
Foreign Office to British Embassy (Washington DC) 24 Oct. 1941, ibid. 27664, F10812. 
616 In September 1941 the Chinese Stabilisation Board made available US$900,000 to the three oil 
companies for this purpose, indicating that in the future more foreign exchange would follow: British 
Colonial Office to Governor (Hong Kong) 1 Oct. 1941, ibid. 27664, F10309. 
617 Darch (Shell London) to British Petroleum Dept 14 Aug. 1939 and reply 23 Aug. 1939, ibid. 23414, 
F9932. 
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ammunition. Shell moved on to use the next best alternative: the Burma road 
between Rangoon and Yunnan. In November, Shell sent about 4,000 tons of petrol to 
China via Rangoon.618 After the Japanese attacked the Haiphong-Kunming route, 
almost all supplies went by way of the Burma road. In January and February 1940 
Shell and Standard Oil together imported some 255,500 litres of petrol into China via 
Burma.619 
The company did not give up its attempts to get financial backing from the 
British government in order to maintain its position in unoccupied China. Mr Morton 
Smith, who as Shell representative had pleaded with the wife of Chiang Kai-shek for 
the abolishing of the Jiangxi monopoly some five years before, was now employed 
by the Chinese government as advisor to the National Control Commission of Liquid 
Fuels. The British Foreign Office did not doubt that he was still closely connected to 
Shell.620 Morton Smith presented a plan to the Chinese government, under which 
Shell would sell £2.5 million worth of oil in five years under a British export credit 
guarantee. As a result of his action, the Chinese ambassador in London requested the 
British government to grant such a guarantee. Morton Smith himself also went to 
London to approach the Ministry for Economic Warfare on behalf of Chinese 
Finance Minister Kong Xiangxi. But the British government again turned down the 
request for a credit guarantee. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross of the Ministry for Economic 
Warfare, expressed the opinion that China was already getting all the oil it needed 
and that an export credit guarantee would make no impression in Chongqing.621 
This setback was all the more serious since Shell’s future seemed to lie in the 
unoccupied part of China rather than in the part under Japanese control. After the 
outbreak of war in Europe tensions between Japan on the one side and the 
Netherlands, Britain, and the US on the other ran high, and Shell and Standard Oil 
were closely tied to these potential enemies of Japan. The Japanese military wanted 
to decrease its dependence on the Western oil companies, and stepped up its attempts 
to have Japanese firms rather than Western or Chinese ones manage the oil trade in 
the eastern half of China. In Hankou fourteen Japanese companies formed an oil 
guild, which monopolised the local oil market.622 In Guangdong the Western firms 
were forced to obtain special permits from Japanese companies to ship goods inland 
and between treaty ports. To make matters worse, the provincial kerosene and petrol 
taxes were raised.623 In the second part of 1940 the Japanese authorities formulated a 
plan to impose a monopoly, this time for all occupied parts of China. Part of this plan 
was the seizure of the oil stocks of the Western companies.624  
In spite of the company’s complaints about the inability of China to purchase 
Shell oil and the advantage of the two American firms, Shell’s sales via Burma 
                                                          
618 Darch (Shell London) to British Petroleum Dept 26 Oct. 1939, ibid. 23537, F11367. Darch wanted 
official confirmation that the British government was ‘anxious’ for Shell to continue such supplies to 
China via Haiphong and Rangoon. The Foreign Office replied that it had no objection. 
619 British Burma Office to British Foreign Office 16 July 1940, ibid. 24667, F3617. 
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23689, F614. 
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624 British Embassy (Shanghai) to British Foreign Office 11 Aug. 1941, ibid. 27687, F7620. 
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continued. Morton Smith continued his lobbying activities with the British 
government in the summer of 1940, when Britain temporarily closed the Burma road. 
He proposed to the Burma Office that after the reopening of the road, Great Britain 
should send new oil supplies to China. In order to prepare for this, the British 
government should invest £100,000 in enlarging packing facilities in Burma.625 In 
September 1941 Shell came with further proposals: the British government should 
help financing a pipeline from Rangoon to Kunming, and supply Shell with ships and 
other distribution equipment.626 
On the other side of the Burmese-Chinese border similar efforts achieved an 
enormous success in early 1941. Shell, Standard Oil, and the Texas Company made 
an agreement with the Chinese government under which China would build petrol 
stations along the Chinese part of the Burma road, provide 200 trucks for use by the 
companies, and pay the companies for the oil transported by them. The companies 
would supervise the building of the stations, rent them for Y1 per year, transport the 
oil, and set its selling price.627 They had succeeded in acquiring control of the only 
major oil route into unoccupied China, and this time China was paying for the 
installations and the trucks. By September 1941 Shell was sending 14,000 litres of 
petrol and 6-7 thousand litres of aviation fuel per month along the Burma road.628 
In the autumn of 1940 the position of Shell in most of the Far East was becoming 
an inseparable part of Japanese-Western political relations. In September and 
October in Batavia the Japanese government negotiated with Shell, Standard Oil, and 
the Dutch government about Japanese demands for oil concessions in the 
Netherlands Indies and oil supplies to Japan. Concessions were not granted and the 
amount of oil offered for sale to Japan was considered insufficient by the Japanese 
government. 629  When in the summer of the following year the Japanese military 
invaded southern Indochina, the US and the Netherlands imposed an oil embargo on 
Japan: Shell and Standard Oil could not export oil from the US or the Netherlands 
Indies to Japan.630 The Japanese government retaliated by freezing all Chinese assets 
of Shell, Standard Oil, and the Texas Company The Shell stock in Yantai and 
Qingdao was immobilised. 631  This seemed to strike the definite blow to the 
company’s business in occupied China, but then the Japanese North China 
authorities informed Shell that they wished to continue doing business. Furthermore 
the Shanghai office claimed to have discovered that Standard Oil and the Mitsubishi 
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Trading Company had made a secret agreement that would enable the American oil 
company to resume up-country shipments through Mitsubishi. Shell decided to wait 
and resume shipments only between Hong Kong and Shanghai—China’s two main 
trading ports still free from direct Japanese administration.632 The real end came in 
December when Japanese troops attacked and occupied Hong Kong and Shanghai’s 
foreign settlements.633 After 1941 the oil supplies to unoccupied China via Burma 
continued, but this lies beyond the limits of this study.634 Although initially Shell 
tried to remain neutral in the Sino-Japanese war, developments in international 
relations between the West and Japan forced Shell to concentrate increasingly on its 
relations with the Chinese side. By the time the Pacific War erupted, the company 
had succeeded in establishing itself firmly in the only remaining route of supplying 
China, the Burma Road.   
 
Conclusion 
The main Shell local interest in China was to create, maintain and enlarge a 
controllable outlet for the kerosene it produced in the Netherlands Indies and the US. 
After World War I petrol, fuel oil, and lubricating oil also became important products 
to be marketed in China. This aim could be achieved only by building an extensive 
up-country distribution system. Once the initial heavy investments in storage and 
transport facilities were made and agency relations were established, the company 
could not easily withdraw from China.635 The hypothesis about the main political 
risks between the beginning of direct investments in 1906 and the Japanese take-over 
in 1941 is largely correct, but needs some additions. Between 1906 and 1916 
political risks did not play a major role, although the Standard Oil concession 
agreement of 1914 was an important exception. Between 1916 and 1928 the main 
political risks—looting and tax insecurity—related to the civil war and the resulting 
administrative fragmentation. But from 1925 anti-foreign nationalism also emerged 
as an important risk to Shell’s interests. The possibility of Japanese political 
dominance becoming a problem first occurred to Shell in the late 1910s, but did not 
yet produce direct risks. Between 1928 and 1937 most political risks were related to 
Chinese nationalism: the authorities tried to limit foreign influence in China by 
                                                          
632 Shell Shanghai to Shell London (no date), PRO London, FO 371, 27688, F9830; Shell New York to 
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imposing new tax, land, and trade regulations. They were also keen to reduce their 
dependence of foreign oil supplies by creating a Chinese oil producing industry. 
From 1931 there was another alarming political risk, namely Japanese imperialism—
in particular in Manchuria. Indeed, between 1937 and 1941, finally, political risks 
experienced by Shell were caused by Japanese imperialism: mainly war damage, 
trade restrictions, and becoming cut off from the unoccupied part of the country. 
And, as with the Dutch banks and the JCJL, the possibility of a war between Japan 
on the one hand and the Netherlands and Great Britain on the other was also a 
serious risk from the end of the 1930s.  
Shell did not find a permanent solution for risks related to civil war. Up-country 
stock could not easily be withdrawn to keep it safe from plunder, and consequently 
local taxation could not be avoided. Initially the company tried to limit the effects of 
looting—usually of up-country agency depots—by having the Chinese government 
pay for the damage via negotiations between the British legation and the Chinese 
government in Beijing. The company consistently presented itself in China as a 
British firm, and usually did not even bother to approach the Dutch legation for 
support. However, in the second half of the 1920s even the British government was 
unable to press for the payment of agency claims on behalf of Shell, and decided to 
limit its actions to claims on behalf of the company itself. Since the agency stock 
could not be fully covered by agency guarantees, the company just had to accept the 
damage caused by looting. In its battle with irregular local taxation, Shell never 
relied on British government support. The company’s strategy was to try and make 
arrangements with the main local warlord, according to which local taxes were 
replaced as much as possible by a regional or provincial lump sum tax.  
Concerning risks closely related to Chinese nationalism—anti-foreign boycotts, 
and the rise to power of a Guomindang committed to limiting foreign economic 
influence—Shell initially hoped that British military power could be relied upon. In 
1925 the oil company tried to persuade the British government that boycott 
movements and the Guomindang party were under the influence of Soviet agents, 
and could be easily destroyed either by direct military intervention or by supporting 
anti-communist warlords. Unwilling to involve itself, the British government refused 
to take such actions, and by the late 1920s Shell decided to establish closer relations 
with the Guomindang-controlled government in order to benefit from the fact that it 
controlled much of China and needed new sources of revenue. During the first half 
of the 1930s, the relationship between Shell and the Guomindang government 
remained uneasy. As it turned out, the Guomindang found it impossible to exercise 
effective control over many local strongmen and therefore could not deliver the 
nation-wide stability needed by Shell. Moreover, the oil company’s managers 
believed that because of pressure exerted by the more radical nationalist leaders and 
in order to gain influence over the economy, the Guomindang government would not 
respect Shell’s position in China fully, no matter how much the company 
accommodated itself to the government’s needs. Despite such unpromising 
circumstances, aided by its strong market position and China’s troubles with Japan 
from 1931, Shell managed to neutralise nationalism-related risks on a case-by-case 
basis. In general, the company was willing to compromise with Chinese demands as 
long as its main local interest of keeping control of its nation-wide distribution 
system up and running was not endangered. Shell accepted higher taxes and shorter 
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land-leasing terms, but not the imposition of a state distributing monopoly. By 1937 
the Guomindang government held de facto power in most provinces, and its 
relationship with Shell was stabilising. There were no more important conflicts 
between the government and the company. Instead, when the Sino-Japanese War 
broke out, plans were under way for a joint venture for oil production that would be 
50 per cent Chinese, 25 per cent owned by Standard Oil, and 25 per cent owned by 
Shell. After 1937 Chinese nationalism as a risk to foreign oil companies evaporated 
as China needed foreign oil to fight its war with Japan. In 1941 the foreign 
companies entered into a co-operative agreement with China to expand the oil 
importing capacity of the Burma Road.  
Political risks caused by the imposition of Japanese political control on China 
were responded to largely in the same way as Shell had reacted to the rise of the 
Guomindang. Initially, in 1919, the company hoped that British power could contain 
Japanese influence. By the early 1930s, when Japan occupied the three Manchurian 
provinces, it was clear that Great Britain was not going to risk causing a military 
confrontation with Japan in order to protect its business interests. Once the Japanese 
were a major territorial power in China, Shell showed a tendency to accommodate to 
their interests in order to protect its own position. In Manchuria, the firm was 
prepared to co-operate with the imposition of a government-controlled distribution 
monopoly, but because this threatened its main local interest the company needed 
firm guarantees that it would retain control of its agents and brand names. The 
complicated negotiations failed and the Western companies decided to withdraw 
from Manchuria. This was a severe setback for Shell, but did not mean that the 
company lost faith in its ability to co-operate with the Japanese elsewhere in China. 
In the late 1930s Shell was confident that Japan’s need for oil would continue to give 
it sufficient bargaining space to defend its main local interest, although the threat of a 
Japanese distribution monopoly continued to exist. Shell took no measures against 
the possibility of a war between Japan and Great Britain or the Netherlands. It could 
not retreat from occupied China because had it done so, its competitors would take 
over Shell’s position. Its strategy was to stay on as long as possible, and accept the 
financial damage should war break out. 

 CHAPTER 5  
 
HARBOUR CONSTRUCTION: HAVENWERKEN 
 
‘But now our relationship with the banks is 
completely different from what it was before. 
"Our bankers are in the dredging line" [... And 
now they] are major shareholders of the 
Company [...] And this is not all; in principle 
they are prepared to supply the necessary funds 
for, and to make possible, the execution of any 
new project on a sound basis, wherever it may 
be in the world, if it shows good prospects for 
yielding profit.’ 
R.H. van Dorsser  
(Havenwerken Amsterdam)  
to F. Quien (Havenwerken  
Shanghai), July 1912.636 
 
Overall Corporate Interest 
The early history of Havenwerken (‘NV Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor 
Havenwerken’) largely coincides with that of attempts to regenerate the harbour of 
Shanghai. 637  In the early twentieth century, foreign shipping companies were 
extremely dissatisfied with Shanghai’s port facilities. The city could be reached from 
either the sea or the Yangzi River only via the Huangpu (Whangpoo) River, but this 
river was too shallow for large ships. 638  Foreign commercial and consular 
representatives were looking for ways to solve this problem. In 1875 the Shanghai 
Chamber of Commerce and the Shanghai Consular Body invited two Dutch 
hydraulic engineers, G.A. Escher and J. de Rijke, who were working in Japan for the 
Japanese government, to take a look at the problem.639  The two experts went to 
Shanghai and wrote a report on possible ways to improve the Huangpu, but these 
plans were not put to practice, mainly because the Chinese government was not 
prepared to invest much money in promoting international trade. In the early 1880s 
                                                          
636 ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH. 
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they had to make very sharp turn (around ‘Pheasant Point’), immediately after which they had to get across 
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Ingenieur 30 (1915) 1006-1007. 
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Escher and De Rijke were paid 2500 Shanghai taels for their study, and during their stay they met the 
consuls general of the US and Britain, the Dutch honorary consul, the consuls of France, Japan, Germany, 
and Austria-Hungary, the chairman and the secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council, the 
Commissioner of Customs, and the Shanghai Daotai. Diary G.A. Escher 1873-1876, private collection L. 
Blussé. 
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an attempt was made by the Chinese authorities to deepen the river, but this work 
was on such a small scale that it did not make a lasting impact.640  
In the years which followed, several Dutch businessmen became interested in 
exploiting Dutch technical knowledge in the field of coastal and riverine engineering 
to undertake activities in China. After a huge flooding of the Yellow River in 1888, 
Dutch financiers, businessmen and engineers sensed an opportunity for Dutch 
enterprise. They established an association with the aim of acquiring commissions 
for river improvement from the Chinese government—the ‘Vereeniging ter 
Bevordering van de Uitvoering van Werken in het Buitenland door Nederlanders’.641 
Several times Dutch engineers travelled to China to study how the Yellow River 
could be brought under better control.642 However, the Chinese authorities were not 
interested in hiring foreigners to work on the Yellow River, and these initiatives 
failed to bear fruit.643 Nevertheless, the idea that there were opportunities for Dutch 
hydraulic expertise in China was now firmly established in the minds of Dutch 
diplomats and businessmen. 
Meanwhile the Shanghai merchant community had not abandoned its search for 
ways to have the harbour improved. In 1897 De Rijke was asked to write another 
report, which he did the following year. Initially there still was no money available to 
carry out his plans, but in 1900 the Boxer War between China and the foreign 
powers came to the rescue of the harbour improvement scheme. One of the 
stipulations in the 1901 Boxer Protocol was that China would finance the  
improvement of the Huangpu, and subsequently a foreign-controlled river 
conservancy board was formed to initiate and supervise the work.644 Although it took 
some more years of negotiations before a way that was acceptable to the Chinese was 
                                                          
640 F.L. Hawks Pott, A Short History of Shanghai (Shanghai 1928); ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, 
KNMH, p.10. 
641 ‘Association to promote the carrying out of Dutch [public or infrastructure] works abroad’. 
642 The first journey was made by P.G. van Schermbeek (Dutch army officer in Japanese service), A. 
Visser (of contracting firm Volder & Bos), and B.H. Blijdenstein (civil engineer). The second journey was 
made by Schermbeek and Visser. A third journey was made in 1891 by J.W.G. Fijnje van Salverda: ‘In 
Memoriam P.G. van Schermbeek’, De Ingenieur (1902) 384; ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, 
KNMH, p.8.  
643 W.F. Leemans, chairman of the VBUWBN, continued his efforts after the failure of the two missions 
to China. In 1901 he informed the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the union of engineers educated 
in Delft wanted to stimulate the employment of Dutch engineers abroad: W.F. Leemans to Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 18 Mar. 1901, ARA The Hague, BZ, B 222, 4.  
644 Hawks Pott, Shanghai, 156-157. This is based on Article VI of the Boxer Protocol, which is reprinted 
in Van Dongen, Neutraliteit en Imperialisme, 387-392. Improvement of the two main treaty ports—the 
protocol also demanded that the harbour of Tianjin be improved—was not seen as one of the main 
elements of the Boxer Protocol by most of the foreign governments, but was nevertheless of great 
importance. By the beginning of the twentieth century the revenue collected by the Imperial Customs 
Service had become one of the pillars of the foreign position in China. Customs collected most of the 
money in Shanghai, and as long as it continued to do so, foreign interests seemed safe. The Qing 
government continued to be viewed as more or less acceptable to all foreign states (especially since the 
Japanese indemnity loans were repaid, and eventually payment of the Boxer indemnity would also be 
ensured). This was thought to be a precondition of China remaining open to economic exploitation and the 
balance between the various foreign powers staying intact. The foundation on which the Customs Service 
was built, however, was primarily the ability of Shanghai to continue to be one of the largest trading ports 
in the world. As long as there was no structural approach to the deterioration of the Huangpu River, there 
would be no guarantee that the complex system of foreign interests in China, as created between 1842 and 
1901, would continue to exist in the long term. 
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worked out, the ‘Whangpoo Conservancy Board’ could finally get to work in 
1906. 645  China financed these activities and controlled the Board through the 
Shanghai daotai and the commissioner of customs. The Shanghai consular body was 
kept informed of income and expenditure.  
The Conservancy Board had to decide whether to work with De Rijke’s plan of 
1898, or to choose a new one.646 The Dutch minister in Beijing thought that Dutch 
business stood a good chance of acquiring a better position in China, if only De 
Rijke—who had finished his work in Japan—were hired to carry out his design.647 
He was aware that De Rijke knew several contractors in the Netherlands who could 
be brought in to work on project.648 This might add a new dimension to Sino-Dutch 
economic relations. Plans did not run smoothly and some objections were raised: a 
German and an American engineer criticised De Rijke’s plan and together they 
presented an alternative plan, which was supported by Germany.649 Fortunately for 
the Dutch, British firms and officials in Shanghai favoured De Rijke’s approach. 
Dutch observers believed that the political insignificance of their country in Chinese 
matters worked to their advantage.650 In 1906 De Rijke was appointed engineer-in-
chief of the Huangpu improvement works.651  
In the Netherlands, one of the contractors acquainted with De Rijke, S. ten 
Bokkel Huinink, responded to the news of De Rijke’s appointment by forming a 
consortium with two other Dutch contractors with international experience in 
harbour works, J. Korthals Altes and G. van Thiel de Vries. Given the high risks and 
the large expenses involved, it was common for dredging contractors to form 
consortiums in order to obtain large projects. The three directors of this consortium, 
called East Asiatic Dredging Company (EAD),652 travelled all the way to China in 
order to secure the contract for the Huangpu improvement works. In Shanghai they 
could count on the support of E.D. Van Walree of the NHM Shanghai branch and 
                                                          
645 In 1901 the foreign powers were strong enough to force their protocol on China, but if all the 
stipulations were to be carried out Chinese co-operation was indispensable. This gave the Chinese 
government the opportunity to make some modifications, which were added to the Boxer Protocol in a 
1905 agreement with the foreign diplomatic body. 
646 In fact he had made two plans: one was to dig a new link between the Huangpu and the Yangzi, the 
other was to close the eastern passage around Gough Island (the ‘ship channel’) and deepen the western 
passage (the ‘junk channel’). Eventually the Conservancy Board would choose the second option. After the 
work was finished, the junk channel was the only passage left, the name of which was changed to Astraea 
Channel, after the name of the first ship to pass through: Blom, ‘Waterbouwkunde’, 1007. According to a 
Dutch newspaper article, De Rijke actively promoted his plans by visiting Chinese officials. In 1905 he 
was even invited by the Chinese government to present his view on how the Boxer Protocol’s Huangpu 
plans could be realised: ‘Een Merkwaardig Man en een Internationaal Werk’, Algemeen Handelsblad (30 
Nov. 1905). 
647 Dutch Minister to China A.J. van Van Citters (Beijing) to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 17 Dec. 
1904, ARA The Hague, BZ, B 222, 2 waterstaatwerk Wangpoo. 
648 Two of these were the unidentified Van Hattum and S. Ten Bokkel Huinink: Dutch Minister to China 
J. Loudon (Beijing) to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 23 Aug. 1902, ibid. 
649 Their plan was to leave the Huangpu more or less as it was, only deepening the ship channel: Blom, 
‘Waterbouwkunde’, 1007.  
650 Although Dutch political insignificance was a motive for British officials and businessmen to prefer 
Dutch engineers and contractors to those larger countries, being dependent on British support to maintain 
its Southeast Asian possessions meant that the Netherlands apart from being insignificant, was guaranteed 
to be pro-British.  
651 His secretarial staff was supplied by the Maritime Customs: Hawks Pott, Shanghai, 156. 
652 In Dutch the firm was called Ten Bokkel Huinink, Korthals Altes, Van Thiel de Vries & Co. 
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F.B. s’Jacob of the Holland-China Handelscompagnie (HCHC). The latter firm 
agreed to act as guarantor for the Dutch contractor firm, and became EAD’s agent for 
China.653 Van Walree was willing to help EAD finance its activities in Shanghai.654 
There was one final obstacle: apart from the Dutch there was a French, a 
Japanese and a German group trying to win the Huangpu contract, and their tenders 
were all cheaper than that of the EAD. Again political circumstances proved 
decisive. The British government supported the Dutch tender, the Netherlands being 
regarded as the most innocuous of the nations involved. The French were eager to 
keep German influence to a minimum, and since the Dutch were willing to co-
operate with French interests were they to win the contract, France followed the 
British lead.655 With this support, the recommendation of De Rijke, and the help of 
the HCHC and the NHM, in 1907 EAD was appointed by the Conservancy Board to 
carry out the Huangpu improvement works for circa seven million guilders. 
It took a year before all of the required heavy-duty equipment had arrived in 
Shanghai—most pieces had to be towed from Amsterdam via the Suez Canal. The 
smaller and simpler equipment was purchased or constructed in China. To carry out 
the work, EAD sent European personnel to China and eventually appointed F.C. 
Quien, a Dutch merchant in Shanghai, as its chief local manager and 
representative.656 In 1909 the promise made to French interests three years earlier 
was fulfilled: the assets of EAD were transferred to a new company, the ‘NV 
Nederlandsch-Fransche Maatschappij voor Havenwerken’ (NFMH). 657  This new 
company was owned jointly by three companies. Half of the NFMH was owned by a 
French company, SA d’Entreprises et d’Exploitations en Indo-Chine. The other half 
was owned by EAD and a German company, Kölnische Tiefbau. The latter firm in 
turn was owned by S. ten Bokkel Huinink and J. Korthals Altes—who also owned 
EAD—and a German contractor, A. Schumacher.  
Unfortunately for those involved in EAD and the NFMH, the Huangpu project 
did not exactly establish Dutch engineers as the ideal dredging contractors. Trouble 
began as early as 1908, when a European employee was discharged by the company. 
This man subsequently made public that certain persons involved in the project had 
committed large-scale fraud.658 During the official investigation he suddenly fell ill 
and died, which gave rise to rumours that he had been poisoned.659 Although it was 
established later by a consular investigation team that his death had been caused by 
                                                          
653 The EAD was to pay the HCHC 5 per cent of the contract fee: minutes of the meeting of the 
supervisory board of Havenwerken 11 June 1914, HBG Gouda, KNMH. 
654 Together with the Mees & Co. bank in Rotterdam: ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH, 
p.11. 
655 Van de Sande Bakhuysen to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 21 May 1907, ARA The Hague, BZ, B 
222, 4 waterstaatwerk Wangpoo. 
656 Quien was not yet working for the EAD when the work started; he was probably appointed in late 
1908. 
657 The ‘Dutch-French Harbour Works Company’, established 9 June 1909 in Amsterdam. 
658 The persons carrying out the actual dredging would get a bonus if they produced quantities of mud 
over a certain limit. In order to obtain their bonus some of them bribed supervisors who had to report on 
the amount of dredging done, so that the latter would report inflated figures: Van Citters to Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 28 Sept. 1908, ARA The Hague, BZ, 1323, 268; Algemeen Handelsblad (17 Feb. 1909). 
The result of this procedure was that the 2 million taels reserved for dredging actually produced less than 2 
million taels worth of work: Oudendijk to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 16 March 1909, ARA The 
Hague, BZ, 263, 87. 
659 Dutch consul-general (Shanghai) to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 14 Oct. 1908 , ibid. 1856, 151.  
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alcohol abuse rather than poisoning, it turned out that his allegation of fraud was 
true. The company acknowledged that some of its employees had participated in the 
swindle, and had to perform 250,000 cubic yards worth of extra dredging by way of 
fine.660 This represented a severe financial loss for the company, the extra amount 
equalling about ten times as much as a single dredger could dig out in a week.661 
Although formally EAD was reorganised into the NFMH in 1909, it is unlikely that 
the Conservancy Board did not realise that this meant merely a change of name.  
In 1909 it was obvious that De Rijke needed extra money in order to complete the 
project.662 However, instead of releasing extra money for the river improvement, the 
Chinese authorities did not renew De Rijke’s contract in 1910. Probably the Chinese 
had been irked by the discovery of the EAD fraud and De Rijke’s failure to keep to 
his budget—there was not even enough money left for maintenance work.663 When 
the original contract expired in 1910, the NFMH was not given a new contract for 
work on the Huangpu, or anywhere else in China. As a result the dregding materials 
in Shanghai could not be employed. 664  After investing large sums of money in 
acquiring and transporting the equipment to China, the company could not afford to 
leave it unemployed, and in early 1911 the NFMH was dissolved. Half of its assets 
were handed over to SA d’Entreprises, the other half to yet another new firm, ‘NV 
Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van Baggermaterieel’ (MEB). The MEB was established 
by Ten Bokkel Huining and Van Thiel de Vries; Mr Korthals Altes withdrew from 
                                                          
660 Oudendijk to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 16 March 1909, ibid. 263, 87. Some indications 
suggest that the investigation team did not discover the entire magnitude of the deceit: Quien—who was 
not yet working for EAD when the fraud was committed—found out in 1912 that six out of ten of the 
barges used to collect scooped-up mud during 1907-1910 were some 10 per cent smaller than reported to 
the Conservancy Board. Again this means that not all of the dredging paid for was actually dredged. Quien 
advised financial director R.H. Dorsser of the Havenwerken to keep quiet about the matter so as not to let 
the Conservancy Board find out that it had been cheated. Quien did tell engineer-in-chief, H.M. von 
Heidenstam, who promised not to inform the Board: Quien to Dorsser 14 July 1912, HBG Gouda, 
Havenwerken, Geschiedenis, correspondentie 1910-1915. Van Dorsser, whose involvement in the 
Shanghai dredging business dates from 1911, subsequently accused his fellow directors, Ten Bokkel 
Huinink and Van Thiel de Vries, of incompetence at the very least: ‘Some here have already said openly 
that it is inconceivable that the leaders were unaware of such large-scale deceit, and it is impossible to 
predict how the Supervisory Board will respond to this news’: Van Dorsser to Ten Bokkel Huinink 6 Aug. 
1912, HBG Gouda, KNMH. 
661 Estimate based on ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH, p.19b, which indicates that dredging 
crews were expected to dig up at least 22,500 cubic yards and at most 27,500 cubic yards per week. 
662 Dutch consul general (Shanghai) to Dutch legation (Beijing) 4 July 1909, ARA The Hague, BZ, B 
222, 4. So far De Rijke and EAD/NFMH had succeeded in creating the Astraea Channel and eliminating 
the Inner Woosung Bar: Hawks Pott, Shanghai, 157. 
663 Especially because the plans were not completed frequent dredging was necessary to keep the Astraea 
Channel open. The Dutch Minister in Beijing was convinced that the Dutch engineering reputation was 
seriously damaged: Dutch Minister to China F. Beelaerts van Blokland (Beijing) to Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 11 Oct. 1909, ARA The Hague, BZ, B 222, 4. The NFMH and the Dutch Minister were 
convinced that the German government had persuaded the Chinese not to work with the Dutch anymore. 
Beelaerts to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 19 May 1910, ibid. Korthals Altes suggested that the Dutch 
Minister should consult his British and French colleagues about how to overcome German and Chinese 
obstruction: A. Korthals Altes to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 10 Oct. 1909, ibid. 
664 One report by the Dutch Minister in Beijing suggests that there was a plan, backed by the German 
government, for the Huangpu project to be continued by a Chinese contractor, who would in turn 
subcontract the NFMH to do the actual dredging: Beelaerts (Beijing) to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
27 Nov. 1909, ibid. 
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the Chinese dredging business. 665  Since EAD/NFMH had not produced enough 
profits to pay back the banks that had put up the starting capital, the MEB was now 
heavily in debt. 666  On behalf of one of the banks R.H. van Dorsser of the 
Nederlandsch-Indische Escompto Maatschappij became a director of the MEB, 
joining Ten Bokkel Huinink and Van Thiel de Vries. Keeping the equipment at 
Shanghai for the time being, the MEB hoped to acquire new contracts in other 
Chinese ports.  
In 1912, after the new Chinese Republic had been established, the Shanghai 
Conservancy Board borrowed money from Deutsch-Asiatische Bank to continue the 
Huangpu project.667 It was decided that the Board would obtain the money to pay for 
this loan from ‘wharfage dues’, a tax on imported and exported goods.668 A Swedish 
engineer, H.M. von Heidenstam, was hired to supervise the work. In spite of their 
damaged reputation, the Dutch and French successors to EAD/NFMH were still the 
only owners of dredging equipment in Shanghai. They could underbid any 
competitor in terms of time and money, and thereby stood a good chance of getting 
the new Huangpu contract. Because of its huge debts, the MEB was practically 
owned by four banks: the NHM, the NIHB, the Nederlandsch-Indische Escompto 
Maatschappij, and the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein—the last-mentioned 
being a German bank. These banks decided to create a new company to re-unite the 
dredging equipment of the MEB and the SA d’Entreprises. They were willing to 
finance the new company’s start-up, provided that they themselves were in control. 
Alternatively these banks could have decided to try and sell the MEB equipment to 
new Huangpu contractor, but in 1912 the prospects for turning the MEB into a 
profitable enterprise were very good. There were no competitors with dredging 
equipment already in China, there was no doubt that the Conservancy Board in 
Shanghai was able to finance the works, and other treaty ports were also likely to put 
out improvement contracts. In the long run, the banks might use their involvement in 
Chinese harbour contracting to expand into the financing of infrastructural works in 
China. From the beginning the possibility of also becoming active in other parts of 
the world was kept open. The owners of the MEB were also involved in harbour 
construction in the Netherlands Indies, which therefore was regarded by the banks as 
a possible alternative to the Chinese market. 
In the spring of 1912 an agreement was reached between the interested parties: 
the banks were willing to finance the establishment of a new company, which would 
buy the MEB’s Chinese equipment. The banks would be in complete control of the 
                                                          
665 Apparently the bankers and the SA d’Entreprises were not happy with him: unknown writer (possibly 
Van Dorsser) to W.R. Esser (Nederlandsch-Indische Escompto Maatschappij) 6 Apr. 1912, HBG Gouda, 
KNMH, Geschiedenis, correspondentie 1910-1915. 
666 In April 1912 the assets of the MEB—equipment and contracts for works in Java—were valued at 
ƒ2.94 million, while its debts amounted to ƒ2.14 million: MEB to SA d’Entreprises (Paris) 22 April 1912, 
ibid. 
667 From 1912 the Conservancy Board consisted of the commissioner of trade and foreign affairs for 
Jiangsu, the Shanghai commissioner of the Maritime Customs Service (a foreigner in Chinese service), the 
Shanghai harbour master (a foreigner in Chinese service), and three Chinese government officials. Besides 
the Board an advisory committee was created which represented the Shanghai merchants: one Chinese (for 
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce) and five foreigners (for the largest trading countries). The 
Conservancy Board continued to represent the Chinese government. Its authority extended over about a 
50-kilometre stretch of the Huangpu: Hawks Pott, Shanghai, 158. 
668 Later supplemented by the proceeds of the sale of reclaimed land: ibid. 158. 
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company: they formed a syndicate to manage their joint control.669 To make sure that 
the SA d’Entreprises would not bid against the Dutch group to get the new Huangpu 
contract, the new Dutch company also bought the materials owned by the French, 
and offered them limited control and part of the shares. As a result on 1 July 1912 
Havenwerken was established, and subsequently obtained the Shanghai contract at a 
price of £240,000. At the time of its creation Havenwerken was owned by the four 
banks (7.5 per cent each), the SA d’Entreprises et d’Exploitations en Indo-Chine (35 
per cent) and the owners of the MEB (Kölnische Tiefbau and EAD: 35 per cent). In 
1913 another Dutch bank—the Twentsche Bank—stepped in, and about the same 
time Kölnische Tiefbau and EAD sold or traded their shares, probably to the banks. 
There were further changes in later years,670 but the banks continued to hold on to 
the majority of the shares. Their position enabled them to control the annual meeting 
of shareholders, which appointed the supervisory board and the managing board.671 
From 1913 there were eight seats on the supervisory board: one for each of the five 
banks, one for the SA d’Entreprises, and two for technical advisors. 672  Bankers 
dominated the supervisory board, and among them the NHM was the most 
influential. The supervisory board convened at the NHM head office in Amsterdam, 
and from 1923 this bank had two delegates on the supervisory board. The first 
chairman of the supervisory board was A. Muller of the NHM managing board. Like 
one of his successors as NHM delegate, D. Crena de Iongh, as well as the NIHB 
delegate T.J. van Haren Noman, Muller was also on the supervisory board of the 
JCJL.673 
                                                          
669 The function of the syndicate was mainly that the member banks would co-operate with respect to 
their interests in the harbour works company. Although the syndicate was disbanded in 1914, the banks 
continued to exercise their control in the Havenwerken in the same co-operative manner. 
670 Shortly after the establishment of Havenwerken each bank took fifty shares from the other two groups. 
In all there were 1000 shares of ƒ1000 each, which means that until the Twentsche Bank came in in 1913, 
the four banks had 12.5 per cent each, EAD-Kölnische Tiefbau had 25 per cent, and SA d’Entreprises had 
25 per cent: ‘NMH: Geschiedenis, Doel, Organisatie’, HBG Gouda, NMH Geschiedenis, diversen. Within 
a few years Kölnische Tiefbau and EAD had been dissolved; their shares in Havenwerken were probably 
taken by the banks, since these were closely involved with the two contracting firms. In 1923 the owners of 
the Dutch contractor firm Grotius acquired shares in Havenwerken, when it took over their company. 
Around 1930 the SA d’Entreprises and the Nederlandsch-Indische Escompto Maatschappij also disposed 
of their shares.  J. Perchot, representing the SA d‘Entreprises on the supervisory board, resigned in 1928. 
He was succeeded by A. Pirard, who did not represent the SA d’Entreprises, but a Belgian firm: SA 
d’Entreprise Générale de Travaux ‘Engetra’. Pirard left in 1933 and was not succeeded by another 
foreigner. Whether this means that all French and Belgian shares were bought by the banks is obscure. The 
Nederlandsch-Indische Escompto Maatschappij disappeared from the supervisory board in 1932. 
671 This was so right from the beginning: under a special arrangement each bank, the French group, and 
the MEB all had six votes, meaning that together the banks could cast twenty-four out of thirty-six votes at 
the shareholders meeting: Statuten van de NV Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor Havenwerken. 
672 The first members of the supervisory board were Abram Muller (NHM), T.J. van Haren Noman 
(NIHB), W.R. Esser (Nederlandsch-Indische Escompto Maatschappij), W. Farwick (A. 
Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein), L.J. Perchot (SA d’Entreprises), A. Déking Dura (retired civil engineer 
for the Dutch government), and A.G. Lamminga (retired civil engineer for the Netherlands Indies 
government). In 1913 they were joined by G.H. de Marez Oyens for the Twentsche: ‘Havenwerkens 
Stamboom’, ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH, p.17. This situation did not change much in the 
following years: in 1923 a representative from Grotius acquired a seat (occupied until 1933), in 1923 the 
NHM got a second seat (occupied until 1935), in 1928 the SA d’Entreprises et d’Exploitations en Indo-
Chine disappeared from the Board, and in 1932 the Nederlandsch-Indische Escompto Maatschappij gave 
up its seat. 
673 Moreover, Muller and Crena de Iongh would later also be on the supervisory board of the NSC. 
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The managing board of Havenwerken needed approval from the supervisory 
board for every important decision it took, whether this related to the hiring of 
managers or engineers, the signing of contracts, or the company’s finances in 
general. Until 1938 Van Dorsser, formerly with the Nederlandsch-Indische Escompto 
Maatschappij, was financial director.674 He was de facto chairman of the managing 
board, because the other two members were ‘technical directors’ and had less 
influence. In 1912 the posts of technical director were fulfilled by Ten Bokkel 
Huinink and Van Thiel de Vries, but they did not stay very long. By 1916 both had 
left Havenwerken. 675  After their departure and until the 1940s, the functions of 
technical director were assumed by civil engineers who previously had worked for 
the Dutch government.  
Knowledge about the company was concentrated in two places. In the first place 
at the supervisory board. The managing board was unable to play an independent 
role, because it was located in Amsterdam and run by Van Dorsser, a financial man, 
who was not in close touch with the construction sites in China. He did not have any 
significant knowledge advantage over the supervisory board. In the second place 
knowledge was concentrated in the operational staff in China. These consisted of 
engineers with great technical and operational experience. One problem was that for 
each contract a new team of engineers was hired and sent to China for the duration of 
the project—usually a few years. The construction workers were hired locally 
through Chinese sub-contractors, also anew for each project. Apart from a single 
permanent representative, there was no lasting organisation in China. Consequently 
no managerial hierarchy developed there that could challenge the supervisory board 
as the main locus of corporate control. Throughout the 1912-1941 period the 
supervisory board remained firmly under the influence of the major shareholders: the 
five banks.  
In 1912 their choice had been between limiting the damage caused by EAD’s 
mismanagement, or seizing the opportunity to own a harbour construction firm with 
a strong market position that was almost certain of acquiring the new Huangpu 
contract. They chose the latter, accepting that it would be propitious to hold on to 
Havenwerken as long as it continued to be profitable. In a calculated fashion, they 
hoped that their involvement in harbour works in China might eventually enable 
them to expand into financing infrastructure projects. Consequently the main overall 
interest of Havenwerken was to generate a profit for its shareholders by conducting 
harbour works—primarily in China but possibly also elsewhere. 
 
Harbour Works in China 
The Shanghai harbour improvement project, which was completed in 1916, marked 
the beginning of many years of activities in China. Although initially Dutch 
engineers had thought that their expertise would be needed mostly for riverine flood 
control, this proved to be commercially unrewarding.676 Money was available only 
                                                          
674 His successor was J.G. Drabbe, like Van Dorsser a man from the banking world. 
675 It seems unlikely that these two technical directors were left with many shares in Havenwerken after 
their other firms had been dissolved, given the financial state these firms were in: Van Dorsser to Ten 
Bokkel Huinink 6 August 1912, HBG Gouda, KNMH, correspondentie 1909-1914. 
676 In 1913 the company claimed that improving the Yellow River was technically and financially beyond 
its means: minutes of the supervisory board of the Havenwerken 21 Nov. 1913, HBG Gouda, KNMH. 
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for harbour works on the sea coasts of China. The company did not develop any 
large-scale activities in the interior, but did expand from dredging to designing and 
building new harbours. In the 1910s-1930s harbours were built by Havenwerken at 
Yantai (Chefoo; 1915-1921), Macao (1922-1929), Huludao (Hulutao; 1930-1931), 
and Lianyungang (Laoyao; 1933-1937). The contract value of such large-scale works 
could be as high as £1 million. During this period Havenwerken was the only firm in 
China capable of large-scale dredging—an inevitable ingredient of any major 
harbour improvement or construction contract. This meant that there were no direct 
competitors: other firms faced large transport costs to bring dredgers to China. 
Although during most years after 1912 the central government did not have the 
money to commission large infrastructural works, there was a market for 
Havenwerken. 
High up on the list of potential clients were conservancy boards such as that in 
Shanghai. In the early twentieth century these were established in several treaty 
ports, such as Tianjin, Yantai, Niuzhuang,677 and Guangzhou. In 1914 the Chinese 
government also created a National Conservancy Bureau. These conservancy boards 
were usually able to take care of smaller maintenance works themselves, 678  but 
needed a foreign contractor before undertaking any large-scale project. They 
represented local Chinese authorities and merchants in the main treaty ports, and co-
operated with the Maritime Customs Service to finance their harbour improvement 
projects. Other potential clients were foreign and Chinese companies (e.g. shipping 
lines and railway companies), and various Chinese state institutions (e.g. local 
military authorities and local governments). Finally there were the colonial 
governments of Hong Kong and Macao. These potential clients were usually capable 
of financing harbour works by raising local trade duties or the funds generated by 
their own commercial activities. 
Each harbour construction project constituted a huge undertaking that needed 
several years to reach completion. The work at Huludao may serve to illustrate the 
magnitude of Havenwerken’s activities—Yantai, Macao, and Lianyungang were on a 
comparable scale. In order to create a new harbour at Huludao, breakwaters, quay 
walls, and retaining walls had to be erected and millions of cubic yards of sand had 
to be dredged. Apart from the between one and two thousand Chinese workers, there 
were about forty Dutch and other European engineers, accountants, medical staff, 
and mechanics, and about the same number of Chinese engineers, foremen, 
overseers, medical staff, and clerks. At the project site the company built houses for 
staff and their families, and sheds for the workers (accommodating 1800), kitchens, a 
twelve-room office building, a hospital (capacity ten staff plus seventy workers; 
including an operating theatre), a bakery, a laundry, a club, tennis courts, workshops 
(covering 1820 square metres; including a locomotive workshop), storage facilities, 
an electrical power plant, a seven kilometre pipe line (to carry water from a nearby 
river), a small ice plant, a quarry, rail tracks (including a forty-five metre bridge 
                                                          
677 The Niuzhuang board was called Liao Conservancy Board: Blom, ‘Waterbouwkunde’, 1005. 
678 The Conservancy Board of Shanghai seems to have had the means to dredger some one million cubic 
yards of mud every year to keep the Huangpu open for navigation: Hawks Pott, Shanghai, 159. 
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across a chasm), and a concrete production plant. For the actual harbour construction 
it used a Titan crane, a floating crane, and several dredgers.679  
Havenwerken’s market position benefited from the fact that a large number of 
Dutch engineers was working for local or national authorities in China. This practice 
was stimulated by the Dutch government and societies of engineers in the 
Netherlands. De Rijke’s example was followed by many Dutch colleagues, such as 
J.C. Vliegenthart (1909-1913 engineer-in-chief for the Conservancy Board of 
Tianjin),680 H. van der Veen (from 1914 chief consulting engineer for the National 
Conservancy Bureau), F.J. Blom (from 1915 consulting engineer for National 
Conservancy Board), P.J. Ott de Vries (in the 1920s member of the International 
Committee of Engineers, Shanghai), F.J.M. Bourdrez (1932-1939 League of Nations 
engineer in service of the National Conservancy Bureau),681 N.A. van den Heuvel 
(from 1935 head of the Institute for Marine Engineering, Nanjing), and Professor W. 
Schermerhorn (1936 consultant to the National Conservancy Board). From 1920 to 
1928 the advisory committee of the Conservancy Board of Shanghai had one 
Dutch member. 682  Finally, there were also Dutchmen working as officials in the 
Maritime Customs Service. The work of these men enhanced the reputation of Dutch 
hydraulic engineering, which boosted that of the Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor 
Havenwerken. But even with a monopoly position and a good reputation—the 1908 
incident appears to have been forgotten quickly after 1912—performing large-scale 
construction works in China remained a very challenging business. Apart from the 
political risks to be discussed later, the ‘normal’ business risks in China were 
considerable and should be taken into account in order to understand the nature of 
Havenwerken’s involvement in China. The main business risks related to the 
purchasing of expensive equipment, the reliability of personnel, the reliability of 
client payments, natural disasters, and the continuity in the demand.  
The first main business risk related to investments in materials. Decisions about 
when to purchase new dredgers and about their technical characteristics were of vital 
importance. Commissioning the building of new dredgers in the Netherlands and 
then bringing them to China was a very expensive undertaking, but was sometimes 
necessary in order to complete the work in time. There were many different types of 
dredgers; it depended on the circumstances and conditions which type was the most 
efficient. In 1937 the company had a fleet of twenty-four large vessels for dredging 
(including tugboats) and twenty-seven supporting vessels in China.683 The costs of 
new dredgers could be only partially recovered by one particular contract; if the right 
equipment was purchased it could be re-used for several further contracts. But it took 
many years of building up experience in China for Havenwerken to find out which 
types of equipment were most cost effective in the long run. In 1937 an internal 
                                                          
679 G.A. van Steenbergen and H. Volker, De Uitvoering van de Havenwerken te Hulutao (Noord China), 
(n.p. 1933). 
680 Although Havenwerken did not work at Tianjin, the involvement of Vliegenthart did lead to the 
purchase of Dutch dredging equipment: Blom, ‘Waterbouwkunde’, 1000-1010. 
681  In 1939 Bourdrez drowned while exploring the upper reaches of the Yangzi for the Chinese 
government in Chongqing: 'In Memoriam Ir F.J.M. Bourdrez, 1901-1939', China 13 (Dec. 1939), 365-371. 
682 Membership was allowed to the five nationalities with the highest annual tonnage of ships visiting 
Shanghai plus a representative from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. 
683 ‘Beschouwingen over NMvH Materiaal’ in: ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH, appendix 
to p.196. 
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report noted that expensive special features designed for several dredgers in China 
had never been put to use.684  
The second business risk, reliability of personnel, was also a difficult issue for 
Havenwerken, which did not work with a permanent managerial hierarchy in China. 
The scandal of 1908 had shown how much damage unsupervised behaviour by 
employees could cause. Apart from employees abusing their position, there were also 
the risks of financial and operational inefficiency, and of not meeting minimum 
quality standards. The head office in the Netherlands could monitor the engineers in 
China only to a limited extent. In 1912 Van Dorsser was assisted only by the 
technical directors and an administrative staff of two or three. During the 1920s the 
number of secretaries, accountants and the like probably still did not exceed a 
dozen.685 Havenwerken’s main presence in China was wherever it happened to be 
carrying out its contracting work. Local management was directed by two persons, a 
financial and a technical director. They were not allowed to make strategic decisions 
and were expected to report directly to Van Dorsser. Engineers were usually hired in 
Europe on a contract for a few years and then sent to China, but lower-ranking staff 
members—both Chinese and European—were often contracted in China. Some of 
the Chinese employees moved along with the company to the next project elsewhere 
in China after their contract had expired and the work was finished. The main body 
of workers—the coolies—was not employed directly by the company. They were 
recruited and supervised by Chinese foremen. These Chinese subcontractors were 
indispensable to the supply of labour and all sorts of supplies; they functioned in a 
way similar to the compradores in the traditional treaty port trade. The restrictions 
put on the decision-making capacity of local management helped Van Dorsser to 
exercise control from Amsterdam, but limited operational efficiency. The site 
engineers frequently complained that Amsterdam was overly cautious and was 
imposing too many restrictions.686 
The third type of risk, that relating to contract payment, was larger in China than 
in many other countries. Because the Chinese currency was silver-based, it was 
difficult to predict how much a contract in taels or yuan would be worth in guilders 
by the time actual payments were made. Whether the client paid the full amount and 
on time depended partly on the political situation, which was always uncertain in 
China. But this aspect was less of a risk if Western influence was directly involved. 
The Hong Kong and Macao governments were considered trustworthy, as was the 
Chinese Maritime Customs Service. If Customs guaranteed payment, the contract 
was considered sufficiently secure. Havenwerken preferred working for Western 
governments and companies, or for those Chinese authorities that were backed by the 
Customs Service. At Huludao, where Havenwerken worked for the Chinese 
Northeastern government of Zhang Xueliang—formally subordinate to the 
Guomindang government in Nanjing—the company demanded to be paid in a certain 
number of instalments and based on a gold standard instead of the silver equivalent. 
This solution caused bad feelings: the Chinese authorities disliked this demand and 
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686 Dankers, interview with  J.G. Drabbe Hilversum 18 April 1985, private collection F. Dankers. 
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refused to co-operate in some respects.687 For banking services Havenwerken used 
the NHM and the NIHM wherever possible; in other cases the HSBC—the bank with 
the most extensive branch network—was employed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Havenwerken engineers and two of their wives standing on a floating caisson, which 
lies alongside a dredger, Yantai, 29 March 1929 (reproduced by kind permission of 
HBG)    
 
Natural disasters posed a fourth important business risk. In August 1917 the Yantai 
works were hit by a heavy storm, which destroyed much of what had already been 
achieved. As a result Havenwerken was not able to complete the contract in time. 
The company appealed to the client, the Harbour Improvement Commission of 
Yantai, for more time and money. Although it took considerable negotiation, the 
Commission did grant the company one and a half year extra time plus ƒ250,000.688 
Later, during the 1920s at Macao, a typhoon caused very serious damage to the 
construction works. In this case the negotiations with the Macao government 
concerning financial compensation went on until after completion of the harbour. 
The final outcome appears to have been lost.689  
The first four types of business risks were a threat to individual projects rather 
than to the company itself. The potential discontinuity in the demand for harbour 
works in China constituted a more fundamental problem for the directors. The 
building costs of a single dredger could be up to ƒ700.000, with the depreciation
                                                          
687  Minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of Havenwerken 18 June 1931, HBG Gouda, 
KNMH. 
688 Minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of Havenwerken 26 June 1918, ibid. 
689 ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, ibid. 108. 
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Construction of a breakwater, Yantai, circa 1920 (reproduced by kind permission of 
HBG) 
 
value annually being as much as to ƒ25.000. 690  Consequently, the company’s 
physical assets depreciated heavily each year, which had to be compensated for by 
reserving a large part of the profit. There had to be a new contract by the time the 
current works were nearing completion, in order not to have expensive equipment 
age without being put to productive use. To address his problem, the company tried 
to broaden its activities by diversifying from dredging into construction and design. 
In 1913, when a Harbour Improvement Commission was formed in Yantai, 
Havenwerken offered to make a feasibility study of possible measures to improve the 
city’s harbour.691 When the Commission accepted, Havenwerken turned for support 
to the Dutch government. At this time Havenwerken had no experience with 
designing: De Rijke had worked as an independent advisor. The Dutch government 
agreed to assist the company by lending it a civil engineer. This specialist, O.C.A. 
van Lidth de Jeude, was sent to China to make a study of the Yantai harbour and 
subsequently designed a plan for its improvement. The Yantai Harbour Improvement 
Commission was pleased with his plan and made arrangements with the Chinese 
government and the diplomatic corps to finance them. Van Lidth de Jeude was 
appointed chief engineer, and Havenwerken was contracted to build the new harbour 
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in 1915.692 Thus by the time the work at Shanghai came to an end, the company 
could move on to Yantai immediately.693 Havenwerken continued its studying and 
designing activities elsewhere in China in order to enlarge its capacity to win new 
construction contracts. 
Another measure taken to achieve this aim was to set up a representative office 
with the specific purpose of promoting it with official institutions in China. 694  
During its first few years, Havenwerken employed Quien, who had also worked for 
the EAD and who had been working for foreign companies in Shanghai ever since 
the 1890s. His knowledge of local conditions in Shanghai was a useful asset when 
Havenwerken tendered for the second Huangpu contract in 1912. But soon the 
supervisory board and managing director Van Dorsser found out that working with a 
person like Quien with much local experience and no close relation with the people 
running the enterprise from the Netherlands also had its drawbacks. They considered 
the wage demanded by Quien excessive and were unhappy about his attitude towards 
them. Van Dorsser informed Quien that:  
 
‘[...] the Supervisory Board consists of 7 members, each of them has a strong 
personality and his own way of viewing things; no tricks can be played on 
these people, in the way this was possible with the previous management [i.e., 
that of EAD/NFMH]. It can be observed from your letters that you consider 
the Gentlemen here to be fools, to whom every bit of information has to be 
repeated over and over again before they even begin to comprehend it. It is 
natural that you are much better informed of the situation in Shanghai, and 
that you should instruct and advise us; but take my advice and change the tone 
that you have used in some of your letters [...]’695 
 
When the work in Shanghai was finished, Quien did not stay with the firm. Instead, 
Havenwerken set up a small representative office in Beijing in 1916, which some 
years later was reorganised into a separate company, the Nederlandsch Syndicaat 
voor China (NSC). The NSC was to represent not only Havenwerken, but also a wide 
range of Dutch banks and industrial firms. Some forty Dutch firms participated 
financially in the NSC.696 The fortunes of this enterprise are described in the next 
chapter. The more traditional and cheaper agency system continued to be used in 
some places with the same aim of ensuring official representation. In Shanghai the 
company was represented by the HCHC,697 during the 1930s by Chinese merchants 
                                                          
692 The German firm H. Diedrichsen & Co. represented Havenwerken in return for 2.5 per cent of the 
contracting fee: minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of Havenwerken 16 Feb. 1914, HBG 
Gouda, KNMH. 
693 After Yantai Van Lidth de Jeude stayed with the company for many years, from 1919 as a technical 
director. He left only when he became a member of the Dutch cabinet in 1935, but in 1937 he joined the 
supervisory board. 
694 According to J.C. Drabbe, who first worked for the NSC and later as director for Havenwerken, 
relations with Chinese officials were not based on bribes. These were avoided, not so much on moral 
grounds, but because the frequent changes in office made them ineffective: Dankers, interview with 
Drabbe. 
695 Dorsser to Quien July 1912, ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH. 
696 Minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of Havenwerken 5 June 1919, HBG Gouda, KNMH. 
697 When the local office for China was moved to Shanghai in 1936, it was decided to end the HCHC’s 
agency contract: ‘Organisatie en Voorwaarden van de Vertegenwoordiging in China der NMVH’, HBG 
Gouda, Havenwerken, diverse stukken etc. 
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in Nanjing and Guangzhou as well. The person appointed to run the NSC was Robert 
De Vos. This Belgian gentleman possessed very valuable talents for negotiating with 
the Chinese central authorities. To build and maintain a social network among 
influential Chinese, he espoused the grand and expensive life style common to 
Western diplomats in Beijing.698 Although Dutch businessmen sometimes found it 
difficult to appreciate such behaviour, it was generally effective. Unfortunately De 
Vos usually had to carry out his work alone. The supervisory board regarded him in 
some respects as it had done Quien: a well-informed individual who at times acted 
too independently. Because of the head office’s reluctance to delegate influence to 
the NSC, the latter’s ability to generate a larger demand in China for the resources of 
Havenwerken remained limited. 
Until the mid-1930s Havenwerken succeeded in acquiring sufficient contracts to 
keep most of its equipment employed in China. However, from the mid-1920s when 
China became highly unstable politically, the aim of profitability could no longer be 
achieved. The company tried to decrease the importance of the Chinese market by 
becoming active in other countries, at first in the Netherlands Indies and later also in 
Iran and in Southern Europe. Nevertheless, until World War II China remained its 
main market. Problems in this market were the main cause of the virtual end to 
profitability after 1923. From 1912 to 1923, dividends were paid each year, with an 
average of 9 per cent of the shares’ nominal value. But in 1924, when the situation in 
China was seriously deteriorating, for the first time the supervisory board decided to 
keep all profits in the company. Except for 1925 (4 per cent), 1933 (3 per cent), and 
1934 (3 per cent), no more dividends were paid before the Second World War. 
Therefore it can be said that the main local interest in China at first was to maximise 
profits, but that this changed during the 1920s because of the worsening of market 
conditions in China. After the mid-1920s the company’s main interest in China was 
to scale down its operations gradually enough to avoid too much financial damage, in 
order to spread its presence over a greater number of countries. 
 
Political Risks and Response 
 
1916-1928 
During the first decade of its existence, Havenwerken did not experience any 
important political risks at the two locations in China where it was active, Shanghai 
and Yantai. The Second Zhili-Fengtian War of 1924—the largest of the civil wars of 
the early 1920s—was the first major political threat to Havenwerken’s interests.699 
The Zhili-coalition, led by Wu Peifu and the Fengtian-coalition under Zhang Zuolin, 
waged war on each other in an attempt to gain control over northern China and the 
capital, Beijing. After Zhang, whose power base was in Manchuria, defeated his 
Zhili armies, Wu was forced to retreat to Central China. It was just at this time that 
Havenwerken expected a contract for a new seaport in Haizhou Bay, roughly in the 
middle of the coastal shipping route between Shanghai and Qingdao. This new 
harbour was to form the eastern terminus of the Longhai railway, which then was 
only partly completed. The defeat of Wu Peifu, who until the war had controlled the 
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area in which the Longhai railway was being built, caused a power vacuum in this 
part of the country. The railway became a prize in the contest between various 
armies, which expeditiously used the finished stretches to move troops and supplies. 
In 1926-1927 the Guomindang’s military advance from South to North China caused 
even more chaos in the provinces through which Longhai ran. Under these 
circumstances the Longhai Railway Administration was unable to finance the 
building of a new harbour, and the plans for the harbour were cancelled. This was a 
serious disappointment for the Dutch firm, and showed that civil warfare in China 
could affect all economic development plans outside the treaty ports.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Havenwerken engineers and Chinese coolies, Hong Kong, 1920s (reproduced by 
kind permission of HBG) 
 
In 1925 foreign companies were shocked to discover that even in the main treaty 
ports they were not safe when, in June, the great anti-British boycott erupted in the 
southern seaports. Hong Kong was hit very hard by strikes among Chinese harbour 
workers. At this time Havenwerken was engaged in expanding Hong Kong harbour 
by constructing a new quay wall. 700  The company was able to continue its 
construction works, because most of its Chinese workers were from North China, 
and had no direct connections with the organisers of the strikes. 701  Although 
                                                          
700 Worth £190.000. Quay walls were also called ‘bund’ walls in China. In 1922 Havenwerken made an 
agreement with Kwik Djoen Eng, owner of a major sugar concern in the Netherlands Indies, who wanted 
to invest part of his earnings in China. On his behalf Havenwerken made a study of existing plans for the 
North Point reclamation works at Hong Kong. In 1924 this resulted in contract with the Hong Kong Public 
Works Department for land reclamation plus the construction of a quay wall, financed by Kwik Djoen Eng. 
The work was completed in 1927. 
701 Minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of Havenwerken 16 July 1926, HBG Gouda, KNMH. 
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Havenwerken did not suffer direct damage during the 1920s, the number and 
importantly the size of political risks was growing. There was no particular place in 
China where Havenwerken was guaranteed safe from these risks. This was worrying 
for a company that could not easily withdraw once it had signed a contract and 
stationed its personnel and dredgers at the building site. As stated earlier, in the mid-
1920s the firm’s leaders responded to the worsening prospects on the Chinese market 
by not remitting dividends to the parent firms. Given that Havenwerken’s main 
interest was to remit profits to its owners, this shows that the supervisory board took 
the situation in China very seriously. Rather than risking losing a company with 
valuable assets that had proven to be very successful during the period 1912-1923, 
the supervisory board—i.e., the banks—preferred to sacrifice dividends. The board 
thought it wise to have extra money on hand to adjust the company’s strategy as it 
was needed. In 1923 Grotius, a Dutch contracting firm active in the Netherlands 
Indies, was purchased. This marked the beginning of a policy to spread 
Havenwerken’s activities to other parts of the world. During the early 1920s, the 
company had already been active in the Netherlands Indies and French Marocco,702 
but in 1927 for the first time it engaged in a major harbour construction work outside 
China when it signed a contract in the Canary Islands.  
 
1928-1937 
Despite casting its net wider, the company did not withdraw from China either. 
Besides the work in Hong Kong, the company was also engaged in a large project in 
Macao. There Havenwerken had been contracted by the Portuguese colonial 
authorities to construct a completely new ‘outer harbour’ east of the city, which was 
to replace the old ‘inner harbour’ to the west.703 When the work in Hong Kong and 
Macao was completed successfully at the end of the 1920s, Havenwerken signed new 
contracts for further projects in China. In 1928 the Dutch firm made an agreement 
with the Hong Kong Public Works Department for the reclamation of land, which 
would enable the extension of Kai Tak Airport.704 It was about this time that the 
company asked the Dutch government for active support for its position in China. 
                                                          
702 During 1920-1923 the company built a railway in Sumatra for the Netherlands Indies State Railways, 
and warehouses in Batavia for the JCJL. In 1921 Havenwerken obtained a contract via Perchot to 
undertake projects in Mazagan and Mogador, Marocco. 
703 Representing almost £1 million; financially this was the company’s largest contract in China. In 1922 
the Macao colonial administration gave the contract for the construction of a new harbour to Havenwerken, 
after the preliminary studies had been made by Portuguese engineers. The aim of the Macao administration 
was to make Macao less dependent on the opium trade and gambling as revenue sources: R. Wank-Nolasco 
Lamas, History of Macau: A Student's Manual (Macao 1998), 190-111. Since the company now worked 
simultaneously on two large projects, new materials had to be purchased in the Netherlands. To finance 
this Havenwerken formed for the Macao project a syndicate with three Belgian firms: SA d’Entreprise 
Générale de Travaux, Société Coloniale de Construction, and SA Ougré Marihaye. The Belgian 
contribution consisted of money; a Belgian financial representative was present in Macao: ‘Geschiedenis 
KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH, pp.62-90. Work continued until 1929, by which time a large area of land 
had been reclaimed and the new Outer Harbour had been completed to replace the old Inner Harbour. 
Nevertheless, in shipping circles it was believed that no matter how much money Macao invested in its 
port facilities, its backwardness and corrupt government would keep it from ever seriously threatening the 
port of Hong Kong: Annual report 1922, Nedlloyd Utrecht, KJCPL, 233 verslagen hoofdagent 1903-1923 
en 1925.  
704  Worth ƒ875,000: Havenwerken won the contract in 1928. ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, 
KNMH, p.108. 
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Following the example of the other foreign powers, in the mid-1920s the government 
of the Netherlands decided to decline to accept further payments of the Boxer 
Indemnity. Ever since 1902 China had been paying the indemnity for the Boxer War 
to the foreign powers in regular instalments. However, by the 1920s most of these 
had come to regard the indemnity as a useful tool to further their national interests in 
China.705 Instead of channelling the money into their national treasuries, the foreign 
powers decided to invest the remaining instalments in educational or economic 
projects that in varying degrees were supportive to China’s development. Not only 
was it hoped that this would enhance the foreigners’ image in Chinese public 
opinion, but it would also strengthen each power’s influence in China. Educational 
projects produced closer ties with future political or business leaders, 706  while 
economic projects created new investment opportunities. 
Havenwerken had the latter aim in mind in 1928 when it contacted the Dutch 
government, which was in the process of finding a suitable new destination for the 
Boxer Indemnity. The company pointed out that the Belgian government had 
arranged that 40 per cent of the Belgian Boxer money would be used by the Longhai 
Railway to order material from Belgian firms.707 Therefore Havenwerken suggested 
that the Dutch portion of the Boxer money would be used to revive the Longhai 
harbour project.708 Moreover, via the NSC the company also proposed that part of 
the money would be used to make a feasibility study of possible ways to prevent the 
Yellow River from flooding. In 1933 the government of the Netherlands decided that 
the Dutch indemnity share—i.e., everything paid since 1926 and still payable until 
1945—would be given to Chinese custody. In return China agreed to use about a 
third of the money for cultural aims and the rest for water works, for which a Dutch 
engineer was to be employed by the Chinese government. 709  This increased 
Havenwerken’s chances of obtaining new assignments. 710  In this way the Dutch 
government used its share of the indemnity to support Havenwerken, albeit 
somewhat less directly than the company would have wished. 711  While this 
arrangement was in the pipeline, at the close of the 1920s, Havenwerken was 
temporarily without work in China. Despite this setback, the supervisory board 
continued to regard China as the firm’s primary market. All materials in China were 
kept there.712 China was being reunified under the Guomindang and it was believed 
by many foreigners that the political turmoil of the 1920s would end in the new 
                                                          
705 Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia relinquished their indemnity shares after the First World War. 
This did not mean that the Customs Service and the Shanghai bankers stopped collecting the shares 
originally destined for these three countries. The Chinese government was allowed to ask the diplomatic 
corps to use it as a guarantee for new foreign loans: Van der Putten, ‘Bokserindemniteit’, 42. 
706 The US government had followed this policy since as early as 1908. The Japanese did the same, but 
also used the money to train Japanese China-experts. 
707 Oudendijk to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 7 Nov. 1928, Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Hague, 
Beijing IV, M 14, 183. 
708 Minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of Havenwerken 1 March 1933, HBG Gouda, 
KNMH. 
709 Van der Putten, ‘Bokserindemniteit’, 40. 
710 Ibid. 41. 
711 This arrangement attracted the attention of other Dutch maritime construction contractors. In 1933 the 
Hollandsche Aanneming Maatschappij wanted to obtain a contract in Canton: ARA The Hague, BZ, DEZ 
III, 102 haven Canton. Presumably this attempt failed. 
712  Minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of Havenwerken 14 Dec. 1928, HBG Gouda, 
KNMH. 
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decade. Havenwerken expected to secure new contracts before too long, which 
indeed it did. The Dutch company was assigned the task of building a completely 
new seaport at Huludao, southern Manchuria.  
In 1930 the Manchurian government of Zhang Xueliang,713 which was allied to 
the Guomindang government in Nanjing, was looking for a way to divert the trade in 
Manchurian products away from Dalian (Dairen, Dalny), the main seaport of 
Manchuria. The part of south Manchuria where Dalian lay, the Liaodong peninsula, 
was controlled by the Japanese army, and the dominant economic power here was the 
Japanese South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR). The other Manchurian 
seaports were not ideal for the development of Chinese-controlled trade: Dandong 
(Antung) and Niuzhuang were too near to Japanese controlled areas and could be 
easily blockaded. In order to contain Japanese influence in Manchuria, Zhang 
Xueliang revived an old plan to build an entirely new harbour at Huludao on the 
western shore of the Gulf of Liaodong, north of Qinhuangdao and the Great Wall.714 
Profiting from his good relations with Zhang, De Vos of the NSC acquired the 
contract for Havenwerken, and the company immediately commenced its building 
activities—not aware that it was becoming enmeshed in a sensitive aspect of Sino-
Japanese relations.  
Zhang’s plan was to link the new port with the Chinese-owned Beijing-Shenyang 
railway, which would then become a serious competitor for the SMR. 715  To 
underline this intention, new Chinese-owned railways were being built from 
Shenyang deeper into Manchuria, while others were planned to link the Beijing-
Shenyang line with Rehe and Inner Mongolia. 716  Japan protested against this 
development, claiming that the building of Huludao harbour was in conflict with 
agreements made in 1905 when the SMR was transferred to Japanese ownership as 
part of the agreement to end the Russo-Japanese War. In the eyes of the Japanese the 
building of Huludao was a severe provocation, because it undermined the economic 
and strategic position they had been cultivating in Manchuria since 1905. This 
formed an important part of the background of the Mukden Incident of September 
1931, when junior Japanese army officers staged a coup against their military and 
political superiors. They managed to set off a Japanese invasion that led to the 
occupation of all of Manchuria, including Huludao. Havenwerken’s activities there 
cam
claimed to be entitled. In April 1932 the company asked the Dutch foreign ministry 
                                                          
e to an abrupt end.  
The company was taken by surprise and once the invasion came, was unable to 
do anything but try to minimise the financial damage. At the time it had received 
only 400,000 yuan for the work, and no further payments were to be expected from 
China.717 Therefore Havenwerken wanted Japan to pay the Y2.5 million to which it 
713 He was the son of and successor to Zhang Zuolin, the leading warlord in Manchuria and North China. 
Zhang Zuolin was murdered in 1928 by members of the Japanese military. 
714 In 1910-1911 the British engineer Hughes of the Liao Conservancy Board led a project to build the 
Huludao harbour. Because of lack of finances, the work was abandoned at a very early stage: Blom, 
‘Waterbouwkunde’, 1005. 
715 According to W.G. Beasley, the SMR was hit harder by the decrease in soya bean prices on the world 
market than its Chinese competitors, because Chinese currency was silver-based: W.G. Beasley, Japanese 
Imperialism, 1894-1945, (Oxford  1987), 191. 
716 Van Steenbergen and Volker, Hulutao. 
717 Note 11 Oct. 1932, ARA The Hague, BZ, DEZ III, 102, havenaanleg Hulutao. 
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to protest about the damage in Manchukuo and Tokyo. 718  While Dutch 
representatives negotiated with the authorities in Japan, De Vos also did what he 
could. In November of 1932 he met the managing director of the Shenyang-
Shanhaiguan line, who represented the Japanese side. The Japanese agreed to pay Y1 
million and let Havenwerken take its materials away from Huludao.719 Again De Vos 
had proved of immense value to the company. The Dutch minister in Beijing was 
amazed by this achievement; his colleague in Tokyo was annoyed that he was 
informed only afterwards, by the Japanese government.720  
In spite of the negotiating success of De Vos, the events in Manchuria were a 
financial setback and a sign that Japan had become a new source of political risks. 
The Manchukuo market had been lost, since the Japanese had their own contractors 
and equipment.721 Moreover, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria also affected the 
market in North China. There Japanese influence was so strong that the Chinese 
government was not interested in investing any money in new public works. During 
the early and mid-1930s Havenwerken finished a large number of medium-size 
projects in Central and South China.722 Apart from various assignments which came 
its way from the Hong Kong Public Works Department,723 the company took on 
works for the Chinese Public Works Department at Guangzhou (construction of a 
quay wall for ƒ350,000, 1930-1931), the Chinese Naval Headquarters at Xiamen 
(construction of a quay wall, 1931-1934), the Zhongshan district government in 
Guangdong province (design for a new harbour, 1931), W.S. Bailey & Co. at Hong 
Kong (shipyard extension for ƒ200,000, 1932-1934), Butterfield & Swire at Xiamen 
(construction of a warehouse for China Navigation Company for ƒ200,000, 1933-
1934), the Gulangyu Municipal Council at Xiamen (construction of a jetty, 1934), 
Shell in Hong Kong (construction of mooring buoys for the Asiatic Petroleum 
Company), and the Chinese Naval Authorities of Nanjing (dredging for ƒ110,000 in 
1936-1937).724 Apart from this, Havenwerken made a study for a mine-laying project 
in the Yangzi for the Submarine Mine College of Jiangsu.725  
                                                          
718 Havenwerken to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 29 April 1932, ibid. 
719 Pabst (Tokyo) to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 24 Nov. 1932, ibid.  
720 Thorbecke to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 24 April 1933, ibid. It did take many years before the 
Huludao case could really be closed. In 1939 a final settlement was reached: Minutes of the meeting of the 
supervisory board of Havenwerken 24 Feb. 1939, HBG Gouda, KNMH. 
721 Minute, PRO, FO 371, 18114, F4416 Belgian activities in Manchukuo.  
722 The only activity in North China concerned an agreement between Havenwerken and the Harbour 
Improvement Commission of Yantai, which the latter party cancelled after Havenwerken had already 
shipped ƒ132,000 worth of materials to China. Dutch diplomatic complaints did not lead to a continuation 
of the contract, or compensation for the damage incurred. The reason for the cancellation is unknown. 
Thorbecke to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 7 March 1933, ARA The Hague, BZ, DEZ III, 102 
havenbouw Chefoo; Havenwerken to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 29 April 1933, ibid.; Thorbecke to 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 30 Sept. 1935, ARA The Hague, BZ, DEZ III, 102 Havenaanleg 
Hulutao. 
723 In 1934: ƒ203,000 worth of dredging at Kowloon, laying a water pipe line from Kowloon to Hong 
Kong worth HK$ 26,5000, and making six caissons for a ferry worth HK$673,140. In 1935: HK$44,000 
worth of dredging and 2 caissons worth HK$52,243: ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH, pp.156 
and 167. 
724 As subcontractor for Kalgan Shih & Co. 
725 Dutch consul general (Shanghai) to Dutch Minister De Vos van Steenwijk 22 Oct. 1936, ARA The 
Hague, BZ, kol-pol, Peking 453. 
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The company’s strategy remained unaltered. Although activities outside China 
expanded to new countries—Portugal in 1932 and Iran in 1934—China remained its 
primary market. Havenwerken ignored the northern part of the country and focused 
on the areas under Guomindang control. In 1933 for the last time it signed a contract 
to construct a new harbour in China: at a price of ƒ2.5 million the Longhai Railway 
Administration contracted Havenwerken for the building of a coal harbour for at 
Lianyungang (Lao Yao). This was in Haizhou Bay, where the larger multi-purpose 
Longhai sea harbour originally had been planned.726 Although the supervisory board 
considered the risks too great, it decided to accept the contract out of fear that other 
foreign firms might take on the job.727 
 
1937-1941 
Four years later, in 1937, the Lianyungang coal harbour was nearly completed when 
the war between China and Japan broke out. The Chinese military recognised the 
great strategic value that Lianyungang possessed for the invading Japanese, and sank 
six of Havenwerken’s vessels in an attempt to make the new harbour unusable. In 
spite of this, the Japanese eventually captured the port. By this time, in spring 1938, 
Havenwerken personnel had already left, but several Chinese maintenance workers 
were killed and the manager in charge was arrested by the Japanese, accused of 
giving assistance to the Chinese army.728 Although the Dutch envoy succeeded in 
convincing the Japanese to let him go, they did not allow him to return to 
Lianyungang. 729  Consequently no personnel of the company remained at 
Lianyungang, and the Japanese military refused to let the Dutch remove their 
equipment from the site. The worst possible scenario had become reality: a major 
construction site had been captured by invading troops when it was almost completed 
but when all materials were still there.  
After Japan had occupied the lower Yangzi provinces in East China, only the 
south coast of the country remained accessible to Havenwerken. Since 1936 the 
company had been working in Guangzhou for the Huangpu (Whampoa) Port 
Development Administration (dredging for ƒ993,000, 1937-1938), and the Ministry 
of Railways (building a quay wall for ƒ578,000, 1937-1938). Even here the war did 
slow down activities. On 16 August 1938 a Havenwerken lighter was confiscated 
between Guangzhou and Hong Kong when the Chinese navy discovered 
                                                          
726  On the functional relationship between the harbour and Longhai Railway in the 1930s, see 
Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 316-317. 
727 Minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of Havenwerken 11 March 1933, HBG Gouda, 
KNMH. 
728 The Chinese army probably expected that the Japanese would land troops at Lianyungang in order to 
advance on Xuzhou, which lay 200 kilometres inland at the intersection of the Longhai line with the 
Beijing-Shanghai (or more precisely the Jinan-Pukou or Jipu) line. Indeed, as during the warlord wars of 
the 1920s, railways proved of enormous importance to troop movements during the Sino-Japanese war, 
and in early 1938 the Japanese launched a two major campaigns to capture Xuzhou, which eventually fell 
into their hands in May 1938. Their advance on Xuzhou was made from their bases in the south (Nanjing) 
and the north (Qingdao), rather than from Haizhou Bay. Lianyungang was occupied by the Japanese only 
in the wake of their attack on Xuzhou. Why they did not land at Lianyungang at an earlier stage puzzled H. 
de Fremery, a Dutch military observer in China: H.J.D. de Fremery, report 11 in: G. Teitler and K.W. 
Radtke (eds), A Dutch Spy in China: Reports on the First Phase of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939 
(Leiden 1999), p.185.  
729 ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH, p.201. 
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contraband—hemp, metal scraps, and resin—on board. The company protested, 
claiming that the Chinese crew had probably been intimidated by smugglers and 
forced to accept the contraband. It added that such incidents were practically beyond 
its control given the chaotic circumstances, and Havenwerken had never before been 
involved in smuggling.730 The matter was not yet resolved when Japan invaded also 
the south coast and seized Guangzhou—and the firm’s materials there—in October 
1938. When the Guangzhou works were abandoned Havenwerken had already 
received part of the contract fee and in 1939 managed to obtain a more or less 
satisfactory arrangement with the Chinese government in Chongqing.731  
The Japanese occupation of most Chinese coastal areas meant the end for the 
Dutch harbour works in the Far East. Attempts to obtain a contract at Shantou came 
to nothing and in Shanghai the material used for the contract with the Chinese Naval 
Authorities of Nanjing—which had been finished just in time—was confiscated by 
the Japanese. In Yantai the Japanese authorities dissolved the Harbour Improvement 
Commission, from which Havenwerken was still trying to obtain compensation for a 
contract cancelled in 1932. The Dutch minister in Tokyo presented a formal protest 
about this dissolution—without effect.732 The final Chinese contract of the 1930s 
was a small one (for ƒ97,000) in Hong Kong in 1938. From 1939 to 1941 the main 
concern of Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor Havenwerken in the Far East was to 
get permission from the Japanese army to remove the Lianyungang materials. The 
Dutch government gave its support by representing the company’s claims in Japan. 
This was to no avail. Japan did not return the equipment or pay for the damage. In 
1940 Havenwerken discovered that the Japanese army was actually using 
Havenwerken materials to repair the damaged Lianyungang harbour.  
In terms of organisation, Havenwerken’s presence in China had always been 
minimal. In 1936 there were only a main office in Shanghai (which was also for the 
NSC; staffed by four Dutch and one Chinese) and a main materials depot in Macao 
(with one Dutch manager). Besides this there were temporary offices in the places 
where the company happened to be building, and Chinese agents in Nanjing and 
Guangzhou. The agency agreement with the HCHC was cancelled.733 At the end of 
1937 the permanent representative for Havenwerken and the NSC, De Vos, was 
discharged. A small office was retained only in Hong Kong. By 1939, when working 
in China had become impossible, the local organisation was almost completely 
dissolved. Only the dredgers were still there: some in the Macao depot, but most of 
them in Japanese hands. 734  By this time Havenwerken was experiencing severe 
difficulties. In China it had lost not just the market, but also most of its equipment. 
Because of local circumstances the work in Iran, at the time the company’ main non-
Chinese area of interest, turned into a financial disaster. From 1936 the company was 
losing hundreds of thousands of guilders each year; losses totalled 2.6 million 
                                                          
730 ‘Memorandum regarding the Smuggling-Case on Board of our Lighter NHW 25’, Ibid. 198. 
731 Dutch Minister De Vos van Steenwijk to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 11 May 1939, ARA The 
Hague, BZ, DEZ III, 102 haven Sjanghai. 
732 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Dutch Minister (Tokyo) 7 Dec. 1938, ibid. havenbouw Chefoo. 
733 Minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of Havenwerken 10 Jan. and 22 Oct. 1936, HBG 
Gouda, KNMH. 
734 In April 1938 a report by Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij on Havenwerken concluded that the 
contractor still had many resources tied up in China: Minutes of the meeting of the supervisory board of 
Havenwerken 14 April 1938, ibid. 
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guilders by the year 1940.735 In December 1941, the two Dutch employees in Hong 
Kong were interned by the Japanese when they conquered the British colony, a fate 
which the Dutch materials manager in Macao escaped because this city remained in 
Portuguese hands during the Pacific War. Although he stayed in Macao as the firm’s 
last representative in Asia during the war, Havenwerken was de facto removed from 
the Chinese market in 1941. 736  
 
Conclusion 
Havenwerken’s main local interest in China during the 1910s and early 1920s was to 
create profits and to remit them as dividends to its owners, which were mainly banks. 
Because of the increase in political risks from the mid-1920s, the company’s main 
local interest became to hold on to its market position in China—either until local 
conditions had improved or until sufficient new activities had been initiated in other 
parts of the world. The hypothesis proves incorrect where it concerned civil war and 
Chinese nationalism. Until 1916 political risks were indeed insignificant, but the 
1916-1928 period also remained relatively quiet for Havenwerken. The only main 
risk was that the civil war in the interior did have a negative effect on the demand for 
harbour works, which was demonstrated by the cancelling of the Longhai Railway 
harbour at Haizhou. During 1928-1937 the main source of political risks was not 
Chinese nationalism, but Japanese imperialism. In correspondence with the 
hypothesis, Japanese imperialism was also the main political risk during 1937-1941. 
The risks related to civil war during the 1920s did not pose a direct threat to the 
position of Havenwerken. However, the civil wars decreased the demand for harbour 
works, because potential clients like the Chinese government or railway companies 
were unable to make new investments. Consequently the Chinese market lost its 
attraction, and the company responded to this by undertaking new projects in other 
countries. 
Risks caused by the entrenchment of Japanese power in China were a more direct 
threat. From 1931 step by step Japan occupied the China coast from Manchuria in the 
northeast to Guangdong in the south. The effect was that geographically the market 
for Havenwerken shrank until all activities in China ceased in late 1938. From 1931 
the company responded to these risks by continuing the strategy it developed in the 
mid-1920s: the position in China was maintained as much as possible while—
gradually—new opportunities for expansion in other countries were gauged. The 
company’s policy towards its activities in China was ambiguous. On the one hand, it 
relied fully on De Vos to assess local conditions, maintain external relations, and 
acquire new contracts, without creating an organisation to support his work. On the 
other hand no materials were removed from China, and hazardous contracts were 
accepted rather than allowing new competitors enter the Chinese market. 
Havenwerken had no effective answer to neutralise the risks related to the Japanese 
advance. Accommodating itself to Japanese interests in order to acquire contracts 
                                                          
735 ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH, p.201. 
736 In spite of the misfortunes of the 1930s and 1940s, Havenwerken did survive. After 1945 there were a 
lot of new opportunities in many parts of the world, although China ceased to be the company’s main 
market. Most equipment in China was destroyed during the war; the damage in China was estimated at 
some two million guilders. The company decided to maintain only a small presence in East Asia; in 
practice work was carried out only in Hong Kong. In the 1950s the remaining equipment in China was 
finally removed. 
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from the Japanese authorities was not an attractive option. For the Japanese military, 
harbours in China were strategic objects for which they had their own maintenance 
equipment. Moreover, after 1937 Japan’s refusal to either return Havenwerken’s 
materials at Lianyungang or to offer a financial compensation disqualified the 
Japanese as suitable partners in the eyes of Havenwerken’s management. Eventually 
the firm’s position in China was destroyed before the company had succeeded in 
withdrawing and transferring its main interests to other parts of the world. 
 CHAPTER 6  
 
RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION: NSC 
 
‘The banks have been very reasonable. They 
took a risk at a time when it seemed acceptable, 
and when things went wrong they did not 
complain—but they also did not get involved 
any further.’ 
J.G. Drabbe (formerly of the NSC), 1985.737 
 
Overall Corporate Interest 
After the end of World War I an opportunity arose for Dutch investors to participate 
in a large railway construction project in China. The NHM and the NIHB, being 
already involved in or closely related to banking, shipping, and harbour construction 
in China, decided to form a syndicate to handle the railway project. The syndicate 
was intended not just to win this particular railway contract, but to act as a permanent 
representative office for Dutch construction and industrial firms. Once the plans had 
been formulated, on 1 July 1919 the Nederlandsch Syndicaat voor China 
(Netherlands Syndicate for China, NSC) was formed. It replaced the representative 
office in China of Havenwerken, which along with the banks was one of the main 
participants in the syndicate―which soon thereafter was reorganised into a limited 
liability company.  
Within one year of its creation, the NSC acquired the railway construction 
contract that had initially motivated the founders of the syndicate. This project, the 
Longhai (Lunghai) railway, was one of the largest railway construction projects in 
China. Building had started already in 1903.738 In the first phase, from 1903 to 1909, 
a Belgian company had constructed a line between Kaifeng and Luoyang, both in 
Henan province.739 At Zhengzhou this line crossed the highly important Beijing-
Hankou line—another Belgian project.740 The name of the Belgian company was 
‘Compagnie Générale de Chemin de Fer et de Tramways en Chine’ (hereafter 
Compagnie Chemin de Fer).741 About 1913 this company launched the second phase 
of construction, which was far more ambitious than the first. The Kaifeng-Luoyang 
line was to be extended eastwards to the Yellow Sea and westwards to Lanzhou in 
Gansu province, deep in the interior of China. The Belgian company would finance 
and build the railway and supply the building and operating materials. After 
completion the railway would cross five provinces and be the first major Chinese line 
running in an east-west rather than a north-south direction. At the time there were 
very few nation-wide lines of communication in China. To connect north and south 
                                                          
737 Dankers, interview with Drabbe, private collection F. Dankers. 
738 K. Bossuyt, ‘De Belgische Bijdrage in de Konstruktie van de Chinese Spoorweg Lung-Tsing-U-hai, 
1912-1936’ (unpublished PhD thesis; University of Ghent 1981), 27. 
739 This section was then known as the Pienlo Railway. 
740 The contract for which had already been signed in 1898 between China and the Compagnie Générale 
de Belgique: Bossuyt, ‘Belgische Bijdrage’, 16. 
741 Created in 1897 as a Belgian-French syndicate under Eduard Empain. In 1900 transformed into the 
Compagnie Générale de Chemin de Fer et de Tramways en Chine. Issued share capital was 1 million 
Belgian francs, which was owned by Belgian (76 per cent), French (21 per cent), and Russian (the Russo-
Chinese Bank; 3 per cent) banks and private investors: ibid. 23-24. 
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there were the Grand Canal, the coastal shipping route, and the two major railway 
lines leading south from Beijing, one via Hankou to Guangzhou and one via Tianjin 
and Nanjing to Shanghai.742 To connect eastern and western China there was only 
the Yangzi River. Thus the Longhai line was to become a kind of second Yangzi: as 
the river connected the interior provinces of Sichuan and Hubei to the east coast, the 
railway would do the same for Gansu, Shaanxi and Henan further to the north.743 For 
this purpose a second Shanghai, i.e., a new major seaport, would have to be created 
at the point where the Longhai railway reached the sea. The latter aspect provided an 
important reason for the Dutch banks and Havenwerken to become involved in this 
railway. After all, they wanted to protect their lead in harbour construction in China. 
World War I seriously delayed the construction of Longhai. The Compagnie 
Chemin de Fer was backed by Belgian and French financial institutions. Because of 
the war, they could not raise sufficient capital to carry out the work. The war also 
caused this company to suffer some one hundred million Belgian francs worth of 
damage, partly because Germany had confiscated its assets in Europe.744 By the end 
of the war the Belgian firm was in danger of losing the Longhai contract. If the 
Compagnie Chemin de Fer remained unable to raise money for the construction of 
Longhai, the Chinese government would turn to other parties. The Japanese were 
very interested in bringing Longhai under their influence. When the Okura company 
proposed buying the entire Longhai business from the Belgian firm, the Belgians 
refused.745 But they knew that they could not withstand such pressure very long. 
With Belgium and France lacking the financial capacity to undertake large-scale 
projects because of the war, the Compagnie Chemin de Fer looked for investors 
elsewhere, especially in Britain and the US. No one seemed interested in investing in 
Longhai, until the company turned its attention to the Netherlands—a country that 
had never participated directly in any Chinese railway concession.  
Bringing together the Dutch and the Belgians was the achievement of Robert De 
Vos, whose name has been mentioned already in connection with Havenwerken. 
Formerly he had been consul for Belgium in Korea and Japan. Thereafter he worked 
for the Compagnie Chemin de Fer.746 In 1919 that company sent him to raise money 
for Longhai in the Netherlands. This he did in an unconventional way: he encouraged 
the Dutch banks to create the NSC, subsequently he took an share of 7.5 per cent in 
the syndicate, became its chief representative, and then returned to Belgium, now to 
negotiate on behalf of this new organisation with the Compagnie Chemin de Fer. In 
this way De Vos shrewdly seized the opportunity to attain his personal goals. As a 
Dutch-speaking Fleming, 747  he considered the Belgian consular service and the 
                                                          
742 The interior of Manchuria was connected by railways to Beijing, Yingkou, Dalian, and Vladivostok, 
and the Transsiberian Railway. 
743 According to the study of this projected harbour made later by the NSC, the main imported goods 
would probably be petroleum and manufactured items, and the main exported goods nuts, beans, and coal: 
G.J. van den Broek, Openbare Werken in China, in het Bijzonder de Lunghaihaven en Spoorweg (The 
Hague 1922), 27. 
744 Bossuyt, ‘Belgische Bijdrage’, 129. 
745 Ibid. 125. 
746 In 1912 De Vos was acting as representative in China for the Compagnie Chemin de Fer. It was De 
Vos who managed to obtain a contract for the extension of the Kaifeng-Luoyang line for his company: 
ibid. 35 note 20. 
747 At that time many Flemish people (who were Dutch-speaking) felt repressed by the Walloons and the 
French speaking Belgian upper-class. 
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Compagnie Chemin de Fer too overly dominated by French-speaking interests.748 He 
preferred to continue his work in China by joining a Dutch organisation. 
On 1 May 1920 an agreement was signed between the Chinese government, the 
Compagnie Chemin de Fer, and the NSC. The Belgian firm was to keep control of 
the Longhai concession, but the Dutch would participate in three distinct respects. In 
the first place they would raise roughly half of the money needed to finish Longhai. 
The NSC would see to it that this money would be used exclusively for orders with 
Dutch firms. In order to fulfil this financial obligation, the NSC was transformed 
from a syndicate into a limited liability company.749 In the second place the Dutch 
would build and supply a section of the railway.750 In the third place they would 
design and build the harbour, which was intended to be located in Haizhou Bay near 
the city of Haizhou where the railway ended.751 The founders of the NSC believed 
that other Dutch investors would find Longhai attractive and that the Chinese 
government would be willing and able to fulfil its loan obligations. Both assumptions 
would turn out to be wrong. 
As indicated, the primary motive behind the establishment of the NSC was to 
exploit the Longhai Railway as an investment opportunity. The major shareholders 
of the NSC were bankers: the NHM, the NIHB, and the Twentsche Bank each owned 
10 per cent of the shares. Another 20 per cent was in the hands of Havenwerken, 
which itself was controlled by the same banks. Further shares were held by R. van 
Dorsser of Havenwerken (7.5 per cent), A. Muller of the NHM (2.5 per cent), and 
G.H. de Marez Oyens of the NIHB (2.5 per cent). Muller and De Marez Oyens were 
also on the supervisory board of Havenwerken. The remaining 37.5 per cent of the 
shares was owned mainly by Dutch producers of electro-mechanical equipment, such 
as Stork & Co. (5 per cent), Heemaf (5 per cent),752 and De Vries Robbé & Co. (5 
per cent). The total capital issued amounted to ƒ400,000.753 Direct supervision for 
                                                          
748 According to both J.G. Drabbe (Nederlandsch-Chineesche Vereniging and Havenwerken) and J.H. 
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751 Ibid. 147. 
752 Hengelosche Electrische en Mechanische Apparaten Fabriek. 
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Colijn thought that the petroleum company might be interested in using the syndicate to look for oil. 
Elsewhere, during the same journey, he wrote that in China the Dutch should compete more actively with 
other Western nations; in the first place to strengthen their hold on the colonies, and in the second place to 
be less dependent on the colonies were they ever to be lost. In early 1914 Dutch Minister to China F. 
Beelaerts van Blokland wrote to Colijn that he welcomed the initiative, and that he was willing to give his 
support—as far as that was possible: Colijn to Loudon 6 Oct 1913  and Colijn 10 Oct 1913 , Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam, Colijn, 54, 3, copybook 3; Beelaerts to Colijn 9 Feb. 1914, ibid, 4, map 1914. 
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the NSC would be carried out by Havenwerken, which had the right to appoint the 
NSC’s director in China. Five other firms—the three banks, Stork, and De Vries 
Robbé—in turn supervised Havenwerken’s management of the NSC. It was probably 
in 1921, when the NSC was transformed from a syndicate into a limited liability 
company, that new shareholders were added to the list. The most important were the 
two banks Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging and Amsterdamsche Bank, the train 
manufacturer Werkspoor, and the trading firm Internatio. Because of its wide range 
of owners, the NSC had the potential to become the main representative agency of 
Dutch business interests in China. In 1922 the managing director of the NSC, J.G. 
Drabbe, took the initiative to establish the Dutch China Association (Nederlandsch-
Chineesche Vereeniging, NCV). The new association was based at the NSC office, 
and Drabbe acted as its secretary. The NCV published a journal called China and 
organised presentations about the country for Dutch school children. Its main aim 
was to expand awareness of China among the Dutch population, and to act as a 
rallying point for Dutch China experts. Its members were mainly Dutch businessmen 
and diplomats who had been stationed in China.754 
From the outset the NSC was firmly under the control of the banks.755 Several 
bankers on the NSC supervisory board held the same function in Havenwerken: G.A. 
Dunlop (NIHB), G.H. de Marez Oyens (NIHB), and J.H. Telders (Twentsche Bank). 
Two NHM bankers, A. Muller and D. Crena de Iongh, combined board membership 
of all three major China enterprises launched by their bank: the JCJL, Havenwerken, 
and the NSC. The permanent office of the NSC in China was extremely small: one 
director with one Dutch and one Chinese staff member, the very same persons who 
also represented Havenwerken.756 The director—De Vos—reported to the NSC head 
office, which was in the office building of Havenwerken in Amsterdam. From there, 
Managing Director Drabbe, with the assistance of a single typist, administered the 
NSC. Drabbe, who had a banking background, held this function until he became 
financial director of Havenwerken in 1938. Given this construction, a managerial 
hierarchy never developed in the NSC. De Vos operated mostly alone, and just as 
with Havenwerken, the work of the NSC was intended to be project-based. After the 
railway was completed, the engineers would return to the Netherlands.  
The NSC had three main overall interests. The first and dominant overall interest 
of the NSC was to serve the interests of the bankers. Initially this meant obtaining the 
Longhai contract. When the NSC succeeded and the syndicate formally became a 
limited liability company, the aim changed into building the railway and securing 
new investment opportunities for the banks. The banks undertook the raising of the 
Longhai loan on behalf of the NSC. The second overall interest was for the NSC to 
                                                                                                                                          
However, as it turned out the Royal Dutch company never associated itself with other Dutch firms in China 
or with attempts to obtain railway concessions. 
754 Dankers, interview with Drabbe. 
755 According to Drabbe, in 1929 the banks intended to decrease their involvement in the NSC in order to 
have more freedom to ‘continue with their own industrial relations’: ibid. A reflection of this change may 
be the fact that in 1929 the statutes were modified: a new class of 200 preference shares of ƒ1000 each was 
created. The number of normal shares was increased to 200 of ƒ5000 each. Of the shares fifty-five normal 
ones were issued, amounting to ƒ275,000: Nederlandsche Staatscourant 240 (9 Dec. 1929) appendix. The 
number of shareholders had probably not increased since 1921, and by 1934 there were still only fifty-five 
normal shares issued: Nederlandsche Staatscourant 226 (22 Nov. 1934) appendix. There are no indications 
that there were any changes in shareholdership between 1921 and 1939. 
756 In 1925 a bookkeeper was added: ‘Geschiedenis KNMH’, HBG Gouda, KNMH, p.45. 
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take over the task of Havenwerken’s representative office: to stay in close contact 
with the Chinese authorities in order to acquire new contracts for Havenwerken. The 
third and least important overall interest was also to obtain investment or exporting 
opportunities in any other field interesting to the banks or the machinery 
manufacturers. In other words, the NSC was intended to perform specific tasks rather 
than create a profit. 
  
Railway Construction in China 
The NSC engineers who were sent out worked on a different section of the railway to 
that being taken care of by the Belgians. They were formally integrated into the 
Longhai Railway Administration, which was owned and supervised by the Chinese 
government.757 However, in practice the Dutch carried out their part of the work 
without much contact with the Belgians or the Chinese government.758 The financing 
and harbour designing activities were also carried out separately. This lack of 
integration was not just at the international level: the various tasks of the NSC were 
also not integrated. After the Longhai agreement was signed in 1920, De Vos at his 
Beijing office concentrated on finding new projects. In the meantime, the building of 
the Dutch Longhai section was done by a temporary Dutch Longhai construction 
team, while the banks tried to raise the capital. The designing of the Longhai 
harbour, finally, was undertaken on behalf of the NSC by Havenwerken’s hydraulic 
engineers in China.759 
Raising capital in Europe for Longhai proved a difficult task. The Dutch 
banks―on behalf of the NSC―intended to supply Longhai with 50 million guilders 
by issuing Chinese government bonds on the Amsterdam financial market. But an 
initial snag was that the Dutch stock exchange (Vereeniging voor den 
Effectenhandel, VEH) refused to allow any Chinese government bonds onto the 
Amsterdam market as long as China did not fulfil its existing obligations towards 
Dutch investors who participated in the 1913 Chinese government loan. 760  This 
problem was still not solved in February 1922 when the NSC tried to issue the first 
16.7 million guilders worth of Longhai bonds. The news about China was not very 
positive at this time. 
                                                          
757 The Longhai Railway Administration was part of the Chinese ministry of communications. The two 
top officials were the Chinese director-general and the European engineer-in-chief, who was appointed by 
the Compagnie Chemin de Fer. Until 1926 this was a Frenchman, thereafter a Belgian: Groeneveld, 
‘Constructie’, 64. 
758 A Chinese director for the eastern section was responsible for communications between the Dutch and 
the local Chinese authorities: E.R. Hondelink, Nederlandsche Spoorwegbouw in China: De Oostelijke 
Lunghai-Lijn (Den Haag 1927), 4-5. 
759 Van Lidth de Jeude, technical director of Havenwerken, complained about the fact that the nominal 
management of the NSC by Havenwerken meant nothing when it came to building the Longhai Railway. 
He and Robert De Vos worried that, through its Longhai activities, the NSC would become a more or less 
independent organisation: minutes of the meeting of Havenwerken Board 30 March 1921, HBG Gouda, 
KNMH. 
760 The fact that China did not was related to the strict rules imposed during the war by Britain on traffic 
between China and the Netherlands and to many of the bonds owned by Dutch nationals being issued in 
Germany or Austria. In November 1921, the Dutch Minister in Beijing Oudendijk, at the request of the 
NSC, asked the Chinese government to resolve this matter together with Britain: Memorandum Oudendijk 
to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2 Nov. 1921, Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Hague, Peking IV, 
MI, 183. 
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Trace of the Longhai railway line between Lianyungang and Lanzhou 
 
The Anfu-Zhili War of 1920 had eliminated the power of Premier Duan Qirui, but 
had not resulted in a strong new regime in Beijing. In 1922 the former allies Wu 
Peifu and Zhang Zuolin, turned against one another and fought the First Zhili-
Fengtian War. Putting money into a large public works project in a disintegrating 
country that was boycotted by the VEH because it did not pay its foreign debts could 
hardly have been a tempting proposition. Consequently there was insufficient 
demand for Longhai bonds in Amsterdam 
The bankers’ group participating in the NSC decided to buy the first 16.7 million 
guilders worth of Longhai bonds themselves. At the same time they looked for help 
from the Dutch export bureau, the NUM (Nederlandsche Uitvoer-Maatschappij), 
which was established during World War I by the NHM and other financial 
institutions to keep Dutch exports going. In February 1923 the NUM decided to 
purchase 8.6 million guilders worth of bonds from the NSC banks.761 In return the 
NSC and the Compagnie Chemin de Fer guaranteed that they would complete the 
railway up to the eastern terminus, Haizhou, even if there were not enough money to 
reach the western terminus. In 1923 an attempt was made by the NSC to issue the 
second group of Longhai bonds, again worth 16.7 million guilders. The banks 
                                                          
761 Minutes of the meeting of the delegates of the supervisory board of the NUM 13 Feb. 1923, ARA The 
Hague, EZ, Directoraat Handel en Nijverheid, 387. The agreement was signed in April and the actual 
transaction was carried out in November 1923. The NUM bought the bonds in four equal parts, each 
transaction being carried out only after Dutch diplomatic representatives in China confirmed that 
contruction work was progressing as planned: minutes of the annual meeting of the shareholders of the 
NUM April 1924, ARA The Hague, EZ, Handel 388. 
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backed this move by buying 8.3 million guilders’ worth of bonds, i.e., the money 
which they had just received from the NUM. This time the NSC managed to raise 5.8 
million guilders from external investors.762 The company now had contributed over 
30 million guilders to the railway, some 60 per cent of the total sum to be contributed 
by the NSC. The remaining 20 million guilders’ worth of bonds were never issued. 
The Belgian side had produced better results. In 1920 the Compagnie Chemin de Fer 
had agreed to raise 150 million Belgian francs. By 1923 the money raised by this 
firm reached the final figure of 137 million francs, or over 90 per cent.763 
With yet a new large-scale civil war—the second Zhili-Fengtian War—erupting 
in 1924, the political situation in China continued to deteriorate. No further attempts 
were made in the Netherlands or in Belgium to issue government bonds. The two 
companies tried to do the job with the money available. But this soon proved 
impossible, and more money was needed. An attempt by the Chinese government to 
attract money from Chinese investors did not produce enough to solve the 
problem. 764  Again the NUM decided to provide extra capital, but this time only 
750,000 guilders and on the understanding that the Netherlands would have to supply 
no further capital and that the funds for the Longhai harbour would be provided by 
Chinese or Belgian banks. 765  Although some adaptations had to be made—for 
example, some of the over 150 bridges were made of wood instead of steel—the 
Dutch section was actually finished without any further contributions of capital. It 
was the much larger Belgian section in the west that was not completed until many 
years later. Of the total of the almost Y243 million borrowed to build Longhai, 
almost Y107 million was provided by the NSC, Y134.5 million by the Compagnie 
Chemin de Fer, and Y1.4 million by Chinese investors.766  By 1925 the Longhai 
Railway was heavily in debt, and the western part still had a very long way to go 
before it was completed.767 
The construction of the Dutch Longhai section itself began in 1921.768 Dutch 
engineers set up their headquarters in Xuzhou (Jiangsu province), which formed the 
intended intersection of the Longhai line and the Beijing-Shanghai line.769 It was 
                                                          
762 Groeneveld, ‘Constructie’, 53. 
763 Bossuyt, ‘Belgische Bijdrage’, 156. 
764 Groeneveld, ‘Constructie’, 54-55. 
765 Ibid. 54; Minutes of the meeting of the delegates of the supervisory board of the NUM 15 Jan. 1925, 
ARA The Hague, EZ, Handel, 387. It is possible that part of this arrangement was also that the entire 
amount of money supplied by the NSC would be used to spend on Dutch firms, whereas the Dutch would 
supply less according to the 1920 agreement. At least this might explain why Bossuyt reported that the 
Dutch would make only equipment deliveries for the harbour, while in fact Dutch firms did supply large 
amounts of equipment and according to Drabbe it was the task of the NSC to make sure that all ‘Dutch’ 
money would go to Dutch companies: Bossuyt, ‘Belgische Bijdrage’, 147; and Dankers, interview with 
Drabbe. 
766 Groeneveld, ‘Constructie’, 55. 
767 Some 930 kilometres were then finished; in the west Xi’an had not yet even been reached. The 
Longhai Railway had been carrying a heavy debt burden even before 1920. According to Ralph 
Huenemann much of the £4 million issued for the railway in March 1913 was probably used to strengthen 
Yuan Shikai’s army: Huenemann, Iron Horse, 87. 
768 The first phase consisted of land surveys and expropriations: Groeneveld, ‘Constructie’, 58. 
769 The connection between Tainjin and Nanjing before integration into a Chinese national rail system 
was called the Tianjin-Pukou line. Before 1968 there was no bridge connecting Nanjing on the south bank 
of the Yangtse to the north bank, therefore the railway stopped at Pukou. After crossing the river by ferry, 
passengers could proceed by train from Nanjing to Shanghai. 
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their task to build the section of the railway from Xuzhou straight through Jiangsu 
province to Haizhou, the eastern terminus. In this way the Dutch would take care of 
the easternmost 200 kilometres of the 1770-kilometre long rail link between Lanzhou 
and Haizhou. The Xuzhou headquarters consisted of a small administrative staff.770 
The Dutch head engineer for the Xuzhou-Haizhou section was J. Déking Dura. 
Under his supervision there were three Dutch section engineers: E.R. Hondelink, A. 
Lutsenburg Maas,771 and L.W.G. de Roo de la Faille. In 1924 Hondelink succeeded 
Déking Dura and was succeeded in his former post by a Belgian engineer.772 Below 
the section engineers there were rail and bridge engineers, most of whom were not 
Dutch. They were supported by communications and rolling stock staff.773 In all 
there were never more than sixteen Europeans engaged in building the Dutch 
Longhai section.774 As was the case with harbour building, the actual construction 
work was done by Chinese workers who were recruited and supervised by Chinese 
subcontractors. The number of workers per subcontractor was small; in all there were 
some 300 Chinese subcontractors.775 Exploitation of the line—which began as soon 
as a part was completed—was in the hands of Chinese railway personnel.  
On 11 June 1925 the first train reached the Haizhou terminus, and a few weeks 
later the NSC officially handed over its section of the Longhai railway for 
exploitation by the Chinese government. Construction costs of the Dutch section 
amounted to circa Y10 million.776 In practice exploitation had already begun before 
this date. In early 1924 Dutch Minister Oudendijk had already travelled a distance of 
70 kilometres on Dutch-built tracks.777 In spite of the railway section formally being 
completed, construction activities did not end in July 1925. Hondelink was still 
engaged in engineering work at Longhai until 1927. Although the raising of capital 
had not gone according to plan, at least the Dutch had been able to complete the 
eastern section—even though Hondelink complained that Amsterdam did not give 
the Dutch engineers in China sufficient support.778 As far as had been possible, the 
NSC had ordered supplies from Dutch firms. Basic construction materials were 
bought in China, but more advanced equipment—such as rails, bridges, and 
locomotives—were imported from Europe. Although orders already placed with 
Belgian suppliers before the NSC entered the project were not cancelled, Dutch-
made equipment used for Longhai still amounted to several million guilders—part of 
which was paid in bonds rather than money.779 Dutch firms such as Du Croo & 
                                                          
770 There was also a Dutch doctor, J.W. Schotman, who wrote about his Longhai experience in Het 
Vermolmde Boeddhabeeld (3 Vols; Amsterdam n.d.). 
771 Adriaan Lutsenburg Maas wrote a letter to his mother every week during the whole four-year period 
that he worked for Longhai. Together with some of his other correspondence of the same period these are 
kept in the Algemeen Rijksarchief: ARA The Hague, 2.21.281.08 archief ir A. Lutsenburg Maas.  
772 According to Hondelink and Lutsenburg Maas, Déking Dura did not support his technicians’ wish to 
modify the original Belgian blueprints sufficiently. Relations between Hondelink and Déking Dure appear 
to have been very bad: Groeneveld, ‘Constructie’, 65.  
773 Ibid. 
774 Hondelink, ‘Lunghai’, 7. 
775 Groeneveld, ‘Constructie’, 70. 
776 Ibid. 55. 
777 ‘De Nederlandsche Spoorweg-Aanleg in China’, NRC (March 1924).  
778 Dankers, interview with Drabbe. 
779 Groeneveld, ‘Constructie’, 55; policy 3664 (Nederlandsche Credietverzekeringsmaatschappij), ARA 
The Hague, Min. Financiën, dossierarchief 1918-1946, 40 China. 
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Brauns, Werkspoor, and De Vries Robbé exported large numbers of wagons, 
locomotives, and bridges to China.780 Now that an important part of the Longhai 
Railway was in operation, repayment of the loan and interest was intended to be done 
out of the exploitation proceeds. However, political events in China seriously 
interfered with this scheme, as will be described below. China did not repay the 
Longhai loan and no new harbour was commissioned. In the end neither the banks 
nor Havenwerken managed to profit from the Longhai project;781 only the NSC itself 
managed to achieve this by earning a commission. This was also the case with 
several Dutch firms that held shares in the NSC and that were able to export railway 
materials to China.782  
Because the NSC worked exclusively in China, its local interest was identical to 
its overall interest: acquiring Longhai-related and other contracts for the banks, 
Havenwerken, and the smaller shareholders (the electro-mechanical and industrial 
exporting firms). As such the NSC was primarily a representative or agency firm, but 
when it became involved in the building of the Longhai railway, the NSC also 
developed into a railway construction firm, however, after the Dutch section of 
Longhai was completed, this development was cut short. Because Longhai was a 
major disappointment for the banks, they paid no further attention to the NSC. They 
did allow it to survive for the sake of Havenwerken, which was largely owned by 
them. But the bankers no longer regarded the NSC as a useful tool for the opening up 
of new investment opportunities for themselves in China. Moreover, because railway 
building was not a main local interest, the NSC did not develop into a regular railway 
construction firm. 783  Therefore, from the mid-1920s, the NSC’s remaining local 
interests were to obtain new contracts only for Havenwerken and the cluster of 
smaller shareholding firms.  
 
Political Risks and Response 
 
1920-1928 
The NSC, which became active in China in 1920, experienced both civil war and 
anti-foreign nationalism as serious political risks. As indicated already in the 
previous chapter, the military defeat of Wu Peifu in 1924 had a direct impact on the 
fortunes of the Longhai railway. Until the autumn of this year, the Longhai Railway 
Administration had been under the control of Wu, who was the leader of the so-
called Zhili coalition that dominated North and Central China. In October 1924, Wu 
Peifu was leading his troops against the ‘Fengtian’ (or Manchurian) army marshalled 
under rival warlord Zhang Zuolin. Just when Wu’s campaign seemed successful, one 
of Wu’s allies, Feng Yuxiang, turned against him and moved his troops into Beijing. 
                                                          
780  According to Groeneveld: 550 thousand guilders worth of wagons (Du Croo), eight heavy 
locomotives (Werkspoor), and 194 bridges (Du Croo and De Vries Robbé). Furthermore, Dutch steam-
powered pile-drivers were used: Groeneveld, ‘Construction’, 61. These materials were shipped from 
Europe via Shanghai or Qingdao to a temporary harbour near Haizhou: Hondelink, ‘Lunghai’, 25. 
781 It is now impossible to discover whether the banks earned a commission for issuing the Longhai 
bonds in Amsterdam, but even if they did so such a commission was dwarfed by the Longhai debt which 
was not repaid.  
782 For a profits and losses overview: Baart, ‘Aktiviteiten’, 223-224. 
783  It participated in two companies related to construction in China—the Far Eastern Syndicate 
(surveying group) and Syndicat de Hankow (construction syndicate)—but this did not lead to new 
construction activities by NSC: Ibid. 72-73. 
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This was a heavy blow to Wu’s standing as the leading warlord in North and Central 
China. The Zhili coalition collapsed at a surprising rate. Troops engaged in fighting 
Zhang Zuolin lost confidence in Wu and deserted the front line; many commanders 
switched their allegiance to the other side. Wu Peifu withdrew to Central China, 
leaving Zhang Zuolin to establish his influence in North China. Whereas the political 
conditions had already been unstable ever since 1916, the situation was now very 
fraught indeed. Wu’s defeat resulted in a power vacuum between the northern and 
the Yangzi provinces―just where the Longhai railway was situated. The increased 
autonomy of local military leaders in Jiangsu and Henan generated even more 
regional instability and more local fighting. The Longhai Railway Administration 
had great difficulty with operating its trains. Traffic on some sections of the railway 
became impossible, and trains were often requisitioned for military transports.  
It was just about this time that nationalism was quickly becoming an influential 
element in Chinese-foreign relations. While the warlords were fighting each other, 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang army left its Guangdong base and advanced north. 
By 1927 the anti-foreign sentiments accompanying this advance had become so 
hostile that most foreign Longhai personnel had to be evacuated. Only after Chiang 
Kai-shek had destroyed the power of the Guomindang’s left wing and suppressed the 
overt opposition of the remaining warlords in 1928 did the situation gradually 
become less threatening. In 1928 the railway was under the control of Feng Yuxiang, 
who now was allied to the Guomindang. Later, in 1930, the Guomindang 
government took direct control of Longhai and removed all Europeans who were still 
involved in the administration of the railway.784 Protests by foreign diplomats were 
to no avail. 
                                                          
Because of all the political insecurity, during these years the railway was 
financially less productive than had been foreseen. And whatever money was 
produced did not go to the foreign investors. The Dutch banks, the NUM, and other 
Dutch investors had bought a large number of Chinese bonds. The Dutch 
government, found itself implicated more directly when the Ministry of Finance 
liquidated the NUM in 1927 and became owner of its Chinese bonds.785 The Chinese 
government was supposed to pay the bondholders regular instalments of the debt 
itself and its interest. However, after July 1925 no payments were made. The Belgian 
and French investors who had bought bonds from the Compagnie Chemin de Fer 
encountered the same problem. As already mentioned, Havenwerken was unable to 
secure the money (Y20 million) needed to initiate the construction of the Haizhou 
port. 
There was no question of the supervisory board allowing the NSC to engage in 
any new large project as long as the capital already invested in Longhai had not yet 
been recovered. The company’s bankers created an association of Dutch holders of 
Longhai bonds, dominated by themselves and the Dutch finance ministry. This 
association was represented in China not by the NSC but by the Shanghai branches 
of the NHM and the NIHB. De Vos complained to Oudendijk that the banks had 
784 Bossuyt, ‘Belgische Bijdrage’, 187. 
785 K. Huysinga to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4 April 1927, ARA The Hague, BZ, DEZ III, 102, 
Lunghai spoorweg. 
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ignored the NSC and that they were not prepared to worry about its position.786 He 
argued that there was no unity, either between the Belgians and the Dutch, or even 
among the Dutch themselves. Indeed, the banks—especially the NHM—acted 
independently of the other Dutch parties involved. The problem with combining 
forces with the Belgians was that the two countries pursued different interests. The 
Dutch had fulfilled their construction obligation and now they wanted to have their 
loan repaid. But the Belgians were still engaged in building the western part of the 
railway line, and if they could not get their money back they could try to limit the 
damage by obtaining new materials orders. The Compagnie Chemin de Fer was 
represented directly in the railway administration, since the engineer-in-chief was a 
European appointed by the Belgian firm. The Dutch complained that the Compagnie 
Chemin de Fer used its influence in trying to sell more materials rather than in 
getting money for the bondholders.787  
The Dutch bondholders association asked the Dutch government to help. The 
government was willing to do whatever was in its power, which was asking Minister 
Oudendijk in Beijing to remind the Chinese government of the unfulfilled obligation. 
For years Oudendijk and his Belgian and French colleagues sent notes to the Chinese 
foreign ministry protesting about this matter. They usually did this twice a year, each 
time when another scheduled date of payment had passed. Apart from this the Dutch 
government could not do much.  
 
1928-1937 
The NSC never recoverd from the Longhai debacle, and no new activities were 
initiated after the mid-1920s. The company merely continued to act as a 
representative office for Havenwerken and the Dutch industrial companies. 788  In 
1926 the NSC was hired to make a study for a ferry project across the Yangtse 
between Nanjing and Pukou, and in 1930 it signed the Huludao harbour contract on 
behalf of Havenwerken. In 1934 an order to equip a paper mill in Guangdong was 
obtained for Werkspoor, Heemaf, and Stork. Unlike the contruction of the Longhai 
railway, these contracts were not carried out by the NSC iteself but by the firms it 
represented. All the while, the Dutch banks that controlled the NSC and that had 
invested heavily in Longhai bonds never ceased the battle to get their money back.  
In 1928 when the Netherlands was intending to negotiate with the newly 
established Guomindang government about China’s import tariff, the bondholders 
association demanded that the Netherlands would not agree to a tariff revision unless 
part of the import revenue were used for the Longhai debt. But the Dutch 
government was not at all prepared to have the signing of a new tariff agreement 
jeopardised by making it dependent on this matter.789 The NSC was important, but 
not more so than Chinese-Dutch trade as a whole. Furthermore, even though the 
political situation stabilised after 1928, the fact that the people in control of the 
railway were not interested in co-operation with the foreign investors and builders 
                                                          
786 De Vos to Oudendijk 29 May 1929, Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Hague, Peking IV, MI5, 193 
Lunghai. 
787 For instance Dutch Minister De Vos van Steenwijk to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 23 Oct. 
1935, ARA The Hague, BZ, DEZ III, 279, 770. 
788 Furthermore the NSC represented certain patents for Dutch firms. 
789 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Dutch Ministry of Finance 17 Dec. 1928, ARA, Min. Financiën, 
dossierarchief 1918-1940, 687 NUM in liquidatie, 4. 
RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION: NSC 187 
was as definite an obstacle to repayment as the chaos in the years before 1928 had 
been.  In a letter to the Dutch foreign ministry Oudendijk remarked that tying the 
Longhai matter to the new tariff would lead to nothing, since he was convinced that 
the Chinese—in this case General Feng Yuxiang—were simply unwilling to pay the 
Longhai debt. Oudendijk believed that the railway would yield enough money if only 
it were be administered more efficiently and if Feng stopped using the existing 
proceeds for military purposes.790 A request made by the NSC and the bondholders 
to the Dutch government in 1929 asking that the Dutch share of the Boxer indemnity 
to be used to strengthen their position also produced no effect.791  
                                                          
In 1933 the Dutch bondholders association with its Belgian and French 
counterparts even went as far as to approach the League of Nations. The 
Guomindang government was not entirely immune to this kind of pressure, since it 
wanted to conclude new international loans. Moreover, extra pressure came from 
Japanese side when the Japanese Consul General in Nanjing announced that Japan 
was quite prepared to take over the Longhai bonds.792 In 1936, in return for a new 
Belgian loan of 450 million francs to build a new railway to connect the Longhai line 
with Chengdu in Sichuan province, China proposed that it would recommence the 
Longhai interest payments that had been halted in 1925. The Chinese government 
demanded that all interest growth up to 1 July 1936 would be annulled and that 
repayment of the debt itself would not begin until 1 July 1947, and the bondholders 
felt they had no option but agree and hope that they would get at least something.793 
After a few years interest payments stopped again because of the war with Japan. 
Eventually China’s foreign Longhai debt was never repaid. The Longhai railway 
itself was finished only in the 1950s.794  
Because after 1925 the NSC was merely an agent for other companies, and had 
no other activities than this representative work, political risks did not form an 
important threat. This lack of risk is the main reason why the banks allowed the NSC 
to continue to exist.795 During the 1930s the only actute political risks were those 
arising from a Japanese occupation of China, but these effectively stymied any 
demand for Dutch harbour works or for Dutch industrial exports. The NSC had no 
other strategy than to wait and see what would happen, and when the Sino-Japanese 
war began the NSC ceased to exist as a Dutch company in China.796 In view of its 
modest size and limited range of activities, its withdrawal from China did not cause 
its owners much damage. 
790 Oudendijk to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 12 Jan. 1929 , ARA The Hague, Min. Financiën, Gen. 
Thes., 687 NUM, 4. In fact, Bossuyt calculated that throughout the 1920s the earning capacity of Longhai 
was above the average for Chinese railways: Bossuyt, ‘Belgische Bijdrage’, 228. 
791 NSC to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 31 Dec. 1929 , ARA The Hague, Min. Financiën, Gen. 
Thes., NUM, 4. 
792 Dutch Minister De Vos Steenwijk to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 13 Feb. 1936, Ministry 
Foreign Affairs The Hague, Peking VII Lunghai onderneming, MI 1936. 
793 Bossuyt, ‘Belgische Bijdrage’, 195-203. 
794 After 1928 the westward extension of Longhai was continued. When Xi’an was reached in 1937, the 
Sino-Japanese war interrupted any further work. In the late 1940s construction was carried through until 
Lanzhou was finally reached in 1952. Ibid 211. 
795 Executive and advisory boards to the shareholders of the NSC Feb. 1928, ARA The Hague, Min. 
Financiën 1918-1940, 687 NUM in liquidatie, 4 Chinese schatkistbiljetten. 
796 De Vos retired in 1938, and NSC was reorganised into the Nederlandsch Syndicaat voor Industrieelen 
Export (Netherlands Syndicate for Industrial Exports), which was no longer aimed at the Chinese market. 
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Conclusion 
The main local interest of the NSC was primarily to acquire profitable contracts for 
financial services in which the shareholding Dutch banks—the NHM, the NIHB, and 
the Twentsche Bank—would participate. In the second place its interest was to 
acquire harbour construction contracts for Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor 
Havenwerken. In the third and last place its interest was to acquire export orders for 
Dutch producers of electro-mechanical equipment. Out of this mixture of interests 
grew the NSC’s activities as a railway construction company. However, when 
Longhai turned out a bad investment for the Dutch banks, these lost their interest in 
the NSC. After 1925 the company existed exclusively as a representative agent for 
Havenwerken and the Dutch industrial exporters. In the first phase of its activity in 
China, 1920-1928, the NSC was threatened not only by civil war but also by the 
effects of nationalism. The effect of these political risks proved so destructive to the 
NSC’s involvement in Longhai that, after 1928, the NSC was reduced to no more 
that a very small representative office on behalf of its shareholders. During 1928-
1937 not Chinese nationalism but Japanese imperialism was the only political risk. 
The Japanese invasion in 1937 effectively ended the NSC’s activities in China; 
consequently there was no more relevant risk during 1937-1941. 
Civil war posed a risk to the NSC because it brought instability to the area in 
which the Longhai line was being constructed. The greater the instability, the more 
difficult it was for the NSC to complete its section or to issue bonds in Amsterdam. 
Although the Dutch firm succeeded in completing its construction activities, it did 
not manage to attract sufficient numbers of Dutch investors. Most of the bonds 
issued ended up with the Dutch banks and the Dutch government, while some 40 per 
cent was never even issued. Moreover, although the eastern section of Longhai was 
completed in time, warfare hampered the railway administration’s ability to operate 
the line profitably and to pay back the loan. The banks did not get their money back, 
and Havenwerken did not win a contract for a new harbour in Haizhou Bay. 
Therefore, checkmated by the civil wars, the NSC failed to achieve the two more 
important of its three main aims: the involvement of the banks was not profitable, 
and Havenwerken did not win any contract at all. The company’s response was to 
limit its activities and to act merely as a representative agent, which did not require 
either new investments or expose the company to undue political risks.  
During the mid-1920s Chinese nationalism was also an important political risk. 
To the instability caused by the civil wars, the rise of nationalism inspired a violent 
anti-foreign attitude among the Chinese population. This made it too dangerous for 
foreigners to continue their work for the Longhai Railway Administration and they 
had to be evacuated. Nationalism also motivated the Chinese government to expel 
foreign involvement in the managing of Longhai. These developments decreased the 
NSC’s chances of influencing the Longhai Railway into repaying its Dutch debt or 
placing new contracts with Dutch companies. Therefore, the effect of this risk was 
largely the same as the effect of the civil wars. The NSC’s response of limiting the 
scale and scope of its involvement may be regarded to be a way of dealing with 
nationalism as much as with the internecine fighting among the warlords.     
Finally, Japanese imperialism threatened the NSC’s remaining local interests after 
the mid-1920s, namely securing contracts for Havenwerken and the Dutch exporters 
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of industrial and infrastructure equipment. A Japanese-occupied China was likely to 
turn to Japanese firms for such contracts—which indeed turned out to be the case 
from 1937. Between 1925 and 1937 the NSC could not produce any response to this 
risk, other than not making new investments in a larger organisation or in more 
offices. Because its owners were not interested in using the NSC for any other 
purpose than acting as their agent in China, investments for relocating the NSC from 
China to other countries were also not made. The risk of a Japanese invasion became 
reality in 1937 and ended the NSC’s activities on the Chinese market. 
 CHAPTER 7  
 
ELECTRONICS: PHILIPS 
 
‘China being a vast and almost virgin country 
from an electrification point of view, of 
approximately 400,000,000 people, was [in 
1924] naturally looked upon by all of us as 
possessing enormous potentialities for the 
future. Since the beginning of 1924 more than 7 
years have passed, and although China has 
been more or less pacified, and [in spite of its] 
development and its vast resources, as 
evidenced by the number of new power 
stations, increased building activities etc. I 
regret to have to confess that, in my opinion, 
the members of the China Lamp Committee 
[i.e., Philips, Osram, and GE], jointly and 
individually, did not succeed in obtaining their 
due share of considerable increased 
consumption of electric lamps.’  
A. Masseurs (Philips) to  
H. Page (GE), 7 April 1931.797 
 
Overall Corporate Interest 
Philips was established in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, on 15 May 1891 as a 
manufacturing firm for incandescent electric lamps, or light bulbs.798 Two aspects of 
the incorporation were highly significant for the company’s ownership structure. In 
the first place Philips began its existence as a family firm, being entirely owned by 
Frederik Philips and his sons Gerard and Anton.799 At least until World War II, the 
Philips family continued to play a prominent role in both management and 
ownership. In the second place the company was created without help from external 
investors. Frederik Philips happened to own a bank, and used his bank to finance the 
lamps firm.800 He let his sons act as managing directors of the light bulb factory and 
supplied them with the credit needed to get the new company on its feet. By the time 
investors from outside the family became involved in the company for the first time, 
Gerard and Anton were experienced business managers and well-acquainted with the 
light bulb industry. 
                                                          
797 Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China, 167 correspondentie Loupart 1929-1936. 
798 The full name was ‘Philips & Co.’; from 1912-1991 ‘NV Philips’ Gloeilampenfabrieken’; from 1991 
‘Philips Electronics NV’. The English name used abroad during the 1920s-1930s was ‘Philips 
Glowlampworks Ltd’. 
799 Anton, who was much younger than Gerard, did not become partner in the firm until 1899. When 
Frederik died in 1900, Gerard and Anton were the sole owners of Philips & Co. The Philips bank became 
the property of a brother of Gerard and Anton. 
800 A. Heerding, Geschiedenis van de NV Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken II: Een Onderneming van Vele 
Markten Thuis (Leiden 1986), 49. The bank was named ‘Fred. Philips’, established in 1871 and became 
part of Mees & Hope in 1969. 
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Participation by non-family investors first occurred in 1912,801 when company shares 
were issued on the Amsterdam financial market.802 Further shares were issued in 
1919 and on eight other occasions in the 1924-1930 period.803 Although from 1912, 
and certainly by the 1930s, Philips was largely owned by outside investors, these did 
not have much influence. Apart from the shares held by a small group of very large 
shareholders, ownership was highly fragmented and company data supplied by 
management at the shareholders’ meetings was very limited.804 Moreover, in 1920 
measures were taken to remove voting rights from the external shareholders.805 But 
while the small shareholders had no direct influence in the company, there also were 
three major shareholders who did have a high degree of control. The first major 
shareholder was the Philips family, which after the restructuring of 1912 still was the 
largest single shareholder. 806  The second major shareholder was the bank 
Labouchere Oyens & Co., which managed the first share floatation in 1912 and 
which led a syndicate of institutional investors. The third major shareholder was 
General Electric (GE), the world’s largest manufacturer of electrical equipment and a 
major competitor of Philips.807  Unlike the other shareholders, GE participated in 
Philips not to obtain dividends but to create a stable basis for the strategic alliance to 
                                                          
801 Initially, when new capital was attracted from outside the Philips bank, only money from members of 
the Philips family was used. On 9 Oct. 1907 a new company was created, the NV Philips’ 
Metaalgloeilampenfabriek, to engage in the manufacture of incandescent lamps with a metal wire. The 
existing firm, Philips & Co., only made the older type of lamps which had a carbon wire. The owners of 
the Metaalgloeilampfabriek were Gerard Philips (holding 30 per cent of the shares), Anton Philips (30 per 
cent), Henri Louis Philips (20 per cent), Eduard Philips (10 per cent), and Henri van Anrooy (a brother-in-
law of Gerard and Anton; 10 per cent). The managing board was made up of the same persons as that of 
Philips & Co.’s: Gerard and Anton Philips. The other three shareholders constituted the advisory board. 
Although technically a separate firm, the Metaalgloeilampfabriek functioned as a department of Philips & 
Co. The reason for working with separate companies was to enable the Philips brothers to enter the still 
new business field of metal-wired lamps in which the outcome of lawsuits over patents were difficult to 
predict: Heerding, Philips I, 175.  
802  For this purpose on 29 August 1912 the assets of Philips & Co. and the NV Philips’ 
Metaalgloeilampenfabriek were transferred to a new company, the NV Philips’ Gloeilampfabrieken: ibid. 
359. 
803 In 1924, 1925, 1927, 1928 (twice), 1929 (twice), and 1930: I.J. Blanken, Geschiedenis van Philips 
Electronics NV III: De Ontwikkeling van de NV Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken tot Electrotechnisch 
Concern (1922-1934), (Leiden 1992), 66 and 316. 
804 For instance, profit and loss figures provided to the advisory board were not the same as those 
provided to the shareholders: Blanken, Philips III, 315. 
805 In 1920 the ‘NV Gemeenschappelijk Bezit van Aandelen Philips Gloeilampfabrieken Eindhoven’ was 
established, which purchased all outstanding Philips shares and instead issued its own shares, which 
carried the same dividend rights as Philips shares but only limited voting rights: M. Metze, Kortsluiting: 
Hoe Philips Zijn Talenten Verspilde (Nijmegen 1991), 193-194. 
806 In 1912 the family held 71 per cent of the regular shares; a syndicate led by the bank Labouchere 
Oyens & Co. held another 17 per cent—however, of this half was in the hands of the bank of Frederik 
Philips. The remaining 12 per cent of the regular shares (100 per cent amounting to 3.5 million guilders) 
plus all of the cumulative preferred shares (totalling 2.25 million guilders) were owned by a large number 
of external investors: Heerding, Philips I, 359-360. Labouchere Oyens & Co., which was established in 
1881 and from 1913 was owned by the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, managed the original floatation in 
1912: ibid. 367. 
807 Not to be confused with the British ‘General Electric Company Ltd’ (GEC), one of Britain’s main 
light bulb producers. 
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be formed between the two companies in 1919.808 This alliance was a precursor to 
the Phoebus cartel that was formed in 1924 on the initiative of GE and that included 
all of the world’s major light bulb manufacturers. 
                                                          
The three major shareholders in Philips did not exercise control through the 
shareholders’ meeting but through the supervisory board, which was established in 
1912. By the time Philips became active in China, the Philips family was represented 
on this board by various family members, Labouchere by G.H. de Marez Oyens, and 
GE by J.M Woodward.809 The background of the latter two was relevant with respect 
to the Chinese market. De Marez Oyens also was on the managing board of the 
Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank, and on the supervisory boards of Havenwerken 
and the NSC. Woodward was on the board of International General Electric, a GE 
subsidiary that owned and supervised the American firm’s foreign assets, including 
those in China.810  
Whereas before 1912 control of the firm had been concentrated in the hands of 
Gerard and Anton Philips, from this year they had to share it with the supervisory 
board. The two managing directors were obliged to report monthly to the supervisory 
board, and to make strategic decisions in conjunction with the board. 811  When 
Gerard retired as managing director and joined the supervisory board in 1922, his 
sixteen-year younger brother Anton remained as the sole director. It was Anton who 
from the 1920s transformed the company from a light bulb manufacturer into the 
giant electronics producer it was by the time he died in 1951. He was an autocratic 
leader who built a huge business empire through his energetic efforts and his talent 
for marketing strategy. However, after his brother retired Anton Philips still did not 
rule the company entirely on his own. During the 1920s, governance was divided 
between him and the supervisory board. While the board needed Anton’s experience 
and managerial influence to direct the company, Anton needed the board’s consent 
for any important decision. The did board did not derive its influence primarily from 
its formal right to supervise the managing director; rather its influence was based on 
the fact that the board relied only to a limited extent on Anton to acquire knowledge 
about the company. Until the mid-1920s the organisational structure of Philips was 
relatively underdeveloped, as the firm consisted only of an electric lamps division 
and the various departments within this division—such as production, marketing, and 
research—had a straightforward structure and were not bureaucratised. This gave 
Anton Philips little opportunity to allocate large financial means without knowledge 
of the supervisory board, and as a result the board was the dominant partner in its 
relationship with the managing director.  
808 Ibid. 411. GE sold its interest in Philips in the 1950s. GE also took an interest in Philips’ main 
German competitors AEG (in 1929, raised to 25 per cent in 1930) and Siemens ($11 million in shares in 
1929): Wilkins, Maturing, 67-68. 
809 During 1912-1941 the members of the advisory board were Eduard Philips (1912-1941), Henri L. 
Philips (1912-1935), C.H. Wagenaar Hummelinck (1912-1914), G. van Mesdag (1912-1939), G.H. de 
Marez Oyens (for Labouchere bank; 1912-1934), G. Swope (for GE, 1919-1922), J.M. Woodward (for GE; 
1922-1934), Gerard Philips (1922-1939), August Philips (1930-1939), J.W. Beyen (1933-1950), C.H. 
Minor (for GE; 1933-1950). Eduard and Henri were brothers of Gerard and Anton, while August was their 
cousin. Wagenaar Hummink and Van Mesdag were leaders of industrial firms, and chosen because of their 
knowledge of the sector: Heerding, Philips I. The board had circa five members. 
810 Blanken, Philips III, 66.  
811 Each month a financial report was submitted: ibid. 384.  
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But as time passed, this relationship gradually grew more balanced. From the mid-
1920s Philips developed into a multi-divisional concern with an organisation that 
covered a large number of countries. 812  During the first half of the 1930s the 
concern’s greatly expanded size and complexity were of necessity given a new 
control structure. Forced by the rigours of the Great Depression to develop efficient 
means to monitor and allocate corporate finances, management was formalised and 
by the second half of the 1930s a managerial hierarchy had developed. This 
managerial hierarchy consisted of managers who supervised the various divisions, 
departments, and foreign assets.813 They reported not only to Anton, who by the 
1930s no longer managed all main operations directly, but also to a group of top-
managers.814 Eventually—after the Second World War—this group was formalised 
as the company’s managing board, the former managing director becaming its 
chairman. 815  Thus, during the 1930s the managerial hierarchy became the main 
element in the company’s control structure. Philips was growing too large and 
complex for the supervisory board to have access to detailed knowledge and 
managerial influence. More than it had done during the 1910s and 1920s, the 
supervisory board depended on the concern’s top management—Anton plus the other 
leading managers—to govern. Yet, the members of the supervisory board were by 
then very experienced and probably still highly influential. Therefore, during the 
1930s control of Philips was shared more or less equally between the supervisory 
board and the top executives. 
The company’s main overall interests were defined by this relationship between 
the dominant groups of stakeholders. To understand what these stakeholders’ 
interests were it is necessary to take a closer look, first at the ownership side and then 
at the management side. With regard to the owners, the interests of the family, 
Labouchère bank, and GE should all be taken into account. The family may be 
assumed to have been interested in both profitability and growth, while the bank was 
interested only in profitability. GE’ s interest in Philips was related to specific policy 
issues, which may be characterised as those related to regulation of the international 
light bulb market. In spite of co-operation in this field, the brands of Philips and GE 
continued to compete and in the long run the two concerns remained each other’s 
rival. Therefore, during the 1920s and 1930s, the main interests on the ownership 
side were a mixture of growth, profitability, and restricted co-operation with GE. On 
the management side, the main party during the 1920s was simply the managing 
director: Anton Philips. During the 1930s this was extended to include also the top-
managers of the main departments or divisions in the 1930s. Each divisional leader 
tended to favour policy measures that benefited its own division. Still, it may 
assumed that the outcome of their behaviour at the company level contributed to the 
same goal: in the end all managers, including Anton, favoured growth of the 
company.  
                                                          
812 Ibid. 417. During the 1920s Philips was organised along informal structures; when compared with 
Osram and Vereinigte Glühlampen- und Elektricitäts, it made a chaotic impression: ibid. 75. 
813 Ibid. 418. 
814 Ibid. 105. 
815 During the 1930s the main members of the informal managing board were, besides Anton Philips, J.H. 
Gaarenstroom (lamps marketing), H.F. van Walsem (legal), O.M.E. Loupart (radio marketing), P.F.S. 
Otten (general), and F.J. Philips (production). See also Wennekes, Aartsvaders, 304. 
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In the 1920s the supervisory board was the dominant party in its relationship with 
management, while in the following decade both sides were equally influential. 
Therefore throughout the 1920s-1930s period, Philips’ primary interests combined 
those of the supervisory board and management: profitability (for the family and the 
bank), growth (for the leading managers and the family), and co-operating in certain 
respects with GE (for GE). Before circa 1930 expansion was subordinate to 
profitability and the relationship with GE, but thereafter all three aims assume equal 
importance.  
 
The Light Bulb and Radio Trade in China 
By the early 1920s China was one of the more attractive areas for rapid expansion in 
light bulb sales. The largest markets were in the Western countries, where 
competition was intense and little scope for fast expansion existed. By contrast, 
China was a very large country where the introduction of electricity was only just 
beginning. During the 1920s the major coastal cities of China were electrified, which 
created a strong new demand. China was expected to become a major market for 
lamps, and therefore it represented an excellent opportunity for expansion, and 
eventually profit. As yet there was no strong indigenous industry for electrical lamps, 
but the leading international lamps manufacturers, GE and Osram, were rapidly 
building up a presence on the Chinese market. 816  Osram was Europe’s largest 
producer of lamps and a joint venture of the giant electronics and electromechanical 
concerns from Germany, AEG and Siemens.817 Even though General Electric, which 
owned a light bulb factory in Shanghai, was a major shareholder of Philips, the 
American and Dutch firm competed on many local markets. Not only was China 
attractive for expansion, but Philips also had to act fast if it wanted to keep up with 
GE and Osram.818 
About 1920 Philips entered a phase of intensive foreign marketing. With the 
Dutch home market being relatively small, exports were more important to Philips 
than to its German and American competitors. Because the First World War had 
upset international market conditions, new possibilities had opened up for the Dutch 
company. Previously Philips used mainly agency firms to sell its light bulbs in 
foreign countries, but after the war it systematically began to establish foreign 
distribution subsidiaries to replace the agents.819 An important reason behind this 
                                                          
816 Osram already had a strong position in China in 1922: Blanken, Philips III, 68. 
817 GE was a large shareholder in AEG, and thus also held an interest in Osram, which was established in 
1919. Apart from Siemens and AEG, the Auer Gesellschaft also participated: I.J. Blanken, 'Philips in 
Japan: De Verhouding tussen Philips en Japanse Elektrotechnische Bedrijven, c.1930-1950' in: C.A. 
Davids, W. Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk (eds), Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: Studies over 
Economie en Politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot Heden, Amsterdam, 553 n8. 
818 When Philips was still preparing the formation of the PCC in June of 1923, it proposed to GE, via 
Woodward and IGE, that a price cartel should be arranged for China which would include Osram. At the 
time competition between the various firms kept selling prices in China very low. The likely motive behind 
this proposal was that Philips wanted to make it possible for the new subsidiary to finance itself. Once 
initial investments had been earned back and turnover would be high enough, Philips would be able to cut 
prices periodically when and if it seemed opportune. It seems less likely that Philips wanted to co-operate 
with its rivals to maximise profits also in the longer run, because in 1923 the company was still engaged in 
catching up on the light bulb business of GE and Osram. Philips Eindhoven to J.M. Woodward (GE Paris) 
7 June 1923, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.2 correspondentie 1923-1949. 
819 Blanken, ‘Philips in Japan’, 553.  
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policy was that agency firms were less efficient in terms of costs and control than 
were subsidiary firms. The agent’s commission drove the selling price up and it was 
difficult for the company to control his sales policy. Establishing a small subsidiary 
was often sufficient to replace the agent, and this kept investment costs low. In China 
the growth rate of the market was high enough to justify the expectation that 
expenses could easily be met and that a profit would soon be made. In other words: 
investing in China promoted expansion, but did not involve the risk that corporate 
continuity or profitability would be negatively affected. At that time the firm of John 
Richards & Co. in Shanghai acted as Philips’ agent, and in February 1923 Philips 
stationed a representative in China to supervise and expand the agency business in 
East and Southeast Asia, excluding Japan.820 Shortly after his appointment, A.G.H. 
Masseurs, the new representative, reported to Eindhoven that Richards & Co. was 
too small to manage the growing trade in electric lamps. Instead, Masseurs 
suggested, he himself should establish and manage a branch office to stimulate 
sales. 821  His advice was acted upon and China became the first non-European 
country where Philips established a distribution subsidiary.822 
For the time being Philips was only interested in selling light bulbs in the largest 
cities, therefore it could comfortably limit its activities to the main treaty ports. The 
Western presence and the availability of a great number of foreign and Chinese 
intermediary firms in places like Shanghai, Tianjin, Qingdao, and Guangzhou made 
it relatively easy for Philips to integrate into the local business environment. Other 
Western corporations already operated distribution subsidiaries in China, and Philips 
was able to learn from them how to contact local dealers, promote sales, and 
transport and store goods. The process was also helped by the fact that when 
Masseurs started the Shanghai office, he managed to secure the services of the 
compradore and one British manager of the now redundant agent John Richards & 
Co.823  On 18 October 1923 at the Dutch consulate general in Shanghai, Philips’ 
distribution subsidiary for the Chinese market was incorporated as the Philips China 
                                                          
820 China kroniek, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882. 
821 A. Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 25 March 1923, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 PCC. 
Initially Masseurs proposed that the sales organisation would be a joint venture, in which Philips would be 
the major shareholder but in which shares would also be taken by three Dutch electro-mechanical firms—
Heemaf, Du Croo & Brauns, and Draka—the manager of the engineering department of Richards—Mr 
Frost—and Masseurs himself. This reduced the financial risk for Philips, and the electro-mechanical 
activities gave the new firm a broader basis than just the light bulb trade: A. Masseurs (Philips Shanghai) 
to Philips Eindhoven 25 March 1923, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek. Philips rejected the 
inclusion of shareholders other than itself, but did accept the need to establish the new subsidiary as a 
distribution firm for both bulbs and electro-mechanical equipment. This was put into practice from 
December 1924 when the PCC obtained an agency contract for Draka, a Dutch manufacturer of electric 
wiring. Its full name was NV Hollandsche Draad- en Kabelfabrieken (also Holland Insulated Wire & Cable 
Works). Since 1913 Philips had held a large number of Draka shares, and Anton Philips, and possibly of 
the members of the Philips advisory board as well, were on the advisory board of Draka: Heerding, Philips 
I, 378. The PCC continued this work until late 1936: Philips Eindhoven PCA 882.2 PCC, China Draka. In 
spite of its work for Draka, the PCC’s interests in electro-mechanical equipment remained far less 
important than those in light bulbs, and later than those in radio equipment. In 1936-1937 the PCC acted 
also as agent for Fokker, the Dutch aeroplane manufacturer, but did not succeed in selling any planes. 
822 When Philips first contracted an agency firm in China can no longer be traced—certainly later than 
1900 when Philips’ only two Asian agencies were located in Yokohama and Surabaya: Heerding, Philips I, 
64. There are indications that Carlowitz & Co. held Philips agencies in China in 1919: China kroniek, 
Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882. 
823 Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 25 March 1923, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 PCC. 
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Company (PCC). 824  The office was located in the International Settlement of 
Shanghai.825 Masseurs was appointed managing director, and a compradore contract 
was signed with the compradore of Richards & Co.826 Eindhoven kept the office on a 
tight rein: Masseurs had to consult the head office on almost any decision. Moreover, 
he had only limited financial and organisational means. The number of employees 
was small and grew only very slowly the 1920s. By 1929 PCC had a sales and an 
accounting department plus a warehouse, with a total of twenty-five employees, of 
whom seven were expatriates.827 Masseurs reported to J.H. Gaarenstroom, Anton 
Philips’ assistant for lamps marketing at the head office in Eindhoven.  
In seeking a model for local agency relations, Masseurs could follow the 
examples set by Shell’s Asiatic Petroleum Company and other pioneering foreign 
distributing companies. Like Shell—before it established its up-country network—
PCC used foreign trading firms as agents in the larger Chinese cities to sell to 
Chinese dealers. Agency contracts were signed with Carlowitz & Co. for Hankou, 
Qingdao, Jinan, Beijing, Shenyang, and Tianjin; 828  the Holland-China 
Handelscompagnie for Hong Kong and Guangzhou; and the Dutch firm of L. van der 
Hoeven for Harbin.829 Representatives of PCC regularly visited the agents and the 
Chinese dealers to analyse local market conditions. Furthermore, the PCC tried to 
acquire orders directly from large customers such as railway and tramway 
companies, and electro-mechanical engineering firms. Although much smaller than 
Shell’s network, the PCC agency system was able to distribute light bulbs in all 
major cities, the only places where there was a demand for the time being. Should 
future market developments make further expansion desirable, then Philips could 
open new branch offices in other cities or contract agents in the interior of the 
country.  
                                                          
824 Akte van Oprichting 18 Okt. 1923, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.1 PCC. The PCC was formally 
owned by three other Philips subsidiaries: NV Philips’  Metaalgloeilampenfabriek, NV Expeditiekantoor 
voorheen A. Wouters & Co., and NV Eindhovensche Drukkerij voorheen Schaefer & Co. The reason for 
this is unknown. The PCC was established as a firma onder vennootschap for three years, its registration 
being renewed every three years until 1941. Philips had preferred to establish the PCC as a naamloze 
vennootschap but at the time the Dutch consular service was unqualified to register Dutch firms as NV. 
Philips did request the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to initiate a change in the relevant regulations; 
therefore it is possible that from its first renewal of registration in 1926 the PCC was an NV or limited 
liability firm: Philips Eindhoven to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 20 Aug. 1923, ibid. A third option, 
registration as commanditaire vennootschap was rejected by Philips because using the same name as the 
parent was prohibited, and Philips had a strong desire to name the subsidiary either Philips China Ltd or 
Philips China Company. Finally, Masseurs informed Philips that although it was possible to incorporate 
the PCC under British law—which many businesses in China did—he did not think that this was a good 
idea, because the managing director would then have to have British nationality: Masseurs (Shanghai) to 
Philips Eindhoven 25 March 1923, ibid.  
825 At 41 Szechuan Road, in the Brunner Mond Building owned by ICI. Kennisgeving 27 Aug. 1923, 
ibid. 
826 His name was Sui Kai King. 
827 Lijst van PCC werknemers 1929, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek. 
828 Carlowitz & Co. was possibly the largest German trading firm in China. It was a major importer of 
heavy machinery, railroad and mining equipment, and weapons: Feuerwerker, Foreign Establishment, 82.    
829 Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 8 Aug. 1927, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.1 PCC. Van der 
Hoeven was also agent for the APC and honorary consul for the Netherlands.  
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Chinese coolies carrying a case of Philips light bulbs in the harbour of Shanghai, 
1929 (reproduced by kind permission of Philips Electronics) 
 
In market development, Philips also benefited from Shell’s activities in the preceding 
decades. Kerosene light often was more expensive but produced a better light than 
vegetable oil light. However, light from electric lamps was more expensive but better 
than light from kerosene lamps.830 The availability of kerosene made commercial 
activity less dependent on daylight and the existence of such activity meant that a 
market for electric lighting was present. Therefore, apart from foreigners and their 
businesses, Chinese manufacturing firms and railway companies were also important 
consumers of electric light bulbs. As the use of electric light caught on among private 
Chinese consumers in the large cities, the market for kerosene became more confined 
to rural China.831 Electricity production in China proper doubled between 1926 and 
1935 (from 751 million kWh to 1,569 million kWh); in 1934 private homes 
accounted for two-thirds of total electricity consumption. 832  In 1930 the Chinese 
                                                          
830 Another similarity shared between kerosene and electric bulbs was that both were sold mainly during 
winter, when daylight hours were fewer.  
831 Nevertheless, Shell’s up-country inspectors sometimes reported new electric light companies outside 
the large cities. For instance, see up-country inspector’s diary Apr.-May 1928 Hangzhou sales area, Shell 
London, E.G. Masters papers. 
832  Osterhammel, Britischer Imperialismus, 148-149. In 1933 63 per cent of electrical power was 
produced by foreign-owned utilities, and almost the entire output was consumed in the larger cities: 
Feuerwerker, Foreign Establishment, 91. 
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market for electric lamps probably consisted of almost 20 million lamps.833 In the 
same year Philips sold 1.1 million light bulbs in China, against 81.5 million bulbs 
world-wide.834 For reasons that will be explained below, sales in China were never 
more than 1.6 per cent of Philips’ total sales.  
In the mid-1920s the company’s marketing strategy changed drastically. The 
expansion of its sales increasingly met opposition from GE and Osram, not just in 
Europe but everywhere. 835  They had also become increasingly interested in 
developing new growth markets like China, and before long all parties were 
worrying about the low prices which were the inevitable outcome of intense price 
wars. In addition to the co-operation that already existed between Philips and GE, 
Osram and General Electric now offered Philips a share in a new cartel for electric 
light bulbs that would cover most parts of the world. There are indications that Anton 
Philips felt confident that his concern was strong enough to continue expansion 
rather than stabilise the company’s market share by joining the cartel. However, the 
Philips supervisory board did not want to take such a risk and decided in favour of 
participation in the cartel. Safeguarding profitability, not expansion, was given 
maximum priority.836  
On 20 December 1924 the agreement for the so-called Phoebus cartel was signed 
by the major European light bulb producers.837 This agreement did not cover the 
American market and GE did not participate directly—it was legally restrained from 
doing so by anti-cartel laws in the US. Only its foreign subsidiary International 
General Electric joined the cartel. Without the direct participation of American 
companies, Philips was the second largest member of Phoebus, coming in behind 
Osram. An immediate result of the cartel arrangement was that Philips was not 
allowed to let its sales in China exceed 1.6 per cent of its world-wide sales, which in 
turn had to remain at 20.2 per cent of the combined turnover of all Phoebus 
                                                          
833 In 1930 Philips sold 1,135,138 light bulbs in China. According to the local cartel (‘China Lamp 
Committee’) agreement this was about 10 per cent of the cartel total, which must have been circa 11.4 
million. In April 1931 the cartel estimated to be holding 55 per cent of the market. If this figure applied to 
1930 the total market was 20.7 million lamps. However, the tone of the cartel report suggests that a share 
of 55 per cent in April 1931 was less than what the cartel occupied before, therefore the 1930 market total 
must have been somewhat less than 20 million lamps. Verkoopstatistiekgegevens per artikelengroep en per 
land, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 81:87, boek 2b 1928-1939, 869a; minutes of the meeting of the China Lamp 
Committee of 15 April 1931, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek; A. Masseurs (Shanghai) to 
Philips Eindhoven 28 April 1931, ibid. 
834 Philips concern totaal: gloeilampen 1930, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 81:87 verkoopstatistiekgegevens 
per artikelgroep en per land, boek 2a 1928-1939, 869a. 
835 Osram experienced severe problems on its home market when the German economy entered a phase 
of depression in 1923, which forced it to push sales in non-Western markets: Blanken, Philips III, 91. 
836 The members of the advisory board unanimously decided that the security offered by the cartel was 
preferable to the uncertainty of competition—even if competition would possibly induce greater benefits to 
the firm: ibid. 1902. 
837 Ibid. 107. The cartel was co-ordinated by a firm that was established for this purpose in Geneva in 
1925: the SA Phoebus Compagnie Industrielle pour le Developpement de l’Eclairage. Phoebus, the 
Latinisation of the Greek Phoibos (meaning ‘bright’), referred to Phoebus Apollo, the Graeco-Roman god 
in his capacity of god of light. In addition to the fact that the reference to Apollo was suitable for an 
organisation of light bulb manufacturers, it was also fitting for a market-regulating cartel because the 
ancient Greek cult of Apollo was associated with the ideal of keeping within one’s limits (‘nothing too 
much’).   
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members.838 Because of this, China lost its characteristic of a market where rapid 
growth could be achieved in the light bulb trade. Phoebus froze Philips’ position on 
the markets for electric light bulbs in the rest of the world as well. On the one hand 
this change in market relations compelled Philips to look for new expansion 
opportunities, which it found by diversifying into the manufacture and distribution of 
radio equipment. Philips China Company also developed new interests in the local 
radio market. On the other hand, in the light bulbs market itself the PCC now had to 
come to terms with GE and Osram about how to apply Phoebus to local conditions. 
Price wars fought between the large light bulb manufacturers in 1923-1924 had 
pushed other Western firms out of the Chinese market,839 and large-scale production 
by Asian manufacturers had not yet got underway. Consequently, in 1924 Philips, 
GE, and Osram, found that among the three of them they occupied almost the entire 
Chinese light bulb market. By this time all three companies had wholly-owned 
distribution subsidiaries in China,840 and after the establishment of Phoebus these 
subsidiaries concluded a local cartel arrangement for China. This local cartel was 
institutionalised as the China Lamp Committee (CLC), consisting of the managing 
directors of Philips China, Osram China, and China General Edison (CGE; GE’s 
China subsidiary). The cartel partners agreed to limit their shares of the mutual sales 
figures to a ratio of 45-45-10 for GE, Osram, and Philips respectively.841 Apart from 
limiting sales figures, the China Lamp Committee also decided about agency selling 
prices. Masseurs felt increasingly uncomfortable about this situation. He complained 
that often near the end of each fiscal year, Philips had to turn down orders from 
customers and raise prices to prevent transgressing the 10 per cent market share 
limit.842 Furthermore, each CLC partner agreed to lowering prices—needed to keep 
outside competitors away—only in those parts of China where it occupied a weaker 
                                                          
838 In 1938 the turnover ratio Philips: Phoebus was 23.7 per cent. For Osram these figure were 28.2 per 
cent and 31.0 per cent respectively: Ibid. 115 and 121 
839 Osram and GE were represented in China by their agents, GEC (China) and Andersen, Meyer & Co. 
Both agents were member of Phoebus, GEC for the GEC/British Thomson-Houston group and Andersen 
Meyer for International GE (which held GE’s foreign interests).  
840 GE’s manufacturing and distribution subsidiary in Shanghai, China General Edison Company, was 
established in 1917: Wilkins, Maturing, 28-29. Osram’s distribution subsidiary in Shanghai, Osram China, 
was established probably about 1924:  W.C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford 1984), 24.  
841 Why Philips accepted such a small part in this highly restrictive scheme is uncertain. Possibly CGE 
and Osram China had shown a greater preparedness to take financial risks in China and had performed far 
better than Philips China until December 1924. Special arrangements were made for Hong Kong and 
Manchuria where the British firms the GEC and the British Thomson-Houston Company (BTH), and the 
Japanese firm the Tokyo Electric Company (TEC) respectively were also allowed to market their lamps. 
Although the GEC of Britain (‘General Electric Company, Ltd’) and GE of the US (‘General Electric 
Company’) had almost identical names, they were not related either through a common history or through 
shareholding. BTH, in which GE had held a controlling interest since 1906, was formed in 1894. The TEC, 
in which GE had held a controlling interest since 1905, and Shibaura Engineering, in which GE held a 
minority interest since 1910, later merged to become Tokyo Shibaura Electric or Toshiba: M. Wilkins, The 
Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914 
(Cambridge MA 1970), 94. Both the GEC and the TEC were member of Phoebus. The GEC was 
represented in China through its subsidiary the GEC of China, and had the right to use the Osram 
trademark for lamps in Hong Kong. 
842 Masseurs (Shanghai) to H. Page (GE Shanghai) 7 Apr. 1931, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China, 167 
correspondentie Loupart 1929-1936. 
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position than the other CLC members. 843  The result was that CLC was slow to 
respond to the Chinese and Japanese light bulb manufacturers, who entered the 
market with low quality, cheap electric lamps that quickly became popular with the 
Chinese consumers during the 1920s.844 The economic depression after 1930 greatly 
stimulated the relative advantage of cheaper products. Consequently, the position of 
the three CLC firms deteriorated from almost complete domination in 1924 to about 
55 per cent in 1931.845  
Philips’ individual market share was likewise diminishing, and Masseurs claimed 
that he was unable to turn the tide, unless the way the cartel companies co-operated 
would change. At a meeting of the China Lamp Committee in April of 1931, 
Masseurs suggested that a closer form of co-operation than simply a turnover and 
price regulating agreement was needed to stop the upsurge of Chinese and Japanese 
competition.846 His colleagues from CGE and Osram China agreed, and a collective 
proposal was submitted to the parent companies of the three firms. The plan was to 
merge the three distribution organisations into a joint venture, in order to cut 
overhead expenses and to make a more effective pricing policy possible. Moreover, 
the CLC representatives wanted to include GE’s lamp factory in Shanghai into the 
new organisation, so that also Philips- and Osram-brand light bulbs would be 
manufactured locally.847 This increase in output would enable the factory to lower 
production costs, which would greatly enhance the capacity of the projected joint 
venture to wage price wars against the Asian competitors.  
The war in Manchuria which broke out in September 1931 subjected Japanese 
light bulbs in China proper to a consumer boycott,848 but this did not provide much 
relief for the CLC. The nationalism on which the boycott was based benefited the 
Chinese producers much more than it did the CLC. 849  Philips, GE, and Osram 
decided to approve Masseurs’s proposal to initiate the integration of their distribution 
operations, but they refrained from including the GE factory in the new joint venture. 
A new collectively-owned distribution firm was formed as an American corporation 
under the name China United Lamp Company (Culco), which became operational on 
                                                          
843 In 1927 Philips had a strong position in the lower Yangzi area and in Hong Kong and Beijing. Osram 
was strong in Harbin, GE in Shenyang, Tokyo Electroc in Shenyang, and the Japanese non-cartel brands in 
Qingdao, Shenyang, Harbin: Masseurs, ‘Reis door Noord China’ 12 Oct. 1927, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 
882 China kroniek.  
844 This does not include the Tokyo Electric Company. Because of Phoebus, the Japanese market was 
closed to Philips, and TEC had the right to market in Manchuria. Competition in Manchuria and China 
proper came largely from small Japanese producers who were not part of Phoebus: Blanken, ‘Philips in 
Japan’, 555-556. 
845 Masseurs (Shanghai) to Page (Shanghai) 7 Apr. 1931, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China, 167 
correspondentie Loupart 1929-1936. 
846 Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 28 Apr. 1931, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek. 
847 In fact, the general manager of China General Edison proposed as early as April 1923 that his factory 
would produce lamps for the Asian markets of Philips and Osram: A. Masseurs (Philips Shanghai) to 
Philips Eindhoven 19 April 1923, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.2 PCC, correspondentie 1923-1946. There 
had also been attempts to create a common selling organisation. These had failed because ‘firstly, it was 
only a half measure and, secondly because of petty jealousy of the various Members, who each wanted to 
dominate the still born organisation”: Masseurs (Shanghai) to Page (Shanghai) 7 Apr. 1931, Philips 
Eindhoven, PCA 882 China, 167 correspondentie Loupart 1929-1936. 
848 Blanken, ‘Philips in Japan’, 555. 
849 In 1931 the China Lamp Committee estimated the output of Chinese competitors at 500,000 lamps per 
month: meeting of the China Lamp Committee of 15 April 1931, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China 
kroniek. 
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1 July 1932. The former China Lamp Committee representatives formed the 
executive members of the Culco board. Masseurs was elected managing director and 
H. Page from CGE became chairman.850 Having transferred its lighting interests to 
Culco,851 the PCC continued to exist as a distributor for radio equipment. Masseurs 
was succeeded as managing director of the PCC by W. Jongeneel, who had 
previously been stationed in Japan.  
Although Culco purchased its light bulbs from the Shanghai GE factory, these 
were still marketed under the existing—and formally competing—brand names. The 
agency networks of GE, Osram, and Philips respectively were also maintained.852 
Philips was allotted 18.7 per cent of Culco’s shares; GE owned 46.6 per cent and 
Osram 34.8 per cent.853 This entitled Philips to 18.7 per cent of dividends, but the 
number of Philips light bulbs sold by Culco was still determined by the international 
Phoebus agreement.854 Culco paid a royalty for each bulb it sold to the owner of the 
brand name under which it was sold. Another element of the reorganisation was that 
whenever the GE factory in Shanghai was unable to supply the entire number of light 
bulbs required by Culco, the latter would order additional bulbs from the European 
factories of Osram and Philips. As a result, substantial numbers of lamps were still 
imported from the Netherlands and sold to Culco by the PCC in the first few years 
after 1932 (see table V). However, after 1935 when Culco obtained all its lamps from 
the CGE factory, the PCC’s role in the distribution of light bulbs came to a definite 
end.  
The representatives of Culco’s parent companies formed an advisory committee 
that convened once or twice annually in Europe, and that functioned in the capacity 
of a supervisory board.855 Although Culco was a joint venture, it was in fact heavily 
dominated by GE. This firm held the largest number of shares, and by early 1934 
three out of five members of the board were Americans.856  In addition, GE was 
Culco’s main supplier and main agent. H. Page, chairman of the Culco board, was 
                                                          
850 At the time of incorporation the board of Culco consisted of W.S. Fleming (of Fleming, Franklin & 
Allman, FFA), C.S. Franklin (FFA), J.R. Browne (FFA), H.E. Page (CGE), A.G.H. Masseurs (PCC), V. 
Meyer (Andersen Meyer), and E. Roessler (Osram). FFA was a Shanghai law firm, its representatives were 
only temporary board members. Minutes of special meeting of stockholders of CULCO Fed. Inc. USA July 
1932, ibid.   
851 The personnel supplied by Philips to Culco—apart from Masseurs—were one European employee as 
typist and a small number of Chinese employees  as bookkeepers, office boy, or warehouse worker: 
Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 3 June 1932, ibid. 
852 The agent for GE was Andersen, Meyer & Co. Agent for Osram was the General Electric Company of 
China of the British GEC: A. Masseurs (Philips Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 25 March 1923, ibid. 
Andersen Meyer was established before the First World War as a Danish trading house in Shanghai. 
However, during the 1920s US manufacturers such as GE invested in this firm, and in the early 1930s GE 
acquired a controlling interest: Wilkins, ‘American Multinational Enterprise’, 263 and 275. 
853 The basis on which this decision was made is no longer known.  
854 Phoebus situatie China 14 Oct. 1939, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek. 
855 In 1934 the members of the advisory committee were R.G. Henderson (chairman, for GE), J.H. 
Gaarenstroom (for Philips), and C. Jensen (for Osram). In 1935 a Hungarian firm, Vereinigte Glühlampen, 
took a 7.5 per cent interest in Culco. This became effective from 1 July 1935. Vereinigte’s agent for China 
was China Engineers Ltd, its brand was Tungsram: Uittreksel uit minutes of the 6th meeting of the Culco 
advisory committee (Paris) 3 Oct. 1935, Philips Eindhoven, ibid. As a result, the stakes of the other 
shareholders diminished slightly (Philips’ stake was reduced by 1.7 per cent to 17 per cent). This alteration 
in ownership did not result in changes in the way Culco was controlled. 
856 Minutes of the annual meeting of Culco stockholders 7 Mar. 1934, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.3 
PCC, Culco board meetings 1932-1939. 
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also managing director of CGE, and Culco’s largest sales agent, Andersen Meyer & 
Co., was a GE subsidiary. 857  Although important decisions regarding price and 
dealer policy had to be approved by the advisory committee, it was above all the fact 
that Masseurs was managing director of Culco that ensured Philips’ continued 
involvement in the Chinese light bulb business. 
 
Table V. Turnover of lamps sales of Philips China Company, 1928-1938  
(from 1934 figures for May 1934-April 1935 etc.) 
 
Year Number of 
lamps 
sold
Turnover 
in 
Guilders
1928 1,054,499 464,243
1929 1,079,632 462,638
1930 1,135,138 377,118
1931 1,019,207 342,569
1932 441,390 207,057
1933 680,919 207,677
1934 455,006 106,215
1935 36,039 7,696
1936 0 6,628
1937 0 2,995
1938 0 0
 
Source: Philips Eindhoven, PCA 81:87, Verkoopstatistiekgegevens per artikelengroep en per land, boek 
2b 1928-1939, 869a. 
 
Despite their efforts in reorganising the CLC into Culco, the Western manufacturers 
were unable to recapture their lost market share. In November 1933, Masseurs 
reported to GE that competition with Chinese light bulb makers was more serious 
than ever. There now were fourteen Chinese producers, who between them made 
50,000-60,000 lamps per day. Some of them were even capable of manufacturing 
light bulbs with the same quality as those of the Western firms.858 Such good quality 
lamps were marketed in ways identical to those employed by Culco: they were 
branded and packed in individual cartons, presented in window displays, and 
advertised in newspapers. And they were cheaper. Masseurs asserted that Culco’s 
condition was ‘precarious’. After amalgamating the various sales departments and 
moving Culco’s office to the GE factory, he thought that the only step left to lower 
costs was by a full merger between Culco and CGE—that is, the GE factory.859 A 
                                                          
857 The largest company brands group sold by Culco were the GE brands, which were handled by 
Andersen Meyer & Co., a controlling interest in which was acquired by GE in the early 1930s. Andersen 
Meyer was a large trading and manufacturing firm in China: Wilkins, ‘American Multinational Enterprise’, 
263 and 275.  
858 These were Oppel, the Shanghai Lamp Company, and Hwa Teh. Apart from the fourteen Chinese 
factories, there was also a Japanese factory in Hankou: Masseurs (Shanghai) to R. Henderson (IGE 
London) 30  Nov. 1933, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China Philips Lamp Company, 167 correspondentie 
Loupart 1929-1936. 
859 Masseurs (Shanghai) to Henderson (London) 30  Nov. 1933, ibid. Masseurs may have been eager 
enough to bring the factory within his Culco organisation, in line with his original proposal, by 
exaggerating the acuteness of the problems. Also in June 1933 he had written a memorandum in which he 
ELECTRONICS: PHILIPS 203 
formal merger never took place, either because GE refused to share control of its 
factory, or because Osram and Philips refused to see their shares in Culco drop to 
insignificant levels, because the factory represented a greater financial value than 
Culco. 
On 1 September 1934 Philips lost much of the influence it had in Culco: on that 
date the resignation of Masseurs became effective. Because of certain ‘allegations’ 
that were made against him, Masseurs could not maintain his position in Culco or 
even in Philips.860 After having served Philips in China for eleven years, Masseurs 
returned to Europe. He was replaced by the director of the PCC, W. Jongeneel, who 
was able to devote only a small portion of his time to Culco. Consequently, 
Jongeneel functioned as a non-executive board member. 861  After Masseurs’s 
departure, the executive section of the board of Culco consisted of two GE 
representatives and one Osram representative.862 Even when Philips no longer had 
direct access to its operational management, Culco still represented a financial 
interest for Philips, and through Jongeneel and Gaarenstroom Philips was still 
involved in strategic decision making.  
Meanwhile, a solution still had to be found for the deterioration of Culco’s 
market position. The advisory committee and the board of Culco decided to respond 
to Chinese competition by taking a more active role in distribution. From 1 January 
1935 all agency contracts for the Shanghai area (including Zhejiang and Jiangsu 
provinces) were cancelled. 863  Credit-based dealer relations similar to those 
developed by Shell and BAT were introduced in this area, with the aim of bringing 
down the selling prices. A suggestion by the European parent firms that branch 
offices for direct distribution in all major treaty ports be opened was rejected by the 
Culco board on the grounds that North China was unstable, expenses would increase, 
and the credit risks would be unacceptable. However, the board did decide to 
commence direct distribution to Chinese dealers in the treaty ports in the entire 
Yangzi area and in Fujian province. Furthermore, a single foreign agent—
presumably Andersen Meyer—would be appointed for each of the main treaty ports 
outside the Yangzi area. This meant a substantial reduction in the number of 
agents.864 Part of the new sales policy was the opening of a sales office in Shanghai 
to co-ordinate Culco’s relations with the dealers. All members of staff in this office 
were Chinese and it was managed by a Chinese office chief.865 In the following year, 
                                                                                                                                          
proposed the merger: ‘Rationalisation of China Lamp Business’ 2 June 1933, Philips Eindhoven, 921.61 
elektronische firma’s China. However, it is not unlikely that the Chinese light bulbs firms indeed had an 
increasingly powerful position. 
860 The unknown matter also affected relations between Culco’s parent firms. Osram in particular was 
very unhappy about both Masseurs and the arrangement made with him by GE and Philips after his 
resignation that Masseurs would receive 55,000 guilders in return for his resignation: Gaarenstroom 
(Eindhoven) to Henderson (London) 18 Sept 1934 and Osram Berlin to IGE London 19 Nov. 1934, Philips 
Eindhoven, PCA 882.3 PCC, Culco board meetings 1932-1939.  
861 Why Philips did not station a new full-time representative on the Culco board is uncertain. 
862 They were Page (CGE) as president, J.J. Mokreis (CGE) as treasurer, and Roesler (Osram China) as 
managing director. The non-executive directors were besides Jongeneel: P. Pruessman (CGE), N.F. Allman 
(law firm Fleming, Franklin & Allman), and J.S. King (CGE): minutes of the Culco stockholders meeting 
of 15 Jan. 1936, ibid.  
863 Minutes of the Culco board meeting of 31 Oct. 1934, ibid. 
864 Minutes of the Culco board meeting of 14 Nov. 1935, ibid. 
865  E. Roesler, ‘Dealer Business in Shanghai and Details of the Workings of the District Selling 
Organisation in 1935’, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.2 PCC, balans 1932-1937. 
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Chinese inspectors were employed to visit agents in both North and South China. As 
with many other foreign subsidiaries in China, Culco’s management believed that to 
continue doing business with the Chinese their firm had to be less foreign. However, 
there is no indication that the dismissal of foreign agents and staff was directly 
related to Chinese nationalist demands that foreign economic influence should 
diminish. Culco’s board merely declared that it wanted to reach new markets in the 
interior of China and to replace ex 866pensive expatriates.  
                                                          
Not only were Culco’s foreign staff and agents removed as much as possible and 
local business relations handled by Chinese employees, it was also considered 
necessary to convert Culco from a foreign joint venture into a foreign-Chinese joint 
venture. In 1936 the shareholding in Culco was adjusted. The old, foreign 
shareholders exchanged their old shares for so-called capital A-shares. The new, 
Chinese, shareholders obtained capital B-shares which carried no voting rights. 
Culco became a 25 per cent Chinese-owned company, with control still fully in 
foreign hands.867 However, the possibility that eventually part of control would have 
to be surrendered to Chinese investors was also considered: 
 
‘That sooner or later Chinese capital participation in Culco ought to be sought 
on a regular unrestricted shareholding basis is fully appreciated by the 
Management and the Board [...] It might suffice to mention here that the latter 
form of Chinese capital participation should be confined to Chinese non-
dealer groups. [...] As regards to the instability of Chinese conditions [...], 
such instability was a feature of the last 50 or more years of Chinese history 
and will be so for the time to come, and should not prevent us from seeking 
closer co-operation with the Chinese element. Besides, Culco is operating as a 
concern with extraterritorial rights under the American ‘China Trade Act’ 
which should enable us to direct the Company’s affairs in a manner 
sufficiently independent from the influence of Chinese conditions and in 
accordance with the wishes of the Partners.’868  
 
The members of the board of Culco believed that co-operation with Chinese partners 
was necessary for business reasons, that is, to integrate into Chinese wholesale and 
retail systems. This was seen as possible in spite of political instability, not as a 
means to decrease the company’s vulnerability to such instability. And it was 
regarded as possible thanks to the existence of extra-territorial rights, not as a way to 
prepare the company for a future loss of these rights. If this statement reflected the 
actual view of the board, then the new strategy indicated an adaptation to the acute 
need of fighting competition. It did not represent a clear resolution to prepare Culco 
for a long-term future in a China after the end of the unequal treaties. Although 
Philips no longer played an important role in defining Culco’s policy, the company 
was kept informed of these changes via Jongeneel’s membership of the board of 
Culco.  
866 Memorandum re Culco staff 1 July 1936, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.3 PCC, Culco board meetings 
1932-1939. 
867 Under the new situation the old shareholders owned Y750,000 worth of new A-shares (in the same 
proportions as their ownership of old shares), and the Chinese authorised dealers held Y250,000 worth of 
new B-shares. The dealers were given these shares instead of their bonuses for the year 1935: minutes of 
the Culco board meeting of 6 July 1936, ibid. 
868 Roesler (Shanghai) to Culco advisory commitee 21 Nov. 1935, ibid. 
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This changed in early in 1937, when Philips reorganised the PCC and withdrew 
Jongeneel to the Netherlands. After his departure, there was no one left at the PCC 
who was qualified to sit on the Culco board. Culco continued to sell light bulbs in 
China until 1941, but no financial data are available for the 1937-1941 period.869 
Royalties and—if available—dividends were probably still remitted by Culco, 
because the joint venture continued to sell Philips-brand light bulbs until the 
beginning of the Pacific War.870 In 1939, when it employed a staff of twelve,871 
Culco was still functioning according to the terms of the Phoebus agreement. Even 
the German occupation of the Netherlands in May 1940 did not cause Osram and 
Philips to end their participation in the China United Lamp Company.872 In spite of 
Philips’ continued financial interest in Culco, there are signs that from 1937 the 
advisory committee did not, or almost not, convene any longer.873 Perhaps the cause 
for this was the dominance of GE within Culco. Between 1934 and 1939 Culco 
gradually transformed from a being jointly controlled subsidiary into a company that 
was managed entirely by GE.874 Possibly GE consolidated its hegemony in China by 
concessions on other markets, and the other Culco-owners were left only with 
royalties and dividend. 875  Therefore, even though Philips still held shares, it no 
longer had any influence in Culco.  
Culco’s dividend figures are available only for the 1933-1935 period and are 
shown in table VI. However, these figures are of limited value: they were kept 
artificially low in order to evade taxation by the US government. 876 
                                                          
869 Osram and GE are no longer in possession of any data whatsoever about Culco: statements by GE 
Fairfield 10 Aug. 1998 and Osram  München 17 Aug. 1998.  
870 Certainly until mid-1940. 
871 Post Mercury Directory 12 (Jan. 1939). 
872 In July 1940 CGE, Osram China, and PCC were still working together in Culco: Mokreis (Shanghai) 
to Philips Eindhoven 29 July 1940, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek. 
873 This is stated by GE: Phoebus situatie China October 1939, ibid. 
874 In 1939 GE demanded that E. Roessler of Osram would leave as Culco’s managing director; he was 
succeeded by Mokreis of CGE. The motive for this change remains a mystery, but it probably signified the 
end of direct Osram representation on the Culco board: Phoebus situatie China October 1939, Philips 
Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek.  
875 These are only the owners with voting rights. From 1936 25 per cent of the shares were owned by 
Chinese firms who did not have voting rights. 
876 Culco was incorporated under American law. Like other foreign firms in China, extra-territoriality 
protected Culco from taxation by the Chinese government. But, in addition to this, under the US China 
Trade Act no company tax was payable to the US government, which could only claim a capital tax. 
Because the Culco board feared that the American tax authorities might impose excessive-profit and 
dividend taxes, it decided that ‘royalties should always be sufficiently high to reduce the remaining profits 
shown in our official statements to an absolute minimum.’ Thus the bulk of the money remitted by Culco 
to its parents was not paid as dividend but as royalties in return for the right to use the trademarks of GE, 
Osram, Vereinigte, and Philips. Naturally American tax officials might eventually suspect that the royalty 
payments were merely a bookkeeping tool to manipulate profit figures. To neutralise this threat, for several 
years—at least in 1934 and 1935—royalty agreements between Culco and its parents were drafted. This 
was done after real profits were known and the desired rate for royalties was established, resulting in an 
artificially low profit statement. To mislead the US government, these royalty agreements were back-dated 
to 1932, to create the impression that royalty rates were defined before profits were known: Osram Berlin 
to Henderson (London) 7 June 1934, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.3 PCC, Culco board meetings 1932-
1939; P. Meinhardt (IGE London) to Jensen (Osram Berlin) and Gaarenstroom (Eindhoven) 24 Apr. 1935, 
ibid.; Meinhardt (IGE London) to Gaarenstroom (Philips Eindhoven) 28 June 1935, ibid.;  Roesler 
(Shanghai) to Culco advisory commitee 18 July 1935, ibid. For instance, the 1932-dated agreement made 
in 1935 listed the royalty rates for the ‘coming years’: 0.04 Shanghai Tael per bulb sold for 1932, Y0.05 
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Table VI. China United Lamp Company profit and dividend, 1933-1935 (in US dollars) 
 
Year net profit dividend combined dividend  for Philips 
1933 18,383 23,407 4,377 
1934 35,879 36,402 6,807 
1935 94,663 65,464 11,685 
 
Source: Culco board meetings 1932-1939, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.3 PCC. 
 
For instance, for the year 1934 Culco paid Y437,664 as royalties, and only Y31,469 
as dividend to the parent firms. 877  Unfortunately, the scarcity of financial data 
combined with this tax-related measure make it impossible to determine the amount 
of money Philips derived from Culco during 1932-1936. The only certainty is that 
until 1936, Culco was profitable and made annual remittances to Philips and its 
partners. Meanwhile, the PCC continued to exist alongside Culco. However, because 
Culco had the monopoly on the trade in Philips-brand lamps, the PCC focused on 
importing Philips radios. 
Until the mid-1920s Philips was mainly a manufacturer and distributor of electric 
light bulbs, but because of the Phoebus cartel the international lamps markets was 
very restricted and the opportunities for further expansion were limited. Anton 
Philips responded to this challenge by diversification into new products. The most 
important of the new products was radio valves to be used in transmitters and 
receivers, and the receiver sets themselves. This proved a highly successful 
enterprise in terms of profits and growth, and Philips benefited from the exploding 
demand after 1925, becoming market leader for radio equipment in Europe by 
1930. 878  Although the radio market in China was even less developed than the 
electric light bulb market, a demand existed and grew quickly from the late 1920s. 
Initially the PCC imported radio equipment in China without important changes 
being made to its organisation. In 1928 and 1929 the PCC sold 5,617 and 6,290 radio 
valves respectively and in the latter year the first forty-five Philips radio sets were 
sold in China. Not the sets themselves, but the valves that were used in the sets were 
                                                                                                                                          
for 1933, 0.04 Sh. Tael for 1934, and again a higher figure for 1935, because profits for 1935 were 
expected to be higher. About the China Trade Act adopted 1922 and amended 1925 see Wilkins, Maturing, 
53. Also Roesler (Shanghai) to Culco Advisory Committee 25 Nov. 1932, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.3 
PCC, Culco meetings of board of directors 1932-1939. 
877 Meinhardt (London) to Gaarenstroom (Eindhoven) 28 June 1935, ibid.; Roesler (Shanghai) to Philips 
Eindhoven 15 March 1934, ibid. The royalties remitted to Philips did not correspond exactly with the 
amounts the company was entitled to. Formally divideds of Culco were to be divided according to the 
shares held by its parent firms; because of the necessity to mislead the American government, profits 
remitted were disguised as royalties, but royalties had to be paid according to the number of light bulbs 
sold of each brand. Although market shares for the brands were very similar to the shares held in Culco, it 
was impossible to control precisely the proportions of lamps sold per brand. To give each shareholder the 
dividends to which he was entitled, the royalties paid by Culco had to re-divided among the parent firms 
according to their ownership of shares in Culco. Only for the period July 1932-December 1934 were 
royalties paid according to shareholding, instead of according to sales figures. In 1935 this detail was taken 
care of through documents drafted especially to mislead tax inspectors: Roesler (Shanghai) to Culco 
advistory committee 18 July 1935, ibid.; Meinhardt (London) to Gaarenstroom (Eindhoven) and Jensen 
(Berlin) 15 Aug. 1935, ibid. 
878 Blanken, ‘Philips in Japan’, 554. 
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profitable and the main article in the radio trade. The radio market in China was 
similar to the light bulb market to the extent that the PCC’s main competitors again 
were GE–via its ties with Radio Corporation of America (RCA) which exported 
radio valves to China–and Siemens and AEG–via their joint venture Telefunken 
which sold valves and radios in China.879  
 
Table VII. Turnover of radio (valves and sets) sales of Philips China Company, 1928-1938 
(from 1934 figures for May 1934-April 1935 etc.) 
 
Year Radio valves Radio sets Guilders (tubes + sets) 
1928 5,617 0 22,678 
1929 6,290 45 28,558 
1930 8,945 237 135,599 
1931 13,154 904 62,581 
1932 5,508 660 91,438 
1933 14,290 703 98,494 
1934 10,145 724 61,365 
1935 4,965 1,138 73,314 
1936 9,144 1,327 96,537 
1937 2,444 2 -/- 499 
1938 26 0 0 
 
Source: Philips Eindhoven, PCA 81:87, Verkoopstatistiekgegevens per artikelengroep en per land, boek 
2b 1928-1939, 869a. 
 
From 1929 Philips regarded radio valve sales in China as part of the PCC’s main 
task, of equal value to light bulb sales. Masseurs reported his radio-related activities 
separately from the light bulb business to the commercial head of the radio 
department in Eindhoven, O. Loupart.880 A large new radio department was added to 
the Philips China Company in 1930 and new office space was rented to 
accommodate it.881 Consequently the PCC grew from twenty-five employees in 1929 
to sixty in 1930.882 Probably because radio sales were aimed primarily at government 
and business clients who were located in a small number of cities, the PCC did not 
employ agents: sales were made directly to the consumers or dealers. Meanwhile, the 
PCC’s sales figures for valves and sets had jumped up enormously and the company 
established itself as the leading distributor of European radio valves in China. A 
market sharing agreement was made with Telefunken according to which the larger 
                                                          
879 RCA was established in 1919. Initially GE had a large interest in this company: Wilkins, Maturing, 
70. It was most likely represented in China through Andersen Meyer. Telefunken (or Gesellschaft für 
Drahtlose Telegraphie mbH, Berlin) was established in 1903 and represented in China via the agency of 
the Siemens China Company 
880 O. Loupart (Philips Eindhoven) to Masseurs (Shanghai) 2 Aug. 1929, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 
PCC, 167 correspondentie Loupart 1929-1936. Correspondence related to light bulb sales went to NV 
Philips Gloeilampfabrieken, and correspondence related to radio sales went to NV Philips’ Radio, both 
were in Eindhoven.  
881 Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 17 Mar. 1930, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.1 PCC. 
882 PCC sales promotion meeting no 1, 31 Jan. 1930, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek; 
Filiaaloverzicht 77 China, ibid. 
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part (71 per cent) was allotted to the Dutch company.883 Competition from Chinese 
manufacturers was non-existent, and the situation looked promising. The Philips 
China Company was ready for its main challenge: to dislodge RCA’s position on the 
Chinese radio market. 
But as early as 1931 Philips halted, and even reversed this policy of expanding 
the PCC. The reason for this was the Great Depression, which inescapably caused 
Philips’ turnover and profit figures to fall. In response, the concern embarked on a 
major restructuring process: to protect the firm’s continuity, costs had to be cut back 
throughout the company. Everywhere, including China, the number of employees 
was reduced. 884  This affected the ability of the PCC to fight off American 
competition on the Chinese market. Shortly thereafter the very existence of PCC 
seemed threatened, when the PCC’s activities in lamps distribution were transferred 
to Culco in July. Warned by Masseurs, Philips was already aware that this might 
destroy the PCC’s financial basis:885 In 1932 its turnover in radio equipment was too 
small to pay for its personnel costs and consequently the PCC was doomed to lose 
money.886 Philips believed that its interests in the light bulb market could best be 
                                                          
883  Loupart (Eindhoven) to Telefunken Berlin 19 Jan. 1933, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.2 PCC, 
Telefunken 1932-1937. In 1930 the Shanghai Power Company (SPC) even asked Philips for a tender for a 
broadcasting station. F.R. Froemel (Philips Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 16 May 1930, Philips 
Eindhoven, PCA 882 China, 167 correspondentie Loupart 1929-1936. The SPC, the operator of the largest 
power station in China, had been sold in the previous year by the Shanghai Municipal Council to the 
American & Foreign Power Company, a former GE subsidiary with GE chairman Owen Young on its 
board during the 1920s and 1930s: Wilkins, Maturing, 131. 
884 The additional office space rented in 1930 to accommodate the expanded radio department was 
excessive by late 1931. Part of PCC’s space in the Brunner Mond Building was sub-let to the Java-China-
Japan Line: Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 19 Nov. 1931, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.1 PCC.  
885 Masseurs realised early on that PCC could only survive as long as it continued its activities as a 
distributor of light bulbs. After he succeeded in convincing Philips that to protect the company’s light bulb 
interests, creating Culco was the best solution, he argued that without its lamps department PCC could not 
exist as a radio distributor. In April 1932 he sent a letter to his superiors in the Netherlands in which he 
underlined his warning that: ‘[...] the Philips China Company stands or falls with the distribution of light 
bulbs’: Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 22 April 1932, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China 
kroniek. The answer to this new problem, according to Masseurs, was that the PCC should retain the right 
to distribute light bulbs in the Shanghai area. Possibly this was rejected by Philips, because its share in 
Culco would have been much smaller than it already was without inclusion of its Shanghai sales, or by GE 
and Osram, who refused to accept such a limitation of Culco’s operating area. Masseurs argued that in fact 
GE and Osram did retain their distributing role: GE via Ansersen Meyer and Osram via the Shanghai 
branches of its parent firms AEG and Siemens. The difference was that GE and Osram could rightfully 
claim that all light bulb distribution interests of their subsidiaries China General Edison and Osram China 
were handed to Culco, and that Philips could not say the same if it assigned the Culco sales agency for 
Shanghai to the PCC. Masseurs ignored the likelihood that GE and Osram would object if the PCC, which 
was shareholder in Culco, would continue to be an active factor in the Chinese lamps market: Masseurs 
(Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 22 Apr. 1932, ibid. As an alternative solution, Masseurs suggested that 
Philips should sell radio valves for American radios in China, but that was not in line with the policy of 
Philips by which it tried to promote the European standard of radio valve technology. By June 1932 he 
seemed to have accepted the fact that the PCC could not be saved. He informed his superiors that, should 
an agency firm take over the PCC’s radio business, Culco was happy to take over the office space it rented 
in Shanghai from Philips: Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 3 June 1932, ibid. Because Philips 
did not wish to eliminate completely the PCC, the office space was kept and not transferred to Culco. 
886 These were 14 per cent of the turnover in early 1932, and were expected by Masseurs to reach 80-100 
per cent from July 1932: Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 22 April 1932, ibid. Apart from Draka 
wiring, during the 1930s the PCC also sold Philips equipment for cinemas, factories, and postage and 
telecommunication offices.  
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served by joining Culco, even if this were to stir up troubles for the PCC. In spite of 
this, before July 1932 no decision regarding the PCC’s future was made. The 
organisation was neither dissolved nor offered any new means to increase turnover; it 
was simply expected to continue its radio sales as before. 
Soon after July 1932 it became clear that the radio business was indeed too small 
to support organisational costs—even though by now the PCC had shrunk to twenty-
one employees.887 A major obstacle to generating a larger turnover was believed to 
be the fact that most radio engineers, operators, and technicians in China had been 
educated in the US or in American missionary schools. With such a background, they 
tended to favour US-made radio equipment—which used RCA valves. There were 
also suspicions that American radio manufacturers were able to benefit from their 
government connections in China, established through the building of transmitting 
stations.888 Still not knowing what to do with the PCC, in late 1932 the management 
of Philips asked the accountancy department in Eindhoven to investigate whether the 
PCC could be maintained as a distribution subsidiary. The resulting report concluded 
that given the growing importance of the Chinese market, there was no reason to end 
Philips’ radio activities in that country.889 At the time itself, the Chinese market did 
not constitute a major part in the company’s total output: in 1931 only 0.3 per cent of 
all radio sets produced and 0.1 per cent of all radio valves went to China.890 The 
problem of low turnover was noted, but considered to be of a temporary nature. 
For the time being, the PCC was allowed to continue without being reorganised. 
But in the year 1933 prospects did not become any brighter. On the contrary, the 
preference shown by the Chinese for American radio equipment became very 
pronounced: in this year 110,000 (88 per cent) of a total of 125,000 radio valves sold 
in China were American.891 At last a decision about the subsidiary’s future was made 
in Eindhoven. In November 1934 Loupart, the top executive manager responsible for 
radio sales, wrote a long letter to Jongeneel. In it he announced the new course to be 
followed by the Philips China Company: 
 
‘[...] in China we must strive to minimise our fixed costs as much as possible 
and make our sales organisation more flexible, in order to be able to retain our 
earning capacity even during adverse times. This can be achieved by creating 
a so-called agency organisation, a network of sole-distributors which will 
cover the whole of China, while simultaneously dismantling the Philips China 
Company [...] Naturally we must avoid at all cost a further reduction of our 
turnover figures, which at the moment already are very poor.’892   
 
Loupart wanted to switch from direct distribution to a network of agents spread over 
some twenty to twenty-five locations, and reduce the PCC to four or five persons 
                                                          
887 Ibid. 
888 Masseurs (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 18 Jul. 1931, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China, 167 
correspondentie Loupart 1929-1936. 
889 Conclusies betreffende filiaal overzicht no 77 China 3 Jan. 1933, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China 
kroniek. 
890 Philips concern totaal, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 81:87 verkoopstatistiekgegevens per artikelgroep en 
per land, boek 2a 1928-1939, 869a. Also after 1931 these percentages remained minimal.  
891 Philips Eindhoven to W. Jongeneel (Rotterdam) 24 Feb. 1933, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China 
kroniek. 
892 Loupart (Eindhoven) to Jongeneel (Shanghai) 26 Nov. 1934, ibid. 
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whose task would be to supervise the agents. Financial risks would be largely 
eliminated, because there would be few fixed costs. If turnover was low, the agents’ 
commission would be correspondingly low. However, Loupart’s aim was not merely 
the reduction of the financial risks represented by the PCC. He was also thinking 
about future opportunities to rebuild the PCC and return to direct distribution. That is 
why the PCC was not dissolved entirely. If the Chinese market continued to grow 
and agency sales kept up with that growth, a point would be reached at which it 
would be possible to finance direct distribution. 
The new course for the PCC as outlined in Loupart’s letter reflected Philips’ main 
interests: profitability was to be protected, but at the same time the company should 
keep open the opportunity to expand. The aim of expansion now was more important 
than it had been in the previous decade. Loupart did not simply hope that the agents 
would gradually increase the number of Philips radio’s they sold, he actually 
instructed Jongeneel to make sure that from the start the agents would sell 
substantially more than the PCC had so far done. This must have struck Jongeneel as 
unrealistic. After all, one of the main reasons why many Western firms created their 
own distribution subsidiaries in China was the belief that high sales figures 
impossible to achieve under the agency system. This meant that at this point, Philips’ 
interests in the Chinese radio market were conflicting, and so were Loupart's orders. 
Switching to agency representation and increasing sales at the same time was a 
contradiction.  
Jongeneel, who did not want to dismantle his own organisation, shrewdly 
exploited this ambiguity in Loupart’s instructions. He refrained from contracting any 
agents, and pleaded for the PCC to be allowed to keep its distribution task. In July 
1935 Jongeneel travelled to Eindhoven and convinced Loupart to give him extra time 
to make the PCC profitable. Loupart was in a difficult position because as head of 
the radio department he had to stop the PCC running at a loss, but at the same time it 
was not in his interest to limit his own division’s activities in China. Arguing that the 
company’s future on the Chinese market was important enough to justify extra 
investments, he allocated a final sum of Y48,000 to help Jongeneel increase his sales 
figures. But about half a year later this money was used up and the PCC was still not 
profitable. In April 1936 Loupart repeated the order to switch to agency 
representation.893 But even then Jongeneel continued to delay;894 he suggested that to 
save costs the PCC should merge with a Chinese radio manufacturer,895 or that he 
would purchase the PCC’s assets and continue representing Philips as its agent.896 
Jongeneel even managed to get permission to send two Chinese engineers to 
Eindhoven to be trained. The idea was that they would eventually find employment 
                                                          
893 The PCC market share for radios in 1935: 8.1 per cent. Not to make a loss the PCC turnover would 
have to be at least Y612,000 per year: Loupart (Eindhoven) to Jongeneel 8 Apr. 1935, Philips Eindhoven, 
PCA 882.1 PCC. 
894 Jongeneel (Shanghai) to Loupart 21 Oct. 1936, ibid. In 1936  Jongeneel claimed that prospects were 
getting better. Indeed, in July 1936 the Dutch aircraft manufacturer Fokker contracted the PCC as its sales 
agent for China: The contract ended 31 Dec. 1937 and was not renewed; no planes were sold in that 
period: Contract PCC en Fokker 17 July 1936, Philips Eindhoven, 882 China kroniek. Furthermore, in 
November 1936 Jongeneel reported that the Chinese government had ordered from the PCC fifty-eight 
radio transmitters for aeroplanes: Jongeneel (Shanghai) to Loupart 27 Nov. 1936, ibid. 
895 Loupart and H. van Walsem (Eindhoven) to Jongeneel (Shanghai) 18 Jan. 1936, ibid. 
896 Loupart (Eindhoven) to Jongeneel 18 Nov. 1935, ibid. 
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with potential PCC customers, such as the Jardine Engineering Corporation or the 
Chinese Bureau for Aeronautical Affairs.897 It is remarkable that Jongeneel had the 
opportunity to delay the restructuring for such a long time. There explanation for this 
was not only Jongeneel’s stubbornness, but also Loupart’s ambiguous attitude. The 
latter was willing to make new investments as soon as more favourable opportunities 
opened up in China, which was illustrated by the fact that until 1937 Loupart 
seriously considered participating in establishing radio factories in China. These 
considerations—which never reached the stage of actual investments—will be 
looked at in more detail in the section on political risks. Only when Loupart ordered 
Jongeneel to return to the Netherlands and the latter left China in early 1937 was the 
PCC finally reorganised.898  
After 1936 only one Dutch technician and four supporting staff members were 
retained.899 They manned a small representative office in Shanghai, which in practice 
was a technical service centre. 900  Radio equipment was delivered directly to the 
newly appointed agents in Shanghai and Hong Kong—there were no agents in the 
smaller cities because Jongeneel had advised against this. 901  After 1936 sales 
handled by the PCC dropped sharply, but no data are available which would shed 
light on the agency business. Therefore, no conclusion can be drawn about the 
functioning or usefulness of the post-1936 agency system. Given the military value 
of radio transmitters and radio valves, it is likely that the Japanese occupation or 
blockade of the treaty ports from 1937 severely hampered the distribution of radio 
equipment. But sales were at least sufficient to support the five-person Philips China 
Company. Although the PCC continued to exist in Shanghai for several years—
probably until the beginning of the Pacific War 902 —it engaged only in giving 
                                                          
897 In October 1936, in the middle of their training programme, the management of Philips decided to 
send them back to China—probably because for the time being there was no prospect of intense activity in 
the Chinese radio market. Note for C.M.M. Mollerus (Philips) 12 Oct. 1936, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 
144.81 directievergaderingen AV (bijlagen); minutes of the AV meeting of 13 Oct. 1936, ibid. 
898 To get him to comply, Loupart promised Jongeneel an important function once he was back in 
Eindhoven. Moreover, Jongeneel was told not to reveal to the other PCC employees that his departure was 
definite, instead he should announce that he was going to Europe on leave: Loupart (Eindhoven) to 
Jongeneel 18 Nov. 1935, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek. 
899 Ibid.; Post Mercury Directory 12 (Jan. 1939). Jongeneel formally kept his function as managing 
director of the PCC, but was not involved anymore in the PCC: China kroniek, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 
882. The technician Mr De Jager was in charge of the Shanghai PCC office from 1937. 
900 Loupart also wanted it to supervise the agents, but it lacked manpower to do this. At the office no-one 
had power of attorney to sign contracts or registration forms on behalf of Philips: Mokreis (Shanghai) to 
Philips London 29 July 1940, ibid. Jongeneel warned that it would be impossible to carry out government 
business out by a reduced PCC, and advised that the agents also be transferred: Jongeneel (Shanghai) to 
Loupart 27 Nov. 1936, ibid. 
901 The Agent for Shanghai was Innis & Riddle. For Hong Kong it was Cotton Radio Co: S. Joor, 
‘Orientatie China’ 30 Sept 1946, Philips Eindhoven, documentatie China. The original plan for twenty to 
twenty-five agents was probably not carried out because Jongeneel thought that it was better for prestige 
and for acquiring government order if a small number of large agents was used rather than recruiting a 
large number of agents who sold only one product type in a small territory: Jongeneel (Shanghai) to 
Loupart 27 Nov. 1936, Philips Eindhoven, 882 China kroniek. In 1938 and 1939 the former Dutch 
Minister to China, W.J.R. Thorbecke, was contracted by Philips to travel to China and analyse local 
developments and look for possible investment opportunities. Thorbecke did similar work for other Dutch 
firms, such as Buhrmann’s Papiergroothandel and possibly also Unilever: A.A.D. Berg (Holland oost-Azie 
Lijn Rotterdam) to NV Vereenigde Nederlandsche Scheepvaartmaatschappij The Hague 17 Jan. 1939, ibid. 
902 The registration of the PCC had to be renewed every three years. The renewal went ahead in 1941 but 
later it was concluded that the procedure was not legally correct, because the request for renewal was made 
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technical support and did not undertake any commercial activities. No data are 
available concerning profits by the PCC during the 1920s. Masseurs claimed that 
because of competition from Chinese light bulb factories, by 1931 this trade was 
barely making a profit. He mentioned this as a motive behind the creation of a joint 
venture.903 It seems that he exaggerated, because the remittances made by the PCC 
were Y453,000 for 1930 and Y677,100 for 1931.904 Probably the PCC was profitable 
until 1932, and lost money after the establishment of Culco in that same year. By 
1935 the PCC was making an annual loss of 50,000 to 75,000 guilders per year.905 
After 1937 the financial operations of the PCC were insignificant. 
                                                                                                                                         
During the time it was active in China, Philips’ local interests changed several 
times. In 1923-1924 the company’s main local interest in China was to enlarge its 
output of light bulbs at as little cost as possible. From the establishment of the 
Phoebus cartel in 1924 until 1937 its main local interest was to maximise profits 
from light bulb sales and to expand in radio sales—again without involving high 
costs. After 1937, when its sales of bulbs and radios in China ended, Philips’ interest 
in China no longer played a role in the concern’s overall strategy. Throughout all 
these years the company’s involvement in the Chinese economy remained small: 
administrative and storage facilities were concentrated in Shanghai, the number of 
employees never exceeded sixty, and distribution to other parts of China was handled 
by treaty port agents.  
 
Political Risks and Response 
 
1928-1937 
During its first years in China, the PCC’s position was not affected by political risks, 
but, during 1928-1937 there were two risks directly relevant to the firm’s future in 
China. The first was the possibility that the Guomindang government would drive 
foreign radio companies out of the country by establishing a state-protected national 
radio manufacturing industry. The second was the possibility that the Japanese 
authorities would ban Western light bulbs and radios from the Manchurian and North 
Chinese market.  
 
only on behalf of Expeditiekantoor Wouters and Drukkerij Schäfer, not by Philips’ 
Metaalgloeilampenfabriek: D.J. Sannes, ‘Situatie Philips China Company’ 6 Nov. 1939, ibid.; E.T. de Boer 
(Philips Eindhoven) to T. Waller (Hilversum) 18 Apr. 1941, ibid; NV Eindhovensche Drukkerij voorheen 
Schäfer & Co.(Eindhoven) to the Dutch consular court for Central China (Shanghai) 31 May 1941, ibid; 
Dutch consul-general Shanghai to Thomson & Co. Shanghai 6 Sept 1941, ibid; De Boer (Eindhoven) to 
Loupart, Van Walsem, Naber and Walterscheid (Philips Eindhoven) 16 Feb. 1946, ibid. Therefore 1941 
marks the end of the PCC’s existence. A new subsidiary was created in September 1946: ‘Philips China 
NV (Philips China Company)’ based in Eindhoven with its office in Shanghai: China kroniek, ibid. Its task 
was to distribute radio equipment and electric light bulbs in China but, to keep expenses low, initially only 
a manager, a salesman, and an assistant were employed. Among the first Chinese orders was one for 1 
million light bulbs and 10,000 radio receivers, but again American competitors were selling more: S. Joor 
‘Orientatie China’ 30 Sept 1946, Philips Eindhoven, documentatie China. In December 1948 a separate 
subsidiary for Hong Kong was created: Philips Industries (Far East) Ltd. China kroniek, Philips 
Eindhoven, PCA 882. 
903 Masseurs (Shanghai) to Page (Shanghai) 7 Apr. 1931, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China, 167 
correspondentie Loupart 1929-1936. 
904 Filiaal overzicht no 77 China 3 Jan. 1933, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek. 
905 Loupart (Eindhoven) to Jongeneel 8 Apr. 1935, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.1 PCC. 
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The possibility of the Chinese government setting up a radio industry first 
emerged as a distinct threat in 1932. In November of this year the Guomindang 
government asked Telefunken to supply manufacturing equipment for a radio valve 
factory. This factory was to be built in Shanghai and to be operated by the Central 
Broadcasting Station in Nanjing. 906  Philips was also involved, because it had a 
market-sharing agreement with Telefunken and the new factory would affect 
Telefunken’s market position. Without informing the Chinese government of this 
agreement, the Germans consulted the Dutch company about how to approach this 
issue. Philips was the leading European radio valve company both in Europe itself 
and in China, with Telefunken in second position. On the other hand, RCA valves—
which were not compatible with European-made radio sets—had captured the greater 
part of the Chinese market for radio valves. Giving China the ability to produce first 
its own radios valves, and eventually also complete radio sets, would diminish the 
Chinese demand for imported radio equipment. But at the same time it would 
strengthen the position of European radio technology, and curb the influence of 
RCA. Therefore the plans of the Chinese government for the new factory represented 
a treat as well as an opportunity to Philips. 
The two options given to Telefunken by the Chinese government were either to 
sell the factory equipment in return for cash, or to supply it in return for an interest in 
the factory. In the first scenario Telefunken would also supply technicians and raw 
materials after the factory became operational. In the second scenario Telefunken 
would obtain a majority share in the factory, as the value of its equipment 
represented the larger part of the total costs.907 Telefunken offered Philips half of the 
factory’s output of radio valves, and Philips agreed to co-operate in return for 
concessions elsewhere in the world.908 With respect to the technical characteristics of 
the factory, Philips imposed two limitations. In the first place, no American radio 
valves should be produced. The second proviso was that not the most modern types 
of Philips’ valves should be produced, because doing this in China would be too 
expensive. Eventually an agreement was signed between Philips and Telefunken 
according to which equipment and technical support were to be supplied to China in 
equal shares by the two partners.909 Their explicit motivation for this agreement was 
to prevent a factory being built using American technology.910 However, during the 
                                                          
906 The request came after Telefunken had built a broadcasting station in Nanjing, probably also for the 
CBS: Telefunken Berlin to Philips Eindhoven 24 Nov. 1932, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek.  
907 The Germans estimated the factory costs at 350,000 Reichsmark, of which 250,000 for production 
equipment: Telefunken Berlin to Philips Eindhoven 24 Nov. 1932, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China 
kroniek. 
908 Because of the 1931 agreement to share the market according to a 71-29 ratio in Philips’ favour, the 
Dutch firm demanded a major concession from the Germans in return for a 50-50 interest in the new 
factory. Suggestions by Loupart were that Telefunken should withdraw from two major markets (Australia 
+ Central America, Australia + part of Africa, Australia + Portugal, Balkans + Near East were mentioned). 
Philips Eindhoven to Jongeneel (Rotterdam) 24 Feb. 1933, ibid.  
909 However, supplies of radio valves were as before to be divided 71-29 between the partners. 
910 Reglung betreffend Fabrikation in China zwischen Philips und Telefunken n.d., Philips Eindhoven, 
ibid. In 1933 Philips found out that it was out of the question that Telefunken in collaboration with Philips 
would supply the entire factory. An American firm was going to build it, but it remained possible that all or 
part of the machinery would be purchased through Telefunken: Jongeneel (Shanghai) to Philips Eindhoven 
2 Sept 1933, Philips Eindhoven, 822.2 PCC, Telefunken 1932-1937; Telefunken Berlin to Philips 
Eindhoven 23 Jan. 1934, ibid. 
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next few years the Chinese government put its plans for the radio valves factory 
aside, and negotiations ended. 
During 1934-1936 Philips wanted to limit its involvement in the distribution of 
radios in China, while the PCC’s director, Jongeneel, was trying to achieve 
completely the opposite. One of his suggestions about how to preserve the PCC was 
that the company should begin manufacturing radio equipment locally, in co-
operation with the Chinese government. Jongeneel gave his superiors in Eindhoven 
the impression that he could easily find official Chinese partners for this plan. In 
January 1936 Loupart responded very positively. After the plans with Telefunken for 
a valve factory in 1932 and Culco’s policy of issuing shares to Chinese merchants, 
the idea of a Sino-Dutch joint venture was less revolutionary than it probably had 
seemed to Philips during the 1920s. Loupart believed that a joint venture was a good 
way to increase his company’s presence in China without incurring too many costs or 
risks. He instructed Jongeneel to look for possible partners in the areas controlled 
directly by the Guomindang government or by the provincial Guangdong regime that 
was allied with the Guomindang.911 North China was thought to be too unstable 
politically. For each region and product type—radio receivers or transmitters, 
amplifiers, and other electrical equipment—a different local joint venture partner 
should be identified and invited to Eindhoven to discuss a possible co-operative 
contract.912  
Loupart also indicated what the eventual contracts should look like. The Philips 
China Company and the Chinese state-owned or state-supported firm should own a 
factory jointly. Management and some 70 per cent of ownership should be Chinese; 
Philips’ contribution would consist of production equipment and of technological co-
operation:  
 
‘[...] the Chinese should be in charge and play the central role, while we play 
only a supportive and indirect role—albeit one that forms a crucial element in 
the whole scheme.’ 
 
This was the first time in the history of the Dutch electronics firm that it was 
prepared to sell valuable new technology without retaining control over the factory in 
which it would be applied. Philips would supply only the semi-finished materials, 
and purchase the end products against a reduced tariff. It was thought necessary to 
include some regulations to prevent the factory from making certain products, in 
order to protect the PCC’s other activities. An important motivation which drove 
Loupart to favour investments along such lines was that the factory would inevitably 
become the monopolist supplier, because it was supported by the government and it 
                                                          
911 Loupart and Van Walsem (Eindhoven) to Jongeneel (Shanghai) 18 Jan. 1936, Philips Eindhoven, 
PCA 882 China kroniek. They based part of their plan probably on a report written for Philips about the 
same time: ‘Ontwerp voor een Werkplan in het Verre Oosten voor de NV Philips’, Philips Eindhoven, 
PCA 882a Verre Oosten (rapportage). The author, probably former diplomat and future Philips 
representative W. Thorbecke, also suggested to using of Chinese agents and inspectors, to co-operate with 
influential Chinese officials, and making market sharing agreements with Japanese manufacturers, also for 
Manchukuo. 
912 As a partner for producing radio sets in the Nanjing-controlled area, the China Radio Corporation was 
suggested by Jongeneel. Loupart believed that China was not yet ready to produce radio valves—
presumably meaning the newest types. 
ELECTRONICS: PHILIPS 215 
could supply distributors cheaper than importers could. Then the danger of Chinese 
competition capturing a stronger position in distribution would be compensated for 
by the fact that Philips would be paid by the factory for each item sold to the 
distributors, and receive 30 per cent of dividends. Allowing its Chinese partner a 
majority share in the joint venture gave Philips not only an excuse to demand that all 
financial capital should be supplied by its Chinese partner, it was also expected to 
give Philips a lead over its American and German competitors. Loupart was 
convinced that in radio manufacturing, Philips was the first foreign firm to accept 
that management would be Chinese. To create a dependable management team, the 
company wanted to educate Chinese engineers in Eindhoven. An agreement was 
made with Telefunken for co-operation with respect to the acquisition of contracts 
for radio factories.913 
In early 1936 Philips was informed by the Director of the Central Broadcasting 
Station, who was in Europe, that the Chinese government was again planning to 
build a factory for radio valves. Foreign co-operation was desired, but at least 51 per 
cent of the share capital would remain in the hands of the Chinese government. 
Loupart informed Jongeneel that he should do his utmost to win this contract, even if 
Philips had to give China the means to manufacture valves of RCA’s standard. While 
Telefunken put forward its own offer separately from Philips, Jongeneel handed 
Philips’ proposal to the Chinese government. As could be expected on the basis of 
the instructions already given by Loupart in early 1936, this included supplying 
production equipment coupled with technical assistance, in return for a service 
charge and preferential treatment as a supplier and customer of the factory.914 The 
two foundations on which the offer for the radio valves factory was based were, in 
the first place, that not a single piece of machinery was to be sold without a long-
term technical assistance contract attached. Chinese personnel was to be trained in 
Eindhoven, and Dutch engineers were to be stationed at the factory to supervise 
operating of the machines. In the second place, the offer was based on a 
determination to avoid taking financial risks as much as possible. The Chinese had to 
pay for all equipment in cash, in Dutch currency, and in the Netherlands before 
receiving anything. This was in spite of Loupart’s idea of taking a 30 per cent share 
in the factory: his colleagues in Eindhoven were firmly opposed to this. They did not 
believe that the Chinese were able to manage a business enterprise of any kind 
effectively, and therefore refused to allow Philips become involved in the factory 
through a minority share.915 Therefore no matter whether or not Philips won the 
contract, and in spite of the ideas of both Jongeneel and Loupart, it was unlikely that 
this would help Jongeneel in his attempts to maintain the PCC’s position. Before the 
                                                          
913 Both firms would try to separately acquire a Chinese contract for participating in radio factories. In 
case of success, the factory deliveries of production machinery, technical assistance, raw materials, and 
profits would be shared among Philips and Telefunken on a 50/50 basis. Supplies of radio valves would be 
made on a 71/29 basis, the larger share being for Philips. Even patent rights on new technologies possibly 
developed by such a Chinese radio factory in the future were already divided between the two European 
firms for the world outside China. Reglung betreffend Fabrikation in China zwischen Philips und 
Telefunken n.d. [ca 1936], Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek. 
914 Philips Eindhoven to Jongeneel (Shanghai) 5 May 1936, ibid. 
915 Sannes, announcement for the meeting of the managing board, 19 June 1936, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 
144.81 directievergaderingen. Philips preferred a lower price in order to increase the chances of getting the 
contract, but Telefunken insisted on a high price in order to acquire as much as shares in the joint venture 
as possible.   
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Chinese government announced with which foreign company it preferred to work, 
the war with Japan broke out and the project was again shelved.  
This leads to the second political risks of the 1928-1937 period, that presented by 
Japanese imperialism. When Japan installed the Manchukuo regime in 1932, Culco 
responded by selling only Philips light bulbs that were made in Japan by Tokyo 
Electric in Manchuria. For this purpose Philips’ trademarks were registered with the 
Manchukuo government, and Tokyo Electric, a Japanese firm that was controlled by 
GE, was licensed to produce light bulbs under the Philips trademarks. 916  The 
Japanese domination of Manchuria and its growing influence in North China 
deterred Philips from investing in these parts of the country. Instead the company 
focused on East and South China. In 1932 Sino-Japanese fighting in Shanghai 
severely but only briefly disrupted the company’s main market area in China.917 This 
was shrugged off, being interpreted as an incident that had only a temporary effect 
on turnover. By this time Philips’s involvement in China was so limited that the 
company did not regard the Japanese occupation as very relevant to its interests. By 
the time the Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, Philips had only limited assets in 
China. This fact was not a result of the effects of political risks, but of the company’s 
reluctance to invest heavily in addressing competition. The firm’s willingness to 
participate in setting up new radio factories in East and South China under conditions 
that were interesting only in the long run, indicated that before 1937 Philips did not 
perceive Japanese influence as an imminent threat in these parts of the country. 
Without important local interests, political risks were hardly relevant after 1937.918 
  
Conclusion 
Philips was active in China between 1923 and 1941, during which time its main local 
interest initially (1923-1924) was to increase light bulb, and thereafter (1924-1937) 
to defend the profitability of these sales and to boost radio sales. At no time was the 
company prepared to take a major financial risk to achieve these aims. In the final 
years (1937-1941) there was no more local interest relevant to its overall corporate 
                                                          
916 J.L. Hamming (Philips Eindhoven) to TEC Kawasaki 16 Aug. 1934, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882.3 
PCC, Culco board meetings 1932-1939. Philips trademarks were registered also in Nanjing since 1929. 
917 This is illustrated by the decline in factory output experienced by China General Edison—which was 
caused by lower sales in Manchuria and Shanghai—from 480,000 large light bulbs in July 1931 to only 
64,000 in February 1932. However, Masseurs believed that the main reason for the low production figures 
in early 1932 was that GE had created excessive stocks of light bulbs in late 1931: Masseurs (Shanghai) to 
Philips Eindhoven 22 April 1932, Philips Eindhoven, PCA 882 China kroniek.  
918 After 1937 the attitude adopted by Culco and the PCC towards the Japanese appears to have been 
identical to that of most Western companies in China: trying to keep a distance from politics and come into 
contact with official authorities only when it was necessary to keep business going.In July 1940 the 
Japanese-controlled ‘new Nanjing government’ led by Wang Jingwei asked all companies to re-register 
their trademarks at a new trademark bureau. To continue business in occupied East China, Culco was 
forced to re-register. Of course this would be interpreted by the Japanese as a sign of recognition of 
Wang’s puppet regime. Nevertheless, the board of directors of Culco decided to comply with the new 
registration rule. However, instead of submitting the original trademark certificates, which had been 
requested by the new government in Nanjing, the plan was to hand in photostats. Before coming to this 
conclusion, Osram China and CGE consulted several law firms in Shanghai and the legal department of 
BAT. Culco held photostats of all of Philips’ Chinese trademarks: Mokreis (Shanghai) to Philips London 
29 July 1940, ibid. As an excuse for not submitting the original certificates, Culco stated that the originals 
were in Europe: Mokreis (Shanghai) to Allman, Davies & Kops Shanghai 5 Nov. 1940, ibid. PCC, being 
only a small service office, does not seem to have experienced any major political dilemma or conflict 
during 1937-1941. 
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interests. Because of its reluctance to invest much money and because the market for 
light bulbs and radios was confined to the major cities, Philips did not become 
involved in China beyond the main treaty ports. Civil wars did not directly affect the 
company during 1923-1928, but during 1928-1937 two important political risks 
emerged: Chinese nationalism and Japanese imperialism. During 1937-1941 political 
risks were irrelevant, as the company had hardly any interest left in China. 
The risk posed by Chinese nationalism consisted of the possibility that the 
Guomindang government would establish a Chinese radio manufacturing industry. 
This would eventually limit the demand for imported radio equipment, and 
consequently of Philips’ chances of selling its products in China. Philips nevertheless 
offered to co-operate with the Chinese government in establishing a Chinese-
controlled radio industry. It was willing to supply China with valuable new 
technology to produce radio valves, as long as the firm might obtain favourable 
service, supply, and purchase contracts and as long as it would not have to bear a 
financial risk. Such a service and royalty arrangement would have been very 
lucrative, and the company was even prepared to give China the technology needed 
to make RCA-type valves. However, what the company definitely refused to do was 
to become involved in ownership or management of the new radio factory. 
Consequently a Sino-Dutch factory agreement, had it actually materialised, would 
not have provided Philips with an opportunity to expand on the Chinese radio 
market. As it turned out, there was to be no agreement with Philips or any other 
foreign company, because the Sino-Japanese War started before any definite plans 
were made. 
The risk of Japanese imperialism was perceived as a problem because it affected 
sales in Manchuria and North China negatively, but until 1937 Philips did not see 
this as a fundamental threat. There is no indication that the company expected that 
the Guomindang regime would not be in a position to defend East and South China 
against the Japanese. Furthermore, during the mid-1930s the company’s involvement 
in China was already very small and therefore the risk of great damage to its assets 
was limited. Other than concentrate its efforts in East and South China, Philips did 
nothing to respond to the growing Japanese political influence. 
 CHAPTER 8  
 
SOAP AND MARGARINE: UNILEVER 
 
‘We must take some risks, and I am the first to 
admit that the proposed investment in North 
China is a risk, and that the figures do not look 
outstandingly attractive, but risks we can afford 
to take, and in my opinion should take, so as to 
seize this exceptional opportunity of 
establishing ourselves “at the bottom of the 
market” in one of the few remaining large and 
undeveloped soap markets of the world.’ 
J.H. Hansard (Unilever), 1939.919 
  
Overall Corporate Interest 
Unilever was created on 1 January 1930 through a merger on the basis of equality 
between the ‘NV Margarine Unie’, a Dutch margarine company, and ‘Lever Brothers 
Limited’, a British soap company. The two most important products made by 
Unilever in the 1930s were margarine and soap. Both products required similar raw 
materials: non-mineral oils and fats. In the nineteenth century non-mineral oils and 
fats were used as fuel, lubricants, food, soap, paints, varnishes, and linoleum. By the 
1930s, technological change had made petroleum into the main raw material for most 
of these products. Only soap and food remained major products of non-mineral fats 
and oils.920 From birth, Unilever was the world’s largest company engaged in the 
processing of non-mineral fats and oils. In soap manufacture there were only two 
other giants: the American companies Procter & Gamble and Colgate-Palmolive. In 
the margarine business Unilever was the single most important producer.921 
In the period before the merger, the Margarine Unie and Lever Brothers 
competed not only in terms of raw materials, but also in terms of consumers. The 
main products of the Margarine Unie were margarine and other edible oils and fats, 
while Lever’s main product was soap. But the Margarine Unie also made soap and 
Lever Brothers also made margarine. Another motive for the merger was that the two 
parties complemented each other in several important aspects. While the Margarine 
Unie was active primarily in Europe, Lever Brothers owned subsidiaries not only in 
Europe, but also in the United States, throughout the British Empire, the Belgian and 
Dutch colonies and in China. Although Lever’s interests were geographically more 
diverse, the Margarine Unie had better financial resources plus a leading position in 
                                                          
919 J. Hansard, visit report China, Japan, and Manchukuo 1939, Unilever Rotterdam, DIR 10, 182.1. 
920 K.E. Hunt, 'Grondstoffen', in: J.H. van Stuijvenberg (ed.), Honderd Jaar Margarine, 1869-1969 (Den 
Haag) , 30-31. 
921 In 1932 only 11 per cent of the world’s margarine was made in the US, whereas Europe produced 75 
per cent—of which a great proportion came from Unilever’s factories: W.G. Hoffmann, 'De Ontwikkeling 
van de Margarine Industrie', in: J.H. van Stuijvenberg (ed), Honderd Jaar Margarine, 1869-1969 (Den 
Haag 1969), 25. 
SOAP AND MARGARINE: UNILEVER 219 
edible fats, which were believed to have better prospects as a tool for corporate 
expansion than soap.922  
Lever Brothers was a British concern in all major respects: the mother company 
and most subsidiaries had their headquarters in Britain. Its managers were British, as 
were most owners of regular shares. Until his death in 1925, its founding father 
William H. Lever owned all shares that had special controlling rights. Upon his 
death, half of them was inherited by his son, while the other half was held by the 
executors of his will. The men who acted as executors were the three most senior 
directors of Lever Brothers. In 1930 they were F. D’Arcy Cooper, H. Greenhalgh, 
and J. McDowell. The Margarine Unie was essentially Dutch, but in two respects 
more multinational than Lever Brothers. In the first place, many important 
subsidiaries had originated outside the Netherlands, often as independent firms that 
were later acquired by the Margarine Unie. Consequently, management and 
shareholdership involved various nationalities besides the Dutch. Secondly, the 
company had combined its extensive British interests into a separate company. This 
British company—‘Margarine Union Limited’—was based in London and its regular 
share capital was owned by British private investors. The Margarine Unie and the 
Margarine Union were firmly interconnected by a so-called equalisation agreement: 
they operated under the same name, pooled their profits, had identical boards of 
directors, and were responsible for each other’s debts. 923  The structure of dual 
nationality had been inherited from Van den Bergh, one of the predecessors of the 
Margarine Unie, and was a product of fiscal considerations.924 Close examination 
shows that the two parts were not fully equal: the Dutch company controlled the 
British company through special shares.925 The controlling shares in the Margarine 
Unie itself were divided between three families: Jurgens (about 42 per cent), Van den 
Bergh (about 42 per cent), and Schicht (about 16 per cent). Although the Schicht 
family was based in Central Europe, most members of the two dominant families had 
a Dutch background. The Jurgens and Van den Bergh families had created the 
predecessors to the Margarine Union in the 1870s, and then the Margarine Union 
                                                          
922 At least by F. D’Arcy Cooper, Chairman of Lever Brothers: W.J. Reader, Unilever: A Short History 
(London 1960), 39-40. Reader identified this mixture of competition and complementation as the main 
motives for the merger: idem, Vijftig Jaar Unilever, 1930-1980 (London 1980), 1-9. 
923 Memorandum of agreement 2 Sept. 1929, Unilever Rotterdam, HIS 153, 1266 NV Margarine Unie 
correspondentie 1927-1930 etc. 
924 Van den Bergh was at first Dutch, and then established a separate firm in Britain, which became a 
limited liability company in 1895. Until 1919 this British company functioned as holding company of all 
Van den Bergh interests. In 1919 a second holding company was established in the Netherlands, which 
took over all assets in continental Europe. The two holding companies were connected through an 
arrangement very similar to those applied later, in 1927 and 1937, to unite the mother companies of the 
Margarine Union and Lever Brothers & Unilever. According to Wilson, dual nationality was introduced to 
Van den Bergh in 1919 probably because new tax laws in Britain would otherwise have resulted in the 
Dutch shareholders of this company having to pay double tax on their dividends: in the Netherlands as well 
as in Britain. Apparently until 1918 it was possible for shareholders of British companies living abroad to 
be exempted from British taxation: C. Wilson, Geschiedenis van Unilever (3 Vols; repr.; n.p. 1984), II, 
258-259. It seems that the Margarine Union copied this arrangement, again with the purpose of avoiding 
double taxation. However, although Van den Bergh may have consisted of two independent mother 
companies, the Margarine Union did not, as overall control was concentrated in Rotterdam. Apparently the 
Dutch tax authorities nevertheless acquiesced in the company’s assertion that the British side was fully 
independent. 
925 The Margarine Union 1928-1929, Unilever Rotterdam, HIS 115, 1092.11.4 The Margarine Union 
1928-1929.  
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itself in 1927. The Schicht family joined only in 1928-1929, when their business was 
taken over by the Margarine Unie.926 Despite its strong multinational character, the 
Margarine Unie was a Dutch company with the main parts of its background, 
managerial hierarchy, ownership, leadership, and control, all being Dutch. 
The merger which created Unilever was only a partial one: neither the 
organisations themselves nor their ownership were entirely amalgamated.927 In fact, 
the only immediate change in organisation was the merger of the boards of directors. 
An ingenious legal manoeuvre was devised to merge Lever Brothers and Margarine 
Unie at the board level while keeping assets and regular shareholders separated. The 
Margarine Unie and the Margarine Union were renamed ‘Unilever NV’ and 
‘Unilever Limited’ respectively. Control of Unilever Ltd was separated from 
Unilever NV and divided equally between two new holding companies: a Dutch one 
named Elma NV and a British one named United Holdings Ltd. The controlling 
shares in Unilever NV were also divided between these two holding companies. The 
shares in Elma were owned by the Jurgens, Van den Bergh, and Schicht families—
analogous to their previous holdings of controlling shares in Unilever NV—while 
those of United Holdings were acquired by the Lever group—W.H. Lever’s son and 
the top managers of Lever Brothers. In exchange, the Lever group transferred all 
controlling shares in Lever Brothers to Unilever Ltd. An arrangement between Elma 
and United Holdings ensured that neither holding company could make important 
decisions without the consent of the other.928  The result was that the controlling 
shares in Unilever were divided equally between the persons who had controlled the 
Margarine Unie and Lever Brothers prior to 1930.  
Ownership of regular shares in Margarine Unie and Lever Brothers remained in 
the hands of the same external investors, and was not merged. It was only in 1937 
that the exchange of assets between the parent firms was time practised on a large 
scale for the first time. To facilitate this, Unilever Ltd (the old Margarine Union Ltd) 
was taken over by Lever Brothers, and became a separate margarine division within 
the soap organisation. After Unilever Ltd had disappeared as an independent 
company, Lever Brothers was renamed Unilever Ltd and concluded its own 
equalisation agreement with Unilever NV.929 In 1937 the former Lever Brothers thus 
                                                          
926 Interview with Mr Krekel Rotterdam 20 Dec. 1950, ibid. 
927 According to the Chairman of Lever Brothers, F. D’Arcy Cooper, amalgamation of the entire share 
capital was not feasible because of the fact that the capital of Lever Brothers consisted largely of 
preference shares, whereas the capital of the Margarine Union was made up predominantly of ordinary 
shares: ‘The Merger with Margarine Union’, Unilever Rotterdam, ‘Progress’ 30/187 (April 1930), 37-39. 
D’Arcy Cooper told this to both employees and shareholders of Lever Brothers. It is unclear why this was 
an obstacle: in 1937 the preference shares of Lever Brothers and the ordinary shares of the British 
Margarine Union were amalgamated after all. This was achieved by dissolving Unilever Ltd after it had 
transferred its assets to Lever Brothers and its shareholders were given shares in Lever Brothers (renamed 
to Lever Brothers & Unilever Ltd). When this happened the old Unilever Ltd shareholders were told by the 
Special Committee that this was done to avoid double taxation: Minutes of the Special Committee meeting 
of 5 Mar. 1937, Unilever UK, Special Committee, General Matters 1931-1942. This suggests that the 
people who carried out the merger of 1930 simply wanted to keep ownership of Lever Brothers and 
Unilever Ltd separate. 
928 Memorandum of agreement 2 Sept. 1929, Unilever Rotterdam, HIS 153, 1266 NV Margarine Unie 
correspondentie 1927-1930 etc. 
929 Formally Lever Brothers now was named ‘Lever Brothers & Unilever Limited’; the name of the NV 
was changed to ‘Lever Brothers & Unilever NV’. The concern as a whole was now called ‘Lever Brothers 
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acquired ownership of the extensive British margarine interests of the former 
Margarine Unie. To compensate for this, Unilever Limited transferred all its assets 
outside Britain and the British Empire to Unilever NV. This included substantial 
soap interests in the US, Latin America and the Far East. In other words: in 1937 
Unilever NV and Unilever Limited redivided ownership of their interests along 
geographical lines, seemingly moving away from the former partition according to 
product—margarine and soap respectively. Because the regular share capital still was 
not affected and because the relationship between the parent firms was fully equal, 
the former Lever Brothers (as Unilever Ltd) continued to exist as a genuinly British 
company and the former Margarine Unie (as Unilever NV) as a fully Dutch 
company.930 
Although the merged companies now had the same name, their interests were not 
fully identical. Even after the exchange of assets in 1937, Unilever NV and Unilever 
Limited did not become involved in soap and margarine to equal degrees. The share 
capital of a group of subsidiaries can be transferred from one mother company to 
another very easily, but reorganising the relations between the corporate centre and 
its subsidiaries, and among subsidiaries themselves, involves more radical changes. 
The British margarine companies continued to exist as a separate division in Unilever 
Ltd, and, as the case of Unilever’s soap company in China will show, soap firms 
outside the British Empire remained oriented towards London more than towards 
Rotterdam. In other words: although the original hierarchies of the Margarine Unie 
and Lever Brothers gradually grew closer through a large-scale exchange of assets, 
their main interests remained tied to different markets. While the British side of 
Unilever’s managerial hierarchy was interested primarily in soap, the Dutch side kept 
its main interests in edible oils and fats.  
Formally, operational knowledge of the Unilever concern was concentrated at 
four places: in the boards of directors of Unilever NV, Unilever Ltd, Elma, and 
United Holdings. Because the membership of the boards of Unilever NV and Ltd 
was identical, these two boards functioned as one.931 From their members the so-
called Special Committee was selected, which consisted initially of eight and later of 
four members. It was this Special Committee that acted as the managing board of 
Unilever. The two holding companies, Elma and United Holdings, appointed the 
Unilever boards and the Special Committee. They were controlled by the major 
shareholders—the Jurgens, Van den Bergh, Schicht, and Lever families—and 
thereby functioned as the two halves of Unilever’s supervisory board. Therefore, 
from 1930 the company was controlled by an alliance of top-managers and major 
shareholders. The common, external shareholders did not have access to operational 
knowledge and consequently they had no direct influence on corporate strategy. In 
the development of the relationship between salaried managers and major 
shareholders in Unilever and its predecessors, the 1930s represented a transitory 
phase in which management quickly became the dominant group. In 1937 ownership 
                                                                                                                                          
& Unilever’. But since this change was reversed in 1952, it will be ignored in this study. In the 1980s 
‘Unilever Limited’ was changed to ‘Unilever plc’. 
930 E.A. Hofman, 'De Tweeledige Structuur van Unilever en de Egalisatie-Overeenkomst', Tijdschrift 
voor Vennootschappen, Verenigingen en Stichtingen (1968), 19. 
931 The three Boards were identical except for the fact that the Lever Brothers one had less members than 
the other two. In 1930 five directors from the Margarine Union were added to Lever Brothers’ Board. 
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of United Holdings and Elma was acquired by Unilever Ltd and NV respectively, 
which meant that Unilever’s boards had the right to nominate their own members.932 
In other words, from 1937 management was in complete control of the Unilever 
concern. In practice, operational knowledge was concentrated in the Special 
Committee. 
This rise to power of the leading exponents of the managerial hierarchy is also 
reflected in the identity of the chief executives. On the Margarine Unie side this 
position was occupied by Paul Rijkens. 933  Rijkens had begun his career in the 
margarine industry as an employee at the London office of Van den Bergh.934 He 
speedily moved up the career ladder, and as one of the architects of the Van den 
Bergh-Jurgens merger that created the Margarine Unie, he became the Unie’s second 
man behind Anton Jurgens. In 1933 Anton, the patriarch of the Jurgens familiy, 
stepped aside in favour of Rijkens. The fact that he was not a member of any of the 
three margarine families plus his impartial attitude in the integration of the Margarine 
Unie companies, made his leadership acceptable to the families. The top executive on 
the Lever Brothers side was Francis D’Arcy Cooper. Formerly a partner in the 
accountancy firm of Cooper Brothers & Co., he was appointed advisor to the board 
of Lever Brothers in 1921.935 It was his task to assist the company in overcoming its 
financial difficulties, which at this time were severe. He played a prominent role in 
the ensuing process of reorganisation, and emerged as the new president of Lever 
Brothers after Lever himself died in 1925. From this time on he was the British 
company’s undisputed leader. Rijkens and Cooper replaced the founding fathers of 
Unilever’s predecessors. Unlike the pioneering entrepreneurs who had built up a 
huge but not always stable business empire from scratch, they were typical managers 
who reorganised the company into an efficient, rationalised organisation. As leaders 
of the Special Committee, their interest lay in the well-being of the company as a 
whole—not in a particular part of it. After 1930 they and their colleagues in the 
Special Committee co-operated closely in creating a unified corporate culture for 
Unilever. To do this they had to negotiate with second tier-managers much more than 
with the main shareholders.  
During the first half of the 1930s, Unilever was controlled jointly by salaried 
managers and by the main shareholders. While the managers were interested 
primarily in corporate growth, the shareholding families may be assumed to have 
been interested in maximised profits but—because a large number of family 
members was involved in management936—also in growth. After 1937 the company 
was firmly in the hands of its management. Consequently, Unilever’s overall 
corporate interest during 1930-1941 was primarily growth, and to a lesser extent and 
only until 1937 also maximised profits. A special aspect of Unilever’s case is that its 
managerial hierarchy consisted of two main bodies, namely a British one in London 
and a Dutch counterpart in Rotterdam, both equally influential. Whereas the British 
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managers were interested primarily in the soap business and represented at the top by 
Cooper, their Dutch counterparts were mainly interested in margarine and 
represented by Rijkens. It was the task of Cooper, Rijkens, and their Special 
Committee to balance these interests by achieving an equal degree of growth in both 
sectors.  
 
The Soap and Margarine Trade in China 
Like other Western producers of consumer products, Unilever was attracted to China 
because of its large population and potential for rapid economic development. In 
1930 Unilever’s position in Europe was extremely strong, but in North America 
strong competitors were encountered. The most promising new markets were densely 
populated countries outside the Western world, especially India and China; in the 
1930s China was the largest market for Unilever soap outside the Western world.937 
In 1934 Unilever sold some fifteen thousand tons of soap in China, which constituted 
about 2 per cent of its total turnover and about 31 per cent of its turnover in non-
Western countries.938 By the late 1930s China had also become a very fast growing 
market for margarine and other food products. Nor was it merely interesting as a 
potential offset market. In raw materials, too, China was an important country for 
margarine and soap manufacture. The ingredients that were most used in soap and 
margarine production were vegetable oils and fats. China was one of the largest 
producers of raw materials for vegetable oil, such as cotton seed, ground nuts 
(peanuts), soya beans, rape seed, and sesame seed. 939  At the latest from the 
beginning of the twentieth century, China was one of the largest exporting countries 
of vegetable oil. 940  In the years immediately before the First World War, China 
accounted for about 8.8 per cent of world exports of the main types of oil.941 In the 
late 1920s, when silver prices were very low, China’s share in world exports of 
vegetable oil grew even larger.942 Unilever’s Dutch margarine factories continued to 
import raw materials from China and Manchuria throughout the 1930s. However, by 
1930 technology was advanced enough to allow margarine and soap makers to 
choose from a range of different sources, price and availability mainly determining 
which they used. Therefore, whereas China was prominent but not irreplacable as a 
supplier of raw materials, its size and underdeveloped state gave it a unique strategic 
value for the marketing of consumer products such as soap and food products. This 
made the Chinese market highly relevant to the future development of both Unilever 
NV and Unilever Limited. 
In order to expand in soap and margarine sales, the company operated two 
subsidiaries in China: the ‘China Soap Company Limited’ and ‘Edible Products 
Limited’.943 Both were registered as British firms under the Hongkong Companies 
Ordinances. The China Soap Company (CSC) was established by Lever Brothers in 
                                                          
937 Ibid. 396-397. 
938 Ibid. 
939 Hunt, ‘Grondstoffen’, 36-39. 
940 Ibid. 66. 
941 Ibid. 38. 
942 The exchange rate of Chinese currency was expressed in silver. Report of the speeches made by the 
chairman at the extraordinary general meetings of Lever Brothers 13 Feb. 1930, Unilever Rotterdam, HIS 
96, 1003 Lever Brothers Ltd, 1. reports of  the directors and reports of the annual meetings 1919-1935. 
943 Until 5 July 1935 EP’s name was ‘United Margarine Company Limited’. 
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the 1920s, but Edible Products (EP) first saw the light of day in 1933. From then, the 
two had largely or fully identical boards of directors. Until 1937 both companies 
reported to Unilever’s Overseas Committee in London, which consisted of four 
people. In 1931 they were H. Greenhalgh (chairman; representing Unilever Ltd), 
C.E. Tatlow (also Unilever Ltd), S.J. van den Bergh (representing Unilever NV), and 
G. Schicht (also Unilever NV).944 Each member of the Overseas Committee was 
assigned a group of countries, each of which he visited at least once every two years. 
After each visit he submitted a detailed report to the rest of the committee. This 
system of supervising overseas companies was a continuation of a practice developed 
by Lever Brothers in the 1920s. In the early 1930s the Overseas Committee member 
directly responsible for China was Tatlow, who had already occupied the same 
position before 1930. He visited China in 1932 and 1934, and was then succeeded by 
J.H. Hansard, who visited China in 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939. The last visit, up to 
the end of 1941, was made in 1940 by J.L. Heyworth. All three men became 
members of the Unilever boards of directors in the 1930s. Their visit reports were 
thorough analyses of economic developments in China in general and the situation of 
the local organisation of the company in particular. 
Until 1937 the Overseas Committee supervised all Unilever and Lever Brothers 
companies outside Europe and reported weekly to the Special Committee. Its 
equivalent for the companies in continental Europe was the Continental 
Committee.945 In 1938, as a result of the formal take-over of Unilever Ltd by Lever 
Brothers and the re-assignment of non-Empire countries to Unilever NV, the 
Overseas Committee was renamed to ‘Empire Overseas Committee’. Its 
responsibility was now limited to the British Commonwealth and Empire. The 
Continental Committee was renamed the ‘NV Continental and Overseas Committee’, 
and was now also responsible for the companies just removed from the authority of 
the other committee. In spite of the changes, China Soap Company and Edible 
Products were still supervised by Hansard, who now attended the meetings of the 
‘NV committee’. The interests in China remained de facto under the direction of 
Unilever Ltd. 946  Because the 1937 re-organisation had little impact on the 
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management of Unilever’s Chinese operations, the sub-committee of the Special 
Committee to which Unilever’s organisation in China reported will be referred to 
here as ‘Overseas Committee’ for the entire 1930-1941 period. 
In 1930 the CSC was Unilever’s first subsidiary in China, and formed the 
organisational basis on which the margarine business was later built. The CSC’s 
history had already begun in the first decades of the twentieth century. At that time 
the market for soap in China was still limited to the major cities. The only washable 
fabrics in most Chinese households were clothes, which were washed either at home 
or by washerwomen who used cheap quality soap. In 1924, after visiting China, a 
Lever Brother director remarked that his impression was that most Chinese never 
washed their clothes at all. 947  At first industrially made, better quality soap was 
imported—mainly from Great Britain—but soon small Chinese soap factories 
emerged. By the mid-1910s, in the larger cities there was a market for industrially 
made soap. This market consisted of two main segments: a small foreign one for 
toilet soap and high quality laundry soap, and a larger Chinese one, mainly for 
medium quality laundry soap. The foreign segment remained the preserve of foreign 
brands. In the Chinese segment, however, there was heady competition between 
imported and locally made brands. After the First World War, Lever Brothers 
became the largest importer of foreign soap in China. The British firm made its first 
direct investments in China on 17 June 1911, when 'Lever Brothers (China)' was 
created. This subsidiary replaced treaty port agents as the channel through which 
Lever Brothers soap was distributed to wholesale dealers. By 1915 Lever Brothers 
China handled about 30 per cent of all British soap exports to China, in addition to 
which it imported soap from the Lever Brothers factory in Kobe, Japan. The 
company operated a head office in Shanghai and a branch office in Canton, and had 
agencies and sales depots in ten cities: Changchun/Harbin, Dalian, Niuzhuang, 
Tianjin, Weihaiwei, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hankou, Canton, and Hong Kong. 948  In 
1916 Lever Brothers' selling organisation consisted of thirty-two Chinese and British 
representatives travelling through various parts of China.949  
Lever Brothers even bought a plot of land in Shanghai in partnership with 
chemicals producer Brunner, Mond & Co., a predecessor of Imperial Chemical 
Industries (ICI). Their aim was establish a jointly owned soap factory. At that time 
Brunner Mond owned two major British soap companies, which were Lever’s main 
competitors in China: Joseph Crosfield & Sons and William Gossage & Sons. Co-
operation with Brunner Mond proved unsuccessful, and in 1919 Lever Brothers 
bought Brunner Mond's soap companies. In the same year Lever Brothers also 
acquired Price's Patent Candle Company, which, jointly with Crosfield and Gossage, 
owned a Chinese subsidiary called China Soap and Candle Company. The British 
soap trade in China was now almost completely in the hands of Lever Brothers. 
Through Price's they also obtained a candle factory in Shanghai, which made soap as 
a by-product. On 15 February 1923, a new company was incorporated to combine all 
Lever Brothers soap assets in China: the China Soap Company. Ownership of the 
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Chinese candle assets was transferred to Candles Limited, a company owned jointly 
by Royal Dutch/Shell and Lever Brothers, but controlled by the petroleum 
company.950  
In 1920 Lever Brothers director C.E. Tatlow visited China and was impressed by 
the seemingly immense opportunities offered by the Chinese market:  
 
‘There are two features which are outstanding in the impressions I have 
gained in China. The one is that there is a vast trade to be done in soap, and 
the other is that, successful as our selling efforts may appear to have been, we 
have barely scratched the surface of the soap trade in China.’951  
 
Tatlow considered cheap bulk production the only way to bring Lever Brothers soap 
within reach of the large majority of the Chinese population, and to meet competition 
from Chinese soap makers. Therefore he strongly recommended building a soap 
factory in Shanghai as soon as possible. Not long after his report was written, Lever 
Brothers bought a large plot of land on the north bank of the Huangpu River, in the 
Yangshupu industrial district, and built a factory on it.952 When the soap factory 
went into business in 1924, it was manned by one European works manager, five 
European technicians and managers, and an unknown number of Chinese labourers. 
Chinese labour was very cheap, which enabled the factory to operate until 1941 
without requiring the installation of automatic machinery. Some raw materials were 
supplied by other Lever Brothers organisations abroad, but most, such as cotton seed 
oil, coconut oil, tallow, and bean oil, were purchased directly by the CSC. In 1925 
the company opened a new head office in the Chartered Bank Building on the Bund. 
Branch offices were opened also in other cities. In 1924 the CSC operated 
warehouses and offices in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Hankou, Jinan, Tianjin, Shenyang, 
Xiamen, Nanjing, and Fuzhou. Most were supervised by a European branch 
manager. The company introduced a wide range of brands and lines in order to reach 
the various segments of the Chinese market.953  
To stay ahead of competitors who exported their soap from the US or Europe to 
the treaty ports where import tariffs were low, and to benefit from the full potential 
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of the Chinese market, in the early 1920s Lever Brothers decided to distribute soap 
not just in the main cities but also to venture into the interior. In making this move, 
Lever Brothers faced the same distributing problems as Royal Dutch/Shell had come 
across in 1908 and the years thereafter. Outside the major cities transactions were 
usually not carried out on a cash basis, and the CSC salesmen did not know to whom 
they could sell on a credit basis. To penetrate the up-country market, the company set 
up an agency distribution system, which functioned in a way very similar to those of 
the three model distributing firms, Royal Dutch/Shell, Standard Oil, and BAT. The 
branch offices supplied Chinese agents, usually influential general merchants, who in 
turn supplied sub-agents and local dealers. The agents held a stock of soap, in return 
for which they gave the company certain securities, such as cash deposits, title deeds, 
share scrip, or guarantee bonds. The company’s own sales force was made up of 
fourteen European and thirty-six Chinese inspectors. It was their task to visit the 
agents, sub-agents, and local dealers. They tried to stimulate business, checked up 
the stock in the depots and sub-depots, and wrote reports for the head office. In 1926 
there were 109 main depots and 167 sub-depots spread over China’s main provinces, 
each depot managed by an agent or sub-agent. Above all, the inspectors’ most 
important function was to see that the company’s selling prices were maintained.954 
In spite of the formation of a unified organisation for the production and 
distribution of soap, Lever Brothers did not succeed in making a profit in China until 
the late 1920s. Losses made between June 1912 and June 1925 amounted to 
£277,142. In 1926 two directors from London visited China and concluded that the 
CSC ‘seemed to be drifting aimlessly’, and that ‘there has […] been gross 
mismanagement of the works and selling force’.955 Distribution costs to distant areas 
proved to be very high, which even affected the company’s position on the large 
Shanghai market, as selling prices were calculated on the basis of all distribution 
costs. Moreover, the use of European salesmen and inspectors was very costly and 
not effective, as they did not know the language well enough to negotiate with local 
dealers. Immediately after the London directors’ visit, China Soap Company’s 
general manager resigned and European staff was cut by half. Still this move did not 
solve everything. Possibly because in the countryside cheap locally-made soap was 
good enough for the washing of most clothes, the demand for industrial soap did not 
reach the level of that for kerosene and cigarettes. But the main difficulty was that 
investments in up-country distribution were high and required a long period of 
building-up agency relations and product familiarity before profits were to be 
expected. A subsidiary not being profitable for several years was not necessarily a 
problem—it had not been for Royal Dutch/Shell when it established its up-country 
organisation after 1907, but for Lever Brothers at this stage of its existence this was a 
problem.  
In the 1920s Lever Brothers lacked a sound financial basis. Around 1920 the 
concern had invested much money in the British fish industry and in African trading, 
neither of which was directly connected to the soap business. This diversification did 
not prove profitable and was followed immediately by a general economic crisis in 
Europe. Under these circumstances it became apparent how dangerous the 
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company’s capitalisation structure was: all shares held by external investors were 
preference shares, which meant that high dividends had to be paid at a time when 
Lever Brothers was short on money. The company incurred large debts, and during 
the following years it was forced to implement a policy of cost reduction. Towards 
the end of the 1920s Lever Brothers achieved a degree of stability, but the problem 
of high dividends was not really resolved until the merger with the Margarine 
Unie.956 Under these circumstances it was not possible to invest money in the CSC 
unless it would produce profits in a very short term. Since the Chinese company was 
already making a loss, its activities were limited to those that had proved profitable. 
This meant abandoning the selling organisation in the interior of China. Only in the 
vicinity of the Shanghai factory were distribution costs low enough to be able to 
build up a strong position with respect to competition. In 1928 the company had only 
one branch office left—in Tianjin—and its salesmen operated only in the provinces 
of Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangsu, Hebei, and Shanxi. Hong Kong and Guangdong were 
supplied by five ‘associate dealers’. For the time being the trade in CSC products in 
Fujian, Shandong, and Manchuria was again in the hands of treaty port agents.957 
Financially, this strategy of territorial contraction proved successful: distribution 
costs fell low enough to keep selling prices down. In the second half of 1928, the 
China Soap Company began to make a profit, and the output of the factory was 
increased from 275 tons to 550 tons per week. Strategically, however, it was a step 
backwards. By the end of the decade, in spite of high investments, Tatlow’s dream of 
bringing Lever Brothers soap within reach of the majority of the Chinese population 
had not come true. In the short run, cheap bulk production in Shanghai could not 
counterbalance high distribution costs in the interior of the country. This was the 
state of Lever’s Chinese investments when Unilever was created in 1930.  
In contrast to Lever Brothers, the Margarine Unie and its predecessors did not 
establish a subsidiary company in China. Before the 1930s a market for margarine 
was virtually non-existent, as the Chinese had no tradition of eating bread with 
butter. Margarine was used only to bake biscuits, for which there was a small but 
growing market around 1930. The Chinese did consume large quantities of cooking 
fats and oils—such as lard, peanut oil, rape seed oil, and bean oil—which could 
possibly be, but so far were not, substituted by European products.958 Margarine was 
sold only in a few large treaty ports. From 1923 to 1929 the amounts exported to 
China by the European Margarine Unie companies were between 150 and 250 tons 
per year; by 1929 the Margarine Unie was by far the largest producer for the Chinese 
market. Although China was important as a supplier of raw materials for European 
margarine producers, these did not invest in a local purchasing organisation. In 1910 
Anton Jurgens, president of Jurgens’ margarine company, travelled to China to 
investigate whether it would be possible to set up such a company, but he abandoned 
the idea when he found out that he was unable to negotiate a favourable price with 
Chinese suppliers.959 European margarine factories continued to rely on agents—
trading companies—to import margarine into China and export raw materials from 
China.  
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A direct result of the merger between Lever Brothers and the Margarine Unie was 
that the management of the CSC became responsible for sales in China of margarine 
and other foods in China. Even though the Chinese food division was turned into a 
separate company in 1933, the soap and food businesses were run by the same 
directors from the same head office on the Bund, their factories were on the same 
site, and their raw materials were purchased collectively. Although their marketing 
organisations were different and in the first years they did not co-operate as well as 
the Overseas Committee had hoped, still CCS and EP functioned as a single 
subsidiary within the structure of Unilever. The changes in the organisational 
structure of Unilever China between 1930 and 1941 reflect its strategy of wanting to 
narrow the distance to the consumers, both geographically and organisationally. 
During the 1930s the space in which the CSC and EP could manoeuvre was 
limited by the world-wide economic depression, which caused a depreciation in the 
price of many agricultural products. In the case of Unilever this meant lower costs 
for raw materials, as well as a depreciation of the stock already purchased. It also 
meant a decrease in the price of butter, a product which competed with margarine. 
The depression furthermore led to a lower income for many potential customers. This 
favoured the position of cheap low quality soap, with which Unilever’s soap 
competed. It also made it more difficult for the CSC to sell an important by-product, 
oil cake, as cattle feed. In spite of the depression, the soap company managed to 
retain its newly-acquired profitability after 1930, and indeed even expanded its 
selling organisation. The financial stability of the CSC benefited from the alliance 
with the Margarine Unie in 1930, and grew very strong in the years after 1933 when 
it became a full subsidiary of Unilever NV. Annual advertisement expenditure—an 
indication of the company’s marketing power—rose from Y13,000 in 1929 to some 
Y300,000 in 1935.960 By January 1933 the selling organisation in the company’s 
‘home territory’—roughly Shanghai, Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces—included 
fifty-five persons divided over seven sections, with branch offices in Shanghai, 
Suzhou, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Zhenjiang, and Nanjing.961 The home territory produced 
about half of the total turnover of the China Soap Company. 
At the same time the company reorganised its relationship with Chinese 
wholesale soap dealers in the home territory. Unilever believed that their attitude was 
too passive, while their financial strength was not as great as it had been during the 
1920s. The company tried to decrease its dependence on them and strengthen its 
influence on selling prices by drastically increasing the number of direct dealer 
contracts. In the Shanghai area this resulted in a rise in such contracts from about 
seventy to one thousand. The minimum amount of cases per purchase was lowered 
from fifty to ten. In the other sections of the home territory, Unilever had previously 
dealt only with the largest wholesale dealers, who supplied smaller dealers, these last 
in turn supplying the shops. But now the company began supplying the smaller 
dealers directly, leaving the larger ones in charge only of collecting orders and 
payments. There was to be direct control of all Chinese dealers and retail shops 
selling Unilever soap by the new selling organsation. Outside its home territory, 
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Unilever sold through agents. For these, there were thirty-one agency depots spread 
over the northern, eastern and southern provinces.962 The number of agencies never 
again approached what it had been in the 1920s, and the penetration of the 
countryside remained much less deep than that achieved by petroleum and tobacco 
firms. Still, by 1934 the CSC’s agency network again covered almost all provinces of 
China proper.963 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The China Soap Company factory seen from Yangshupu Road in the industrial area 
of the Shanghai International Settlement; the photo was taken in 1926 before the 
merger between Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie and the subsequent addition of 
a margarine factory (reproduced by kind permission of Unilever Historical Archives) 
 
In 1936 the company estimated that of a population of 450 million, only 50 million 
lived in areas too distant for the company to reach. Of the remaining 400 million, 
about half were thought to be too poor to buy Unilever soap.964 Consequently, the 
Chinese soap market was thought to consist potentially of about 200 million 
customers. Actual soap consumption increased by 50 per cent from 1932 to 1935, 
reaching some 100,000 tons in the latter year—still only half a kilo of soap per year 
for each of the 200 million consumers thought to be within reach of the soap 
industry. Nevertheless, were soap consumption to continue to grow in the same pace 
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this would mean great opportunities for all soap manufacturers involved. The 
Overseas Committee was convinced of this:  
 
‘[…] a country of 400 million inhabitants [geographically within reach] and a 
soap trade of only 80,000 to 100,000 tons per annum is not one which 
[Unilever] can afford to be out of.’965  
 
Unfortunately for Unilever, not they but Chinese producers benefited most from the 
growth of the soap market in the first half of the 1930s. 966  Unilever’s main 
competitors on the soap market were Chinese and Japanese manufacturers. Since 
major US soap companies like Procter & Gamble and Colgate-Palmolive did not 
produce soap in China, these could not lower their prices enough to reach customers 
in the interior of the country. Competition from Western companies existed mainly in 
the market for toilet soap, which was limited to the major cities and dominated by 
Unilever’s Lux line. The main toilet soap manufacturers in Shanghai were the 
Japanese Jui Pao Company and the International Soap Works. Neither was 
considered very dangerous by Unilever in 1932.967  
In the more important market for laundry soap there was a very large number of 
small Chinese producers. These were very hard to compete with for a nation-wide 
organisation such as Unilever China. Local soap factories had little or no transport 
costs and could sell their products more cheaply. Despite their competition, in 
general Unilever welcomed the existence of these small producers, because usually 
their products were of low quality. The Overseas Committee believed that these 
firms introduced laundry soap to people who had not used it before on a larger scale 
and much more cheaply than Unilever itself could ever achieve. This would bring 
more people within reach of Unilever’s soap products, which were more expensive, 
but supposedly also better. Only on occasions when these small producers imitated 
Unilever’s trademarks did the company suffer some misgivings. The main 
competitors, then, were the larger Chinese soap producers. As a result of the 
Japanese advance into China, Japanese soap companies—both in Japan and in 
China—also became more important as competitors. 
At the beginning of the 1930s the largest Chinese competitor was the 
International Dispensary Company (IDC), based in Shanghai. Its main soap line was 
called Koopun. Other competing Chinese firms were the Pacific Soap Company, the 
Nanyang Company and the Ting Foong Company, all active in the Yangzi valley. 
While the Overseas Committee was convinced that the smaller ones among these 
larger producers were no real threat, the IDC was seen as a serious challenge to 
further expansion in East and Central China.968 In 1931 the IDC sold 300,000 cases 
(almost 6,000 tons) of soap.969 At the same time Unilever China estimated that it 
controlled about a quarter of the market for laundry soap, which consisted of some 
72,000 tons and was growing rapidly. The special position of the IDC in comparison 
to other Chinese soap makers induced Unilever to think about coming to an 
                                                          
965 J. Hansard, visit report China, Japan and Manchukuo 1939, Unilever Rotterdam, DIR 10, 182.1. 
966 Because of the war the demand for soap stayed roughly at the same level in the second half of the 
1930s. 
967 Visit report China 1932, Unilever UK, Overseas Committee, OSJ 6/1-16 visit reports 1912-1937. 
968 Visit report China 1928, ibid. 
969 Visit report China 1932, ibid. 
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arrangement with the IDC. In 1934 during his visit to Shanghai, Tatlow, of the 
Overseas Committee, met three IDC directors at the Chinese Bankers’ Club. Later he 
reported about this meeting to the Overseas Committee: 
 
‘The meeting was extremely pleasant but the conversation remained general. 
What ever ideas they may have as to closer co-operation in soap selling or 
otherwise, they were not mentioned, and Robson [the managing director of 
the CSC and EP] and I considered that any approach in that direction must 
come from them. We are not in any panic. However, we now know each other 
and my impression was that they are anxious to work in harmony with us, as 
they do at the present in Glycerine to mutual advantage, though, of course, 
meanwhile we are each maintaining full pressure on our respective soap 
sales.’970 
 
Unilever’s main soap product in China was Sunlight soap, which was more 
expensive than Koopun. Sunlight was protected by one or more ‘fighting lines’, soap 
lines similar to Koopun in quality and price. Were a price war to eventuate, Tatlow 
argued, ‘we can strike and strike hard’ by lowering the price of the fighting lines 
enough to push Koopun out of the market, leaving Sunlight untouched. 971  In 
practice, however, competition from the IDC proved to be very strong and hard to 
resist, especially after 1934. One problem was that Sunlight was popular in the north 
only; in the rest of China cheaper soap lines were preferred. This situation benefited 
the IDC, especially since Sunlight was more expensive than Koopun, but of more or 
less the same quality. 
By 1935 the CSC was losing ground to the IDC, its market share having already 
fallen below 10 per cent. Unilever responded by lowering the price of Sunlight and 
improving its quality in order to strengthen its position in Central, East, and South 
China. At the same time the expansion of Koopun was to be checked by 
improvement of the quality of Unilever’s cheaper soap lines, and their introduction 
into North China.972 Quality of soap could be improved by increasing the content of 
fatty acid. In the south, where competition was weak, the quality was not 
improved.973 An attempt to reach an agreement with the IDC on soap prices failed. 
Competition proved strong not only in the laundry soap business, but also in that for 
toilet soap. In 1935 Unilever lost 5,500 tons of trade, while the competitors, mainly 
Japanese, lost nothing. In spite of having to face strong competition at a time when 
many consumers could not afford expensive soap, there were still some factors to 
Unilever’s advantage: its main lines were well-known thanks to a long history and 
extensive advertising, their quality was good and uniform,974 and the company had a 
well-functioning selling organisation. The Overseas Committee thought that the 
                                                          
970 Visit report China 1934, ibid. In 1934 and 1935 the market for glycerine had been divided between 
Unilever and IDC by means of a quota agreement, a somewhat greater part being for Unilever. Early in 
1936 IDC forced Unilever China to accept annulment of this agreement by offering to pay a penalty of  
Y30,000 and increasing its output at the same time. Unilever accepted the money. 
971 Visit report China 1934, ibid. 
972 Visit report China 1936, ibid. 
973 Visit report China 1936, ibid. 
974 Among other measures, stocks were kept fresh by water cooling. 
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company could regain its former market share if only expenses could be kept low.975 
Indeed, in 1936 and 1937 Unilever managed to recover much of its position on the 
soap market, equalling and then surpassing the IDC sales of about 15,000 tons per 
year. The CSC expanded its production facilities in Shanghai,976 and began exporting 
soap to other parts of Asia.977  
 
Table VIII. Trading results of the China Soap Company, 1926-1941  
 
 Sales (tons) Net Profit (Yuan) Net Profit 
 (£) 
1926 n.a. -/-       17,720 -/-        1,785 
1927 10,594 -/-     436,951 -/-      39,600 
1928 16,530 -/-     411,901 -/-      39,040 
1929 16,690 603,473 51,070 
1930 18,429 705,008 41,680 
1931 15,504 1,401,007 65,670 
1932 16,675 1,656,647 101,380 
1933 17,134 1,210,126 73,430 
1934 15,462 1,475,270 100,397 
1935 9,982 -/-     606,797 -/-      45,248 
1936 15,362 763,753 45,936 
1937 18,605 116,333 6,969 
1938 17,646 1,272,067 57,932 
1939 23,220 6,707,027 147,778 
1940 19,327 3,517,280 55,866 
1941 23,929 16,432,190 209,852 
 
Source: Unilever UK SCD 25, 5, 1; Unilever Rotterdam DIR 18, 325.1; Unilever UK, OSJ 6, Visit Reports 
China. 
 
In 1937 the IDC’s position weakened rapidly while at the same time Japanese 
competition was increasing significantly. Preliminary negotiations were begun by the 
CSC with about the possibility of amalgamation with the IDC. The Special 
Committee agreed to this plan, but only if it would result in the IDC being bought by 
and incorporated into the CSC. In that case the IDC’s former owners would be given 
the right to be represented on the board of the China Soap Company978 However, by 
this time—the summer of 1937—the Sino-Japanese War had broken out and the 
                                                          
975 In 1936 it was considering closing the expensive office on the Bund, and moving it to the factory site 
at Yangshupu Road, far away from the city’s centre: visit report China 1936, ibid. But the office was never 
actually moved. 
976 The CSC was negotiating with Lih Teh Oil Mill & Hardening Plant. This firm’s supplies of refined 
oils were no longer needed since the CSC had a new refinery. The idea was to purchase the Chinese 
company and then remove all useful machinery from its plant to the Unilever factory. The two sons of the 
owner could then keep their jobs as seed buyer/oil and cake seller, and oil mill manager respectively. 
However, it appears that this purchase failed to go through. About the same time the Overseas Committee 
began planning for a second soap factory in Tianjin. This would limit distribution costs and enable the 
company to have better access to supplies of cotton seed. Visit report China 1937, ibid. 
977 Early in 1937 Unilever China started exporting soap to the German firm Georg Dralle in Batavia: 
Minutes of the meeting of 22 March 1937, Unilever UK, Special Committee, general matters 1931-1942. 
978 Minutes of the meeting of 9 Aug. 1937, Unilever UK, Special Committee, minutes of the Special 
Committee meetings with the Overseas Executive/Overseas Committee 1937. 
CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR AND POLITICAL RISK 234 
Japanese occupation of Shanghai forced the IDC to cease production. Unilever lost 
its interest in taking over the IDC. Two Japanese soap factories were now established 
in Shanghai, but they did not manage to capture a large market share. In 1941 
Unilever produced 23,929 tons, the IDC produced 4,422 tons, and the China 
Chemical Works (CCW), another Chinese firm, produced 2,762 tons. 979  The 
combined output of all other Shanghai soap manufacturers averaged only 3,300 tons 
in the last three years before 1942. 980  By 1941, the company was successfully 
defending its share of the soap market in the parts of China that were still accessible 
from Shanghai, and in the process was making good profits. Its trading result up to 
this year are listed in table VIII. 
Unilever’s position in the Chinese margarine market was somewhat different: this 
market was much smaller than the soap market. Consequently Edible Products 
remained much smaller than the CSC. But although butter became drastically 
cheaper because of the economic recession,981 the Chinese trade in margarine grew 
during the 1930s. There are no exact figures of how much Unilever margarine was 
sold in China at the beginning of the decade: margarine made by Unilever in Europe 
was shipped by many different companies under many different names. Until late 
1939 Hong Kong was supplied from Europe. The new factory was built in 1932 
besides the soap factory, and was operated under the supervision of a Dutch 
engineer, 982  who was later joined by a second margarine expert from the 
Netherlands. The margarine division’s sales director was British. At first margarine 
was sold in China through European agents, but when EP was incorporated on 7 
February 1933 it set up a selling organisation, consisting of Chinese travelling 
representatives under a Chinese ‘Number One Salesman’. 983  This sales force 
remained small, as there was not much opportunity for geographical expansion. The 
demand for margarine was concentrated mainly in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Qingdao, 
Tianjin, and Beijing; for the time being there was no food product that could be sold 
in the countryside. The tonnage actually sold was too low to enable the company to 
mount extensive advertising campaigns. In 1936 only Y10,000 was allocated to 
adv
                                                          
ertising.984 
By 1935 the Chinese margarine market consisted of some 400 tons, of which 383 
(circa 96 per cent) were sold by Unilever. In the same year, in addition to margarine, 
the company had also sold 30 tons of other edible fats and oil products. Margarine 
was largely consumed by Europeans, at home, or by bakers and biscuit makers.985 
Other important customers were Russian refugees and, increasingly, Chinese who 
developed a taste for Western products. The integration of soap and margarine 
interests at the local level was not an immediate success. The management of 
979  In 1939 the CCW, a maker of toilet articles, first produced laundry soap in Shanghai. 
980 Memorandum as a basis for the consideration and formation of policy and plans for the future 20 Nov. 
1945, Unilever UK, SDC 25 (China Soap Company)/3/5. 
981 Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, 276. 
982 D. van Gelderen, who was sent to China in December 1932, was highly experienced in margarine 
production and became a member of the Board of the United Margarine Company, as was then the name of 
Edible Products. Visit report China 1932, Unilever UK, Overseas Committee, OSJ 6/1-16 visit reports 
1912-1937. The second Dutchman was A.F.H. Blaauw, who had a chemical background. 
983 Visit report China 1932, ibid. 
984 Visit report China 1936, ibid. 
985 Visit report China 1936, ibid. 
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Unilever China, which was responsible for soap and margarine alike, was not very 
enthusiastic about Edible Products. Even in 1936 the margarine division was run as a 
separate company, definitely playing second fiddle to the soap division: ‘Except for a 
very vague attention, no one in the Shanghai office has had anything to do with it.’986 
The Dutch margarine specialist sent by Unilever NV to Shanghai, and his small 
Ch
es in China.987 By the latter year, EP had proved its potential for 
ver
ch. Unilever’s 
com
Geddes and Henningsen were informed by Unilever of its 
int
                                                          
inese staff, had to work more or less independently in these early years. 
From 1937, when the CSC formally had to report to Rotterdam instead of 
London, more attention was paid to the margarine trade. In 1937 a new refinery 
enabled EP to produce salad oil. Biscuits made using margarine as shortening 
became very popular among the wealthier Chinese. The company made a plan to 
make pineapple-flavoured margarine for biscuit manufacturers, and even flirted with 
the idea to enter the biscuit business directly. Besides the biscuit trade, the influx into 
Shanghai of tens of thousands of German Jews in 1939 also gave the margarine 
market a strong impulse. In the same year Unilever decided to buy a plant in 
Shanghai to produce milk and ice-cream. In 1940 and 1941 the company made plans 
to sell Wall’s sausag
y rapid growth. 
There was less competition on the margarine market than in the soap trade. As 
was the case with the soap trade, US-based margarine producers, such as Procter & 
Gamble (P&G), Kraft, Standard Brands, Jelke, and the meat industry, were not very 
active in China, which imposed a heavy import duty on margarine.988 P&G’s Palm 
brand was the strongest non-Unilever brand in Shanghai. Unlike soap, margarine was 
not consumed outside the major cities. Therefore there were no small-scale 
competitors in areas that were expensive for Unilever to rea
petitors were mainly foreign firms in Shanghai and Hong Kong. 
At the beginning of the 1930s there were two margarine producers in Shanghai: 
Swiss-China Trading and Manufacturing Company and Henningsens Produce 
Company. The former sold only its own margarine, 989  while the latter also 
distributed imported brands. Two firms that distributed margarine without producing 
it themselves were Geddes Trading & Dairy Farm Company, an important customer 
of Unilever, and Frost Brand Company. Henningsen (American) and Geddes 
(British) were the two largest margarine dealers in Shanghai. In 1931 Geddes urged 
Unilever to establish a margarine factory in Shanghai as soon as possible, as it could 
not drop its prices as low as Henningsen’s. The Special Committee decided to 
investigate the plan for a factory, and, for the time being, to support Geddes, ‘even at 
great sacrifice, in order to maintain trade against local manufacture’.990 In March of 
the following year, 
ention to build a margarine factory.991 
After Unilever began margarine production in Shanghai, its position on the local 
margarine market became even more dominant than it had been. By 1936 the market 
was divided as follows: EP 78.3 per cent, Henningsen 13.3 per cent, and Geddes 8.3 
986 J. Hansard (Shanghai) to Overseas Committee (London) 14 March 1936, ibid. 
987 J.L. Heyworth, visit report China and Japan 1940, Unilever Rotterdam, DIR 18, 325.1. 
988 P&G did establish a margarine factory in Manila in 1931: Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, 276.  
989 And possibly was a Chinese firm. 
990 Minutes of the meeting of 31 Aug. 1931, Unilever UK, Special Committee, minutes of the Special 
Committee meetings with the Overseas Executive/Overseas Committee 1931. 
991 Minutes of the meeting of 3 March 1932, ibid. 1932. 
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per cent. Unilever and Henningsen—not Geddes—made informal price agreements 
with each other. When Henningsen complained about its share, Hansard set up a plan 
to allow Henningsen temporary price reductions to increase its sales by 25 per cent. 
A European auditing firm should then be employed to confirm the accuracy of 
Henningsen’s sales figures. Hansard argued that this would ensure Unilever the co-
operation of Henningsen whenever competition from Geddes or another third party 
would become strong. The great advantage was that this plan was simpler and 
cheaper than a full quota system, which would require pool accountants, 
administrative expenses and prolonged negotiations. 992  Related factors were that 
Henningsen relied on Unilever as an outlet for its egg yolk, and that Unilever could 
not get access to the Shanghai market for ice cream as long as it was dominated by 
Henningsen. Geddes was still buying margarine from Unilever, but without formal 
agreement. Each purchase was made on an individual basis. In spite of these 
connections, the three firms continued to compete. A price fight in 1936 resulted in 
severe damage to the local butter trade, in which Chinese producers had been rising 
to the cost of overseas producers. 993  In 1937 Unilever tried reach a definite 
agreement concerning supplies to Geddes, in order to be able to pressure Henningsen 
into a formal price fixing agreement, and possibly striking a deal to manufacture for 
them.994 However, in 1940 the situation had not yet changed, 995 except for the fact 
that a new competitor appeared to have entered the stage: Swan Products Company, 
a Chinese-Russian firm.996 In Hong Kong, which was not supplied by EP until 1940, 
there was no import duty. The main competitor in Hong Kong was the Dairy Farm 
Ice & Cold Storage Company, the only firm with cold storage facilities. Unilever’s 
policy was to push small producers out of the market, rather than attacking Dairy 
Farm. 997  As shown in table IX, given its dominant position and the increase in 
dem nd, profits rose rapidly from 1934, with a slight drop in 1938 only. 
onnage of margarine exported to Hongkong from 
uropean Unilever factories, 1933-1941 
 
Shang from Euro s
Net Profit EP (Y) Net Profit 
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Table IX. Trading results of EP and t
E
 
Tonnage 
hai 
Tonnage 
pe
Total 
ales
EP  
(£) 
1933 89 98 187 -/-     1 -/-   1,7,022 033  
1934 175 167 342 1,027 70 
1935 198 185 383 6,560 489 
1936 387 185 572 32,740 1,968 
1937 420 348 768 73,101 4,379 
1938 486 249 735 77,636 3,536 
1939 1, 1,
941 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,851,903 24,102 
141 248 389 419,298 9,239 
1940 n.a n.a. n.a. 1,244,856 19,772 
1
 
Source: Unilever UK SDC 25/5/1; Unilever Rotterdam DIR 18, 325.1. 
                                                          
992 Visit report China 1936, Unilever UK, Overseas Committee, OSJ 6/1-16 visit reports 1912-1937. 
993 Visit report China 1937, ibid. 
994 Ibid. 
995 J.L. Heyworth, visit report China and Japan 1940, Unilever Rotterdam, DIR 18, 325.1. 
996 A memorandum on the margarine and edible fats industry of Shanghai 14 Oct. 1941, Unilever UK, 
SDC/25/8/3. 
997 J.L. Heyworth, visit report China and Japan 1940, Unilever Rotterdam, DIR 18, 325.1. 
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Apart from soap and margarine, Unilever also produced glycerine in China as a by-
product of soap manufacture. In the late 1920s the CSC installed a refining plant for 
glycerine, from which it supplied tobacco companies.998 In 1929 640 tons of refined 
glycerine were sold, 118 tons of which went to BAT. However, in 1930 BAT 
stopped using glycerine, and subsequently supplies to the egg yolk industry and the 
cosmetics industries assumed greater importance.999 Later the pharmaceutical and 
toothpaste industries also became large customers. After 1930 the demand for 
glycerine gradually increased, Unilever being the largest supplier. Throughout the 
1930s this demand generally remained great; in 1940 the company sold 920 tons. 
Only in 1937, possibly because of the initial economic disruptions caused by the war, 
the demand for glycerine was so low that the soap company’s profits were severely 
affected. The profitability of the CSC appears to have depended heavily on 
dev
              
elopments in industries that used glycerine as a raw material.1000 
Edible Products was created as a subsidiary of Unilever NV.1001 Therefore any 
profits or losses made by Edible Products directly influenced the profits of Unilever 
as a whole—albeit it only to a very limited extent. At the end of 1939 investments in 
EP totalled about £9,000,1002 while the dividend produced by this company in the 
1933-1941 period was £19,920.1003 Ownership of China Soap Company was a more 
complicated matter. This company had been established in 1923 by Lever Brothers, 
which fully owned it until 1934.1004 In 1934 and 1935 many or most of its shares 
were sold to Unilever NV,1005 and in 1937, as part of the transfer of non-Empire 
assets to its Dutch parent, the CSC became the full property of Unilever NV. 
Therefore, from 1930 to 1933 the dividends paid by the CSC—totalling £147,960—
were of little importance to the profits made by either Unilever NV or Unilever Ltd. 
The total dividend for 1934 to 1941, when most or all of it did end up with Unilever 
                                            
om local authorities to export glycerine 
f
ch held one share were M.B. Brown, A.E. Seddon, C.G.W. 
R  of the United 
M
 China and Japan 1940, 11. 
38,000 were sold in 1934, and possibly another 442,000 in 
1
spondentie etc.  
998 Visit report China 1928, Unilever UK, Overseas Committee, OSJ 6/1-16, visit reports 1912-1937. 
999 Visit report China 1932, ibid. 
1000 In 1941 the market for glycerine in China became so small that the company had 900 tons in stock, of 
which it wanted shipped 700 tons to South Africa: Minutes 27 Jan. 1941, Unilever UK, Special 
Committee, minutes of the Special Committee meetings with the Overseas Committee 1941. However, by 
the summer it had become very difficult to obtain permission fr
rom Shanghai: Minutes of the meeting of 5 Aug. 1941, Unilever UK, Special Committee, minutes of the 
Special Committee meetings with the Overseas Committee 1941. 
1001 Apart from six that were owned by the new company’s board of directors, all shares were held by 
Van den Bergh’s Fabrieken, a Dutch subsidiary of Unilever NV. There were 30,000 shares of Y10 each. 
The new company’s book value was ƒ149,571: Minutes of the extraordinary general meeting of the United 
Margarine Company Ltd, Unilever UK, Microfilm 18/3, (152) United Margarine Company Ltd (Shanghai) 
1933-1941. In 1933 the six directors who ea
obson, W. Harper, P.H. Cobb, and L.D. McNicoll: Minutes of the meeting of the directors
argarine Company Ltd 16 Feb. 1933, ibid. 
1002 Unilever Rotterdam, DIR 18, 325.1 J.L. Heyworth: Visit to
1003 The dividend was paid only in the year 1941: EPL profits etc. 1933-1948, Unilever UK, SDC 25/5/1. 
1004 Via a Dutch subsidiary, NV Lever’s Zeep Maatschappij.  
1005 In fact they were sold to the Overseas Committee, which was a committee of the Unilever Board. The 
legal status of the Overseas Committee is not clear. The total share capital of the China Soap Company 
consisted of 800,000 shares of Y10 each. 2
935: OSC legal dept to Lever’s Zeep Mij NV 26 and 27 June 1934, Unilever Rotterdam, HIS 105, 1081 
NV Lever’s Zeep Mij: Corre
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rather than the shareholders of Lever Brothers, was £501,060.1006 At the end of 1939 
investments made in the CSC amounted to about £230,778. 1007  While the 
subsidiaries in China were registered under British law, on various occasions 
Unilever did not hesitate to state that they were owned by a Dutch mother company. 
In September 1941 when the British China Association—which represented many 
British China firms in London—asked for certain information about Unilever’s 
activities in China, Unilever complied, but not without pointing out that its business 
in China was the property of Unilever NV, in other words, that Unilever’s Chinese 
subsidiaries were Dutch. A few days later, when asked by the China Association to 
con
try agency and dealer relations for soap, Unilever’s involvement in the 
Chinese economy was great enough to make it highly sensitive to local political 
ver’s interests in the years 1930-1937 were 
popular boycott movements, the Guomindang regime’s tax and trademark policies, 
company about the sale of Unilever’s unused land in Shanghai were deferred until 
                                                          
tribute to a fund for the provision of a pension for its retiring secretary, Unilever 
refused.1008 
The main local interest of Unilever in China was to develop a large and stable 
market share in both soap and margarine sales, and expand this as the Chinese 
market itself expanded. Achieving this was the task of two manufacturing and sales 
subsidiaries, the CSC for soap and EP for margarine and other food products. The 
soap market was larger than the margarine market, but EP grew fast and by the end 
of the 1930s it was developing new activities such as the production of ice-cream and 
sausages. In the soap trade, the more promising part of the market lay not in the 
treaty ports, which could be easily supplied with imported soap, but in the interior. 
Therefore, the CSC became the first foreign soap company to establish an up-country 
distribution network. Through its soap and margarine factories in Shanghai and its 
up-coun
risks.  
 
Political Risks and Response 
 
1930-1937 
The political risks that threatened Unile
and Japan’s domination of Manchuria.  
 
Anti-Foreign Boycotts. Early in 1932, when hostilities broke out between Chinese 
and Japanese armed forces around Shanghai, Unilever heard rumours that an 
association called the Blood and Soul Society was planning a boycott against the 
company. The reason was that it purchased oils from Japanese firms. The company’s 
Shanghai management took the threat very seriously, as it saw the anti-Japanese 
boycott as a weapon which could easily be exploited by Chinese competitors. 
Consequently Unilever decided not to buy hardened fish oil from Japan or hardened 
fat from the Japanese Oil Company at Dalian: ‘[…] our Diplomatic and Consular 
bodies are helpless in the matter and the only means of dealing with it is as [we] are 
doing tactfully through influential Chinese’. Also negotiations with a Japanese cotton 
1006 Dividend was paid only in the years 1930, 1932, 1933, 1934, and 1941: CSC profits etc. 1925-1948, 
U
UK, Special Committee, minutes of the 
S
nilever UK, SDC 25/5/1. 
1007 Unilever Rotterdam, DIR 18, 325.1 J.L. Heyworth: Visit to China and Japan 1940, 11. 
1008 Minutes of the meetings of 2 and 16 Sept. 1941, Unilever 
pecial Committee meetings with the Overseas Committee 1941. 
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the outcome of the Sino-Japanese conflict had become clear. 1009 Meanwhile, the 
company benefited from the fact that the imports of Japanese toilet soap were 
res
 
am g the Chinese population. In 1934 Tatlow reported to the Overseas Committee: 
 
n it has been for years and can be 
quietly dealt with by tact and patience.’1011 
ble of exerting influence on foreign companies via tax and 
trademark laws.  
tested its ability to evade 
Ch
tricted.1010 
Unilever’s management was well aware of the danger of anti-foreign feelings
on
‘We, in the China Soap Company, have during the past four years steadily 
followed a policy of getting on with our job of selling soap without the 
publicity which has marked the activities of such large Companies as the 
BAT, the ICI and the APC, thereby attracting attention of those who felt 
themselves responsible for some action on behalf of propaganda of Anti-
Foreign feeling, and so whilst in certain areas and at certain times, we have 
felt its influence, it is not more so now tha
 
Shortly hereafter Hansard, Tatlow’s successor, began to think about ways to obtain 
political protection from the Chinese government against the anti-foreign aspects of 
nationalism. He suggested, for instance, that the donation of carbolic soap to 
‘cleaned-up’ areas in Jiangxi—i.e., parts of the communist Jiangxi Soviet that were 
taken by the Guomindang army—would be an effective means of ingratiating 
Unilever with the Chinese government.1012 Not only were good relations with the 
government a way to obtain protection from popular anti-foreign movements, but by 
the mid-1930s it was becoming clear that the Guomindang government was 
increasingly capa
 
Taxation under the Guomindang Government. One of the great challenges awaiting 
the Guomindang when it seized power in 1928 was to prove its ability to impose 
taxation on foreigners. As foreign corporations, Unilever’s subsidiaries, the CSC and 
Edible Products, enjoyed extraterritorial status and could not be taxed directly by the 
Chinese government. Although direct taxation was beyond its reach, indirect taxation 
was possible through import and export duties on goods levied by the Chinese 
Maritime Customs service at the treaty ports. In 1929 the foreign powers restored 
China’s tariff autonomy, in return for the abolition of the lijin and other domestic 
trade duties. One important exception was made for goods transported by steamship 
from one treaty port to another, on which an export duty was payable at the moment 
they left port. To some degree the central government’s growing strength in fiscal 
matters threatened Unilever. During the 1920s the government had been too weak to 
protect Chinese enterprises by the imposition of tax regulations; local trade barriers 
were numerous and unpredicatble, but at least they applied to all traders alike. But 
now the economic policy of the government—one that propagated a nationalist 
ideology—was gaining in relevance. In 1931 Unilever 
ina’s tax policy by refusing to pay this steamship duty. 
                                                          
1009 Visit report China 1932, Unilever UK, Overseas Committee, OSJ 6/1-16 visit reports 1912-1937. 
1010 Minutes of the meeting of 24 March 1932, Unilever UK, Special Committee, minutes of the Special 
Committee meetings with the Overseas Executive/Overseas Committee 1932. 
1011 Visit report China 1934, Unilever UK, Overseas Committee, OSJ 6/1-16 visit reports 1912-1937. 
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Unilever shipped its soap from Shanghai to Lianyungang, which was not a treaty 
port and therefore the company did not need to pay export duty in Shanghai. In 
Lianyungang the soap was immediately reshipped to Qingdao, which was a treaty 
port. When the Qingdao Commissioner of Customs noticed what the company was 
doing, he demanded payment of the Shanghai export duty. Unilever refused this, and 
approached the British commercial counsellor in Shanghai. The company claimed 
that it was being discriminated against by the Chinese authorities, and hoped that the 
British government would put pressure on Nanjing to let the goods pass without 
taxation. Unilever told the commercial counsellor that Customs was applying a 
certain regulation called ‘privileged factory treatment’ in the case of Unilever soap, 
but that the same rule was not applied to Chinese soap traders. The privileged factory 
treatment was not a privilege at all, because it entailed having to pay export duty 
regardless of in what way and for which destination goods were transported from a 
treaty port. It was a remnant of the period when the government had introduced this 
rule to exempt industrial products from lijin in return for export duty.1013 Formally 
this regulation still applied but, because it was outdated, it was not enforced by 
Customs. Still, the British government preferred that China formally removed the 
pri
d of trade 
dut
                                                          
vileged factory treatment law, and Unilever hoped that its steamship problem 
would be considered as part of the same issue by the British government.  
Unfortunately for Unilever, the British commercial counsellor did not agree with 
the way it presented the facts. He believed that Customs had judged correctly that the 
company was simply trying to evade tax, which had nothing to do with the privileged 
factory problem.1014 Therefore he decided that no British official protest should be 
made. His view was confirmed in October of 1932, when he had a meeting with 
representatives of the British companies affected by the privileged factory treatment. 
Other companies involved, besides Unilever, were Royal Dutch/Shell, Caldbeck, 
McGregor & Co., the China Printing & Finishing Company, Jardine-Matheson, and 
Mackenzie & Co. When asked by the commercial counsellor if they were interested 
in the matter being taken up with the Chinese government, none of those present was 
in favour. All, including Unilever, wanted the situation to remain as it was. 1015  
Regardless of whether the British government had actually been able to help 
Unilever if it had wanted to, the company now learned that the Foreign Office was 
not willing to oppose China’s right to exercise its autonomy in the fiel
ies. Because it saw no other strategy to resist the steamship duty, Unilever gave in 
and reverted to junks and trains to transport soap between treaty ports.1016 
As it turned out, the Guomindang government was not immediately interested in 
using fiscal measures to limit foreign influence and protect Chinese business. The 
1013  The Chinese government had hoped to stimulate factories in Shanghai switching from making 
indigenous products to substituting imported products for the Chinese market. It was the latter kind of 
‘foreign style goods’ that were targeted by the privileged factory treatment. When local transit duties were 
still being imposed, it had been an advantage that goods were only taxed by a single export duty and were 
exempt from local duties. But from 1 January 1931 all so-called ‘native goods’ could be moved by junk, 
rail or—if to a non-treaty port—steamer without payment of any duty, and the law lost its original effect.  
1014 Minute by the British Commercial Secretary A.H. George (Shanghai), PRO London, FO 371, 16238, 
F8928. 
1015 Minutes of the meeting of representatives of British firms (British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai) 
26 Oct. 1932 , ibid. 
1016 J. Hansard, visit report China, Japan, and Manchukuo 1939, Unilever Rotterdam, DIR 10, 182.1. 
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Maritime Customs’ trade duties remained uniform for national and foreign 
merchants. By 1936 the company’s attitude had changed, and its management even 
considered the question of voluntarily paying corporate tax. This was not required 
legally, but  in a report to the Overseas Committee Hansard noted that the matter 
deserved attention as eventually the Guomindang government would begin to 
complain about it. In other words, rather than opposing the tax policy of the Chinese 
government, Unilever was beginning to think about actively co-operating with it in 
order to ensure a good relationship with Nanjing. However, he felt that the time was 
not yet ripe for such a policy—not so much because there was no legal basis on 
which China could force Unilever to pay corporate tax, but because the government 
was no
 
such a 
law and order as exists. At that time we should probably gain by leading the 
teamer tax, by the mid-1930s the 
com any was willing to comply with the tax policy of the Chinese government and 
because the brand name copied happened to be part of the Chinese firm’s own name, 
o ed, 
 
t yet strong enough to force Chinese firms to pay: 
‘We cannot afford to be too generous and pay the 2% Capital or Turnover tax 
which Chinese companies are liable to pay, as it is likely that most of them do 
not pay it, and certainly none of them pays it in full, but when and if the 
Central Government establish a system of taxation which is fairly 
administered, they will probably press for foreign companies to pay 
something for the privilege of trading and enjoying the protection of 
way and paying gracefully what must in equity be paid eventually.’1017 
 
His last remark indicated that Hansard believed that, one way or another, foreign 
investors in China would lose their freedom from direct taxation and that having a 
good relationship with the Guomindang government was a desirable aim. Whereas in 
1931 Unilever still had to be forced to pay s
p
even contemplated paying extra tax voluntarily. 
 
Trademark Infringements under the Guomindang Government. Besides taxation, a 
second important instrument available to the Chinese government to exert influence 
on foreign direct investors was its trademark policy. For a company like Unilever, 
trademark laws were extremely important. Soap was easy to make, but establishing a 
popular brand name involved a great deal of time and effort. In the period 1933-1935 
there were several instances when Unilever discovered that Chinese soap 
manufacturers had imitated the appearance of well-known Unilever brands such as 
‘Gossage’, ‘Lux’, ‘Lever’, and ‘Vinolia’. Despite protests, in each case the 
Trademark Bureau of the Chinese government refused to prohibit these imitations. 
On the contrary, the Bureau was extremely slow in even responding to Unilever’s 
complaints. When the Bureau did reply, it rejected the complaint, for instance, 
r because it was used on a different type of soap.1018 Once its claim was reject
                                                         
1017 Visit report China 1936, Unilever UK, Overseas Committee, OSJ 6/1-16 visit reports 1912-1937. 
1018 Several cases were reported to the British Foreign Office. The China Ziang Mow Foreign Candle and 
Soap Factory (Suzhou) made ‘China Ziang Mow Foreign Soap’ which used the same Chinese characters as 
were used by Unilever for ‘Gossage’. The Trademark Bureau judged that there was no rule against a 
product bearing the name of its manufacturer: British commercial counsellor (Shanghai) to British Minister 
A. Cadogan (Beijing) 25 April 1935, PRO London, FO 371, 19325, F6219; Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Nanjing) to the British Minister 24 May 1934 , PRO London, FO 371, 18088, F4281. Li Sheng 
Factory sold ‘Lux Cold Cream’, a name referring to Unilever’s ‘Lux Toilet Soap’. In late 1933 Li Sheng 
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the company followed the tedious procedure of requesting for a re-examination, 
followed by appeals to the Minister of Industries and the Administrative Yuan. These 
were supported by the British Embassy, which sent memoranda to the Chinese 
government.1019 In spite of these efforts, Unilever never managed to obtain Chinese 
protection official against trademark infringements. While it is unknown to which 
extent the Chinese government was actually able to punish Chinese trademark 
infringements had it wanted to do so, Unilever’s troubled relationship with the 
Trademark Bureau certainly showed that there was no way an unwilling Chinese 
government could be forced to change its trademark policy. Hansard’s suggested 
improved relations with the government through voluntary tax payments had a 
potential practical value, at least in the field of trademark protection. 
 
Taxation under the Manchukuo Government. In 1932 the foreign policy of Japan 
threatened Unilever’s interests, when it established Manchukuo. This puppet state 
introduced its own customs tariffs, which drove up the transport costs of the soap 
which Unilever produced in Shanghai. In anticipation of this Unilever had shipped a 
year’s supply—some 60,000 cases—of soap into the area. The company 
pessimistically considered the Manchurian market lost from the moment these 
supplies would be exhausted. Erecting a soap factory in Manchuria was an option, 
but the idea was discarded because the situation was judged to be too chaotic.1020 In 
the following years it turned out, however, that Unilever’s business was not really 
seriously affected by the new import tariff.1021 The company even found new outlets 
in Manchuria: through wholesale dealers, Unilever sold glycerine to the Japanese 
military which used it for anti-freeze purposes.1022  
                                                                                                                                          
Factory registered with the Trademark Bureau the trademark ‘Lux’, as well as a coloured carton similar to 
Unilever’s Lux Toilet Soap wrapper, and a soap box similar to Unilever’s box: British commercial 
counsellor (Shanghai) to Cadogan (Beijing) 19 July 1934 , ibid. 18088, F5523. The Trademark Bureau 
concluded after an investigation lasting more than nine months that this was not a case of consumer 
deception, because the Chinese Lux was not a soap but a skin cream. Meanwhile Lux Cold Cream had 
spread to Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, and Guangdong: Unilever Shanghai to 
the British commercial counsellor (Shanghai) 15 June 1934 , ibid.; ibid. 18088, F6704. In 1935 a Chinese 
soap factory registered under the name of Lee Hwa, written in the same characters as used in the ‘Lever’ 
brand trademarks. According to Unilever China: ‘It is difficult for us to refrain from calling the present 
situation absurd.’ Unilever Shanghai to the British commercial counsellor (Shanghai) 22 March 1935 , 
ibid. 19325, F6219. Some months later the Trademark Bureau refused to register Unilever’s ‘Vinolia 
boracic & cold cream soap’ carton, because looked similar to a carton registered in 1931 by Chung Chong 
Toilet Soap & Printing Factory. The Bureau was not impressed by the fact that the Vinolia carton was 
already in use in China ‘since 1914 or thereabouts’ in a different shape, and in the same shape since 1925: 
Unilever Shanghai to the British commercial counsellor (Shanghai) 10 July 1935 , ibid. 19325, F6422. 
Finally, Li Yih Kee Soap Factory (Suzhou) was imitating Unilever’s Gossage brand trademarks: Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Nanjing) to the British ambassador (Nanjing) 20 Aug. 1935 (translation), ibid. 
19325, F6253. 
1019 However, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs only passed the matter on to the Ministry of 
Industries, which would respond by stating that the appropriate Chinese court should solve the matter. 
Each procedure was a lengthy and protracted affair. Unilever also tried to use its influence in the British 
Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai to put pressure on the Trademark Bureau to amend its regulations. The 
Chamber of Commerce formed a sub-committee to study the matter: C.G.W. Robson (Unilever Shanghai) 
to the British Chamber of Commerce (Shanghai) 16 Feb. 1935, ibid. 19325, F3144. It is unknown whether 
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1937-1941 
The main political risks for Unilever in the late 1930s were caused by the fighting 
between Japan and China, by Japan’s policy in North China, and by the imminent 
possibility of a war between Japan and the Western Allies.  
 and stock 
did
ritish Foreign Office, the company dropped this demand, 
albeit under protest.1026 
                                                          
 
Damage from the Sino-Japanese War. The company did not foresee the outbreak of 
the Sino-Japanese war: in April 1937 Hansard reported that he did not expect a 
Japanese military advance into the northern provinces. When the war suddenly 
erupted three months later, its immediate consequence was that Unilever’s operations 
were severely hampered. The first serious effect of the war was that, although located 
in the International Settlement, its soap and margarine factories suffered damage. 
The site on which they lay happened to be in that part of the Settlement which had 
been assigned to Japan in the city’s defence scheme. The intention of the defence 
scheme was to keep the frequently occurring civil wars in China out of the 
Settlement—by keeping out the military forces of all warring parties. However, in 
1937 the result was exactly the opposite of what had been intended. Since Japanese 
forces were occupying this sector, Chinese army commanders regarded it as enemy 
territory. The British authorities were aware of the dangers for British persons and 
possessions in the Japanese sector, but could do nothing to protect them.1023 Unilever 
tried to prevent the factory from being targeted by the Chinese by displaying British 
flags. To the disappointment of the company, its request to illuminate these flags 
during the night was rejected by the Japanese military authorities. The danger was 
increased by the fact that Japanese warships anchored in the part of the river right in 
front of the factory. Close to midnight on 18 September 1937, the Chinese air force 
did what Unilever China had been fearing it would do: it bombed the Japanese sector 
and the river, and hit Unilever’s factories. While the damage to buildings
 not seriously affect production capacity, it did amount to £15,657.1024  
To obtain compensation from the Chinese government for the damaged factory, 
Unilever had to hand in detailed evidence to the British government, including 
photographs and damage assessments by independent sources. After collecting 
similar claims from other British firms, the British government addressed the its 
Chinese counterpart and demanded compensation. The same procedure was applied 
for the Japanese government with regard to damage caused by Japanese forces. It 
was not possible for a British company to get compensation for war damage without 
the intervention of the British government. This was a problem, as Unilever was not 
satisfied with the approach of the British government, which handled only claims for 
physical damage. The company demanded also compensation for the loss of income 
resulting from a decrease in trade.1025 After negotiations between Unilever’s London 
headquarters and the B
1023 PRO London, FO 371, 21006, F5563. 
1024 Braidwood (Unilever Shanghai) to the British consul-general (Shanghai) 3 Aug. 1938, ibid. 22067, 
F13052. 
1025 C.L. Cole (Unilever Overseas Committee) to E. Clement Davies (Unilever Ltd) 6 Sept. 1938, ibid. 
22064, F9652. This was only £662, but Unilever insisted that it was a matter of principle. 
1026 Unilever (London) to British Foreign Office 10 Dec. 1938, ibid. 22067, F13052 and 22067, F13221. 
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Even before the bombing had begun, the Japanese military had closed the factory to 
its Chinese labour force. In a memorandum about this, Hansard complained that the 
British government was refusing to take ‘a strong line against the Japanese’. In his 
view much more could be done to protect British interests in China.1027 He claimed 
that the Japanese were deliberately trying to harm Unilever’s business, using military 
considerations as a pretext. By the time his complaint reached the British Foreign 
Office, the Japanese authorities had already given permission for the return of the 
Chinese workers.1028  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chinese workers packing Lux soap bars at the Toilet Soap Department of the China 
Soap Company factory, Shanghai, circa 1938 (reproduced by kind permission of 
Unilever Historical Archives)  
 
Another case of unwanted interference from the Japanese army during the fighting 
occurred in Xinxiang, Henan province. In February of 1938 the Japanese army 
entered this city and took over the godown of a Chinese transport firm and sealed up 
the goods stored inside. In the godown there were 3228 cases of Sunlight soap and 
150 cases of other soap, all of which were the property of Unilever China. When he 
found out about this, P.H. Cobb, the director of Unilever’s Tianjin branch office, 
went to the Japanese consul in Tianjin. The consul secured help from the Japanese 
military authorities in Beijing, who in turn introduced Cobb to the chief of staff at 
Xinxiang. By the time Cobb visited Xinxiang it was November. It then transpired 
that some Y10,000 worth of soap was missing, but the rest was returned to him. 
However, after Cobb had returned to Tianjin, the Japanese military in Xinxiang 
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suddenly made it known that the goods could not be transported by train, nor could 
they be sold to the regular buyers. Instead Unilever China was asked if they wished 
to sell part of the stock to the Japanese army—at a discount. Now the company 
turned to the British representatives in China, who requested the Japanese High 
Military Command to return the soap.1029 Whether this had any effect is not known. 
A more serious matter was that the war made deliveries into the interior 
impossible. Unilever was forced to abandon 40 per cent of its trading area,1030 and 
responded by concentrating its selling efforts on the northern provinces and around 
Shanghai, which soon fell to the control of the Japanese military. Attempts were also 
made to build a new distribution network in the areas in West and Southwest China 
controlled by the Guomindang government. This proved very difficult, as all goods 
had to be transported from Shanghai to Chongqing via French Indochina and the de 
facto autonomous province of Yunnan. Although Unilever did manage to get its 
products there and the demand for soap in Chongqing was very large, sales in West 
China remained relatively unimportant. The Japanese-occupied areas were more 
important. In spite of transport limitations on the Yangzi, the company could still 
reach many places. Where direct deliveries were not possible, the soap was sold to 
dealers who came to Shanghai, Beijing, or Tianjin from where they took it into the 
interior. In 1939 Unilever managed to supply depots in Suiyuan, Datong, 
Zhangjiakou, Beijing, Dongshan, Tianjin, Shijiazhuang, Yuci, Jinan, Yantai, 
Qingdao, Xinxiang, Zhengzhou, Shanghai, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Zhenjiang, 
Nanjing, Wuhu, Hankou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, Chongqing, Kaifeng, Changde, 
Wuxi, and Haimen.1031 According to the Overseas Committee: ‘[…] we were able to 
distribute our soaps in a way one would hardly think possible in a country at war. 
[…] ways and means of distribution to the interior were many and varied.’ 1032  
Unilever even succeeded in shipping goods to several Yangzi cities at a time when 
the river was supposed to be closed to commercial traffic. In 1941 the company was 
still able to supply Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Hangzhou, Gulangyu, Quanzhou, 
Shantou, Fuzhou, Kunming, Guiyang, Chongqing, Hong Kong, Tianjin, and 
Qingdao.1033 Partnerships for distribution with Japanese firms were avoided as much 
as possible: Unilever preferred paying high fees to Japanese shipping lines rather 
than losing control over its up-country depots. Only in the case of Hankou was the 
company forced to let Mitsui take care of distribution to local dealers. In Shanghai 
the soap division was in direct contact with over 5,000 shops and dealers. 1034  
Although distribution costs were much higher than before 1937, soap sales rose, 
especially in North China. After Japan took control of the Chinese Maritime 
Customs, many import duties were lowered. This enabled Unilever China to use 
more imported palm oil from the Netherlands Indies instead of Chinese oils, which 
were more difficult to obtain.1035  
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Japanese Economic Policy in Occupied China. In many cases trade restrictions were 
overcome by Unilever. Still, as a result of the war, the demand for soap dropped in 
Central China but rose in North China where Japanese control seemed firmly 
entrenched. The Overseas Committee felt that the company should adapt to these 
changes: ‘Since the commencement of the present hostilities in July 1937, our policy 
in China vis-à-vis both the Chinese and Japanese, politically, has been that of a 
neutral manufacturer carrying on legitimate business in China under extra-territorial 
rights’.1036 But by now the Japanese position in China was so strong that it became 
necessary to establish closer relations with them. Hansard was sent to Asia; his main 
mission was to investigate the possibilities for establishing new soap factory in 
Tianjin. He had to obtain a guarantee that in North China the company would be not 
be subject to political discrimination, and that it would be possible to remit profits 
freely. Two smaller matters to be addressed related to renewed problems with 
Manchukuo’s import tariff, and competition with other soap makers in Shanghai. 
During several months during late 1938 and early 1939, Hansard visited Japan, 
Manchuria, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Chongqing.1037 Roger Heyworth, the 
general manager of the CSC and EP, accompanied Hansard on his tour. 
Establishing direct contacts with the Japanese authorities was a new challenge for 
Unilever. At first it was thought that a profit-sharing arrangement with Nissan, which 
was active in soap manufacture in Shanghai, would help Unilever to gain access to 
political and military influence. But during his stay in the Far East, Hansard came to 
the conclusion that Unilever was strong enough to deal with the Japanese authorities 
by itself. He talked to ministerial officials in Japan, and Japanese military and 
consular officials in Tianjin and Shanghai about the Tianjin factory.1038 In his report 
to the Overseas Committee he showed to be very pleased about the Japanese reaction 
to his visits.  
 
‘The phrase I used in one of my letters to the Japanese Government, that ‘it is 
our intention to develop our business in North China on lines which may be 
described as parallel to Japanese industry’ struck a chord and [produced a] 
hiss of appreciation from every Japanese official who saw it. At the same time 
it commits us to nothing more than a statement that we are not following a 
deliberately anti-Japanese policy.’1039 
 
Unilever proposed to invest some £150,000 in the new Tianjin plant. In a letter to the 
Japanese vice-minister of finance, Hansard stressed the fact that Unilever would buy 
as much Japanese fish oil and soya bean oil ‘as is practicable’, and that the projected 
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1038 He instructed the management of the CSC and EP to use these contacts only in matters of major 
importance. For minor matters it would suffice to have a Japanese staff member. Since ‘it would be foolish 
to antagonise the Japanese Government or competitors unduly’, he proposed to buy raw materials from 
Manchukuo and Japan whenever ‘reasonable possible’: J. Hansard, visit report China, Japan, and 
Manchukuo 1939, Unilever Rotterdam, DIR 10, 182.1. 
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oil mill would produce exportable articles ‘which are all capable of being sold in 
Europe and the USA and thus providing foreign currency’. He also asked for an 
arrangement to provide Unilever with enough foreign exchange as would be needed 
to operate the new factory: ‘I believe that such assurances could be given to a 
company such as ours, and that such assurances would materially help in promoting 
the expansion of Industry in China in the best interests of the Economic 
Development of East Asia’.1040 The Japanese government guaranteed that Unilever 
could continue and expand its business in Japanese-occupied China, while being 
allowed equal access to raw materials with any Japanese competitor. A definite 
guarantee from the Japanese authorities in North China on the amount of foreign 
exchange obtainable by the new factory was not included. Still, the assurances given 
went further than those given to any other foreign firm. While Hansard realised that 
Japan’s policy remained an uncertain factor, he believed that Unilever was in a 
strong bargaining position.  
There was a special reason why he believed this, and why he had been able to 
meet and impress so many Japanese officials: 
 
‘[…] so long as we continue to buy the goods from Japan which we have 
bought for years there are three million sterling reasons why they should not 
hamper us in a business which can do nothing but good to the country in 
which it operates. With the careful avoidance of threats to boycott Japanese 
goods, and yet by bringing the amount of our purchases to the notice of 
Government officials and leading business and banking interests, we have 
secured the goodwill of the Japanese Government.’ 
 
Unilever was the largest single buyer of Japanese goods outside the Yen-block. The 
company had been spending between £3.4 and £3.5 million annually on Japanese 
goods over the past three years. In 1938 the company bought large quantities worth 
of soya beans and soya bean oil from Manchuria (£1 million), canned fish (£1 
million), whale oil (£760,000), sundry merchandise for West Africa (£450,000) plus 
another £160,000 worth of other goods. These figures do not even include purchases 
by the German fat control—Unilever had important companies in Germany, which 
used oil from Japan or Manchuria. In all, Unilever’s purchases amounted to three per 
cent of all Japanese exports to non-Yen countries.1041 This was important at a time 
when Japan had a serious shortage of foreign currency.  
The fact that Unilever provided Japan with much-needed foreign exchange did 
not fail to attract the attention of the British government. In January 1939, when 
Hansard was in Tokyo, he was asked by the British ambassador to reduce Unilever’s 
purchases of Japanese goods.1042 The British government hoped that putting extra 
pressure on Japan’s foreign exchange shortage would help make diplomatic exertions 
concerning Japan’s foreign policy more effective. In response to this request two 
members of the board of Unilever visited the Foreign Office in London. They 
explained that Unilever bought mainly whale oil and canned salmon from Japan, and 
that Japan would have no problem at all in finding new buyers for its whale oil. At 
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the same time a refusal to buy Japanese goods would hurt Unilever’s canned salmon 
business, which was important not only to the company but also to the British 
government: Unilever had ‘certain commitments […] in respect to the storage of 
food’. 1043  The picture painted by the Unilever men about their relationship with 
Japan did not at all match their real views, which were far more optimistic. It is not 
clear to which extent the Foreign Office actually believed them. Even so, the remark 
about Unilever’s role in Great Britain as a major food supplier may have hit a 
sensitive spot: in the case of a European war, Unilever’s food supplies would be of 
strategic importance. The final result was that the two directors managed to convince 
the Foreign Office that Unilever was not in a position to put pressure on the Japanese 
government.  
This did not satisfy the British ambassador in Tokyo, who had serious 
complaints. In February 1939 he wrote a letter to the Foreign Office in which he 
stressed the uniqueness of Unilever’s trade relations with Japan. He said that the total 
amount of British imports from Japan and Manchukuo was only £10 million, while 
Unilever alone spent £3.5 million. ‘In other words’, he wrote, Unilever’s subsidiaries 
‘are by far the largest single buyers of Japanese goods, and in one year furnish the 
yen block with sterling equal to about 12 per cent of Japan’s present gold reserve. 
[…] The fact that [Hansard] was so well received [by government and military 
officials in Tokyo] and the promptitude with which the undertakings were given are 
an index of the importance attached by the Japanese authorities to [Unilever’s] 
purchases.’ 1044  In spite his protestations, the company was not put under further 
pressure by the Foreign Office. Moreover, Unilever felt little inclination to follow 
closely the guidelines of the British government. In his report to the Overseas 
Committee, Hansard wrote:  
 
‘Our experience has shown that we can carry on business while the war goes 
on. We should remain ‘neutral’ and independent, with more emphasis on our 
International character than our British. In my opinion British policy will fall 
between two stools in China. We talk a lot in favour of China and give Chiang 
[Kai-shek] small credits. We help bolster up the exchange, which will benefit 
British, Japanese and Chinese business. But we do not, and cannot do, enough 
to make the Chinese win the war. Yet we do quite enough to infuriate the 
Japanese and ensure increasingly unfavourable treatment of British interests 
by the Japanese in their occupied territories. […] 
When, and if we decide to go ahead with the Tientsin [Tianjin] factory 
and go along (metaphorically) with a cheque for £150,000 in our pocket, we 
shall get the permits and assurances we need. We are in an exceptionally 
favourable position to adopt a forward policy in China. A large potential 
market, as good relations as it is possible to obtain with both Chinese and 
Japanese Governments, and a hold over the latter with our purchases which 
we never had before because the facts had not been presented to them in a 
concise form.’1045  
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Unilever had a strong bargaining position, and the company was not letting itself be 
used by the British government as a political tool. Despite all this, the political 
obstacles to doing business in occupied China proved very high, even for Unilever. 
The Special Committee did not consider the assurances obtained by Hansard 
sufficient, especially as it was aware that Japanese military authorities in North China 
did not always follow the policy defined in Tokyo. Before the Tianjin project could 
start a firmer guarantee concerning the remittance of profits made in North China 
was needed. Furthermore, the agreement reached with the Manchukuo government 
was based on the assumption that Unilever would spend £1 million annually on 
Manchukuo goods. Now it turned out that its purchases in Manchukuo were 
decreasing considerably, and that they would certainly not reach £1 million in 
1939.1046  
Although matters surrounding the Tianjin factory were not yet resolved, Hansard 
travelled to Manchuria to address some problems which had recently cropped up in 
this market. The Manchukuo government had imposed an import and export control. 
Certain products, such as soap, were not allowed to be imported, unless they were 
Japanese. The Manchurian soap market consisted of 12,000-15,000 tons per year, 
most of which was imported. As early as the summer of 1938 Unilever had taken the 
initiative for the formation of a committee comprised of the main British firms 
trading with Manchuria. Unilever hoped that this committee could put pressure on 
the Manchukuo government. As Heyworth pointed out to the British commercial 
counsellor: ‘if it is found that the decline in trade is due to political causes, we submit 
that the possible application of retaliatory measures should not be left out of 
consideration.’1047 Unilever was worried about a Japanese company’s plan to build a 
soap factory in Manchukuo. Hansard held talks with Manchukuo government 
officials, with whom he reached an unbinding agreement. The authorities would give 
Unilever import and exchange permits for a certain percentage of the amount to 
which Unilever bought Manchurian goods. For its import and export activities, the 
company would be able largely to use its own channels. 1048  Again the fact that 
Unilever was an important supplier of foreign exchange enabled Hansard to bargain 
with the government. 
When he arrived in Shanghai, yet another problem demanded Hansard’s 
attention. He had to find a solution to difficulties with Nissan and the IDC on the 
local soap market. Before the war, Unilever had been considering taking over its 
main Shanghai rival the IDC. When the war broke out, the IDC had to stop its 
operations and approached Unilever with more favourable terms if the latter could 
take over its property immediately, ‘but [Unilever’s management] decided that an 
agreement made under such circumstances might be misconstrued by the Japanese 
authorities, and therefore postponed further negotiations’. 1049  The IDC’s factory, 
which lay outside the International Settlement, was consequently captured by he 
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Japanese military, after which Nissan was permitted to use it for its own soap 
production.1050 However, in contrast to many smaller Chinese soap producers, the 
IDC was not put out of business by the war. In early 1938 it recommenced 
production in a new factory inside the International Settlement, where it was safe 
from the Japanese military. Unilever feared that its own soap would no longer sell in 
the International Settlement and the French Concession. Another worry which 
plagued the company was that Nissan’s plans to use the IDC’s old factory 
jeopardised its future position in the lower Yangzi provinces, especially if Nissan 
were backed up by the Japanese military. The Overseas Committee’s plan was to try 
and have the Japanese return the factory to the IDC. In return, Unilever would 
acquire control of the IDC’s trademarks and assets through a manufacturing and 
royalty agreement. The Japanese should give a promise to stay out of soap 
manufacture in China, for which they would obtain a percentage of profits.1051 In 
October 1938 Nissan was informed about this, and also about Unilever’s plans to 
build a new factory in Tianjin. If Nissan co-operated it would also be given a share in 
the profits of the new factory.1052  
The worries about Nissan were somewhat assuaged because when Hansard was 
in Shanghai he noticed that relations between Japanese businessmen and the 
Japanese authorities were not very close knit. He also thought that Nissan’s demands 
for co-operation were unreasonable. In Hansard’s view the CSC and EP could stay 
fully independent and avoid Japanese shareholders, directors, or profit-sharing 
partners. When Nissan proposed co-operation in January of 1939, Hansard answered 
that this was impossible, as the Nissan factory was not its property. Besides, he 
added, the Japanese government had not given any assurances about fair treatment to 
Unilever, and the population in the interior of China would boycott Unilever’s 
business as soon as the public became aware of its alliance with Nissan.1053 Hansard 
was optimistic about continuing in China without Japanese involvement in the 
company: ‘In my opinion we are in a stronger position to develop today, and more 
justified in risking further capital expenditure in China [than in the previous years].’  
The IDC could sell its Koopun soap only in the International Settlement (and the 
French Concession), while Nissan made use of the Koopun trademark to sell its soap 
in occupied China. Chinese Koopun soap was the best selling line in the International 
Settlement, some 150,000 cases being sold in 1939. 1054  Unilever used the same 
strategy to counter the IDC as it had used in 1936 and 1937: it depended on a good 
quality and low price fighting line. As before, this strategy protected Unilever from 
being pushed out of the market. Outside the Settlement, in October 1938 Nissan had 
begun making the Japanese version of Koopun, but it turned out to be unpopular with 
the Chinese population. Unilever continued to negotiate with both parties. When he 
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was in Japan, Hansard had discussed the situation in Shanghai with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In a letter to the director of the commercial affairs bureau of this 
ministry, Hansard complained about the Japanese seizure of the factory of the 
International Dispensary Company. He asked for the return of the factory to the IDC, 
which would ‘pave the way for an understanding between ourselves and leading 
Japanese interests for the co-ordination of the Soap and Vegetable oil industry of 
East Asia’.1055  
When Hansard was informed that the factory would not be returned by Nissan, he 
addressed the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai. His aim was to get Nissan to 
stop using the Koopun trademark. This would enable Unilever to acquire control 
over the IDC’s manufacture and sales of Koopun soap. To compensate Nissan, 
Unilever would make sure that the IDC Koopun would not be sold at a price 
undercutting that of Nissan soap. To increase the pressure on Nissan, Hansard visited 
the Japanese military officer in charge of economic matters in Shanghai. There he 
showed a letter by Nissan to all soap dealers outside the International Settlement. The 
letter stated that the Japanese military department prohibited the sale or transport of 
any soap other than Nissan Koopun soap. This, he hoped, would cast Nissan in an 
unfavourable light, since the statement concerning the Japanese military was not true. 
At the same time, Hansard wanted to talk the IDC into letting Unilever produce 
Koopun for a five year period. He made his proposal very attractive to the IDC 
financially, expecting that it would be very difficult and expensive for the IDC to 
start manufacturing again after having stopped for five years. Hansard was not 
pleased when he found out that the IDC had sent a letter to Nissan which declared 
that in principle it was willing to co-operate with the Japanese. He failed to reach an 
agreement with Nissan and the IDC during his stay in Shanghai, but after he left 
Heyworth continued the negotiations. 
To complete his tour of the Far East, Hansard also went to Chongqing, the war 
capital of the Chinese government. There he met Finance Minister Kong Xiangxi 
(H.H. Kong) and Minister of Economic Affairs C.Y. Wang. He told Kong that 
although Nissan had approached Unilever for co-operation, ‘their proposals were so 
unreasonable that we were happy to remain as in the past, completely independent. I 
also told him of my efforts to help International [Dispensary Company] in the matter 
of their trademark.’ Hansard believed that there would not be much fighting in the 
future, and that the Chinese government would stay in Chongqing and develop the 
Western and Southwestern provinces–Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangxi, and part 
of Guangdong–it still controlled. He figured that these provinces would constitute a 
fast-growing market for soap, and proposed to invest £5,000 or £10,000 in building a 
small factory in Sichuan. The Chinese government was now prepared to welcome 
such an enterprise.1056  
Later, back in Britain, Hansard wrote a memorandum entitled ‘Some Notes on the 
Present “Hostilities” in the Far East’. A copy of this memorandum was presented to 
the British Foreign Office. In it Hansard accused the British people and government 
of lacking a realistic view of the Far East. He stated that all large foreign companies 
in China had done well in 1938, and that Japan interfered only in one aspect of 
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foreign trade, namely shipping on the Yangzi. Referring to the attitude of the British 
government he concluded: ‘It seems to me a pity that [British] policy in China has 
not been that of neutrality between China and Japan, and with greater emphasis on 
the real British interests of invested capital in China.’ His idea was that Britain’s real 
interests in China were the interests of British businesses in China, and that an anti-
Japanese policy was useless and harmful to British interests. The Foreign Office did 
not quite share his point of view: ‘Mr Hansard evidently belongs to the school of 
thought that favours wholehearted co-operation with the Japanese in their 
exploitation of China’. Furthermore, Unilever ‘affords more positive support to the 
finances of Japan that any other private firm in this country, perhaps in the world 
[…] The firm therefore have every interest in seeing that the Japanese propaganda 
predictions of what Japan will achieve in China come true.’ Not only did the Foreign 
Office dislike the idea of letting Japan pursue its foreign policy unopposed, but it 
was convinced that Japan would not spare the interests of the smaller British firms in 
China.1057  
After Hansard’s return, the company continued its efforts to acquire sufficient 
guarantees for the safety of its proposed factory in Tianjin. On the evening of 31 
May 1939, officials from the Foreign Office and the Board Of Trade dined with 
Hansard and Clement Davies, who was a member of the Unilever boards of directors. 
At this dinner Hansard requested an official letter from the Foreign Office which 
stated that the British government did not object the building a new soap factory in 
Tianjin. He said that he wanted to show such letter to the Japanese as proof ‘that 
British policy was not blindly anti-Japanese’. One of the government officials then 
asked whether the new factory would not benefit Japan by generating much needed 
foreign exchange. Hansard denied this. Still, the Foreign Office felt very 
uncomfortable about the idea. Later one official commented: ‘Profoundly suspicious 
of this letter. It would be great for the Japanese. Why would Unilever need such a 
letter to make a decision about the factory? […] I deduce that Unilever want to do 
something which they know to the contrary of our policy and they want to cover 
themselves in case of publicity (cf. sale of ships to Germany)’.1058 The Japanese, on 
the other hand, would be delighted to be able to publish the fact that we had set the 
seal of approval on a scheme of the sort contemplated by Unilever’. Yet it was also 
thought to be impossible to discourage Unilever from carrying out its business. The 
Foreign Office postponed the matter until Unilever no longer required the letter.1059  
The day after the dinner, Clement Davies sent a letter to the British Permanent 
Undersecretary of State, A. Cadogan. The letter explained the company’s problem 
regarding foreign currency in North China, and pointed out that Unilever’s business 
in China was beneficial to Britain: it supplied the British economy with orders for 
machinery and miscellaneous other goods, Unilever’s Chinese profits would be 
brought to Britain, and the purchases of soya beans, whale oil, and canned salmon 
provided food for he British people. 1060  Again, Unilever did not specify what it 
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wanted from the British government. Possibly the company was thinking about a 
way to distance itself from British official policy, but without creating a conflict with 
the Foreign Office. 
In June 1939 the situation in North China deteriorated, as the Japan-controlled 
Beijing Provisional Government imposed new export control rules in North China. 
This meant that all foreign exchange earned with exports by Unilever from North 
China were to handed over to the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) in Beijing. The FRB 
permitted the use of this foreign exchange only for the import of certain 
commodities, which did not include Unilever products. The company turned to the 
free exchange market in Tianjin to change the profits of sales in North China into 
pounds. This resulted in an increase in costs for Unilever, as the foreign exchange 
obtained in Tianjin was relatively expensive, but it kept the company in business. 
Heyworth wanted a return to the old situation, in which Unilever China used a large 
portion of proceeds in North China to buy raw materials for the factory in Shanghai. 
In July he began negotiations with the FRB. In a letter he stressed how useful his 
company had been to Japan by exporting raw materials from North China and by 
purchasing Japanese goods.1061 In October Cobb, from the Tianjin branch office, 
went to Beijing to visit the FRB. When he was informed that there was no foreign 
exchange available for Unilever, Cobb launched a strong objection. He said that the 
Japanese authorities were making Unilever’s trade in North China impossible, 
whereas ‘ [Unilever] always had been perfectly willing to co-operate with the 
Government in control’.1062 Some weeks later Heyworth sent another letter to the 
FRB, which stated even more explicitly than the previous one how beneficial 
Unilever’s activities were to the Japanese Empire and for the population of North 
China.1063 His aim was to convince the North China government to put soap on the 
list of preferred commodities. When the FRB refused to give Unilever more 
favourable treatment, Heyworth approached the British Embassy to complain.1064  
By this time the war in Europe had begun. The Special Committee believed that 
further negotiations between the CSC and the North China government were 
pointless. Instead, James Lawrence Heyworth, member of the boards of Unilever, 
was sent to Tokyo. Accompanied by his brother Roger Heyworth of the CSC and EP, 
he visited Japan in January 1940. J.L. Heyworth was convinced that the FRB could 
not give Unilever sufficient foreign exchange since it did not have any. His plan was 
to make an arrangement with the Japanese Finance Ministry on the foreign exchange 
supplied by Unilever through its purchases in Japan.1065 The two brothers went to the 
British Embassy before seeing any Japanese officials. There they were told that the 
British government could act only in case of specific cases of discrimination, but that 
there would be no problem if Unilever were to try to exploit its special bargaining 
position to the full. According to J.L. Heyworth, Sir Robert Craigie, the British 
ambassador to Japan, was very much ‘in sympathy with [Unilever’s] schemes’. He 
believed this to be important: ‘[…] I would be much averse, in present world 
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conditions, to taking up an independent line and going on with any scheme which did 
not have the full support of our Government’.1066 He was unaware that Ambassador 
Craigie had complained bitterly to the Foreign Office about Unilever’s refusal to 
boycott Japan in 1939. 
Next the delegation contacted the secretary of the Japan-British Trade Council, 
Mr Toda. He was also an official of the Japanese Economic Federation, which in turn 
was associated with the Japanese section of the International Chamber of Commerce. 
Mr Toda was an influential person who had no difficulty in establishing the contact 
between Unilever and the Japanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, and 
the China Affairs Board. In his efforts to get in touch with Japanese officials, J.L. 
Heyworth also made use of a letter of introduction given him by the Japanese 
Embassy in London. During the negotiations he proposed that the money earned by 
Unilever in North China be transferred to Japan as payment for canned fish and 
whale oil. Although no agreement was reached during the Heyworth brothers’ visit 
to Japan, they picked up signals that the Japanese government was willing to reach a 
settlement. Were Japan to allow Unilever to use 50 per cent of the North China 
proceeds for purchases in Japan, and it seemed likely to do so, this would give the 
company the opportunity to earn enough money to be able to write off the cost of the 
new factory within two years and three months after its completion. By this time the 
costs for the factory with a capacity of 8,000 tons, plus an oil mill and a 
hydrogenation plant, were estimated to be £202,000. In addition £25,000 would be 
required to buy the necessary plot of land in Tianjin from the current owner, the 
Peking Syndicate. 
From his visit report, it is clear that J.L. Heyworth was fully aware what Unilever 
could do to help Japan. He wrote that the ability of Japan to export had suffered a 
severe blow. As a result, the country had a serious shortage of foreign exchange, 
which it needed to import steel and machinery. Heyworth thought that Japan’s 
economic problems were so great that eventually the government would have to 
accept Unilever’s proposals. While the company’s sterling payments for Japanese 
goods were badly needed by Japan, a new factory in Tianjin which would produce 
exportable vegetable oil would also be an important means to obtain foreign 
currency. Although the British government did nothing to oppose Unilever’s plans, 
these certainly did not fit in the official British policy of increasing pressure on 
Japan. 1067  When he left China in February 1940, J.L. Heyworth expected the 
politically unsettled conditions in China to continue for two or more years. He 
recommended accepting lower sterling or guilder profits if the exchange were to 
remain heavily depreciated, for the sake of the company’s goodwill. But Unilever 
was also well-prepared to take full advantage of the difficulties of the small Chinese 
producers and importers, as well as the Japanese need for foreign currency:  
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‘The great thing is to keep in the game. The China market is potentially one of 
the world’s largest and when peaceful conditions are restored we should be 
well rewarded for patience and enterprise.’1068  
 
Roger Heyworth continued the negotiations from Shanghai. Anxious to strengthen its 
position even further, the Special Committee instructed Unilever’s largest subsidiary, 
the United Africa Company, to study the possibility of buying more canned fruit 
from Japan. 1069  But in 1940 management in Shanghai informed the Overseas 
Committee that the condition was serious: not only had the foreign exchange 
guarantee needed for the Tianjin factory still not been obtained, now the danger that 
Unilever would disappear from the North China market had become acute. Roger 
Heyworth believed that under such circumstances, assistance from the British 
government was the only hope of saving the trade in North China. He approached Sir 
George Sansom, who had been sent to Japan on a mission by the Foreign Office. 
Heyworth told him that the products of Unilever China should be regarded as British 
goods, hoping that Sansom would be able to put pressure on the Japanese 
government to use the balance of trade surplus of sterling to buy more British 
goods.1070  
 
War with Japan. The situation deteriorated further and in the summer of 1940 the 
main political risk was no longer that the North Chinese market would disappear, but 
the Japanese-Western war would break out. By now Unilever was no longer able to 
sell soap in North China or anywhere else in the interior. The land in Tianjin which 
Unilever had been wanting to buy for £25,000 was purchased by a Japanese firm for 
£37,000.1071 To prepare for a conflict between Japan and Great Britain, the Special 
Committee decided to hypothecate shares in EP and the CSC to the Chase National 
Bank, based in the US, in order to be able to borrow money, even though the loan 
would have to be repaid in New York. 1072  Any two members of the board in 
Shanghai were authorised to borrow as much money from the Chase National Bank 
as might be required for Unilever China.1073  
On 16 October 1940 the Foreign Office asked the ten largest British firms that 
operated in China, including Unilever and Royal Dutch/Shell, whether they wanted 
to evacuate their staff from the Far East.1074 The companies replied that they intended 
to wait until their British employees themselves asked to be evacuated. Unilever 
continued to do as much business as was still possible in China but, by late 1940, the 
company’s political environment, as far as Japan was concerned, could no longer be 
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influenced. In 1941 there were no more high-level negotiations with the Japanese 
authorities. In August the Special Committee decided to prepare for war with Japan. 
W.G. Braidwood, the new general manager of the CSC and EP, was permitted ‘to 
deal with the question of withdrawal of Europeans and any subjects not involving 
ownership of either company’. At the same time in case of an emergency he was 
given instructions to appoint, some Chinese administrators as attorneys of China 
Soap Company and Edible Products. Their function would be to carry on the 
businesses ‘as going commercial concerns’. To enable them to do so, they would be 
granted powers to deal with the good will or undertakings of the respective 
companies of their fixed assets.1075 In September the families of the European staff in 
China were evacuated.1076 
In 1940 it became very difficult for Unilever to obtain enough raw materials into 
Shanghai to continue production. In July the Overseas Committee decided to close 
the factory for several months, beginning in September. 1077  Meanwhile the soap 
division managed to achieve record profits in 1939 and 1941. By this time the soap 
division of Unilever China was also selling imported toilet preparations and was 
considering undertaking their manufacture. In 1940 preparations were made for a 
silicate of glass plant, which was to cost Y762,000. 1078  In the autumn of 1941, 
Unilever—still in business in the Shanghai area and along the coast—was threatened 
by a shortage of raw materials for its factories. When the Netherlands Indies 
government prohibited all exports to Shanghai, Unilever approached the British and 
Dutch consular officials in Shanghai. These arranged for palm oil and copra to be 
permitted to be shipped to Unilever China. But there was yet another problem, 
caused by the Chinese government.  
The Stabilisation Board of the Guomindang government, operating from Hong 
Kong, had limited the use of foreign currency for imports into the Shanghai 
International Settlement. Foreign exchange was available to certain goods only, not 
including the raw materials Unilever needed for soap and margarine manufacture. On 
14 October 1941, Braidwood sent two memoranda to the Stabilisation Board. The 
first was on behalf of the CSC, the IDC, and the China Chemical Works. Braidwood 
claimed they represented 90 per cent of the Shanghai soap industry, and, while 
calling the manufacture of soap a health service, he mentioned that much soap went 
from Shanghai to ‘Free China’. The second memorandum was on behalf of EP, 
Henningsen, Geddes, and Swan Products Company. In it Braidwood stated that they 
represented 90 per cent of the margarine trade and almost 100 per cent of the edible 
fat trade in Shanghai. He argued that their exports to Hong Kong and Indo-China 
produced foreign exchange for China.1079 On 11 November the Chinese Stabilisation 
Board informed Braidwood that enough exchange would be granted to the soap and 
margarine companies in Shanghai to produce the average of their sales in 1939-
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1941.1080 Unilever was still in business and was still capable of overcoming such 
minor obstacles, but tensions between Japan and the West were mounting. On 17 
November the board of China Soap Company appointed a management advisory 
committee, consisting of five Chinese, to prepare for a Japanese take-over of 
Shanghai.1081 Eight days later they were also appointed attorneys of the company. 
These emergency measures turned out to be in vain. On 8 December Japanese forces 
occupied the Shanghai International Settlement. The European staff of Unilever were 
interned and the Japanese took control of the company’s factories.1082  
 
Conclusion 
Unilever’s main local interest in China was to occupy as large as possible a share of 
the markets for soap and for margarine, and to hold on to both these positions while 
the Chinese economy developed during the coming decades. While the company 
made good progress in the foods business and managed to create a basis for itself in 
the Chinese food industry, during the 1930s Unilever’s main area was in the soap 
sector. Both margarine and soap were produced and sold in the treaty ports, but only 
soap was marketed by Unilever in the interior of China. The company developed an 
up-country distribution network based on an agency system along the lines 
developed by pioneering companies like Royal Dutch/Shell. Consequently it was 
mainly the soap business that was responsible for Unilever’s involvement in the 
Chinese economy and that was threatened by political risks. 
Unilever was created in 1930; its Dutch predecessors had not engaged in direct 
investment in China. During 1930-1937, the main political risks related to Chinese 
nationalism: anti-foreign boycotts and the tax and trademark policy of the 
Guomindang government. However, because of Japan’s invasion in Manchuria, 
Japanese imperialism also presented a threat in this period. During 1937-1941, it was 
only Japanese imperialism which caused major political risks. These were mainly the 
obstruction of commercial activities because of the fighting between Japanese and 
Chinese forces, the imposition of trade restrictions in occupied North China, and the 
deteriorating relationship of Great Britain and the Netherlands with Japan. 
Initially the Anglo-Dutch company addressed risks caused by the rise of 
nationalism in China by relying on its own strength and the help of the British 
government. Moreover, its management believed that China Soap Company’s profile 
was inconspicuous enough not to draw attention from anti-foreign activists. During 
Chinese-Japanese fighting in 1932, Unilever refrained from buying Japanese raw 
                                                          
1080 In the case of the margarine firms, the Board mentioned only that Edible Products and Henningsen 
were granted exchange to import raw materials. General Secretary of the Chinese Stabilisation Board 
Chao-ting Chi (Hong Kong) to W.G. Braidwood (Unilever Shanghai) 11 Nov. 1941 (two letters), Unilever 
UK, SDC 25/8/2. 
1081 According to Unilever’s archives their names were: ‘W.C. Tsih (chairman), S.Y. Doe, T.W. Koo. 
M.Y. Wong, and Z.L. Li’. Minutes of the meeting of China Soap Company directors of 17 Nov. 1941, 
Unilever UK, Microfilm 18/3, (146) China Soap Company Ltd. 1923-1937. A similar construction was 
probably used for Edible Products. 
1082 For the next three years, Unilever was not active in East Asia. After Japan was defeated the company 
returned to Shanghai. For a brief period, between 1946 and 1949 Unilever again produced and sold its 
products in China. But before the company was able to reorganise and resume attempts to expand its 
business in China, political and economic instability again interfered. Shanghai was hit by serious 
inflation, a Communist occupation, and a Nationalist blockade. During the Korean War Unilever was 
forced to end all activities in the new Peoples’ Republic of China.  
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materials in order not to risk being boycotted by its Chinese customers. That the 
Guomindang government was stronger and the British Foreign Office less helpful 
than the company had thought was clearly underlined when it attempted to resist 
paying steamship duty in 1931. Consequently, the company changed its attitude: it 
began to favour an active approach in its efforts to obtain the co-operation of the 
Chinese government by donating soap and even by considering voluntary payment of 
corporate tax. This meant that the company eventually was prepared to give up its 
extra-territorial rights, the defence of which was the last major aspect of British 
foreign policy that still had a direct impact on the economy of China. Unilever’s 
problems concerning trademark infringements by local soap manufacturers 
underscored that only good relations with the Chinese authorities, not British official 
interventions or legal procedures, could ensure the company of official protection. 
The company may have had a low political profile, but to do business in China some 
degree of government protection was required, at least to safeguard valuable brands. 
Because Unilever was in China not for a quick profit, but to continue selling soap 
and margarine far into the future, it needed official support from the Guomindang 
government.   
The risks to Unilever’s activities in China caused by Japanese imperialism were 
also addressed through accommodation. At first, when Japan created the puppet state 
of Manchukuo, the company responded by keeping up sales as long as possible, 
while accepting that the Manchurian market would eventually be lost. However, it 
turned out that the trade policy of the Manchukuo regime did not pose a fundamental 
problem to Unilever’s sales. Nor indeed did the Japanese invasion into China proper 
immediately threaten Unilever’s future. Although the war did make very it difficult 
to sell soap in Central China, the soap market in North China now developed very 
quickly. But when Unilever decided to build a soap factory in Tianjin, a major 
problem emerged: the company needed permission from Japan to remit profits from 
the North China market before it could build the factory. Therefore Unilever 
approached the Japanese government and stressed how beneficial its investments in 
Tianjin would be to the Japanese position in China. Unilever was in the position to 
negotiate for special privileges not only because the factory would support the North 
China regime economically, but also because the company was a major consumer of 
Japanese export products. Unilever was the largest supplier of pounds sterling to 
Japan: the foreign exchange which the country needed in order to import strategic 
goods such as fuel for its war effort in China.  
The company hoped to be allowed to use its profits from North China to pay for 
its purchases in Japan. The plan fell to pieces because the shortage of foreign 
exchange in Japan was so great that the Japanese government could not approve 
Unilever’s plan. Moreover, by the late 1930s the amount of Japanese export goods 
bought by the company quickly decreased. By 1940 the factory plan had to be 
postponed indefinitely, and Unilever had to face the possibility of a war between 
Japan and the Western allies. Because the company was in China to stay, it did not 
consider withdrawing from Shanghai. By 1941 its production and storage assets were 
concentrated in this city, and to a lesser extent in other large treaty ports. The up-
country network was abandoned, and the company had reverted to its basic form. 
Apart from appointing Chinese nationals to take over management of the CSC and 
EP should such a war erupt, Unilever could do nothing more to address this risk. 

 CHAPTER 9 
 
THE RESPONSE OF DUTCH COMPANIES  
TO POLITICAL RISK IN CHINA  
 
How did political instability affect the behaviour of Dutch firms in early twentieth-
century China? The two concepts at the core of this question are interests and risks. 
Every foreign company in China had certain local interests, which it tried to protect 
from the risks of political instability. Therefore Dutch corporate behaviour with 
respect to the political condition of China was determined by the relationship 
between its interests and the political risks it perceived. At the outset of this study, a 
hypothesis was formulated—based on relevant publications—of Dutch corporate 
behaviour from the entrance onto the Chinese market of the first large firms in 1903 
until their expulsion by Japan in 1941. 
 
Table X. Hypothesis of behaviour of Dutch companies towards political risk in China from 
1903 until 1941 
 
period main political risk corporate response 
1903-1916 none none 
1916-1928 civil warfare  unknown 
1928-1937 anti-foreign nationalism  accommodation to Chinese interests 
1937-1941 Japanese imperialist influence  accommodation to Japanese interests 
 
Civil warfare refers to the violence that resulted from the fragmentised condition of 
the Chinese state between the death of President Yuan Shikai in 1916 and the 
establishment of the Guomindang government in 1928. The core phenomenon of this 
period was the armed conflict between warlords (regional strongmen) that erupted 
endemically throughout the whole country. Chinese Nationalism, in the present 
context, refers to the emergence of mass-movements led by intellectual and political 
elites that aimed at strengthening the country internationally, primarily by limiting 
foreign influence. The Guomindang (Nationalist Party) and the Chinese Communist 
Party were the main political embodyments of China’s rising nationalism. During the 
so-called Nanjing Decade between 1928 and 1937 the Guomindang was the main 
political force in the country. Japanese imperialism refers to Japanese foreign policy 
towards China insofar as it aimed at imposing exclusive political control. During the 
Sino-Japanese War that began in 1937, Japan replaced the Guomindang as the 
dominant political power in China. This hypothesis has been tested by individual 
analyses of each company’s main local interest in China, the political risks it 
perceived, and how it responded to these risks.  
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Table XI. Large Dutch companies with foreign direct investments (FDI) in China prior to 1941 
and their main overall activities (not specifically in China) 
 
company FDI  
in China 
main overall  
activity 
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij 1903-1941 banking 
Java-China-Japan Lijn 1903-1941 shipping 
Royal Dutch/Shell 1906-1941 petroleum production/sales 
Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank 1906-1941 banking 
Ned. Maatschappij voor Havenwerken 1912-1941 harbour works 
Nederlandsch Syndicaat voor China 1920-1937 railway construction 
Philips 1923-1937 electronics production/sales 
Unilever 1930-1941 soap/foods production/sales 
 
Not all eight large Dutch companies were active in China during all of the four 
periods of the hypothesis. The NSC, Philips, and Unilever came only after the end of 
the Yuan Shikai reign in 1916, while the NSC and Philips no longer had any 
significant activities after the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. 
Consequently, not all types of risks included in the hypothesis were relevant to each 
company. 
 
Table XII. Main local interest and degree of local involvement in China per company 
 
company main local interest degree of  
local involvement  
NHM growth in banking low 
JCJL growth in shipping low 
Royal/Dutch Shell growth in petroleum sales high 
NIHB growth in banking low 
Havenwerken profits from harbour works high 
NSC profits from railway construction high 
Philips profits from electronics sales low 
Unilever growth in soap/foods sales high 
 
The main local interests of companies in China reveal two relevant characteristics: 
the economic sector in which it was active, and what it tried to achieve in China. 
There were two main aims: either growth or profits. The NHM, the NIHB, the JCJL, 
Royal Dutch/Shell, and Unilever entered China seeking an expansion of their 
activities. This was a long-term interest: they came to stay permanently because they 
expected that the Chinese market would continue to grow for at least several decades 
and eventually would be the world’s third major market alongside the US and 
Europe. The remaining three firms were interested mainly in producing profits in 
China, which was a short-term aim because they intended to stay in China only as 
long as it was profitable. In this second group, the NSC was the least interested in 
growth, while for Philips growth was a relevant as a secondary aim.  
As a result of each firm’s main local interest, its involvement in the Chinese 
economy was either high or low. Because the NHM, the NIHB, the JCJL, and Philips 
were interested in aims that could only be achieved in the foreign-controlled enclaves 
of the treaty ports (mainly Shanghai and Hong Kong), and that did not require 
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investing in expensive immovable assets, their local involvement remained low. 
They could withdraw relatively easily should political risks become too great. In 
contrast to them, Royal Dutch/Shell, Unilever, Havenwerken, and the NSC were 
much more involved. Royal Dutch/Shell and Unilever could achieve their aims only 
by establishing an up-country distribution organisation. The NSC, as a railway 
construction firm, was also forced to work in the interior. And although 
Havenwerken was mostly active in the treaty ports, it did engage in major 
construction works in non-treaty ports such as Huludao and Lianyungang. Moreover, 
the four firms that worked outside the treaty ports also had expensive material assets 
in China. The NSC and Havenwerken operated construction equipment, while 
Unilever and Royal Dutch/Shell had factories in Shanghai. The latter two companies 
also had depots throughout the country, which in the case of Royal Dutch/Shell 
included numerous expensive tank installations. The companies with a high degree 
of local involvement could not withdraw easily. 
 
Table XIII. Periodisation of categories of perceived political risks per company 
 
company civil war Chinese  
nationalism 
Japanese  
imperialism 
war with Japan 
NHM no risk no risk no risk 1940-1941 
JCJL no risk 1903-1931 no risk 1940-1941 
Royal Dutch/Shell 1916-1928 1914-1937 1919-1941 1940-1941 
NIHB no risk no risk  no risk 1940-1941 
Havenwerken 1920-1928 no risk 1931-1938 not relevant 
NSC 1920-1928 1925-1928 1931-1937 not relevant 
Philips no risk 1932-1937 1931-1937 not relevant 
Unilever not relevant 1930-1937 1931-1941 1940-1941 
 
This table shows that the hypothesis was largely correct with respect to the main 
categories of political risks, but should be adapted in a few respects. In the first 
place, civil war was succeeded by Chinese nationalism as the main political risks not 
in 1928 but as early as 1925. In the second place, in 1931-1937 not only Chinese 
nationalism but also Japanese imperialism caused major political risks to Dutch 
firms. In the third place, by 1940 not Japanese imperialism in China, but the 
possibility of a war between Japan and the Netherlands was the main cause for 
concern in most Dutch companies. The possibility of war breaking out between the 
company’s own government and the government that controlled the parts of China in 
which most of their interests were concentrated should be seen as the fourth major 
political risk category of the 1903-1941 period. Finally, in the fourth place, for each 
category of political risks—except the risk of war with Japan—there were several 
firms which did not perceive them as directly relevant. 
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Table XIV. Risks caused by civil war and ultimate response per company, 1916-1928 
 
company risk response 
NHM (none) (none) 
JCJL (none) (none) 
RD/Shell looting of agency stock appeal to home government  
 irregular taxation accommodation 
NIHB (none) (none) 
Havenwerken contract cancelled withdraw 
NSC railway disfunctionate withdraw 
Philips (none) (none) 
Unilever (not relevant) (none) 
 
The response of Dutch firms to the state of civil war that China was in during the 
1920s, was diverse. The NHM, the JCJL, the NIHB, and Philips were not even 
directly threatened by the effects of the civil wars. Their assets and activities were 
located mainly in Shanghai and Hong Kong, which were well-protected by 
international military forces. The JCJL ships remained in coastal waters and did not 
sail up any Chinese rivers. Unilever did not have a relevant experience, because it 
was not yet active in China in the 1916-1928 period when the civil wars were a 
major phenomenon.  
Of the remaining three companies, Royal Dutch/Shell tried to address these risks 
by accommodating to the interests of local governments (in the case of irregular 
taxation), and by relying on support from the home government (in the case of 
damage from looting). The reason the oil company accepted the need to make tax 
agreements with local governments was that its aim was to see growth in petroleum 
sales and its high degree of local involvement made it impossible to withdraw. Until 
effective central government was restored, there was no-one except local 
governments to protect the company from excessive trade taxation. In the case of 
agency claims for damage to company property, Royal Dutch/Shell relied on the 
British government, because the only channel to obtain indemnities from the Chinese 
authorities was through the legations in Beijing. Great Britain, being politically more 
influential in the Far East, was favoured over the Netherlands for this task. Its unique 
ownership structure and British appearance, made it possible for Royal Dutch/Shell 
to become regarded by the British Foreign Office as a British interest. When the 
British government decided to scale down its handling of agency claims for British 
firms, the oil company energetically tried to prevent the implimentaiton of this new 
policy. The reason was that damage to its agency depots involved high costs, but that 
in order to expand in sales and because of its high degree of local involvemment, the 
company could not abandon its up-country agents.  
Havenwerken and the NSC withdrew from up-country activities after the Longhai 
project. Havenwerken concentrated on contracts for the treaty ports, until 1930 when 
it commenced work on the Huludao harbour. As long as there was sufficient work 
for Havenwerken in the safer treaty ports, it was not necessary to expose itself to 
risks related to the civil wars. The NSC, which was interested in making Longhai 
profitable for the Dutch banks, ended its high-risk involvement in railways and 
limited its activities to representative work for Havenwerken and Dutch electro-
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mechanical firms. It could not realise the most important of its main local interests, 
and therefore it withdrew to the treaty ports. 
 
Table XV. Main risks caused by the rise of Chinese nationalism and ultimate response per 
company, 1925-1937 
 
company risk response 
NHM (none) (none) 
JCJL anti-foreign boycott etc accommodation 
RD/Shell anti-foreign boycott etc sit tight and continue 
 new taxes accommodation 
 land use restrictions accommodation 
 sales restrictions withdraw 
 initiation local oil industry accommodation 
NIHB (none) (none) 
Havenwerken (none) (none) 
NSC railway disfunctionate withdraw 
Philips emergence local radio industry accommodation 
Unilever new taxes accommodation 
 trademark infringements appeal to home government 
 
The rise of nationalism as a political force in China was perceived by Dutch firms to 
pose a considerably greater number of political risks than was the case with the civil 
wars. Even so, three out of eight firms still were not directly affected and continued 
to operate relatively unscathed. The banks, the NIHB and the NHM, were active 
mainly in Hong Kong and Shanghai, in a sector of banking that was largely involved 
in international trading. No boycotts threatened the banks, and they remained beyond 
the reach of the Guomindang government. For Havenwerken, Chinese nationalism 
was not a risk. The re-establishment of a strong central government that was 
interested in strengthening the country offered the company new opportunities rather 
than threatened its activities.  
The most constantly occurring type of response offered by those companies that 
did face political risks was accommodation to the interests of Chinese political 
leaders, usually of the Guomindang government. Ultimately the JCJL, Royal 
Dutch/Shell, Philips, and Unilever were prepared to meet Chinese demands for a 
reduction of treaty privileges in return for improved relations with the political and 
business leaders of China. In the case of the JCJL this process of accommodation did 
not necessitate major concessions on the part of the company. In the Tjibadak case, 
the company dismissed a Dutch employee when Chinese public opinion demanded 
this, but otherwise continued its business. Philips hesitated about investing in a 
Chinese-controlled radio valve factory and offering training programmes to Chinese 
engineers, but for the time being chose not to follow a strategy that would increase 
its local involvement. In order to maintain a presence on the Chinese radio market, it 
was prepared to sell only technology and equipment in return for direct payment. The 
fact that these two firms were active in the treaty ports meant that there were few 
direct relations between them and the Chinese government, and that they could 
withdraw if boycotts or protective state policies threatened their operations. 
In the case of Royal Dutch/Shell and Unilever, their co-operative attitude was 
preceded by resistance on their own account or by relying on their home 
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governments for protection—which also amounted to resistance. Only after they had 
discovered that they were unable to neutralise political risks on their own or via the 
British and Dutch governments did they begin to look actively for ways to obtain 
political support from the Guomindang government. For Royal Dutch/Shell the 
imposition of a government sales monopoly in Jiangxi province was non-negotiable, 
and in this case the company withdrew rather than giving in. The reason was that its 
main local interest was not just to expand sales in China but also to impose a large 
degree of control on the market: to survive in the kerosene trade it was imperative to 
be able to adjust local prices and quantities in line with the company’s global 
strategy. In other matters it was willing to make concessions, because these did not 
directly threaten its main local interest. Only in the wave of anti-British boycotts and 
violence during 1925-1928, Royal Dutch/Shell had no option but to rely on its 
agency and competitor relations and sit the storm out. It did not want to withdraw, 
but the British government could not offer full protection, and there was not yet a 
central government to turn to. By the mid-1930s Unilever was looking for a better 
relationship with the Guomindang government for the same reasons as Royal 
Dutch/Shell: it did not want to withdraw as long as there were prospects for growth, 
its local involvement was high, and there was no home government that could offer 
protection from political risks such as the imposition of anti-foreign tax and 
trademark policies. After 1928 the Guomindang became acceptable as a partner with 
which to co-operate because it proved willing to make compromises if it could 
benefit from foreign investments, and because there was no alternative. 
 
Table XVI. Main risks caused by Japanese imperialist influence in China and ultimate 
response per company, 1931-1939 
 
company risk response 
NHM (none) (none) 
JCJL (none) (none) 
RD/Shell land use restrictions  resistance 
 transport restrictions sit tight and continue 
 sales restrictions withdraw 
NIHB (none) (none) 
Havenwerken sales restrictions withdraw 
 materials confiscated withdraw 
NSC sales restrictions withdraw 
Philips sales restrictions withdraw 
Unilever foreign exchange restrictions accommodation 
 transport restrictions sit tight and continue 
 
Risks related to the building up of Japanese political influence in China affected 
Dutch business activities in many ways, but here again there were three companies 
that did not perceive such perils as directly relevant to their main local interest. As 
before, the two banks continued their operations in the treaty ports without major 
problems when Japan occupied East and South China. International trade continued, 
and Japan did not control the International Settlement of Shanghai or the British 
colony Hong Kong. The JCJL, operating in coastal waters only, also experienced no 
direct political risks. 
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The NSC, Havenwerken, and Philips withdrew from China. They were unable to 
defend their main local interests: the Japanese advance ended the demand for Dutch 
electro-mechanical equiment, harbour works, and radios. The Japanese military 
authorities now were the main customers, but for strategic reasons these preferred to 
be supplied by Japanese companies. Consequently these firms could no longer 
operate profitably and virtually ended their activities. To keep a foot in the door, 
Havenwerken and Philips still maintained small representative offices in China. In 
the process of trying to deal with the rise of Japanese influence, the bulk of 
Havenwerken’s equipment and materials was either confiscated or destroyed. 
Royal Dutch/Shell was willing to accommodate itself to Japanese interests on the 
same basis as that on which it co-operated with the Guomindang government before 
1937. However, this strategy turned out to be impossible to sustain. In 1919-1920, 
when Japan tried to impose land use restrictions in Qingdao, the company opted for 
resistance because at this time Japan was still sensitive to the type of pressure 
excerted by the major oil companies. But in 1937-1938, when the Japanese imposed 
restrictions on Yangzi shipping, there was little else to do but try to adjust as well as 
possible and wait for the fighting in the Yangzi provinces to end. And when Japan 
wanted to impose a state monopoly on oil sales in Manchuria, Royal Dutch/Shell 
failed to reach a compromise with the Japanese government. Because it could no 
longer achieve its aims in Manchuria and to defend its position in Japan, the oil 
company pulled out of the Manchurian market. In spite of this, the company 
continued to expect that its accommodation policy—based on the knowledge that 
Japan badly needed large quantities of petroleum—was the key to surviving in 
Japanese-occupied China. 
Unilever, too, counted on its ability to offer Japan what it needed—foreign 
exchange to import strategic goods—in order to obtain political protection. Like 
Royal Dutch/Shell it had no option but to sit out the phase of transport restrictions 
that accompanied the fighting in East and Central China. And like Royal 
Dutch/Shell, the fact that negotiations with the Japanese government did not produce 
clear results did not prevent the company management from believing that 
accommodation to Japanese interests was the best way to proceed. As long as the aim 
of growth on the Chinese market remained feasible in the long run, Unilever and 
Royal Dutch/Shell did not withdraw from China. 
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Table XVII. Main risks caused by the possibility of war between Japan and the companies’ 
home government and ultimate response per company, 1940-1941 
 
company risk response 
NHM assets in enemy territory sit tight and continue 
JCJL assets in enemy territory sit tight and continue 
Royal Dutch/Shell assets in enemy territory sit tight and continue 
NIHB assets in enemy territory sit tight and continue 
Havenwerken (not relevant) (none) 
NSC (not relevant) (none) 
Philips (not relevant) (none) 
Unilever assets in enemy territory sit tight and continue 
 
By 1940 only one important political risk loomed over Dutch firms in China: the 
possibility of war between Japan and the Netherlands. This risk was not relevant to 
the NSC, Philips, and Havenwerken because by this time they had withdrawn 
virtually all their assets from China. In the case of the NHM and the NIHB, this risk 
posed a serious threat, but they did not withdraw because they had few material 
assets in China, and because as long as war did not actually break out, their main 
local interest of growth could still be defended. The JCJL’s position was different: its 
main possessions which might very well fall in Japanese hands in eventuality of war, 
were its ships. These were very valuable, but also very mobile. Consequently the 
company continued to work for its main interest of growth as long as possible. But 
when the outbreak of war seemed imminent, the JCJL withdrew its ships from 
Chinese waters. Even so, this was only a temporary withdrawal: the company 
intended to remain entirely focused on shipping between China and Java.  
The remaining two companies chose to wait and see, like the banks. However, the 
difference was that the material possessions of Royal Dutch/Shell and Unilever in 
China were far greater—the tank installations of the oil company were especially 
very valuable. Moreover, as long as there was no war, these companies continued 
their attempts to retain their local market positions. Because they did not want to 
leave China, there was nothing else for them to do but stay put and hope there would 
be no war.  
The number of large Dutch companies in China was small: there were only eight. 
Although relationships of ownership and control between the NHM, the NIHB, the 
JCJL, Havenwerken, and the NSC were tight, they never acted as a group. The 
remaining firms Unilever, Philips, and Royal Dutch/Shell were much more 
independent; insofar as they had close ties with other companies, these were 
competitors adopted by other nationalities. There was no common element in the 
strategy of Dutch companies towards political risks in China, other than the fact that 
they did not rely on Dutch government protection. Consequently, there was no Dutch 
business system, and there was no typically Dutch business strategy in China. The 
only possible explanation for common elements in the behaviour of Dutch firms was 
that they had no strong home government on which they could rely to fight for them 
on the diplomatic front.  
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Table XVIII. Main types of strategy related to interest profiles 
 
 company ultimate 
response 
to political 
risks 
reliance on  
Dutch 
government 
protection 
accommodation 
to interests 
China or Japan 
short term/low involvement 
 
Philips withdraw no yes (China) 
short term/high involvement Havenwerken withdraw no no 
 NSC withdraw no no 
long term/low involvement JCJL stay no yes (China) 
 NHM stay no no 
 NIHB stay no no 
long term/high involvement RD/Shell stay no yes (both) 
 Unilever stay no yes (both) 
 
Concerning the actual behaviour of Dutch companies, a distinction can be made 
between companies that in the face of mounting political danger withdrew from 
China, and those that stayed on. The companies that persisted all had in common that 
that they had long-term interests in the Chinese market, while the firms that pulled 
out all had short-term interests. Thus, even before the Pacific War broke out, Philips, 
Havenwerken, and the NSC had already left China.  
Among the firms that stayed on, the tendency to accommodate to local 
political interests was stronger if the company's involvement in the Chinese economy 
was greater. The NHM and the NIHB were active only in the treaty ports, where they 
did business mainly with trading companies. These two banks showed no sign of any 
tendency to accommodate to local politics. The JCJL's activities were also limited to 
the treaty ports, but through its contacts with traders, suppliers, passengers, and 
crews, its exposure to Chinese factors was greater than in the case of the banks. 
Consequently, the JCJL did show a certain preparedness to adapt to the local political 
situation. Finally, Unilever and Royal Dutch/Shell–in particular the last mentioned–
had extensive operations in the interior of China, and were among the foreign 
companies with the greatest extent of local involvement. These two companies–again 
especially Royal Dutch/Shell–were willing to accommodate to local political 
interests in more instances than the other Dutch firms in China. 

 CONCLUSION 
 
In the introduction three sub-questions about Dutch corporate behaviour were posed. 
With slight alterations to the periods to which they apply, they have proved valid and 
can now be answered. In the first place: How did Dutch companies deal with the 
civil war period between 1916 and 1928? As it turned out, most were either already 
in the treaty ports or withdrew to them, and there they continued their business under 
foreign military protection. Only one company, Royal Dutch/Shell, went ahead with 
its up-country operations throughout the 1920s. At first sight it may have seemed 
that, while the purely Dutch companies were unable to operate in the interior of 
China, this ristriction did not apply to Royal Dutch/Shell because it was partly British 
and as such benefited from the support of the British government. However, this 
study has shown that protection by the British government was not the cause for 
Royal Dutch/Shell’s persistence in staying up-country. The company did appeal for 
government support, especially in the case of compensation for the looting of its 
depots, but this support was not very effective. Only part of the damage was 
eventually paid for by the Chinese government, and the cause of the damage could 
not be removed. When it came to payment of the irregular trade duties exacted by 
local warlord regimes, the British government was unable to offer any help 
whatsoever. The company relied on its own financial resources to negotiate with 
these regimes; this had no relation to its nationality. The main difference between 
Royal Dutch/Shell and the other Dutch firms was not nationality but the fact that at 
this time the oil company was the only Dutch enterprise that had both long-term aims 
in China and was deeply involved in the up-country economy. The other firms had 
either short-term aims or were not deeply involved in the Chinese economy. In other 
words: no foreign government was powerful enough to protect its up-country 
business interests effectively, and therefore the fact that the Dutch government was 
militarily and diplomatically weaker than the great powers was irrelevant.  
In the second place, did Dutch companies accommodate themselves to the 
interests of the Guomindang between 1925 and 1937? The NHM, the NIHB, the 
NSC, and Havenwerken showed no sign of trying to improve relations with the 
government of China. The JCJL and Philips indicated they were willing to take 
Chinese sensitiveness about foreign influence into account. However, their 
relationship with with the local environment was not very close, and both were 
willing to adapt to political factors only in one instance. Only Unilever and Royal 
Dutch/Shell were clear cases of Dutch companies that saw accommodation to the 
interests of the Guomindang government as desirable in order to obtain protection 
against political risks such as detrimental tax, land, and trademark policies or anti-
foreign boycott movements. These two companies were not willing to co-operate 
with the Guomindang immediately: initially both tried to resist Chinese government 
influence by relying on their own strength and on official British support. Only when 
it was plain that there was no alternative did these companies begin to consider a 
strategy of accommodation. This change of behaviour can be explained by the fact 
that these two companies were too deeply involved in China to consider 
withdrawing, and because their long-term approach made it worthwhile for them to 
invest in developing good relations with the local government. The fact that the other 
large Dutch businesses in China were showed little interest in or were uninterested in 
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doing the same can also be explained by the nature of their interests and 
involvement. Their activities were not affected by risks against which the Chinese 
government could possibly offer protection, or they were interested only in 
immediate solutions. 
Finally, in the third place, did Dutch firms accommodate to the interests of the 
Japanese authorities in occupied China during 1931-1941? Most did not, but again 
Royal Dutch/Shell and Unilever were the exceptions. The explanation is the same as 
that given for the previous question: these two companies needed protection and 
could obtain this only from the Japanese government. Their deep local involvement 
and long-term outlook set them apart from the other Dutch companies. NHM, NIHB, 
and JCJL could continue their activities from Shanghai and Hong Kong after 1937 
with very little disruption. The remaining companies did not see any possibility to 
continue after Japan had imposed its control on Manchuria and most parts of China, 
not only because the sectors in which they operated were hit by the Sino-Japanese 
war, but also because they were not interested in making further investments in order 
to overcome new challenges.  
There is no common element to be detected in the attitude of Dutch firms towards 
political insecurity in China. The fact that the behaviour of Royal Dutch/Shell and 
Unilever was often different to that of other large Dutch companies can be explained 
only to a very limited extent by their partly British identity. The main explanation for 
the behaviour of all Dutch companies in China is constituted by their main local 
interests, not their nationality. These local interests were unique to each firm and 
combined the organisational characteristics of ownership and control with the 
features of the Chinese market.  
The results of this study confirm Osterhammel’s conclusions and are in line with 
the other literature mentioned in the introduction, about British companies as well as 
Western companies in general. This suggests that regardless of their nationality, 
support from the home government proved mostly irrelevant to Western companies 
in China during the 1920s and 1930s. Either they were too little involved in the local 
economy and faced so few political risks that they needed no protection, or they were 
deeply involved and their activities lay beyond the potential reach of even the most 
powerful Western governments. In the two decades preceding World War II, the 
relationship between Western investors and China should not be seen as a part of 
Sino-Western political relations: when businessmen discovered that they could not 
rely on their governments to solve their problems in China, they perceived their 
interests to be divergent from those of their home governments. By the late 1920s it 
was clear to Western firms that they would be unable to resist the political changes 
that were then affecting East Asia. While the attitude of many companies remained 
passive, those with a high degree of local integration and a long-term interest in the 
Chinese market were ultimately prepared to accommodate to the interests of the host 
government.  
 CHINESE PLACE NAMES 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century various styles of romanisation were used for 
Chinese words, and in some cases foreigners used other names than those in use 
today. For instance, Xiamen used to be known as Amoy, Shenyang as Mukden, et 
cetera. Moreover, some cities have been renamed. Between 1928 and 1949 Beijing 
was called Beiping (spelled by foreigners as Peking and Peiping respectively), and in 
1926 the city of Hankou was incorporated into Wuhan. The romanised names of the 
main cities and provinces are listed below, both the version that was the most 
common before 1941, and in pinyin. Names that have remained the same, such as 
Shanghai, are not included. In this book the pinyin version of the current name, such 
as common in today's China, has been used. The exceptions are Chang Jiang River 
and the northeastern provinces, which are internationally commonly known as 
Yangzi River and Manchuria respectively. Also for names of persons, the pinyin 
spelling has been used, except for Chiang Kai-shek (in pinyin: Jiang Jieshi). 
 
 
 
Early twentieth-century     Pinyin 
 
Amoy        Xiamen 
Anhwei       Anhui 
Canton (city)       Guangzhou 
Canton (province)      Guangdong  
Chengchow       Zhengzhou 
Chekiang       Zhejiang 
Chihli        Zhili 
Chungking       Chongqing 
Dairen        Dalian 
Foochow       Fuzhou    
Fukien       Fujian 
Haichow       Haizhou 
Hangchow       Hangzhou 
Hankow       Wuhan 
Honan        Henan 
Hopeh        Hebei 
Hsian        Xi'an 
Hsuchow       Xuzhou 
Hunan        Hunan 
Hupeh        Hubei 
Ichang        Yichang 
Kansu        Gansu 
Kiangsi       Jiangxi 
Kiangsu       Jiangsu 
Kiukiang       Jiujiang 
Kwangsi       Guangxi 
Kwangtung       Guangdong 
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Laoyao       Lianyungang 
Lanchow       Lanzhou 
Lienyunkang       Lianyungang 
Mukden       Shenyang 
Nanking       Nanjing 
Newchwang       Niuzhuang 
Ningpo       Ningbo 
Peiping       Beijing 
Peking       Beijing 
Port Arthur       Lüshun 
Shansi        Shanxi 
Shantung       Shandong 
Shensi        Shaanxi 
Sinkiang       Xinjiang 
Soochow       Suzhou 
Swatow       Shantou 
Tientsin       Tianjin 
Tsinanfu       Jinan 
Tsingtao       Qingdao 
Szechuen       Sichuan 
Wenchou       Wenzhou 
Yingkow       Yingkou 
Yunnanfu       Kunming 
 SOURCES 
 
Archives 
Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), The Hague 
 Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ): various  
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ): various 
 Ministry of Finance (Min. Financiën): various 
 Koninklijke Java-China Paketvaart Lijnen: 2.20.58.02 and 2.20.59  
 Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij: 2.20.01 
 Nederlandsch Syndicaat voor China: 2.20.01/47   
 Nederlansch-Indische Handelsbank: 2.20.03   
 Geslacht Heldring: 2.21.085   
Ir A. van Lutsenburg Maas: 2.21.281.08   
Hollandsche Beton Groep NV (HBG), Gouda 
 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor Havenwerken (KNMH) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague 
 postenarchief, Beijing 
Nedlloyd, Utrecht 
 Koninklijke Java-China Paketvaart Lijnen 
Philips, Eindhoven 
 882 China   
Public Record Office (PRO), London 
 Foreign Office: FO 371, political correspondence  
Shell Group Archive, London 
 Asiatic Petroleum Company  
Shell Group Archive, The Hague 
 correspondence and reports related to China, 1897-1941: various 
Shanghai Soap Factory, Shanghai 
 China Soap Company  
Unilever NV, Rotterdam 
 correspondence and reports related to China, 1911-1941: various  
Unilever PLC, London and Liverpool 
 correspondence and reports related to China, 1912-1941:  
Overseas Committee, Special Committee 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
 H. Colijn 
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SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
 
Bedrijfsgedrag en Politieke Risico’s:  
Nederlandse Ondernemingen in China, 1903-1941 
 
Rond het jaar 1900 deden Nederlandse bedrijven voor het eerst directe 
investeringen in China. De pioniers van het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven die in 
de decennia voor de Tweede Wereldoorlog en de Koude Oorlog ervaring 
opdeden met directe investeringen in China, waren de Nederlandsche 
Handel-Maatschappij en de Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank (beiden 
zijn later opgegaan in ABN Amro), de Java-China-Japan Lijn (nu P&O 
Nedlloyd), Koninklijke/Shell, de Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor 
Havenwerken (nu HBG), het Nederlandsch Syndicaat voor China, Philips, 
en Unilever. Deze studie volgt de ervaringen van deze acht bedrijven in 
China tot aan 7 december 1941, het begin van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in 
Azië. De nadruk ligt op de perceptie van politieke risico's en de gevolgen 
ervan op het ondernemingsgedrag.  
Zoals andere buitenlandse investeerders voelden Nederlandse bedrijven 
zich tot China aangetrokken vanwege het enorme marktpotentieel. De 
commerciële mogelijkheden in China waren groot, maar daar stond 
tegenover dat de instabiele politieke situatie ernstige risico's met zich 
meebracht. Met name in de periode 1916-1941 was de politieke onrust in 
China zeer hevig. Het jaar 1916 bracht burgeroorlog en het uiteenvallen van 
de staat, en gedurende de volgende vijfentwintig jaar streden warlords, 
nationalisten, communisten, en Japan om de hegemonie in China. Ondanks 
deze politieke chaos bleven de meeste buitenlandse investeerders actief. Pas 
in 1941 kwam er een einde aan de grootschalige aanwezigheid van 
buitenlandse investeringen, doordat het Japanse leger de meeste Westerse 
bezittingen in China in beslag nam. 
De volgende hypothesen over de perceptie van politieke risico's en de 
invloed ervan op het gedrag van Nederlandse bedrijven in China zijn bij 
aanvang van de studie geformuleerd: 
1. Voor 1916 had de perceptie van politieke risico's geen grote invloed 
op het bedrijfsgedrag. 
2. Tussen 1916 en 1928 werden de disintegratie van de Chinese staat en 
de daarmee samenhangende burgeroorlogen als de belangrijkste oorzaak 
van politieke risico's ervaren. Er was geen voor de hand liggende reactie 
typerend voor Nederlandse bedrijven als groep. 
3. Tussen 1928 en 1937 was het Chinese nationalisme de belangrijste 
bron voor politieke risico's. Minstens enkele van de Nederlandse bedrijven 
reageerden door tegemoet te komen aan de belangen van de Chinese 
politieke elite.  
4. Tussen 1937 en 1941 was vooral de Japanese verovering van de 
commercieel belangrijkste delen van China de oorzaak van de politieke 
risico's die door Nederlandse bedrijven werden ervaren. Enkele of alle van 
hen reageerden door accommodatie aan de belangen van het Japanese leger. 
 Deze hypothesen zijn getoetst aan de hand van de ervaringen van de 
genoemde acht Nederlandse bedrijven. Het resultaat zijn acht case studies, 
elk bestaande uit een analyse van de lokale bedrijfsbelangen (main local 
interest), de ervaren politieke risico's, en de reactie op deze politieke 
risico's. Deze studies tonen aan dat de ervaringen van de verschillende 
bedrijven zeer uiteenliepen. De Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, de 
Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank, de Java-China-Japan Lijn en Philips 
blijken slechts in beperkte mate te zijn geconfronteerd met politieke risico's. 
Voor de overige vier ondernemingen–de Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor 
Havenwerken, het Nederlandsch Syndicaat voor China, Koninklijke/Shell, 
en Unilever–waren de politieke risico's juist aanzienlijk. Voor deze tweede 
groep geldt dat het gedrag van Unilever en Koninklijke/Shell veel 
nauwkeuriger was afgestemd op de aanwezige politieke risico's dan dat van 
de overige twee bedrijven.   
Uit de case studies is verder gebleken dat de hypothesen grotendeels 
correct zijn, maar dat enkele aanvullingen noodzakelijk zijn. Ten eerste 
werd Chinees nationalisme al vanaf 1925 als de voornaamste bron van 
politieke risico's beschouwd. Ten tweede was gedurende 1931-1937 Japans 
imperialisme in China in de perceptie van Nederlandse bedrijven even 
belangrijk als Chinees nationalisme voor het ontstaan van politieke risico's. 
Ten derde was er in 1940-1941 een nieuwe primaire bron van politieke 
risico's voor Nederlandse investeerders in China, namelijk de dreigende 
oorlog tussen Nederland en Japan. Ten vierde waren er verschillende 
bedrijven die zich in China niet alleen tot 1916, maar helemaal tot tot aan 
1940 niet direct lieten beïnvloeden door politieke risico's.  
Doordat het gedrag van iedere onderneming vanuit haar lokale belangen 
is verklaard, kan tot slot van de studie een vergelijking worden gemaakt 
tussen de verschillende percepties en reacties. De meest fundamentele 
elementen in het lokale belang waren de mate van lokale betrokkenheid, en 
de bereidheid lange-termijn investeringen te doen. De bedrijven die slechts 
korte-termijn investeringen deden, trokken zich terug uit China als de 
politieke risico's te groot werden, terwijl de bedrijven met lange-termijn 
investeringen bleven. Bij de bedrijven die ondanks toenemende politieke 
risico's in China bleven, was de bereidheid zich aan te passen aan de 
belangen van de heersende politieke elite groter naar mate de integratie in 
de lokale economie verder ging. Daarom waren het uiteindelijk juist de twee 
giganten Koninklijke/Shell en Unilever die zich–ondanks hun grote 
commerciële invloed–het meest gevoelig toonden voor de wensen van de 
gastregering, terwijl kleinere ondernemingen buiten het bereik van China's 
machthebbers bleven doordat ze zich terugtrokken binnen buitenlandse 
enclaves zoals Shanghai en Hong Kong, of doordat ze de Chinese markt 
helemaal verlieten. 
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